


Galina Andreyeva

***SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY***



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS

"The extensive theoretical work of G.M. Andreyeva provides an excellent opportunity for a clearer understanding of the development of this complicated area of science and a greater appreciation of its achievements. At the same time, several issues are touched upon that will require more attention on the part of researchers in the future..."

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"We in no way feel that this book represents the 'final word' in Marxist social psychology, but historians of science will no doubt regard it in the future as a reference point in socio-psychological literature".

Valdásg, Hungary

Galina Andreyeva

**SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY**



Progress Publishers

Moscow

Translated from the Russian by **Thomas Dumstorf**
Designed by **Gennady Gubanov**

Г. М. Андреева
СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ ПСИХОЛОГИЯ
На английском языке

© Издательство МГУ, 1980
English translation of the revised Russian text © Progress Publishers 1990

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

А $\frac{0303040000-237}{014(01)-90}$ 11-90

ISBN 5-01-001989-2

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FOREWORD

It is not easy to write an introduction to this book for American readers. The entire history of Soviet social psychology (starting from its "second birth" in the late 1950s) developed to a significant degree as a direct dialogue with the American tradition. This has been a two-sided dialogue: both an expression of piety towards the established practice of experimental research, the basic elaborations of methods of analysis by American authors and at the same time a continuous flow of criticism of their general methodological and theoretical orientations and, in most cases, of the social thrust of research. There is an explanation for such complicated relations between the Soviet and American traditions in social psychology.

The specifics of the subject-matter of social psychology are found in the analysis of two groups of laws: the psychological and the social. Hence, social psychology, like other social sciences, is closely involved in acute social, and therefore ideological and political problems. Social psychology, either willingly or unwillingly, includes not only a "social context" but also ideological standards accepted in society. Soviet social psychology is based on Marxist philosophy and propagates the positions of Marxist social science. Therefore, there are two fundamentally different approaches to the analysis of contemporary social realities in the aforementioned dialogue.

The fact that the very "realities" that social psychology deals with are distinctly different on each side of the ocean is another reason for this dispute. In other words, the very "social context" which is so often talked about in social psychology is specific in each instance: the social psychology of

the USSR and the USA exist in different types of society, with different socio-economic systems and political structures, and different cultural traditions. These distinctions are more significant than those between some two countries possessing the same type of social system, and naturally the problems of social psychology are born of these very distinctions. Hence different "topics", with their own terminology of description, etc.

Of course, the reason for this dialogue can be found in the fact that the time of "maturing" of social psychology in the USA and USSR coincides with different periods of history. The American tradition developed swiftly over the first two decades of the 20th century, involving the aspirations of the time and placing an emphasis on certain methodical approaches. Science at that time had a predilection for laboratory experiments. This by no means signifies some sort of stagnation in American socio-psychological thought: on the contrary, it is namely through such technological equipment of research that it developed with the times (in particular, it was the first in its field to apply computer technology). I would like to stress that the tradition formed within a definite period of time and its heritage was subsequently felt over a much longer period. The fact that Soviet social psychology began its active life significantly later (in the latter half of the 20th century) accounts not only for certain of its weaknesses (a "late" start), but also for some advantages. The science took shape at a time of completely *new* developments in the world. Things were growing more complicated and dynamic and more interconnected. Social psychology in Europe was in a similar situation (it practically launched attempts to gain independence from the American tradition shortly after the Second World War). The European tradition's criticism of the American school is therefore very similar to that of its Soviet counterparts.

This only explains one side of the dialogue between Soviet and American social psychologists. Considering the American tradition's significantly richer methodological and organisational base of research, it is certainly worthwhile (especially for a young specialist in social psychology) to become familiar with this tradition. For this reason the book contains numerous references to American social psychologists that contributed to the development of the science as a whole. It would be impossible to study social psychology extensively without including some of the American experiments considered classics in the field, too.

Many of the authors I have mentioned I know personally

from my trips to the US and from different international conferences and congresses. The high professional standard of my colleagues and their kindness and willingness to establish contacts made the meetings completely satisfying but in no way hindered the keenness of the discussions. In my turn, I was able to acquaint them with those achievements which, it seems to me, Soviet social psychology has made, for example, application in it of the principle of activity treated in detail in this book, new problems connected with the existence of special types of collective, and so on. My explanations were always met with an interest, though not always accepted, but this kind of relations is a norm among scholars. The somewhat unstable contacts of the past can be explained simply by pointing out the general deplorable state of Soviet-American relations existing for a long time as a part of the Cold War legacy.

Now that the atmosphere has improved, the new political concepts and also in part the need to confront the problems facing humanity in the nuclear age have had an influence on the climate of international cooperation among scholars. The formulas of this "new thinking" still demand some study on our part along with the new problems caused by the realities of this age. I am glad that my book is to be published in the United States at this important stage in history and I hope that the introduction to our approach will serve to promote further fruitful cooperation and better mutual understanding. We must always bear in mind that society is the focal point for social psychology. The following task now stands before all of us—the search for joint solutions to the global problems of humanity, with the problems of social psychology included in this research.

The idea that joint actions determine the success of interaction between people is often mentioned in this book. I would like to see this idea not only accepted but put into practice. I hope to see more regular and systematic exchanges of scientific information between the USA and the USSR and that such exchanges will be beneficial to both countries.

Section One

INTRODUCTION

Chapter One

**SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS PLACE IN THE
SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE**

The very words "social psychology" point out the fact that this discipline occupies a specific place in the system of scientific knowledge. Social psychology emerged at the interface between psychology and sociology and to this day maintains its own, special status thanks chiefly to the fact that each "parent" discipline readily includes social psychology in its make-up. There are many reasons for the complex position of this scientific discipline. The main one can be found in the objective existence of such a class of facts pertaining to social life that can be studied and analysed only with the help of two sciences, namely psychology and sociology. On the one hand, any social phenomenon has its psychological aspect, because the laws of society are manifested exclusively through the activities of people, and people are acting consciously, guided by their own consciousness and will. On the other hand, in situations characterised by joint actions of people, special types of links form among them, those of communication and interaction. Analysis of these links is impossible outside the sphere of psychological knowledge. Another reason for the two-sided position of social psychology can be found in the very history of its simultaneous formation within the realms of sociological and psychological knowledge. The very words "social psychology" arose at the "crossroads" of these two sciences. Many difficulties appeared in the attempts to determine the subject-matter of social psychology and reveal the problems that should be included in its competence.

At the same time, social development dictates the need for research of such borderline problems and they cannot "wait" for a final solution of the question of social psychology's object of research. The requirements of socio-psychological

investigations stem literally from all spheres of social life connected with the ever-increasing demand for conscious management of social processes. Such requirements arise in the areas of industry, education, mass communication systems, demographic politics, struggle against anti-social behaviour, public services, sports, etc. There is no doubt that the practical requirements far surpass the progress of theoretical knowledge in social psychology.

This all serves to stimulate the intensive development of social psychology at the stage. The need for this development is made even more intense by two circumstances. The first is that Soviet social psychology as an independent discipline had passed through a rather long period of stagnation and the new stage of "rapid revival" of socio-psychological research began only in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Secondly, social psychology, in essence, is a science acting in rather close connection with acute social and political issues and ideologies, so that it may evolve along two different lines, depending on whether it is based on Marxist or non-Marxist world outlook. Social psychology in the West exists within the framework of this second tradition; given its solid history, we are faced with the questions of how to assess the theoretical and methodological approaches of Western researchers and also the results of their studies.

The solution of two problems is currently vital to social psychology, even more so than for any other discipline: the elaboration of practical recommendations worked out in the course of applied studies and the completion of its own "building" as an integrated system of scientific knowledge by clearly defining its subject-matter and thoroughly evolving its specific theories and research methods. This, in the eyes of Soviet scholars, signifies an elaboration of the system of *Marxist* socio-psychological knowledge.

Not resorting, for the time being, to precise definitions, it is necessary to begin by outlining the problems to be solved by social psychology. Regardless of its interface character, social psychology is a part of psychology (although some place it closer to sociology). Consequently, the defining of problems it should deal with will signify a separation of the *psychological* ones from those which directly pertain to the area of social psychology proper. Considering the fact that Soviet psychology proceeds from a principle of activity, the specifics of social psychology can be defined as *the study of the laws of behaviour and actions of the people depending on the social*

group they belong to and the psychological characteristics of these groups.

Social psychology did not realise its goals overnight. An analysis of the discussions that hold a significant place in its history will provide a clearer understanding of this question.

The history of Soviet social psychology witnessed two stages of this discussion: the 1920s and the late 1950s-early 1960s. Both of these stages are interesting not only from a historical point of view: they also help better understand the place social psychology occupies in the system of scientific knowledge and provide for a more precise definition of its content.

In the 1920s, that is in the first years of Soviet power, the discussions concerning the subject-matter of social psychology were stimulated by two circumstances. On the one hand, life in the newly-formed social structure called for a solution to the problems involved in social psychology. On the other hand, socio-psychological knowledge came into the orbit of the acute ideological struggle of those years. This struggle arose between materialist and idealist psychology, and the whole of psychological science experienced a change in its philosophical and methodological foundations. The ideas of idealist psychologist Georgi Chelpanov held special meaning for the fate of psychology.¹ He proposed the division of psychology into two parts: social and general psychology. Social psychology, in his opinion, had to be evolved within the framework of Marxism and general psychology must remain an empirical science, independent of Marxism or any other world outlook. This point of view signified a formal recognition of the right of social psychology to exist as a science at the cost, however, of depriving of the Marxist philosophical basis the rest of psychology.

It is no surprise that Chelpanov's position was unacceptable for those psychologists who shared the idea of reconstructing the philosophical foundations of *all* psychology, of including the whole of it into the system of Marxist knowledge. Objections to Chelpanov took on various forms. At first the idea was expressed that as long as psychology was interpreted from the point of view of Marxist philosophy, the whole of it had a social orientation, and there was no need to single out a special branch—social psychology: psychology should simply be subdivided into the psychology of the individual

¹ For detail, see: A.Ye. Budilova, *Philosophical Problems in Soviet Psychology*, Chapter 2, Moscow, 1971, (in Russian).

and the psychology of the collective. Reactology was another approach which received great popularity at the time. Here the idea was proposed to preserve the unity of psychology, only by means of spreading out the behaviour of man in a collective through the methods of reactology. In practice, this signified that the collective was understood as a unified reaction of its members to a single irritant and the task of social psychology was to measure the speed, strength and dynamics of this collective reaction. The methodology of reactology was developed by Konstantin Kornilov.¹

The distinguished Soviet psychologist Vladimir Bekhterev also objected to Chelpanov's idea. He proposed the creation of a new science of reflexology. A special branch of this science was to be devoted purely to the study of socio-psychological problems, which he called "collective reflexology", considering its object to be the behaviour of collectives, the individual in the collective, the conditions of the origins of social associations, the specifics of their activity and the interaction of their members.² Such an interpretation of collective reflexology provided a way to get around subjectivist social psychology since the problems of the collective were interpreted as the correlation of external influences with the motive and mimico-somatic reactions of their members. Here the socio-psychological approach was seen as a combination of the principles of reflexology (mechanisms of people's association into collectives) and sociology (the specifics of the collectives and their relationships with social conditions and the class struggle under way in society).

Although this approach contained the understanding of the collective as something whole, in which there can arise new qualities and characteristics only possible through the interaction of the people, its general methodological platform proved to be weak: these special qualities and characteristics were interpreted as developing under the same laws as those of the individual. This was due to mechanism which penetrated the whole system of reflexology. Mechanism was, in particular, seen in how collective reflexology understood the combination of the biological and the social in man: although the personality was declared to be a product of society, its specific biological features and, mostly, social instincts were taken for a

¹ See: K.N. Kornilov, *Textbook of Psychology Presented from the Angle of Dialectical Materialism*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, (in Russian).

² See: V.M. Bekhterev, *Collective Reflexology*, Petrograd, 1921 (in Russian).

basis in concrete analysis. The laws of the inorganic world (those of gravity and conservation of energy) were in fact turned to as an explanation in the analysis of the social links of the individual, although the idea of such reduction was subjected to sharp criticism. Therefore, despite the discoveries that were of great importance for the development of social psychology, overall Bekhterev's reflexology was unable to provide an answer to the question of the subject-matter of social psychology.

Proposals made on the reconstruction of social psychology in connection with discussions on the interpretation of ideology were profound. M. A. Raisner, for one, proposed to construct Marxist social psychology by directly correlating a series of psychological and physiological theories with historical materialism. Proceeding from the idea that psychology must be founded on the theory of conditioned reflexes, Raisner, for instance, suggested a direct identification of conditioned reflexes in the sphere of social psychology with a superstructure and of unconditioned reflexes—with a system of production relations. In the final analysis, social psychology was announced to be a science dealing with social irritants of different types.

Regardless of the subjective desire of many psychologists to create a Marxist social psychology, this task was not fulfilled in the 1920s. Attempting to oppose the idealistic approach, researchers were often captivated by positivist philosophy, whose concrete and specific manifestation was mechanism. Moreover, there was no single opinion with respect to the subject-matter of social psychology: in fact two problems, or two interpretations of the object of social psychology were mixed up. On the one hand, social psychology was identified with the theory of the social determination of mental processes, and on the other hand, with the investigation of a special class of phenomena generated by the people's joint activity. Those who accepted the first interpretation (and only the first) justifiably affirmed that the reconstruction of the whole of psychology on a Marxist, materialist basis meant the transformation of all psychology into social. Then there would be no need for a special discipline of social psychology. This solution conformed to the criticism of Chelpanov's position. Those who saw the task of social psychology in the analysis of the behaviour of the individual in a group and the groups themselves, were still unable to master the entire wealth of Marxist ideas to such an extent as to propose an adequate solution to the problems at hand.

As a result of this complicated struggle, only the first of the designated interpretations of the subject-matter of social psychology received recognition as a theory of social determination of the psyche. Attempts to turn social psychology into a separate discipline (or at least a separate branch of psychology) stopped for a considerable stretch of time due to the failure to prove that it was necessary.

The problems involved were successfully tackled, but along other lines, not by creation of independent social psychology. This period is referred to as the "break" in the development of social psychology, yet this term is relative. The break in the independent existence of social psychology as a science did not preclude independent research of a strictly socio-psychological nature. This research was dictated by the needs of social practice, primarily pedagogical. Although the study of the issue of the collective was then concentrated in the sphere of pedagogical science, the works of Nadezhda Krupskaya and Anton Makarenko were not to be reduced to only pedagogical value. Some problems of social psychology, in particular the problems of the social psychology of classes and groups, continued to be elaborated upon within the framework of philosophy. Here the formation of Marxist tradition in socio-psychological knowledge in the 1920s was prepared before the revolution to a significant degree by V. I. Lenin, especially in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.

It must be mentioned here how socio-psychological thought developed within the bounds of psychological science. The outstanding Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky played the most important role in this research. He dealt mostly with two groups of questions which are directly related to the development of social psychology.

On the one hand, it was the theory of higher mental functions which to a significant degree solved the task of clarifying the social determination of the psyche (to put it in the language of the 1920s—"making all psychology social"). Demonstrating that the higher mental functions (arbitrary memory, active attention, abstract thinking, volitional act) could not be considered immediate functions of the brain, Vygotsky came to the conclusion that to understand the nature of these functions, it was necessary to go beyond the limits of the organism and search for the roots of these functions in social conditions. The understanding of social experience changes the *content* of mental life and creates *new* mental processes which assumed the form of higher mental functions

that distinguish man from animal. In this way, the concrete forms of socio-historical activity become *decisive* in the scientific understanding of the formation of mental processes. Along with the idea of the historical origin of higher mental functions, Vygotsky expounded upon the idea of cultural-historical determination of the very process of *development* of all mental processes. Two famous hypotheses of Vygotsky (on the mediated character of man's mental functions and the origin of internal mental processes in originally "intermental" activity) allowed to make the conclusion that the main mechanism of mental development was one of mastering the socio-historic forms of activity. Such an interpretation of the problems of general psychology provided a solid materialist basis for the solution of specific socio-psychological problems.

On the other hand, in his works Vygotsky also solved more concrete problems of social psychology and, in particular, gave a new understanding of the subject-matter of social psychology. The new understanding resulted from the criticism of Wilhelm Wundt's "peoples' psychology" provided the groundwork for this understanding. Social psychology or "peoples' psychology" as Wundt understood it, considered language, myths, customs, art and religion as objects of study. Vygotsky called these "clots of ideology", or "crystals". In his opinion, the task of a psychologist was not to study these "crystals" but the "solution" itself. However, the "solution" could not be studied in the way that Bekhterev suggested, i.e. by evolving a collective mentality from that of the individual. Vygotsky did not agree with the viewpoint that social psychology should study the mentality of a *collective* personality. The mentality of the *individual* is also social and therefore is an object of research of social psychology. In this sense social psychology is different from *collective* psychology: social psychology focuses on the mentality of the separate individual and collective psychology—on personal psychology under conditions of collective manifestations (for instance, the church and the army).¹

At first glance it seems that this position is substantially different from the contemporary view of social psychology as we conditionally formulated it above. But the distinction lies only in the terminology: Vygotsky compared "social" and "collective" psychology, not "general" and "social" (as is usually the case now). It is quite evident that social psychology

¹ See: L.S. Vygotsky, *Psychology of Art*, Moscow, 1968, p. 31 (in Russian).

to him was the same general psychology which adopted the idea of cultural-historical determination of mentality (in the terminology of the 1920s, this was the kind of general psychology which "has all become social"). By the term "collective psychology" Vygotsky designated the second aspect of the understanding of social psychology, which many psychologists in the 1920s were unable to see or else to which they were unable to find a realistic methodological approach in research. Therefore, we are justified in considering Vygotsky's ideas of the 1920s and 1930s as a necessary precondition that emerged within psychological science and eventually led to a precise determination of the social psychology's subject-matter.

The second stage of the discussion concerning the subject-matter in social psychology took place in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Two circumstances started a new debate of this problem.

First, the requirements of practical activity were expanding. The problems of conscious regulation and management of social processes took on special significance. Basic economic, social and political problems called for a more careful analysis of the psychological aspect of various manifestations of social life. Active inverse influence of consciousness on the course of objective processes had to be investigated in greater detail in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution where the psychological, "human" factor assumes such a great role. The mechanisms of concrete interaction between society and the individual under these circumstances have to be investigated on a socio-psychological, as well as on a socio-logical level.

Secondly, the moment these problems were given a significantly greater amount of attention, there occurred profound changes in psychology itself. Soviet psychology has effected a radical reconstruction on the basis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and has turned into a mature discipline disposing of solid theoretical works and varied practice of experimental research. The skills of the personnel increased significantly in both professional and methodological terms. The essential subjective prerequisites were thus created for new discussions of the destiny, subject-matter, tasks, methods of social psychology as well as its place in the overall system of sciences. The discussion of these issues on a new level had become both urgent and possible.

The polemics touched mostly upon two problems: 1) the subject-matter of social psychology and correspondingly the

set of its problems, and 2) the correlation of social psychology with psychology, on the one hand, and with sociology, on the other hand.

Three approaches were formulated around the dispute on the *subject-matter* of social psychology. The supporters of the first, enjoying prevalence among sociologists, understood social psychology as a science of "mass phenomena of the psyche" and treated each phenomenon from the angle of his definition, sometimes they gave most attention to the study of the psychology of classes and large social communities and also to separate elements of the group mentality like traditions, morals, customs, etc. In other instances, attention was focused on the formation of social opinion, on such specific mass phenomenon as fashion, etc. Finally, on the basis of this approach, a nearly unanimous agreement emerged concerning the need to study collectives. The majority of sociologists saw the object of study of social psychology as research of the *mentality* of "large" social groups, first of all, of classes.

The supporters of the second approach, on the contrary, considered the *individual* as the main object of social psychology's research. Discrepancies arose here only in the choice of context the individual was to be studied in. On the one hand, greater attention was given to the mental peculiarities of the individual (personality typology) and on the other hand, the position of the individual in the collective, interpersonal relations and to the entire system of intercourse. Later discussions touched upon the place of the so-called "psychology of the individual" in the system of psychological knowledge (whether it was a part of general psychology, an equivalent of social psychology or an independent field of research). The argument often arose in defence of this approach that it was much more "psychological" and that only by means of this approach could social psychology be considered an organic part of psychology namely, a variety of psychological knowledge proper. It is only logical that such an approach proved to be the most popular among psychologists.

The third approach was an attempt to synthesize the two previous approaches. Social psychology was seen as a science studying both mass mental processes and the position of the individual in a group. In this case problems of social psychology seemed to be rather broad: practically the entire set of questions examined in different schools of social psychology was included in its domain. Attempts were made to enlist all the problems tackled within the boundaries of this approach. The

list proposed by Boris Parygin was the most extensive. According to him, social psychology covered: 1) social psychology of the individual, 2) social psychology of communities and communication, 3) social relations, and 4) forms of cultural activities.¹ According to Vladimir Myasishchev, social psychology involved: 1) changes in the mental activity of people in a group under the impact of their interaction, 2) specific features of the groups, 3) the psychological aspect of social processes.²

It is important to note that all the outlines of the object of study of social psychology had one thing in common: the subject-matter of social psychology is rather extensive and its definition can be approached both from the angle of the individual and from that of mass mental phenomena. Such an interpretation was mostly consonant with the emerging practice of research and therefore with the practical requirements of society. It is for this reason that even though this approach was not unanimously accepted, it became firmly rooted. The working definition of social psychology we proposed at the beginning of the chapter corresponds precisely to this approach.

Agreement on the set of problems to be tackled by social psychology does not, however, signify a unanimity in the understanding of the correlation between psychology and sociology. Therefore it was necessary to discuss the "borders" of psychology and sociology independently. This discussion can be divided into four positions: 1) social psychology as a part of sociology, 2) social psychology as a part of psychology, 3) and 4) social psychology is a science situated at the interface of sociology and psychology, within which there are two divisions: a) one in which social psychology "seizes" a definite part of psychology and a definite part of sociology, b) one in which it occupies a sort of "no man's land"—an area belonging to neither sociology nor psychology.

According to John Walter McDavid and Frank Harary (in American literature the question of the position of social psychology in the system of sciences is discussed no less actively), all the aforementioned positions can be referred to one of the two approaches: intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary. In other words, the place for social psychology can be found *within* one of the "parent" disciplines or else at their

¹ See: B.D. Parygin, *Fundamentals of Socio-Psychological Theory*, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).

² See: V.N. Myasishchev, *Personality and Neuroses*, Moscow, 1960 (in Russian).

interface. There are two positions in both approaches (for intradisciplinary approach, see positions 1 and 2 and for interdisciplinary one, see positions 3 and 4). Regardless of the essential distinctions, all the suggested approaches run up against the same problem of the location of the "interface" between social psychology and psychology, on the one hand, and between social psychology and sociology, on the other. No matter where social psychology is "placed", however, it nonetheless borders on these two disciplines. If it is a part of psychology, then where is the border of socio-psychological research *within* psychology? And even if sociology falls outside the borders of social psychology, it nonetheless borders on it due to the specifics of the object of study of both these disciplines. The same argument is possible in relation to the position of social psychology within sociology. With the interdisciplinary approach, we are still unable to get away from the idea of "interface": what is meant by "at the interface", what part of sociology borders on psychology? Or what is meant by "an independent discipline": does it "cut off" parts of sociology and psychology? Or does it dispose of some absolutely independent areas of research, belonging neither to psychology nor to sociology?

Let us take a closer look at the "borders" of each of the "parent" disciplines separately. The present-day structure of sociology in the system of Marxist knowledge is usually broken up into three levels: general sociological theory (historical materialism), special sociological theories (for example, the theory of personality), and concrete sociological investigations. In the system of theoretical knowledge, there are two levels, both of them relating directly to the problems of social psychology. The correlation of social life and social mentality and also the structure and forms of social consciousness are investigated on the level of general theory (historical materialism). The correlation of the ideology and psychology of classes and other social groups is one of the issues in this problem. It is namely this issue that is of interest to social psychology, too; therefore it is here that we place one of our "borders". On the level of special sociological theories we can see several such theories where there are obvious socio-psychological problems: the sociology of mass communications, of social opinion, the sociology of the individual, and so on. Perhaps it is in this sphere that the placing of "borders" becomes difficult, and the very concept of these "borders" is conditional. It is often impossible to draw a

line on the basis of the subject-matter. There exist only specific *aspects* of research and specific *points of view* on the same problem.

The question of the "border" between general psychology and social psychology is even more complicated. If we set aside the interpretation of social psychology as a theory of the social determination of human mentality, because in this sense all Soviet psychology is social, then the specific problems of social psychology, naturally, comes closer to being a part of general psychology which is designated as psychology of personality. It would be an oversimplification to think that general psychology studies the individual outside its social determination and that only social psychology studies this determination. The whole idea of positing the problems of personality in Soviet psychology can be found in the fact that *from the very beginning* personality is considered to be determined by society. Alexei Leontiev points out that the activity of certain concrete individuals can take place in two forms: in the conditions of open collectivity or in the face of the environment. "But no matter under what conditions and in what form the activity of man takes place, no matter what structure it assumes, it cannot be considered as withdrawn from social relations, from the life of society".¹ It is from this point of view that the structure of the needs, motives, etc. of a personality are investigated in general psychology.

Nevertheless, there still remains a class of specific problems of the investigation of personality in social psychology in addition to those tasks that cannot be resolved by general psychology (the dynamics of development of interpersonal relations in groups, the nature of people's joint activity in groups and the forms of developing communication and interaction). Social psychology tackles the studies of personality from a definite angle, considering how the personality behaves in *real* social groups. Social psychology must not simply answer the question of how motives, needs and orientations of the individual are formed, but also to explain why namely these, and not other motives, needs and orientations have formed in a given individual and to what degree they depend on the group to which the individual belongs, and so on.

In this way, the sphere of true interests of social psychology comes to light rather clearly, allowing distinctions to be

¹ A.N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, Moscow, 1975, p. 82 (in Russian).

made between its own problems and those of sociology and general psychology. This, however, is not enough for a precise definition of the place of social psychology, although it provides a basis for defining the *fields of research*. The arguments concerning the place of social psychology continue just as they do in world social psychology. This is, for example, how Roger Pinto and Madeleine Grawitz described the basic line of these polemics: before the rise of social psychology there were two lines of development of problems involved in the issues of personality and society: psychology analysed the nature of man and sociology, the nature of society. Then there arose social psychology, an independent science which analysed the relation of man to society.¹ This outline only applies to sociology which analyses the nature of an individual isolated from society. It is difficult to find this kind of psychological theory now, although many theories, while recognizing the influence of society on man, still do not suggest a correct solution to the problem of the way society exerts this influence. An understanding of the subject-matter of social psychology and its place in the system of sciences depends on the interpretation of the objects of study of both psychology and sociology.

Such discussions do not lead to elaborating of a precise definition but are extremely necessary and helpful due to the fact that they, first, assist in outlining the group of problems to be tackled by definite sciences and, second, they formulate the unresolved problems more distinctly and shed the light on the possibilities and means at the disposal of each science. The discussion on the object of social psychology is not concluded but the agreement that has been reached at least allows for conducting further research. Such a compromise led to the formation of two social psychologies in the Soviet Union: one being connected mainly with sociological problems and the other, with psychological ones. In this sense the situation in this country is similar to situations that exist in a number of other countries. (Social psychology in the United States, for example, has a double status: there are sections of social psychology officially existing within the American Psychological Association and within the American Sociological Association. In the introductions to textbooks it is usually indicated whether the author was educated as a sociologist or psychologist.) Of course, such duality creates a number of problems, yet the

¹ See: Roger Pinto et Madeleine Grawitz, *Methodes des Sciences Sociales*, t. 1, P. Dalloz, Paris, 1964, p. 242.

discussion on the subject-matter of social psychology also had its positive aspects.

The acuteness of problems of social psychology can be explained not only by a certain vagueness of its place in the system of sciences. The really vital characteristic of socio-psychological knowledge is its inclusion, to a larger degree than any other area of psychology, into the social and political problems of society. Of course, this relates especially to such problems of social psychology as the psychological characteristics of large social groups, mass movements, etc. The study of smaller groups and the socialisation or social sets of the individual in connection with specific problems solved by a society of a definite type are also traditional areas of socio-psychological research. The theoretical part of socio-psychological knowledge is invariably influenced by a definite ideological position.

The greater part of socio-psychological studies were called to life by the specific demands of a practical nature. Therefore the orientation of this research must be examined from the standpoint of problems which were raised by practice. Contemporary scientific investigations cannot be performed without a definite system of financing and that system dictates both the goal and ideological hue of the basic direction of the work. Thus the question of the class content of science is a reality for social psychology.

Research being conducted directly in various sections of the social organism demands high professional skills and civil responsibility. Social psychology "intrudes" upon social life by providing certain practical recommendations. Consequently, both the issue of professional ethics and that of the formulation of the social position are quite important for social psychologists. One cannot but agree with Serge Moskovici in his assertion that it is society that creates the problems for social psychology. The social psychologist must understand the problems of society, fully grasp their meaning and realise to what degree and in what way he can promote their solution. Academism and professionalism in social psychology must include a certain "social sensitivity", an understanding of the essence of the ideological function of this science.

The specifics of social psychology developed along the lines of a Marxist worldview consist not only in a definite ideological thrust in its theory and methodology. Logically a *new type* of society gives rise to a new set of problems. Of course, many of the phenomena discovered by traditional social psychology have a place in socialist society, too: interpersonal relations,

communication processes, leadership, solidarity—all of these phenomena are inherent in any type of social organisation. However, while asserting this fact, two circumstances must be kept in mind.

First, even those phenomena which were described in traditional social psychology sometimes acquire completely different *contents*. Formally, the processes remain the same: people interact with each other, definite social orientation form in them, and so forth, but the contents of the various forms of their interaction, and what kind of orientations arise in relation to definite social phenomena—all of this is determined by the content of specific social relations. This means that the analysis of traditional problems takes on new dimensions. The methodological principles of consideration of the contents of socio-psychological problems are also dictated by the demands of society.

Secondly, new social realities generate new problems. In Soviet social psychology, a group of problems is taking shape that are not found in Western social psychology—for example, problems related to the *collective*, which is treated as a special type of community typical only of socialist society. The same refers to the socio-psychological problems of socialist competition. The task of working out these problems is a specific goal of social psychology in socialist countries. The idea that society dictates the problems of social psychology must be supplemented by the idea that the duty of social psychologists is to acknowledge these problems.

This work is particularly important because, in addition to the problems of a general theoretical kind, society sets to social psychology a number of specific applied problems connected with the improvement of management of the national economy, first of all in industrial production; problems related to improvement of work collectives and ensuring a favourable climate in each of them; problems involved in instilling a communist attitude to labour, the struggle against violations of the law and order, perfection of socialist way of life, and so on.

The logic behind the establishment of Marxist social psychology is as follows. Intercourse and interaction between people takes place not in a vacuum but always in really existing society (the first empirical fact). Therefore, the first “department” of social psychology—“Intercourse and Interaction”—must start with the analysis of the place these phenomena occupy in the structure of social relations. Only then can the structure of intercourse itself be analysed. After the general

characteristics of intercourse and interaction has been revealed, it becomes necessary to analyse their modifications in various social groups—first of all, “large” and then, “small”. Therefore, “Psychology of the Group” can logically be considered the second large department of social psychology. The final stage is the analysis pertaining to the ways in which the each social group determines specific ways of behaviour and actions of the individual within it. Thus, the third logically defined “unit” of socio-psychological knowledge is “Social Psychology of the Individual”.

Only within such a structure can the need to “attach” the individual to the “social context” be avoided, since from the very outset it will serve as an explanatory principle of the entire complex of socio-psychological phenomena.

THE HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEA

The study of the history of socio-psychological thought is of great significance for the formation of a profound and clear idea of the essence of the science, its problems and its subject-matter as well as for the enrichment of the psychologist's knowledge. The history of social psychology as a science is considerably shorter than the history of what Hans Hiebsch and Manfred Vorweg regarded as socio-psychological thought.¹ The need of realising the character of joint activity and the forms of intercourse taking shape in it, is evidently as old as the joint activity of the people itself. The history of primitive society is a witness to the fact that already at the dawn of civilisation people were confronted with socio-psychological phenomena and in one way or another tried to make use of them. Diverse ancient religions, for instance, employed such phenomena, as susceptibility for psychological influence, resulting in the crowd exerting an impact on the individual. The rites, rituals and taboos were handed down from generation to generation and in this way served as a moral regulator of human intercourse. Orators of old were aware of the secrets of influencing the public. "Socio-psychological thinking" has existed for thousands of years in such unique forms, while social psychology as a scientific discipline is a relatively young branch of knowledge.

The difficulty involved in the creation of the history of social psychology as a science lies in the fact that it has grown out of many sources. It is hard to determine for

¹ See: H. Hiebsch and M. Vorweg, *Erführung in die marxistische Sozialpsychologie*, VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1969.

certain what sciences contain elements of socio-psychological knowledge. An even larger difficulty consists in that as soon as social psychology was established as a separate discipline, there immediately arose two opposing trends in its development, Marxist and non-Marxist. Consequently, the history of social psychology must include examination of both these trends as well as an exposure of the fundamental methodological and theoretical distinctions in their present-day forms.

Just as with the rise of any other scientific discipline as an independent branch of knowledge, the reasons for the birth of social psychology were two-fold, social and purely theoretical. The analysis of the theoretical reasons concerns the way in which socio-psychological ideas grew out of other branches of knowledge, promoting an independent phase in its development as a special science, and also the description of the first actually socio-psychological concepts.

The formation of preconditions of social psychology are as a whole the same as in the development of any other scientific discipline. The socio-psychological ideas originally took shape within the realm of philosophy and then gradually branched off from the system of psychological knowledge. This did not occur overnight but rather, through the branching off of two other disciplines, sociology and psychology, which in their turn gave birth to social psychology.

Many researchers point out the existence of certain elements of socio-psychological knowledge in the realm of philosophical concepts. Otto Klineberg, for example, asserts that the majority of problems in social psychology take root in ancient philosophical systems. Gordon Willard Allport considers Plato the father of all socio-psychological problems. Formation of the key ideas of social psychology can be traced through all the centuries of the development of philosophical knowledge. Ancient philosophy is made up not only by the philosophy of Plato but also by that of Aristotle. It is impossible to speak of contemporary philosophy without mentioning names like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Claude Adrian Helvétius, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Georg William Friedrich Hegel. Social psychology ideas were elaborated in the systems of both idealist and materialist philosophy. In general, they have been inseparably connected with the interpretations of more general philosophical ideas, so that it would be difficult to single out purely socio-psychological aspects. On the other hand, such ideas are literally scattered like the grains of sand, and it would hardly make sense to try to list examples, since the history

of psychology developing within the system of philosophical knowledge has already been studied in great detail.¹

It is much more productive to analyse the second stage of the development of social psychology, specifically the period following its establishment as an independent field of knowledge. In order to do this, three moments should be closely considered: "the requirements" concerning the solution of socio-psychological problems which arise in various contiguous sciences; the processes involved in the separation of socio-psychological problems within the two "parent" disciplines—psychology and sociology; and finally, the description of the first forms of independent socio-psychological knowledge.

The period referred to is the middle of the 19th century, when significant progress was typical of the development of a number of sciences, some of them immediately related to social processes. One of such sciences was *linguistics*.

This was prompted by the events taking place in Europe at the time: it was a period of a rapid development of capitalism, an increase of economic ties between countries causing a massive migration of the population. The problem of language intercourse and mutual influence of different peoples and correspondingly the problem of the connection of language with various components of the peoples' psychology became quite acute. Linguistics was in no position to solve these problems through the means at its disposal.

A significant number of facts accumulated at that time in the fields of *anthropology*, *ethnography* and *archaeology*, which all needed social psychology for their effective interpretation. The English anthropologist Edward Burnett Taylor was completing his work on primeval culture, the American ethnographer and archaeologist Lewis Henry Morgan was studying the life of the Indians, the French sociologist and ethnographer Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was investigating the thinking patterns of primitive man. All these investigations had to take into account the psychological characteristics of definite ethnic groups, the connection of cultural products with traditions, rituals, etc.

The development of *criminology* was also characterised by both successes and difficulties. The development of capitalist social relations gave rise to new forms of violations of the law and order, and explanations for this behaviour were

¹ See, for example, Mikhail Yaroshevsky, *History of Psychology*, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian).

to be looked for in the sphere of social relations and psychological characteristics of such behaviour.

We can make the conclusion that there was a need for singling out a class of problems which could not be referred to the competence of any existing disciplines. This need manifested itself with special acuteness in the development of two sciences regarded as the "parents" of social psychology: psychology and sociology.

The development of *psychology* in the middle of the 19th century (on the plane we are interested in) was characterised by the fact that it evolved for the most part as the psychology of the individual. Only in specific areas, mainly in pathopsychology, were the hints of future concepts of the specific forms of social interaction, mutual influences, etc. felt. The upsurge of psychiatric practice, in particular the use of hypnosis as a specific form of suggestion, played a big role in this respect. The idea that the mental regulation of the behaviour of the individual depended on the influence on the part of another person was discovered. In other words, research touched directly upon the problem relating to the specific area of social psychology. The theory of associationism, which held a prominent position in general psychology at that time was found to be inefficient, which gave rise to efforts to overcome it. However, the first attempts to overcome associationism were taken by psychologists adhering to idealist philosophy. Johann Friedrich Herbart was a particularly outstanding figure in this trend. Attempting to make the switch from descriptive psychology to explanatory psychology (to meet the demands of pedagogical practice), Herbart considered the notion as the initial phenomenon of psychology ("the primary unity of the soul"), asserting that on its basis an explanatory model could be constructed. This was an effort to discover new forms of the determination of mental phenomena, yet it proved unproductive due to a false premise. Therefore, the programme of the reconstruction of psychology, including the search for new approaches to the explanation of human behaviour was yet to be outlined. For the time being, the interest in socio-psychological problems on the part of psychologists was not very significant. The prototype of the future discipline of social psychology began to take shape somewhere on the sidelines of the evolution of psychology.

The interest in socio-psychological knowledge on the part of *sociologists* took on a different form. *Sociology* became an independent science only in the middle of the 19th century.

Almost from the very start, it attempted to provide an explanation for a number of social facts by means of laws borrowed from other fields of knowledge. Historically, biological reductionism, especially popular in the organic school, was the first form of reductionism in sociology. However, the unsoundness of biological reductionism forced sociologists to turn to the laws of psychology as an explanatory model of social processes. Outwardly, this position appeared more productive. It seemed that, as distinct from biological reductionism, it focused on the specifics of social life. The fact of the *presence* of a psychological aspect in every social phenomenon was identified with the idea of *determination* of social phenomena by the psychological aspect. This, at first, was the reduction to individual mentality (Gabriel Tarde's concept is a good example of this).

When the unsoundness of the explanatory models of this kind became clear, sociologists proposed more complicated forms of psychological reductionism. The laws of social mentality began to be reduced to the laws of collective mentality. A special—psychological—trend formed in the system of sociological knowledge. The founder of this trend in the United States was Lester Frank Ward, but a better exposition can be found in the work of Franklin Henry Giddings. In his opinion, the primary social fact is not the consciousness of the individual or the "soul of the people", but the so-called "consciousness of kind", which should be studied by the "psychology of society" or, in other words, sociology. Here the idea of psychological reductionism was brought to its logical end.

The psychological trend in sociology proved viable due to the fact that the psychologisation of social relations easily and organically coincided with any idealist interpretation of social life. Since such explanations were typical of the time, psychologism took firm root in sociology. This led to confusion in later years as regards the specifics of socio-psychological knowledge: the psychological trend in sociology was identified with social psychology. Therefore, the psychological trend in sociology hindered the establishment of social psychology as a science, though it accounted for some interesting findings in the characteristics of the psychological aspect of social phenomena. However, to all appearances there was a distinct interest in the development of socio-psychological knowledge within sociology.

Thus a sort of reciprocal movement took shape within the two sciences—sociology and psychology, which was to pro-

mote the formation of the set of problems to be tackled by social psychology.

In the mid-19th century, these mutual aspirations were realised, giving life to the first forms of socio-psychological knowledge as such. It is necessary to say a few words about the general atmosphere of the development of scientific knowledge in which these first theories emerged. These theories could not yet be based on any kind of research practice and were therefore similar to constructing universal encyclopaedic schemas in social philosophy of the time. These theories created according to the canons of philosophical knowledge, were speculative and abstract; social psychology, therefore, assumed the character of a purely descriptive discipline. Among the numerous theories evolved by social psychology in that first period three most significant are usually singled out: peoples' psychology, mass psychology, and the theory of the instincts of social behaviour. The principle underlying the classification of these first socio-psychological systems is analysis of the interrelations between the individual and society. In principle, two solutions are possible: recognition of the primacy of the individual or of the primacy of society. Mass psychology and the theory of instincts of social behaviour are good examples of the first solution, and peoples' psychology, a good example of the second. Both of these solutions have a continuation in the subsequent stages of development of the history of social psychology and for this reason, they should be examined carefully.

Peoples' psychology developed as one of the first forms of socio-psychological theory in Germany in the mid-19th century. Based on our criteria, peoples' psychology proposed to proceed from the primacy of society: within it there was assumed to be the substantial existence of the "super-individual soul" subordinate to the "super-individual whole" which is the people (nation). The process of the formation of nations, occurring at that time in Europe, took on a specific form in Germany because of the need to consolidate the parcelled feudal lands. These specifics were reflected in a group of theoretical concepts of German social science of that period. It also had a definite influence on peoples' psychology. The philosophical doctrine of Hegel on the "Spirit of the People" and the idealistic psychology of Herbart served as theoretical sources for these specifics. Peoples' psychology was an effort to unify these two approaches.

The most outstanding creators of peoples' psychology were

Moritz Lazarus (1824—1903) and linguist Heymann Steinthal (1823—1893). In 1959 *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (the journal *Peoples' Psychology and Linguistics*) was founded, in which an article by Lazarus, and Steinthal, entitled "Introductory Thoughts on Peoples' Psychology" was printed. The article expressed the idea that the main force of history is the people, or "the Spirit of the Whole", which can be seen in art, religion, language, myths, customs, etc. The individual consciousness is only its product, a link in a certain mental connection. The task of social psychology is to perceive the psychological essence of the spirit of the people and discover the laws that guide the spiritual activity of the people.

Later on, the views of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) furthered the development of the idea of peoples' psychology. Wundt first formulated his theory in 1863, in his "Lectures on the Soul of Man and Animals", and developed it in the final form in 1900, in the first volume of the ten-volume *Völkerpsychologie (Peoples' Psychology)*. Already in the "Lectures", written on the basis of the course he read in Heidelberg, Wundt developed the idea that psychology must consist of two parts: physiological psychology and peoples' psychology. In his opinion, physiological psychology was an experimental discipline, but experimentation was useless for the study of higher mental processes, thinking and speech. Therefore, peoples' psychology should start from this "point": it should use other methods of research, namely analysis of the products of culture: language, myths, customs and art.

Wundt rejected the vague notion of the "spirit of the whole" and rendered peoples' psychology more realistic, which permitted him to propose a programme of empirical investigations for the study of language, myths and customs. The psychology of peoples must be a descriptive discipline, not seeking to discover any laws. Regardless of the distinctions in the approaches of Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt, they held one fundamental idea in common: psychology is faced with phenomena rooted in the consciousness of the people rather than in the consciousness of the individual, and must therefore be considered a special department of this science, which would engage in the investigation of these problems, applying methods not used in general psychology. The principles of peoples' psychology were obviously idealistic, yet, regardless of its erroneous philosophical basis, the important idea was formulated within this concept that there is something existing

without the individual consciousness which characterises the psychology of the group and, that to a definite degree, this something influences the individual consciousness. This idea could become rational in case of the materialistic interpretation of the mind; but the authors of peoples' psychology, beneficial as this idea was, developed it within the context of idealism.

Mass psychology represents the other group of the initial socio-psychological theories in accordance with the aforementioned criteria, since it resolves the issue of mutual relations between the individual and society from an "individualistic" position. This theory emerged in France in the latter half of the 19th century, taking its sources in the concepts of Gabriel Tarde (1843—1904). Tarde's basic ideas—the role of irrational movements in social behaviour and the role of imitation—were assimilated by the creators of mass psychology, Italian lawyer Scipio Sighele (1868-1913) and French sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931). Sighele based his work primarily on the study of criminal cases. Being a sociologist, Le Bon directed his attention towards the problem of opposing the masses to the elite of society. His fundamental work *La Psychologie des foules*, containing the main ideas of his concepts, appeared in 1895.

In Le Bon's point of view any accumulation of people represented the idea of the "mass" with the typical characteristics of its behaviour being depersonalisation (leading to the domination of impulsive, instinctive reactions), decisive predominance of emotions over intellect (leading to the liability to various influences), the general loss of intellect (which provides for the absence of logic), and the loss of the sense of personal responsibility (which leads to the absence of control over desires). The conclusion drawn from this unrepresentable picture of the behaviour of the individual in the mass can be found in the fact that the nature of the mass is always disorderly and therefore in need of a leader, whose role is taken over by the "elite". This conclusion was reached relying on the observation of isolated instances of mass behaviour, namely when panic-stricken; subsequently observations of this single form were extrapolated to all other mass actions.

Mass psychology has a manifest theological shade. The late 19th century was marked by numerous mass movements of the proletariat, forcing bourgeois ideology to look for the substantiation of various reactionary actions directed against these mass movements. The idea that the late 19th and the early

20th century was the "era of the mob", when an individual person lost all individuality, yielding to his impulses and primitive instincts and thus to various irrational actions, won a wide popularity.

The purely theoretical meaning of mass psychology proved to be ambivalent: on the one hand, it raised the question of the relationships between the individual and society and on the other, it failed to provide a well-founded solution to this question. Formally, the primacy of the individual over society was recognised and society itself was arbitrarily reduced to the role of the "crowd" as a result of a rather one-sided interpretation. Therefore, mass psychology did not have any significant consequences as regards the future of social psychology.

Yet another concept which was prominent among the first independent socio-psychological constructs was William MacDougall's theory of the instincts of social behaviour. (MacDougall moved to the US in 1920 and continued to work there.) His work, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* was published in 1908, which is considered to be the year of the final emergence of social psychology as an independent scientific discipline. (In the same year, the US sociologist Edward A. Ross published his work *Social Psychology*. It is quite symbolic that in the same year a psychologist and a sociologist both produced a systematic course for one and the same discipline.) This year, however, can be considered as the beginning of a new era in social psychology only conditionally, because as far back as 1897, James Mark Baldwin's work, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* was published in New York. This work can also be considered as one of the first systematic manuals in social psychology.

The basic thesis of MacDougall's theory is that inborn instincts are the cause of social behaviour. This idea is a realization of a more general principle accepted by MacDougall, namely the aspiration towards a goal characteristic for both animals and man. It is this principle that is so significant in MacDougall's concept. In opposition to behaviourism, he called his psychology "purposive" or "hormic" psychology (from the Greek word *horme*, meaning aspiration, desire, or impulse). The hormone acts as a motive force of the intuitive character, giving an explanation to social behaviour. In MacDougall's terminology, the hormone is realised in the quality of instincts (or, later, "inclinations").

Each person's set of instincts arises as a result of a definite

psychophysical predisposition—a hereditarily-fixed channels for the release of nervous energy. Instincts include affective (receptive), central (emotional), and afferent (motive) parts. All that takes place in consciousness is directly dependent on the unconscious. The internal expression of instincts is mainly emotions. The connection between instincts and emotions has a definite systematic character. MacDougall mentioned seven pairs of interconnected instincts and senses, emotions: the instinct of struggle and the corresponding senses of anger and fear; the instinct of flight and the sense of self-preservation; the instinct of reproduction and jealousy and feminine timidity; the instinct of acquisition and the sense of property; the instinct of construction and the sense of creation; the herd instinct and the sense of belonging. All the social institutes grow out of these instincts: family, trade, various social processes and first of all, war.

In spite of the great popularity of MacDougall's ideas, they played a negative role in the history of science: the interpretation of social behaviour from the standpoint of certain spontaneous aspirations for a goal signified the recognition of irrational, unconscious inclinations as the motive force both of the individual and humanity as a whole. Therefore, just like in general psychology, the overcoming of the theory of instincts was an important milestone in the formation of scientific social psychology.

We can now sum up the theoretical baggage of social psychology after these first concepts had been drawn up. First of all, their positive meaning consists in the fact that really important questions were posed concerning the correlation of the consciousness of the individual and the consciousness of the group, the motive forces of social behaviour, etc. It is also interesting that, in the very first socio-psychological experiments efforts were made to find solutions to problems from two sides, psychological and sociological. In the first instance, all solutions presupposed the primacy of the individual, his mentality, and transition to the psychology of the group was practically ignored. In the second instance, a formal attempt was made to depart from society, but "society" itself was diluted in psychology, which led to the psychologisation of social phenomena. This signified that neither a "psychological" nor a "sociological" approach could provide correct solutions if the concepts they were based on proved methodologically unsound. Finally, the first socio-psychological concepts were vulnerable because they did not

rely on any experimental practice, but rather presented a "discourse" in the spirit of old philosophical constructs on socio-psychological problems, not their studies. It is, however, important that social psychology announced its right to existence as an independent scientific discipline. Now, it required an experimental base, inasmuch as psychology had already accumulated sufficient experience in the application of the experimental method. The next stage in the formation of social psychology could only be an experimental one.

However, before turning to the characteristics of this next stage, we must first turn to the origin of a completely new tradition in the development of the theoretical foundation of social psychology: we have in mind the creation of premises for socio-psychological knowledge within Marxism.

The mid-19th century marked the creation of the Marxist world outlook. Naturally, the entire system of social science was included in the polemics between Marxism and the bourgeois theories of social development. This polemic in sociology immediately assumed an open character. The situation in social psychology developed a little differently. Since it had, to a significant degree, a psychological orientation, a direct dialogue with Marxism was not pronounced, although the "meeting" of social psychology with Marxism was inevitable. In 1913, James Mark Baldwin placed Marx's *Capital* among those works which produced a fundamental change in the views on the relationship between the individual and social consciousness. This upheaval did not, however, lead to the adoption of Marxism by official social psychology. On the contrary, Marxist ideas were met with hostility. This led many authors of socio-psychological theories to extreme oversimplification or misinterpretation of these ideas. Since psychology also did not accept Marxist ideas, two independent traditions developed in socio-psychological knowledge: one was that of further isolation of this science from the general system of the bourgeois worldview, and the other was engaged in the formulation of new principles of socio-psychological knowledge within the framework of Marxism.

The development of the Marxist tradition in the system of socio-psychological knowledge is characterised by a number of specific traits. In certain respects, social psychology acts like a social science, meaning an acceptance of the fundamental theoretical propositions of Marxism as regards the essence of social phenomena and the understanding of the nature of man and society. The Marxist tradition in socio-psychological

knowledge signifies an embodiment of these propositions in specific research of separate socio-psychologic phenomena. In other respects, social psychology, acting more like a natural science, assumes the general philosophical principles of Marxism and realises them in the specific method of analysis of its own particular objects of study. Tracing the development of the Marxist tradition here means investigating the entire methodological arsenal of social psychology, to reveal how much the very principles of organisation of scientific knowledge, proposed by Marxism, are realised in practical research.

A peculiarity of the historical development of Marxist social psychology can be found in the fact that the assimilation of Marxist theory and the Marxist method took place on various chronological planes to varying degrees. The most important theoretical foundations of socio-psychological knowledge were already formulated in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and also of such distinguished Marxists as Georgi Plekhanov, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Antonio Gramsci, August Bebel, Antonio Labriola and others. We mean here not only the elaboration of the general conception of social development as an initial principle for social psychology, but also the formulation of more specific questions in this field of knowledge, even though in a general way.

Naturally, the analysis of socio-psychological phenomena in the system of Marxism was carried out on the basis of a materialistic understanding of history. More than anything else, this signified that social life itself was considered to be determined by material conditions. Such an approach fundamentally differed from the interpretation of the influence of social factors on the development of mentality in certain versions of the traditional socio-psychological approach. Thus, in sociology the recognition of the primacy of the social in the relationships between the individual and society was characteristic, for example, of the concepts of Emile Durkheim. However, even in this, the "strongest" variant, "sociality" was considered in an extremely one-sided way. It was not connected with the idea of the primacy of material conditions of the life of society. In the words of Soviet psychologist Mikhail Yaroshevsky, it was "sociality without materialness". Therefore, the evolution of socio-psychological ideas based on a materialistic understanding of history, which allowed to precisely determine the place occupied by the psychological aspect of social phenomena in the entire system of social relations was new in principle for Marxism. The role this

psychological aspect played was not denied. Plekhanov remarked that "to Marx, the problem of history was, in a certain sense, a *psychological problem* as well".¹ It was only emphasised that the psychological aspect was determined by the deeper processes of the material life of people.

It was namely on the basis of the general theory of Marxism that the most important regularities of socio-psychological phenomena were revealed. The main emphasis was laid on revealing the place of the social psychology ("everyday consciousness") of classes and other social groups in the system of social consciousness, its correlation with the ideology and its role in social development. In the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the social psychology of various classes of capitalist society was analysed. In addition to this, the psychology of mass motives of people, like the public mood, illusions and delusions were also studied. This was important in connection with the analysis of the original motive force behind the historical process. Special attention was paid to the characteristics of mass consciousness in periods of drastic historical shifts, in particular, to the mutual influence of ideology and everyday consciousness of the masses in these situations.

Naturally the positing of all these problems was included in the general body of Marxist social theory and was not singled out as ready-made propositions of social psychology as a special scientific discipline. But the very inclusion of the analysis of the psychological aspect of social processes in the context of general sociological theory set up a definite methodological standard for social psychology. A perfectly outlined programme for the examination of all socio-psychological phenomena in such a context was provided in classical Marxist works long before contemporary attempts by Western social psychology to include the "social context" in the system of socio-psychological knowledge.

The same principled solutions were found for other departments of social psychology connected with the study of personality, the microenvironment of his formation (later called the problem of the small group), the means of communication and mechanisms of socio-psychological impact. In these instances, it was not the matter of inventing special socio-psychological theories, or working out concrete methods of investigation but of the creation of *philosophical prin-*

¹ G.V. Plekhanov, "Essays on the History of Materialism", *Selected Philosophical Works* in five volumes, Vol. II, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 161.

principles to underlie socio-psychological knowledge and, consequently, of the *general methodology* of socio-psychological research. In that historical period, a new problem—that of the assimilation of specific scientific means of analysis underlined by a certain philosophical programme—obviously could not be solved. In this area of science, Marxist tradition could begin to take shape only under the condition of combining the philosophical foundations of knowledge elaborated through Marxism with practical research, developing until this time in the framework of completely different traditions. This required that professional scholars, social psychologists master the Marxist world outlook.

Today we can speak about the formation of the Marxist tradition in social psychology as a *system* of scientific knowledge. The Marxist tradition in a certain sense “was given equal rights” with the non-Marxist tradition: both contain their own philosophical basis as well as definite areas of practical research and are characterised by a definite level of institutionalisation. The fact that each of these traditions is as a whole connected with various types of society (although individual manifestations of the Marxist tradition are also observed in capitalist countries), distinctly “separates” the social functions of science, making them subordinate to the goals and tasks of the corresponding society.

However, before the first specific investigations of a Marxist orientation were performed experimental research was conducted in the framework of traditional social psychology outside Marxism. The early 20th century, especially the period after the First World War, is considered the beginning of the metamorphosis of social psychology into an experimental science. The programme proposed by Walter Moede in Europe and Floyd Henry Allport in the US, formulating the requirements of turning social psychology into an experimental discipline, served as a milestone in this process. Experimental social psychology developed for the most part in the US, where the vigorous formation of capitalist forms in the economy stimulated applied psychological research and forced social psychologists to face real socio-political problems.

However, American social psychology, like other social sciences, in demonstrating its extreme “earthiness”, focussed its attention on the solution of insignificant practical problems, and thoroughly avoided the more general problems which directly pertained to the essence of social evolution.

The philosophical premises of American socio-psychological thought served to promote such a situation. Pragmatism and positivism, traditional in American philosophy, reflected in the specific form adapted to the particular features of psychological knowledge, formed the basis for the majority of investigations and predetermined relations between science and practical work.

From the point of view of the objects of research, the main attention began to be focussed on the small group. This, to a certain extent, facilitated enthusiasm shown to experimental methods, which were only applicable in processes taking place in small groups. The accent on the development of experimental methods in itself signified an indisputable progress in the development of socio-psychological knowledge. However, in those concrete conditions under which this tendency developed in the US, such enthusiasm led to a one-sided development of social psychology: not only was all interest in theory lost, but the very idea of theoretical social psychology became compromised. According to the testimony of many American authors, the interest of some scholars in theoretical work made others doubt their scientific competence, prompting pity and sometimes even contempt. Almost like in American sociology, *research* as an optimal form of the organisation of the scientific process was contrasted to *speculation* as simple reasoning concerning an object. The rational demand to look at research as the basic form of the organisation of scientific knowledge led to rejection of theoretical work which had begun to be identified with "speculation". The real situation that had formed by that time in science seemed to promote contempt for theory. Experimental works, in particular due to the efforts of Kurt Lewin, put social psychology as a science in a more advantageous position, especially in comparison with the abstract constructs typical of the 19th century, which caused a shift in the accents (which is often encountered in the history of science) in the appraisal of theoretical knowledge: the casting off of "bad" theory (more precisely, speculative knowledge) began to be identified with the need to discard theory in general. If we take into account the fact that behaviourism held supremacy in American psychology at the time, rendering it a rather "respectable" look, it is easy to understand the stand assumed by researchers, which was mostly rooted in the general intellectual atmosphere characteristic of the US in the early 20th century. Therefore,

the experimental period in the development of social psychology, specifically in its American variety (which dominated in the West), was soon noted for acute contradictions.

On the one hand, social psychology gained strength as a scientific discipline namely in this period. Much research was conducted in the area of small groups, and methods, which would later be described as classical in textbooks, were expounded. Rich experience was accumulated in applied research, etc. On the other hand, excessive enthusiasm for the small groups changed them into a sort of "tumour" on the body of social psychology, so that problems connected with the special features of mass processes were practically excluded from the analysis. Along with the criticism of the primitive form of analysis of these phenomena in the first socio-psychological concepts, the problems themselves were discarded. Social psychology paid dearly for these contradictions. All the enthusiasm for experimental orientation stemmed from the need to provide authentic knowledge about the real problems of society. However, the actual form this orientation assumed emasculated all social content from the skilfully conducted laboratory research. This led to the sharp growth of critical tendencies in contemporary Western social psychology. The critical condition of the discipline, emphatically stated in contemporary socio-psychological literature, is seen in the resurrection of the interest in theoretical knowledge today.

It cannot be said that theoretical work was completely stopped during the period of the boom in experimental research in the 1930s. It was unpopular and scarce, but still it was carried on. The current interest in theory is on the rise, one of the reasons being the disturbing contrast between the enormous quantity of tangible experimental research and the relatively weak general effectiveness of social psychology. After fifty years of rather stable existence, American social psychology faces the need of a deeper comprehension of the science in order to analyse the situation at hand. In the setting of hectic social processes developing in Europe and America in the mid-20th century, social psychology came face to face with the most acute social problems. Its ability (or inability) to solve these problems can only be verified through a global analysis of its previous development. Such an analysis demands a more or less systematic representation of the "body" of science, in other

words, an exposure in its structure of theoretical knowledge, of independently existing methodology, and the practice of empirical research forming the basis of mass scientific production (including the adaptation of their results in applied areas). Theoretical knowledge plays an important role in this structure: it is an indicator of the condition of the science because it is the analysis of theories that are applied in the science that allows to precisely determine the major tendencies of its development and to see in a generalised light both the significance of the results achieved and the newly-arisen difficulties.

It is no coincidence that the interest in the analysis of the state of theory always becomes more acute at the crucial points of development of any scientific discipline. The atheoretical position of American social psychology has experienced numerous setbacks over the last decade. Fundamental works appeared concerned specifically with the problems of theory in social psychology (Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, *Theories in Social Psychology*, New York, 1965; Marvin E. Shaw and Philip P. Costanzo, *Theories in Social Psychology*, New York, 1965, etc.). Although the degree of the concern shown by the authors of this research for the destinies of socio-psychological theory in the US varies, the works cited demonstrate the need for the proportional development of two spheres of scientific knowledge—the theoretic and the experimental.

The question of the level of socio-psychological theory is widely discussed. The ideas of creating "middle-range theory", first developed by sociologist Robert Merton, permeates social psychology alongside "total" theory which pretends to encompass all spheres of social behaviour (the field theory of Kurt Lewin is often considered a model of this). Merton provided a thoroughly elaborated methodological substantiation of the three levels of knowledge in sociology: general ("total") theories, theories of the middle range and empirical generalisations, directly obtained in empirical research. Thus "middle-range" theories represent a certain middle level of generalizations acting as a mediator between working hypotheses and global generalisations. The understanding of the need for such theories came about rather late in social psychology. The greater part of socio-psychological theories existing today (theories of frustration-aggression, changes of attitudes, cognitive dissonance, cooperation-competition) belong to the bracket of middle-range theo-

ries. The level of generalisation proposed by these theories is of vast significance in certain object-related spheres. However, their role would have been much larger if they had functioned under the conditions of general theories as well. The situation existing in American social psychology today is characterised by the fact that the middle-range theories are essentially the only models of theoretical knowledge, which interferes with the need of taking full account of the "social context".

At present, the theories of the middle range are mostly concentrated around four trends: behaviourism, psychoanalysis, cognitivism and interactionism.¹ Among these four trends, the first three present themselves as socio-psychological variants of the main streams of psychological thought and the fourth, interactionism, has sociological sources.

Behaviourism in social psychology currently involves contemporary variants of this general-psychological stream. The neo-positivist methodological complex neobehaviourism is based on, includes absolutisation of the standard of scientific research formed in the natural sciences, as well as the specific interpretation of the principles of verification and operationalism, naturalism (which, in the given instance, is realised as ignoring the specifics of human behaviour), negative attitude to theory and making an absolute of the empirical description of the object directly observed and finally, complete rejection of the value approach and break with philosophy. The socio-psychological realisation of these epistemological principles can, of course, be traced only through the interpretation of specific investigations, since the authors, working within the framework of neobehaviourist orientations, differ greatly, particularly from the point of view of their strictly following the aforementioned methodological principles.

There are two well-known trends in behaviourism connected with the names of Clark Leonard Hull (who introduced the idea of "intervening variables") and Burrhus Frederick Skinner (a supporter of the more orthodox forms of classical behaviourism). Hull's approach to social psychology involved an elaboration of several socio-psychological theories, primarily the theory of frustration-aggression of Norman Miller and John Dollard, and also numerous models of

¹ See: G.M. Andreyeva, N.N. Bogomolova, L.A. Petrovskaya, *Modern Western Social Psychology (Theoretical Trends)*, Moscow, 1978 (in Russian).

dyadic interactions, for example, in the works of John W. Thibaut and Georg A. Kelly. The employment of the notion of the mathematical theory of games is particularly characteristic of this sort of work. The ideas of so-called social exchange, developed in the works of George C. Homans stand apart in socio-psychological neobehaviourism. The entire arsenal of behaviourist ideas can be found in all the aforementioned theories; moreover, the notion of reinforcement (in the variants of classic or operant conditioning) is a central idea. Neobehaviourism seeks to create a standard of scientific research in social psychology, involving thoroughly developed laboratory experiments and measurement techniques. The basic methodological reproach addressed to behaviourism is that the majority of experiments are performed on animals. Certain social psychologists belonging to this trend are trying to overcome this shortcoming. People were involved in the greater portion of Albert Bandura's research, for example.

However, the very strategy of research bears the characteristics of behaviourism (specifically, analysis of group processes is almost excluded and the groups themselves are considered dyads at best). Therefore, a "social context" can be found least of all within the framework of this trend, and social psychology has a much less than "social" appearance.

Psychoanalysis did not receive such widespread recognition as behaviourism in social psychology. However, its significance cannot be underrated. In the dialogue between scientism and humanism characteristic for contemporary social psychology, the psychoanalytical orientation opposes the behaviouristic as fighting for psychology not so much as for an "equivalent to science" as for an "equivalent to man". In other words, it emphasised the uniqueness of the spiritual world of the individual and the impossibility of its comprehension through scientific methodology. At present, the systems reproduction and development in social psychology of the whole complex of Sigmund Freud's principles is less likely to be discussed than the so-called "dispersed psychoanalysis" within which the process of active inclusion, integration of separate psychoanalytical principles in the most varied systems of views is understood. In this way psychoanalysis exerts a great influence over the theory and practical work of socio-psychological research. The problems of social psychology as viewed from the angle of psychoanalysis can be divided into two groups: the purely socio-psychological problems and

those located at the interface between social psychology and other disciplines. The theories of W.R. Bion, Warren Bennis, Herbert Allen Shepherd and William Carl Schutz represent examples of socio-psychological problems. Unlike behaviourism, the attempt is made here to depart from dyadic interactions and examine the processes in larger groups. It was namely in the framework of this trend (specifically in the theories of Warren Bennis and Herbert Shepard) that the so-called T-groups (training groups) were created, involving the mechanisms of people's socio-psychological influence on each other. Here the idea of psychoanalysis was employed concerning the possibility of broadening the influence of the individual by presenting to his consciousness and controlling those mechanisms of behaviour he uses but is not conscious of. The development of the group in the practical work of T-groups is highly specific and there is therefore an extremely dangerous tendency to apply laws found here to a much wider circle of groups. Concerning the employment of the mechanisms of influence on the individual demonstrated in T-groups, it is apparently also possible outside the framework of a psychoanalytical orientation.

A good example of the inclusion of psychoanalysis in social psychology in the solution of borderline problems can be found in the research of the authoritarian personality carried out under the direction of Theodor W. Adorno, the author of *The Authoritarian Personality*¹, and also falling under its influence Milton Rokeach's book *The Open and Closed Mind*,² written in the footsteps of the former work.

Regardless of the polarity of behaviourism and psychoanalysis, in recent socio-psychological works dealing with psychoanalysis approaches can be found that seemingly paradoxically, bring these two trends closer together. The accent on the emotional character of interpersonal relations leads again to ignoring social realities, in any case in the capacity of the determinant of these relations. Regardless of the modification of some of the aspects of traditional Freudianism, social psychologists of a psychoanalytical orientation remained firm in the most important initial premises. This cannot help but reflect negatively on the quality of analysis of socio-psychological phenomena.

¹ Theodor W. Adorno, E. Frenkel Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt R. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1969.

² Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, Basic Books, New York, 1960.

Cognitivism begins with Gestalt psychology and the *field theory* of Kurt Lewin. The examination of social behaviour from the point of view of cognitive processes of the individual is its basic principle. The theory of *cognitive balance* is based on the proposition that the main motivating factor of individual behaviour is the demand for the establishment of correspondence, a balance of his cognitive structure. The theory of balanced structures of Fritz Heider, the theory of communicative acts of Theodore M. Newcomb, the theory of cognitive dissonance of Leon Festinger and the theory of congruence of Charles Egerton Osgood and Percy Hyman Tannenbaum all relate to this theory. Moreover, such well-known American researchers as David Krech, Richard S. Crutchfield, and Solomon E. Asch work in the mainstream of cognitivism.

In all of these theories an attempt was made to explain the social behaviour of the individual, most of all through the correlation of the logical and alogical, the rational and irrational which in itself is very important. However, the specifics of the basic explanatory model, the idea that all acts and actions take place for the sake of the construction of a connected, non-contradictory picture of the world in the consciousness of the individual make this model extremely vulnerable in methodological terms. The abstract "correspondence" the individual strives to reach has no connection at all with the real world. Moreover, all the theories of correspondence contain flexible definitions of the basic concepts (for example, the categories of "following" and "non-following") and they suffer from miscalculations which stem from assumptions based on the common sense. It is not important that the theories stem from the considerations based on the common sense (sometimes this is warranted and the elaboration of the conception of "psychologic" in the framework of these theories is extremely interesting), but rather that they result in explanations hardly distinguishable from the judgement of the common sense. The very activeness of man in these theories assumes a very specific look: as a rule, it proves to be activeness only in the reconstruction of cognitive structures.

At the same time, cognitivist orientation is presently becoming more widespread. This can be explained by the fact that, setting itself apart from the behaviourist orientation of social psychology, it places a special emphasis on the "humanisation" of social psychology, underlining the role and sig-

nificance of mental formations in explaining the social behaviour of the individual. This position is not carried out consistently enough and therefore the cognitivist approach itself falls amongst a complicated group of contradictions and the "humanisation" turns out to be merely a declaration, since the true human problems as problems of a socially active individual are left untouched.

The theory of *interactionism* as the sole sociological theoretical orientation can be found in George Herbert Mead's work on the theory of symbolic interactionism. However, in contemporary social psychology, interactionism includes not only the development of Mead's ideas (made by two schools: The Chicago School—Herbert Blumer and the Iowa School—Thomas S. Kuhn) but also a group of different theories combined under one name, namely the role theory (Theodore Roy Sarbin) and reference group theory (Herbert Hyman and R. Merton). In recent years Erving Goffman's ideas of social drama have been developing within the framework of interactionism. In interactionism, to a larger degree than in other theoretical orientations, the attempt is made to establish the social determinants of human behaviour, by introducing a key concept, that of "interaction" (from which the name of the given orientation is derived), within which the personality is shaped. However, the analysis of the social determinants of behaviour is reduced to the statement of "interaction". The broad spectrum of genuinely social problems winds up, being excluded from the analysis: the individual is not included in the system of social relations, in the social structure of society. Therefore, the "sociological nature" of the interactionist orientation proves to be, to a significant degree, external. The fundamental methodological problems of socio-psychological knowledge remain unresolved here, too.

Although the four basic theoretical orientations have various sources, the borders between them are not very strict. Today theoretical eclecticism is typical of American social psychology, especially in the practical work of experimental research, where various theoretical orientations may intermingle in the same investigation. The deep crisis western social psychology is experiencing is testified to by the fact that many experimenters continue to ignore theory.

Intensification of the critical tendencies with respect to the "image" of social psychology that developed on American soil, with social thought oriented on positivist philoso-

phy is an important characteristic of social psychology in the West today. These critical tendencies develop both among American and Canadian researchers, and particularly among their colleagues in West European countries.

The positions of American authors differ widely. Criticism of the present situation is present in the majority of works in social psychology, but its depth and sharpness vary greatly.

There are perhaps two varieties of the critical approach among American authors. On the one hand, the works of those researchers personally involved in theoretical activities, not to say that they are not noteworthy as experimenters as well. This group includes many prominent representatives of American social psychology: Morton Deutsch, Robert Paul Abelson, Robert B. Zajonc, Theodore Newcomb, Solomon Asch, Elliot Aronson, Phillip George Zimbardo, Donald Thomas Campbell and others. As a rule they point out the deficiencies either in the incorrect strategic orientation of researchers or in the not high enough quality of separate theories. The question is not raised concerning the *contents* of these theories (in regards to their correspondence with social realities), or the *principled* miscalculations in the area of the philosophical foundations of socio-psychological knowledge. Although this type of critical analysis is very important, just as are the remarks of those who primarily analyse the shortcomings of laboratory methods in social psychology (Martin Theodore Orne, R. Rosenthal, Moris Rosenberg, Irving Silverman, and Donald Thomas Campbell), another type of critical approach is more substantial.

This pertains first of all to the work of William James McGuire, beginning with his report to the 19th International Congress on Scientific Psychology in Tokyo in 1970. Speaking on the two paradigms of contemporary social psychology, the "old" and the "new", McGuire singled out within each of them two components: the creative (the character of advanced hypotheses), and the critical (a means for examining these hypotheses). He noted that typical of the old paradigm was the "theoretically relevant" hypotheses with laboratory experiment as the means for proving them. The new paradigm provides other solutions: "socially relevant" hypotheses (formulated on the basis of real social problems) exist in it, with field experiment being the means of proving them. It would seem that such innovations would provide for a new form of social psychology, but, as McGuire pointed out, the "new" paradigm does not really save the situation. Hypothes-

es, although forming on the basis of real social problems, are formulated in the terms created by the "old" theories, whose relevance to social practice is often very doubtful. Field experiments also, to a significant extent, repeat the whole pattern of laboratory experiments, only transferring the situation to the field, but these researchers try in every way to limit themselves to the same two isolated variables— independent and dependent. Therefore, the conclusion of McGuire is rather harsh: a completely new paradigm must be established in social psychology which will revise the situation more radically. Unfortunately, such a paradigm is still not formulated. McGuire proposes seven principles (coens) in place of it, presenting a definite interest (this pertains especially to such demands as "study, but study people, not data", or "don't be like Alice in Wonderland peering through the looking-glass, because in such a situation social psychology is just like a voluntary prisoner in a world of Plato's shadows, in which it turns its back on the outside world, contemplating only the shadows on the wall"). It is easy to see that the bitter criticism of McGuire is well-grounded, but examples of such logical and systematic criticism in American literature are not so very frequent.

More definite critical tendencies came from Canada and some West European countries. It must be kept in mind that social psychology, which took shape in the European countries, was for a long time but a variant of American social psychology. This can be seen from the contents of the research, the methods used, and the popularity of the models of American theoretical thought and of the names of American researchers. A new movement, making itself felt here, was connected with the creation of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology in 1963. This association brought together many prominent European researchers in the field of social psychology (Henri Tajfel from England, Serge Moscovici, Claude Flament and C. Foché from France, Rom Harré and Ragnar Rommetveit from Norway, Johan Asplund from Denmark, Joachim Israel and Hakan Wiberg from Sweden, Martin Irle, Wolfgang Ströbe and Peter Michael Schönbach from the Federal Republic of Germany, Mario von Cranach from Switzerland and others).¹ Two fundamental articles by S. Moscovici and H. Tajfel pub-

¹ See: *The Context of Social Psychology. A Critical Assessment*, Ed. by H. Tajfel and J. Israel, Academic Press, London and New York, 1972.

lished in one of the Association's early collections provided a programme of these researchers.

They placed a completely new alternative before contemporary social psychology: to follow the traditions of the well-organised experimental discipline, based on the ideas and methods of recent years, or enter into the search for new theories and new principles expressing extreme dissatisfaction with the old ones. The authors naturally took the second choice, which can be explained by the general situation. In the words of Moscovici, that situation can be described as follows: "Before us, ahead of us and around us there was—and still is—American social psychology."¹ In his opinion, such a situation is impermissible because, by its very definition, this discipline must be oriented on social problems and these problems are, of course, different in America and Europe. European social psychology must turn to its own particular social problems because "training" under the Americans can only lead to the fact that "we can achieve in this way scientific recognition as methodologists or experimenters—but never as social psychologists".² The probing-stone which, in Moscovici's opinion, tested the maturity of social psychology, was the so-called "student revolution" of 1968. The student protest against the official system of social sciences is one aspect of the leftist student movement, which is often emphasised. The leaders of the "new left" criticised official social science in connection with the fact that it "successfully" ignored important social problems and that such a position was conducive to the support of the establishment. Social psychology was included by the theoreticians of this movement along with other social disciplines and was associated with the official science of bourgeois society. The underlying idea (and often the openly-formulated idea) of Moscovici's article was that the American tradition was responsible for this state of social psychology, where the refined measurement procedures in laboratory experiments led researchers away from the vital problems of society. The predominance of experimental orientation in social psychology is deficient not due to the fact that experimentation is useless as a method, but because of the fact that the possibility is lost on the level of experimental research to see the connection between the problem studied and the social context.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

The task therefore lies in concentrating efforts on the elaboration of the theory in social psychology rather than the liquidation of experimental practice. According to Moscovici, the main obstacle in the way of this elaboration is the domination of positivist epistemology, including the absolutisation of the "data". We can agree with the author that while the domination of positivism continues, the development of theory in social psychology will be braked.

Moscovici considered the prevalence of the psychological branch in social psychology as another hindrance on the road of development of theoretical knowledge. He spoke out decisively in favour of a different type of development of the discipline, with socio-psychological problems examined to a greater degree from a sociological point of view. If the inappropriate (in our view) term "socialisation" is discarded (why must social psychology be "socialised", that is, turned into sociology to a significant degree?), it is impossible to disagree with Moscovici's reasoning: the simple presence of another individual or even "multitudes" of individuals can't make social psychology "social", for this signifies an ignorance of the fundamental character of the social system individuals act in, while only performing the analysis of the "subsystem", namely the subsystem of interpersonal relations. It is this idea that developed in Marxist social psychology.

The work of Henri Tajfel is another example which must be considered. The basic content of Tajfel's article, "Experiments in a Vacuum" is defence of the socio-psychological experiment from its erroneous interpretation. Tajfel stated that the greater part of contemporary research was still "manipulative research in the laboratory". According to Tajfel, this methodological list is connected with an erroneous understanding of the subject-matter of social psychology: social behaviour is understood as a simple adaptation of individual behaviour to the existence of the environment, consisting of other people, that is, a transfer from individual behaviour to social is attained without qualitative consideration of the group. Experiments only reflect these theoretical premises: their purpose is to examine the hypotheses formulated on the basis of non-social theories. The large number of examples and illustrations cited by Tajfel bears witness to the fact that this critical appraisal also relates to the American tradition in social psychology.

Tajfel proposed a positive programme that included for-

mulation as the main problem of social psychology of the problem of "relations between the individual and social change", presupposing an analysis of intergroup relations. The appeal to the sociological theory of "social change" is at the same time a proposal for a greater "socialisation" of social psychology. The belief in "socialisation" as a panacea for all the troubles in social psychology seems somewhat naive, to say the least. The real problem of the future development of this discipline, from our point of view, is not whether it is to be based on psychology or sociology, but on *which* system of psychological and sociological views it should be oriented. The appeal to social problems in itself provides no answer to the question. From which positions should it relate to social problems—this is, in our opinion, the main clue in the search for the future evolution of social psychology. This means that an analysis of the fate of social psychology also includes the positing of the question of the role it should play in society. The principled polemics between all the orientations of Western social psychology and Marxist tradition in socio-psychological knowledge acquires a special significance for the development of social psychology in the contemporary conditions on the global arena.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Any science has problems of methodology of research, especially in the present age when tasks facing it become extremely complicated in connection with the scientific and technological revolution, and the methods science applies assume much greater significance. Moreover, new scientific forms of science organisations appear, and large research collectives emerge. Within these collectives it is necessary for scholars to work out a single research strategy, a single system of methods. A special class of interdisciplinary methods used in various disciplines are formed on the basis of the development of mathematics and cybernetics. This requires that the researchers to a greater degree control their cognitive actions and analyse the means they employ in practical research. Evidence of the great interest of contemporary science in the problems of methodology can be found in the growth of special branches of knowledge within philosophy, namely, the logic and methodology of scientific research. Philosophers and specialists in this new discipline, as well as representatives of specific disciplines more and more often get involved in the analysis of methodological problems. A new class of methodological reflexion is formed—intrascientific methodological reflexion.

All that has been said above pertains to the field of social psychology, too. There are also a number of specific reasons for this, in particular its relative “youthfulness” as a science, and the complicated nature of its origin and status, giving rise to the need for practical research to be simultaneously guided by methodological principles used in two scientific disciplines: psychology and sociology. This creates a specific

task for a social psychologist—that of a correlation, the “imposition” of one group of regularities upon another: the laws of social development and the laws of the development of man’s mentality. The difficulties increase even more because of the absence of its own conceptual apparatus, which generates the need for the use of two terminological lexicons. The “youthfulness” of social psychology accounts for the restricted base of its research and the consequent lack of sufficient research experience which would make clearer numerous methodological problems. They have yet to be pointed out to their complete extent.

Before treating the methodological problems of social psychology specifically, it is necessary to define what is understood by methodology in general (even this question is not so simple). Three different levels of scientific analysis designate what is meant by the term “methodology” in contemporary scientific knowledge within the Marxist tradition.

1. *General methodology*—a certain general philosophical approach, a general method of cognition accepted by researchers. For social psychology, developing in the framework of the Marxist tradition, the approach is dialectical and historical materialism. The general methodology formulates certain more general principles which—consciously or unconsciously—are applied in research. Social psychology must proceed from a definite understanding of the correlation of social being, social consciousness, mutual relations of society and the individual, etc.

2. *Particular (or Special) Methodology*—an aggregate of methodological principles applied in a given field of knowledge. Particular methodology is the realisation of philosophical principles in relation to the specific object of research. This is also a definite means of cognition, but also a means of adaptation to a more narrow sphere of knowledge. In connection with the dual origin of social psychology, the special methodology was formed by means of adaptation of methodological principles of both psychology and sociology. We can examine, by way of an example, the application of the principle of activity in social psychology.¹ In the broadest

¹ There is a well-known terminological difficulty in the interpretation of the principle of activity, connected with the fact that the word “activity” in a number of languages (Russian included) means both “activities” and “activeness”. In Marx’s works, written in German, there are two terms used: *Tätigkeit* and *Aktivität*, with *Tätigkeit* used in the meaning implied here. In English, *activity* covers both meanings.

sense the philosophical principle of activity signifies an acknowledgement of the fact that activity makes up the essence of man's being. It is the realisation of a still more general principle—that of reflection, in accordance with which consciousness is regarded as the higher form of reflection, presupposing the individual's activity. In social psychology, activity is interpreted as the means of existence of human society, a realisation of the social laws which are manifested solely through the activities of the people. Activity produces and changes specific conditions of the existence of individuals and society as a whole. It is through activity that the individual is included in social relations. In psychology, activity is considered to be a certain subjective-objective relation in which the individual as the subject is related in a definite way to the object as he masters it. The category of activity "comes to light in its actual dimensions, embracing both poles—that of the object and that of the subject".¹ In the course of activity, the individual realises his interest by modifying the object-related world. In activity the individual satisfies his needs; and new needs arise also in activity. Therefore, activity represents a process, in which human personality itself develops.

Social psychology, applying the principle of activity as one of the principles of its special methodology, adapts it in reference to the basic object of its research—the group. Therefore the content of the principle of activity in sociology is contained in the following propositions: a) activity is understood as a *joint social* activity of people during which particular connections arise, for example, communicative connections; b) not only the individual society and the group act as the subject of activity, introducing the idea of the *collective subject of activity*; this permits the investigation of real social groups as definite systems of activity; c) the study of all corresponding attributes of the subject of activity—demands, motives, goals of the groups, etc.—becomes possible if the group is interpreted as the subject of activity; d) it is impermissible to reduce group research only to empirical description, to the simple statement of acts of individual activity outside the defined "social context"—the given system of social relations. The principle of activity thus turns into the standard for socio-psychological research—and this is the function of special methodology.

¹ A.N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, p. 159.

3. *Methodology as an aggregate of specific methodological methods* of research that are more often signified by the term "methodics". Special methods applied in socio-psychological studies are not completely independent from more general methodological considerations.

The proposed "hierarchy" of various methodological levels is introduced so as not to reduce all methodological problems only to the third level. No matter what empirical or experimental methods are applied, they cannot be considered in isolation from general and special methodology. This means that any methodological technique—questionnaire, test, sociometry—is always taken under the condition that a number of more fundamental questions of research have been solved. Philosophical principles cannot be applied in the studies of every specific science directly: they are refracted through the principles of special methodology.

It must be clarified what is meant here by the expression "contemporary scientific research" in the logic and methodology of science. Unlike "speculation", typical of science in the 19th century, 1) it is always connected with specific objects, in other words, with the observable amount of empirical data, which can be collected through the means science has at its disposal; 2) differentiated within it are empirical (the establishment of facts, the elaboration of methods of measurement), logical (the drawing of one proposition from another, the determination of the connections between them) and the theoretical (the search for the causes, discovery of the principles and the formulation of hypotheses or laws) and cognitive tasks; 3) the distinct demarcation between the established facts and hypothetical suppositions is characteristic for it inasmuch as the procedures are worked out for the verification of hypotheses; 4) its goal lies in the foretelling of facts and processes, not only their explanation. These distinguishing characteristics can be briefly summed up as the thorough collection of empirical data, their generalisation into principles and the verification and application of these principles in forecasting the future developments.

Each of the above-named characteristics of scientific research has its specifics in social psychology. It is necessary to emphasise a number of specific problems connected with each of these characteristics.

The first is connected with the problem of *empirical data*. Data in social psychology can either be those based on the overt behaviour of the individuals in groups, or those based

on some specific characteristics of these individuals or the psychological characteristics of the groups themselves. There is a fierce debate concerning what is to be considered as data in social psychology. The question is answered differently in various theoretical conceptions. In behaviourist social psychology only the facts concerning the overt behaviour of the individual are considered as data; cognitivism, on the opposite, regards as such only those data as constitute the cognitive world of the individual: images, knowledge, values, orientation, etc. In Marxist tradition, the data of socio-psychological research can include both varieties. The varying concept of data determines the methods of their collection. The individual is the source of all data in social psychology, but one group of methods is suitable for the registration of the acts of his behaviour, and another—for the fixation of his cognitive formations. An acknowledgement of both forms requires a recognition of all the multitude of the diverse methods recommended for their collection.

There is still yet another aspect to the problem of data—namely what should be their volume? Depending on the volume of data, all socio-psychological research is divided into two types: a) correlatory—based on a large mass of data, within which various types of correlations are established, and b) experimental where researchers deal with a limited volume of data, arbitrarily introducing new variables and then controlling them. The theoretical position of the researcher holds great significance in this question: which objects, from his point of view, are “permissible” at all in social psychology (for example, whether or not does he include large groups in his objects of study).

The second feature of scientific research is the generalisation of data, the establishment of the principles, the formulation of hypotheses and theories. This characteristic is of particular importance for social psychology. As far as theories are concerned, with regard to the logic and methodology of the sciences, social psychology does not have any. Theories in social psychology often lack a deductive character; in other words, they do not present a well-organised connection between separate propositions so that one of them can be derived from another. In social psychology there is no strict order that exists in the theories of mathematics or logic. Therefore, particular attention attaches to hypotheses. In socio-psychological research, the hypothesis “represents” a theoretical form of knowledge. The formation of the hypo-

theses, understandably, is the most important link of socio-psychological research.

At the same time, no matter how complicated the creation of theories in social psychology, full knowledge cannot develop without theoretical generalisations. Therefore, even the existence of a good hypothesis in research is not enough: generalisations reached on the basis of the verification of such a hypothesis are, in essence, only the most primary form of the "organisation" of data. The next step is transition to generalisations on a higher level—theoretical generalisations. In contemporary social psychology there are two possible types of theory: general theory and theory of the middle level. Of course, the construction of a general theory, explaining all the problems of social behaviour, the activity of the individual in the group, the mechanisms of the dynamics of the groups themselves, etc. would be ideal. But a more specific elaboration on the separate aspects of social behaviour is contained in so-called special theories (in Western literature they are often called middle-range theories). Such theories are theories of group solidarity, of group decision-making, of the collective, and so on. The creation of specific theories in social psychology is as important as the elaboration of a specific methodology. Without this, the accumulated empirical material cannot be of any value for prognosing social behaviour, in other words, for solving the main task of social psychology—the improvement of the management of social processes.

The third characteristic feature of scientific research is the *compulsory verification of hypotheses and the formulation of forecasts*. The verification of the hypothesis is a necessary element of scientific research: without this element, research loses its general purpose. Social psychology experiences many difficulties with regard to the verification of hypotheses, which is due to its ambivalent position.

Like any other experimental science, social psychology uses the standard ways of hypotheses verification accepted for all experimental disciplines: various models of experimental verification of hypotheses have been worked out long ago. However, social psychology, possessing the traits of a humanitarian discipline, also experiences difficulties connected with this. For a long time now there is a debate in the philosophy of neo-positivism, what does verification of hypotheses mean. Positivism accepted only one form of verification, namely the correlation of the propositions of science with the data

of an immediate sensual experience. If such a correlation proved impossible, then it could not be stated whether the verified proposition was true or false: it could not, in such an instance, be considered a proposition, only a "pseudo-proposition". If this principle is strictly followed (i.e. if the idea of "rigid verification") is recognised, not a single more or less general proposition of science would have the right to exist. Two important conclusions follow accepted by the positivist-orientated researchers: 1) science can use only experimental methods (because only in this instance is it possible to organise the correlation of the proposition with the data of the immediate sensual experience) and 2) science, in essence, cannot have any thing to do with theoretical knowledge (because not every theoretical proposition is verifiable). The requirement formulated in the philosophy of neopositivism halted the development of any non-experimental science, limiting theoretical knowledge in general, which came under criticism long ago. However, to this time there exists among researcher experimenters nihilism with regard to any sort of non-experimental research, where verification of hypotheses is impossible in that sole form in which it was worked out in the neo-positivist variant of the logic and methodology of science. But in social psychology, there exist such fields of study as research of the psychological characteristics of large groups and mass processes, where entirely different methods should be applied because verification is impossible. These fields cannot be excluded from the problems of science, so different methods are needed here in order to verify the proposed hypotheses. In this way social psychology is similar to the greater part of the humanitarian sciences and like them it must affirm the right of the existence of its profound specifics. In other words, it is necessary to introduce additional criteria along with those based on the material of exact sciences. The assertion that every inclusion of the elements of humanitarian knowledge lowers the "scientific standard" of the discipline cannot be supported: the crisis phenomena in contemporary Western social psychology show to the contrary, that its failures are mostly due to the deficiency of its "humanistic orientation".

Thus all the requirements of scientific research formulated above proved applicable in social psychology with certain provisions which led to an increase in methodological difficulties.

The problem of the *quality* of information in socio-psy-

chological research is closely tied with the preceding problem which can be formulated also as a problem connected with the obtaining of reliable information. The problem of the quality of information is solved through the *representation* of the data and also through the verification of the means of obtaining data for *reliability*. These general problems take on a specific appearance in social psychology. Information obtained in experiments as well as through correlation research must meet definite demands. The consideration of the specifics of non-experimental research must not lead to contempt for the quality of information. For social psychology, as for any other science involving the study of man, there can be pointed out two parameters of quality of information: the *objective* and the *subjective*. This is brought about by the fact that the source of information in this discipline is always *man*. It is necessary to consider this fact along with the ensuring a high level of reliability of "subjective" parameters. "Subjective" information consists of the information gathered from various questionnaires or interviews, and this information can be complete and reliable enough; on the other hand, important moments, growing out of this "subjectivity", may be overlooked. A set of demands providing for the ensurance of the reliability of information must be introduced in order to overcome such mistakes.

The reliability of information is reached primarily through the verification of the reliability of the data-collecting instrument. Three characteristics of the *reliability* of information are ensured in every instance: validity, stability and precision.

The validity of information is ensured by the ability of the instrument used to measure those characteristics of objects which can be measured. In the construction of some sort of scale, the researcher (social psychologist) must be sure that that scale is focused on the characteristics he intends to survey—the sets of the individual, for instance. There are several ways of verifying the validity of the instrument. The help of *experts* can be drawn upon, whose competence in regard to the given question is generally recognised. The distribution of characteristics of the properties under investigation obtained by means of the scale, can be compared with the distribution by experts, working without a scale. The coincidence of the results confirms the validity of the applied scale to a certain extent. Another means, also based on comparison, is the conducting of supplementary interviews. The questions in these interviews must be formulated so that their an-

swers provide indirect characteristics of the distribution of the studied property. Here, too, coincidence is considered as evidence of the validity of the scale. It is obvious that all these means do not provide an absolute guarantee of the validity of the applied instrument: here lies one of the essential difficulties of socio-psychological research. It can be explained by the fact that there is no set means of proving the validity; on the contrary, the researcher must every time construct a new instrument of investigation.

Stability of information is its quality to be monosemantic when gathered through various means by various researchers. The following are means of verification of the stability of information: a) repeated measurement, b) measurement of the same properties by different observers, c) the so-called "split scales", the verification of the scale's separate parts. As is obvious, these methods of verification are all based on repeated measurements. These methods must make the researcher sure that he can rely on the data obtained.

The *precision* of the information is measured by how small the size of the unit of measurement, or, by the sensitivity of the instrument. Thus, this is the degree of bringing the results of a survey as close as possible to the true dimensions of the measured magnitude. Of course, every researcher must try to gather the most precise data. However, creation of an instrument possessing the required degree of scientific precision is often quite difficult. It is always necessary to decide what degree of precision is sufficient in each given instance. Researchers have to use their entire arsenal of theoretical ideas on the object in order to determine this degree.

Many researchers note that the means of verification of the reliability of information is insufficient in social psychology. Moreover, as Pinto and Grawitz justifiably noted, these methods "work" only in the hands of qualified specialists. In the hands of inexperienced researchers, the results are faulty and serve as the basis for unsound affirmations.

Demands considered elementary in other scientific research are complicated with many difficulties in social psychology owing to its specific *source of information* more than anything else. What characteristic traits of such a source do make the situation more complicated? Before becoming a source of information, the individual must *understand* the question, instructions or any other demand of the researcher. But people possess different abilities of understanding. Consequently, the researcher must expect the unexpected already

at this point. The following circumstance concerns the properties of human memory: if a person understood the question, he must still recall all that is necessary for a full answer. But the quality of memory is a strictly individual thing and there is no guarantee that the subjects selected will have similar memory abilities. There is still one more very important circumstance: the individual must agree to give information. His motivations in a given instance can be, to a definite degree, stimulated by the instructions or conditions the investigation is conducted under, but all these circumstances do not guarantee the subjects' cooperation with the researcher.

Therefore, along with the ensurance of the reliability of data, the question of the *representation* of the data is also very important in social psychology.

The very way of positing the problem is connected with the ambivalent character of social psychology. Were it only an experimental discipline, then the problem would be rather simple to solve: representativity in experiment is determined and verified strictly enough. But in correlation research, the social psychologist runs up against a completely new problem, especially in the area of mass processes. This new problem is the construction of selections. Of course the same type of selections applied in statistics are also used in social psychology: sporadic, typical (or stratified), selections based on a quota, etc. But the determination of the type of selections in every specific instance is always a creative problem: whether or not, in every instance, the general grouping should be divided initially into classes and only then sporadic selections made from them—this problem arises anew every time an investigation is started, and the solution depends on the given object of study, and the given characteristics of the general grouping. The very singling out of classes (types) within a general grouping is dictated by the description of the object of research: when discussing the behaviour and activities of a mass of people, it is very important to determine precisely along what parameters various types of behaviour can be singled out.

The most important problem, however, is that of representation arising specifically in the socio-psychological experiment. But before turning to this, it is necessary to touch upon the general characteristics of those methods applied in socio-psychological investigations.

The selection of methods can be subdivided into two large

groups: the methods of collection and the methods of analysis of information.

It is of little use to characterise each of these individual methods in detail in a general outline. It should be better to point out the cases of their application when definite problems encountered in social psychology are analysed, while now providing only the most general characteristic of each method and emphasise those moments when their application involves some difficulty.

Observation is the "old" method of social psychology and is sometimes contrasted with experimentation as an imperfect method. At the same time, all the possibilities of this method are far from being exhausted in social psychology: this method plays a very important role in the collection of data on overt behaviour and the actions of individuals. The main problem involved in the application of the method of observation can be found in the need to ensure the fixation of definite classes of characteristics so that the contents of journals of observations could be understood by other researchers and could be interpreted in terms of hypotheses. In everyday language the problem can be formulated thus: What to observe? How to fixate the observation? There is a variety of means of so-called *structurisation* of observation data, in other words, singling out certain classes in advance, for example, the interaction of the individual in the group with the subsequent fixation of the quantity, frequency and manifestations of this interaction, etc. One of such attempts, namely, that of Robert F. Bales, is described below. The question concerning the singling out of classes of observed phenomena is essentially a question of the *units* of observation, a rather important question in other departments of psychology, too. The question of what should be taken as a unit of observation in socio-psychological research can only be solved in each individual case, with consideration of the object of study. The time interval regarded as sufficient for the fixation of the units of observation is another important question. Although there is a variety of procedures to ensure the fixation of these units in definite intervals of time and their encoding, a number of important questions remain to be solved by social psychology.

The study of documents holds large significance, since it makes possible analysis of the products of human activities. Sometimes this method is groundlessly contrasted with the method of questionnaire, for example, as an "objective" and

a "subjective" method. This opposition is hardly appropriate, however. Even in documents the individual is the source of information, consequently all the problems contained in the fact still exist. Of course, the degree of "subjectivity" of the document depends on whether it is an official or private document, but the subjectivity exists nonetheless. Another problem arises in connection with the fact that it is the individual who interprets the document, a man who also possesses his own individual psychological peculiarities. The ability to *comprehend* the text is the most important part of the study of a document. This problem is a separate problem in psychology, but here it is included in the process of the application of a method consequently, it cannot help but be considered. To overcome this new type of "subjectivity" (the interpretation of the document by an individual researcher), a more or less formalised method called "content analysis" must be introduced: the text is divided into special "units" and then the frequency of their use is counted. The method of content analysis is only sensibly applied when the researcher is working with large volumes of information, making it necessary to analyse a great number of texts. This method is used in social psychology when studying mass communications. Content analysis is, of course, not without its own difficulties; for example, the very process of the division of the text into units depends, to a large extent, on the theoretical stand of the researcher and on his personal competence, as well as the level of his creative abilities. Just as with the application of many other methods in social psychology, here too the success or failure depends on the skill of the researcher.

Questionnaire—a very widely applied method in socio-psychological research; it comes under perhaps the largest amount of criticism. Usually it pertains to whether one should trust the information received directly from the subject's verbal responses, their personal accounts. Uncertainty here is usually based on either misunderstanding, or on the incompetent way in which the questionnaire was filled. Professionals have set rules for the *compilation* of questionnaires, the logic of their composition and the exclusion of typical mistakes. The compilation of the questionnaire is a very difficult task not to be hastily carried out, otherwise it only compromises the method.

A separate problem is found in the application of the interviews, because the interaction between the interviewer and respondent represents in itself a certain socio-psychological

phenomenon. In the course of the interview all the impact one person can exert on another is manifest, which is described in social psychology, all the laws of people's perception of each other and their norms of communication take effect. Each of these characteristics can influence the quality of the information, providing for still another potential variety of the "subjectivity" mentioned above. It must be kept in mind, however, that all these problems are not new for social psychology, all of them have specially worked-out "antidotes", so what is required is conscientiously mastering these methods. To counteract the widespread unprofessional opinion that the questionnaire is the most easily applied method, it must be asserted that the compilation of a good questionnaire is the most difficult method of socio-psychological research.

Testing is not a method specific to social psychology, it is widely applied in various areas of psychology. What is more often meant by tests in social psychology are the so-called *personality tests*. But these types of tests are also commonly applied in general psychological research of the personality. There are no particular specific applications of this method in socio-psychological research. All the methodological standards in the application of tests in general psychology also apply here. The majority of these tests were developed in pathopsychology where they should be applied only in combination with methods of clinical observation. Testing, within definite boundaries, gives important information about the pathology of the personality. The main weakness of personality tests is usually considered that they can only investigate one aspect of the personality. This deficiency is partly overcome in more complicated tests, for instance, in the tests of Raymond Bernard Cattell, or the tests of the *MMPI*—Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. However, the application of these methods not in the conditions of pathology, but rather in the conditions of the norm (in which social psychology is involved) requires many methodological amendments. The main question here is to what extent can the test measurements of various characteristics of the personality, its activity in the group, etc. be correlated. The idea that all the problems of a group and the individuals in a certain group will become clear through the conducting of a large amount of personality tests in that group is extremely dangerous. Tests can only be applied as a supplementary means of research in social psychology. The data obtained in these tests must be compared with the data of other applied methods. The appli-

cation of tests has a local character because it touches mainly upon one area of social psychology—the problem of the personality. There are not many tests which have great significance for the diagnostics of the group. The test of Timothy Leary is a good example of a widely-spread sociometric test.

The *experiment* is one of the basic methods of research applied in social psychology. The polemics on the possibilities and limitations of the experimental method in this field are some of the most acute polemics on methodological problems at the present time. There are two basic types of experiment in social psychology: laboratory and natural. There are certain general rules expressing the essence of the method existing for both types, namely arbitrary introduction by the experimenter of independent variables and control of these variables, as well as control of the changes of dependent variables. The singling out of the control and the experimental groups is a general requirement so that the results of the measurements can be compared. However, along with these general requirements, laboratory and natural experiments have their own particular rules. The laboratory experiment is of particular interest in socio-psychological discussions.

Two problems are mostly discussed: what is the ecological validity of the experiment, that is, what is the possibility for the distribution of the data obtained in the experiment in real life, and where lies the danger that these data can be not trustworthy in connection with the selection of the testees. Moreover, a more principled methodological question can be posed, whether or not that very "social" quality, so important in the context of a socio-psychological study is lost in the laboratory experiment. There are varying points of view on the first problem. Many authors see laboratory experiments as of a limited significance, while others feel that it is not necessary to expect an ecological validity from them, that the results of these experiments should not necessarily be applied to real life, that these experiments are meant only to verify some positions of the theory and that in order to analyse real situations the positions of the theory must be interpreted. Many years of discussion were necessary before relatively deep specifics of the experimental method were recognised in social sciences. Donald Thomas Campbell made a large contribution to the treatment and status of these problems in social psychology. In the last ten years, there have been very few works published that do not mention his efforts.

Among the large group of questions discussed by Campbell,

(the correlation of quantitative and qualitative knowledge in social sciences, the specifics of the experiment, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the applied programmes,) the specifics of the forms of experimental research in social psychology is of special interest.¹ In his opinion, the main task consists in the need to discover those factors which threaten the validity of the conclusion reached through data gathered in the socio-psychological experiment. Campbell distinguishes between several types of validity including "internal" (the type of experiment which demonstrates that it is experimental influence that determines the recorded changes) and "external" (the type of experiment which guarantees the possibility of the generalisation of the conclusion and its spread to extra-experimental situation). Twelve factors must be kept in mind for the insurance of both types of validity (eight factors for the internal and four for the external). Each of these factors manifests in different ways on various plans of experimental research. The next step in Campbell's argumentation is the determination of all these plans in the social sciences and, specifically, in social psychology. The sixteen plans of experiments can be distributed in three groups: the "pre-experimental", "experimental" and "quasi-experimental". The first two groups are rather well known and often described in relevant literature. Therefore, Campbell's description of quasi-experimental plans as of a specific type of experiment in the social sciences is of interest. Quasi-experimentation is a method of research within which a kind of experiment materialises in the *gathering of data*, but there is no full control over the *order* of experimental influences. In the instance where the application of better plans of experimentation is impossible, the researcher can also employ such a plan where the optimal control is absent, but each time the verification of the twelve factors threatening validity is obligatory. Therefore, the idea of admissibility of non-traditional forms of experimentation was introduced in social psychology, and the means to minimize the imperfection of these forms was suggested. In this way the first deficiency in the experimental method of social psychology was overcome (though not completely).

There is another limitation in solving the problem of representation in the laboratory experiment. In gathering a group

¹ Donald Campbell, *Models of Experiments in Social Psychology and Applied Investigations*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1980 (in Russian).

of testees in laboratory conditions, they must, for a long while, be "extracted" from their actual life activities. This is so difficult to accomplish that the experimenters often follow the easiest course of action, using those people who are accessible. Most often they are students of the psychology department, and what is more, those who have agreed to participate in the experiment. It is namely this fact that evokes criticism (in the US, there is even a scornful term, "social psychology of the second-year students", ironically demonstrating the predominant contingent of the testees), because the age and the professional status of the testees in social psychology play a very serious role and the results can be distorted greatly. Moreover, the "preparedness" to work with the experimenter also signifies a certain bias of the selections. The so-called Rosenthal-effect (the effect of the presence of the experimenter), the effect of "anticipated evaluation" (the subject guesses the intentions of the experimenter and "underplays" him), and others are quite well known.

Experiments staged in natural conditions have certain advantages in comparison with laboratory experiments, but fall short of the latter in their "purity" and precision. If the most important requirement of social psychology is considered the study of real social groups and the real activities of the individuals in them, then the natural experiment can be considered a more promising method of socio-psychological research. The contradiction between the precision of the survey and the depth of the qualitative substantial analysis of the data really exists, and not only in relation to the problems of experimental methods.

All of the described methods have one trait in common inherent in social psychology. Under any form of information gathering where the source of information is an individual, the *interaction of the testor with the testee* arises as yet another specific variable. This interaction makes itself most evident in the course of the interview, but actually it is present in any of the methods. This fact and the demands to take account of it were emphasised long ago in socio-psychological literature; however, serious treatment of this problem has yet to be approached.

The *processing of material* as the second set of methods involves several important methodological problems. This pertains to the methods of statistics (correlation analysis, factor analysis) and also the methods of logical and theoretical editing (the constructs of typology, various means of construct-

ing explanations, et.). Here, too, a certain contradiction comes to light. To what degree is the researcher allowed to include considerations of both logic and content theory in the interpretation of data? Will their inclusion reduce the level of objectivity of research, introducing what is known in scientific language as the *problem of value*? For natural and especially exact sciences the problem of values is not a specific problem, but in sciences dealing with people, including social psychology, it plays a significant role and therefore requires special discussion.

The solution to the problem of values can be found in the formulation of two kinds of scientific knowledge in contemporary scientific literature—"scientific" and "humanistic"—and the explanation of the relationship between them. The scientific form of science was created in the philosophy of neopositivism. The main idea of this form is found in the comparison of all sciences to the more exact and developed natural sciences, most of all physics. Science must rely on a strong foundation of facts, apply strict methods of measurement, use only operational concepts and possess perfect means for the verification of hypotheses. No value judgements of any kind can be included in the process of scientific research itself, nor in the interpretation of its results, since such inclusions would reduce the quality of knowledge, allowing for the possibility of extremely subjective conclusions. The role of the scholar in society is interpreted according to this form of science. It is identified with the role of the impartial observer, but by no means a participant in the events of the world he studies. At best, the scholar can assume the role of the engineer or, more precisely, the technician who develops specific recommendations but is not involved in the solutions of questions of principle, for example, the use of the results of his research.

Currently in the humanistic orientation, unlike the scientific, it is emphasised that the sciences about man require the inclusion of value judgements in the makeup of scientific investigation. The question is more specific in relation to social psychology: in what forms do values "penetrate" the process of scientific research? First of all, the scholar formulates the problem, being well aware of the goal of his research and orients himself on the values of society which he recognises or rejects; further, the values he recognises permit the determination of the purpose in the application of his recommendations; finally, these values must also "be present" during the interpretation of the results obtained; this does not "lower"

the quality of knowledge, but on the contrary, makes the interpretation conscientious, allowing the social context, in which the studied events took place, to be fully evaluated. Burrhus Frederic Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is often cited as an example, where the author, consistently following the principles of behaviourism, worked out a special "behavioural technology" which "freed" the individual from optional situations and made him a docile instrument in the hands of the operators, manipulating his behaviour. Scientism, which lay at the basis of Skinner's reasoning, turned into a rather open reactionary programme of social reconstruction, while the "humanistic" tradition made the researcher "think" about the thrust of his research and the goals it serves.

The problem of values is a very real problem for social psychology. The thoroughness of the selection process, the elaboration and application of specific methodics cannot in themselves provide for successful socio-psychological research if the problems as a whole are not kept in sight, that is, in their "social context". The main task is, of course, to find the means through which this "social context" can be "grasped" in every concrete study. But that is another question. It is important to see the problem, to understand that value judgements inescapably exist in investigations carried out within the framework of sciences like social psychology, and that researcher should not avoid the problem but should consciously determine his social position. Before the beginning of an investigation, before the choice of methodics is made, the basic outline of research must be precisely defined, and the *goal* of the research and its *premises* must be thoroughly thought out.

The construction of the *programme* of a socio-psychological study is the means for meeting all these demands. In every investigation, it is important to designate precisely the tasks to be solved and the object selected; the problem being investigated should be clearly formulated and the applied concepts defined; the entire set to be used should be systematically designated. This will provide for the improvement of the "methodological equipment" of research. It is namely such programme that allows to trace the connection of every investigation with real social problems.

Section Two

LAWS OF COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTIONS

Chapter Four

SOCIAL AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

If we proceed from the understanding that social psychology analyses primarily those regularities of human behaviour and activities which are brought about by people's inclusion in real social groups, then the first empirical fact this science confronts is the fact of communication and interaction of people.

The main task of social psychology is to understand the result of the influence of social conditions on the activities of the individual and to reveal the specific mechanism of the "interweaving" of the individual into the "cloth" of social realities. The difficulty consists in the fact that this "result" cannot be interpreted in such a way that at first some kind of "non-social" behaviour takes place, and then something "social" is superimposed on it. It is impossible at first to study the individual, and only then insert it into the system of social links. The individual himself is, on the one hand, a "product" of these social connections and, on the other hand, he is their creator. The interaction between the individual and the system of social links (both of the macrostructure—society as a whole, and the microstructure—the immediate surroundings) is not an interaction between two independent essences located one outside the other. The investigation of the individual is always the other side of an investigation of society.

This means that, from the very start the individual must be observed in the general system of social relations, provided by society, i.e. in a certain "social context". This "context" is presented by the system of real *relations* of the individual with the outside world. The problem of relations has great methodological significance in psychology. In Soviet psychology this

problem is treated to a significant degree in the works of V. N. Myasishchev.¹ The fixation of relations signifies a realisation of a more general methodological principle—the study of natural objects in their connection with the environment. This connection becomes a relation for man inasmuch as he acts in it as a subject, the actor and consequently, in the words of Myasishchev, the roles of the objects of this connection become strictly allocated in his connection with the world. The connection with the outside world also exists for animals, but, as Marx said, “the animal does not ‘relate’ itself to anything, it does not ‘relate’ itself at all.”² Where there is some kind of relation it exists “for me”, i.e. as a specifically human relation, determined namely by the activeness of the subject.

The content and level of the individual's relations with the world vary extremely. Whole groups are involved in relations along with the individual, and therefore the individual winds up as the subject of numerous and variegated relations. In this variety two basic types of relation must be pointed out: social relations and psychological relations of the individual.

Sociology investigates the structure of social relations. A definite subordination of various types of social relations is revealed in Marxist sociological theory. At the base of society lie production, material relations and an entire group of relations form upon them: social relations in the narrow sense of the word (relations between social groups), political and ideological. They all combine to form a system of social relations. Their specifics are found in the fact that individuals “meet” and “relate” to each other within them, not simply as individual to individual, but as individuals representing definite social groups (classes, trades, etc. formed in the sphere of the division of labour, and also groups formed in the sphere of political life, for example, political parties, etc.). Such relations are built not on the basis of affection or antipathy but rather on the definite position each individual occupies in the social system. Therefore, such relations develop objectively, they are the essence of the relations between social groups or between individuals as representatives of these social groups. This means that social relations have an *impersonal* character: their essence is not found in the interactions of specific indi-

¹ See: V.N. Myasishchev, *Personality and Neuroses*.

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The German Ideology”, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 44.

viduals, but, rather, in the interactions of specific *roles*.

The *social role* is the characteristic of a definite position a certain individual occupies in the system of social relations. More specifically, the role is understood as "the function, the standardly accepted behavioural model expected of each individual occupying a given position".¹ These expectations, which determine the general outline of the social role, do not depend on the consciousness and behaviour of a specific individual: their subject is not the individual but society. Such an understanding of the social role should also be supplemented with the idea that what is essential here is not so much the statement of rights and duties (which is suggested by the term "expectations"), as a connection of the social role with definite types of the social activity of the individual. It can therefore be said that the social role is a socially-necessary type of social activity and a way of individual behaviour. Besides, the social role always bears the stamp of social evaluation. Society can either approve of certain social roles or disapprove of them (for example, the role of criminal is not an approved social role). Sometimes this approval or disapproval varies in different social groups. The evaluation of the role can acquire completely different meaning in correspondence with the social experience of a definite social group. It is important to emphasise that this approval or disapproval is expressed not with respect to a specific person, but with respect to a definite type of social activities. Thus, having pointed out the role, we "relate" the individual to a definite social group.

In reality, each individual plays not one, but several social roles. He can be an accountant, father, trade union member, member of a soccer team, and so on. Some social roles are given at birth (the role of a male or female), while others are acquired in life. However, the social role does not in itself specifically determine the type of activity and the way of behaviour of each individual in every detail: everything depends on the degree to which the individual internalises his role. The internalisation is determined by the set of individual psychological peculiarities of each specific holder of a given role. Therefore social relations, being in essence impersonal role relations, in reality acquire a definite "personal colouring" in their specific manifestations. Although at certain levels of analysis, this "personal colouring" can be made into an abstraction,

¹ I.S. Kon, *Sociology of the Personality*, Moscow, 1967, p. 23 (in Russian).

in sociology and political economy for instance, it exists in reality and therefore must be investigated in special fields of knowledge, in particular in social psychology.

In describing the nature of social relations, Marx said that people take part in them not as individuals, but as members of a class. He noted that, "we do not mean it to be understood from this that, for example, the rantier, the capitalist, etc., cease to be persons; but their personality is conditioned and determined by quite definite class relations..."¹ Remaining personalities in a system of impersonal social relations, people inescapably enter into interactions, into communication where their individual characteristics are unavoidably displayed. Therefore, each social role does not signify an absolutely set pattern of behaviour. It always allows for a certain "range of possibilities" for its performer, which can be conditionally named a definite "style of performance of the role". It is namely this range which is the basis for the construction, within the system in impersonal social relations, of the second group of relations—interpersonal (or, as they are sometimes called, psychological relations). The existence of such relations *within* each type of social relation can be systematically represented as the cross-section of the system of social relations at a certain angle. What this "cross-section" of economic, social, political and other varieties of social relations reveals are interpersonal relations. With this explanation it becomes clear why interpersonal relations seem to "mediate" the influence of a broader social system on the individual. In the final analysis, interpersonal relations are determined by objective social relations but only *in the final analysis*. Two groups of relations co-exist together, and an underestimation of the second group hinders a truly deep analysis of the relations of the first group. Marx in his *Capital* provided a good illustration of this position. In reference to the process of the exchange of goods he said that people exist for one another only as specific economic masks, since their behaviour is preset. Along with this, Marx pointed out the deficiency of such a model through the following argument: "A may be clever enough to get the advantage of B or C without their being able to retaliate. A sells wine worth \$40 to B, and obtains from him in exchange corn to the value of \$50... The value in circulation has not increased by one iota, it is only distributed differently between A and B."² The-

¹ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 78.

² Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 160.

refore, Marx repeatedly warned that it is not sufficient to investigate *only* the totality of objective social relations which are impersonal by nature: this would lead to difficulties due to the fact that people would appear only as personified categories, and not as individuals.

The existence of interpersonal relations within various forms of social relations is a "realisation", as it were, of interpersonal relations in the activities of specific individuals and in the acts of their communication and interaction. In addition to this, in the course of this "realisation", relations between people (including social) are again reproduced. In other words, this signifies that moments exist in the objective fabric of social relations starting with the conscious will and particular goals of the individuals. It is namely here that the sociological and the psychological directly collide. Therefore, the posing of this problem has paramount significance for social psychology.

The examination of the structure of relations has very important consequences for the strategy of socio-psychological research. For every participant in interpersonal relations, these relations may present themselves as the sole reality. Although in reality the content of interpersonal relations is in the final analysis one type of social relations or another, i.e. a definite social activity, their content and even more so, their very essence remain hidden to a great degree. Regardless of the fact that in the process of interpersonal and therefore social relations, people exchange thoughts, becoming aware of these relations, this awareness often goes no further than the knowledge of the fact that people entered into *interpersonal relations*. The separate moments of social relations represent only interpersonal relationships to their participants. On the level of everyday consciousness, matters are presented precisely in this way, without special theoretical analysis. Therefore motives of behaviour are often explained by the representation of relations on the surface, with no attention at all given to the real objective relations *behind* this representation. The situation becomes even more complicated with the fact that interpersonal relations are in essence the actual *reality* of social relations: no "pure" social relations exist outside them. Therefore in practically all group actions the participants come out as if playing a double role, filling the impersonal social role and the role of unique human personalities. The existence of personality traits in the way the social role is performed evokes response reactions from different members of

the group thus causing a whole *system* of interpersonal relations to appear within the group. Unlike social relations, interpersonal relations have an emotional basis. They can therefore be considered as a factor of the psychological "climate" in the group. They form on the basis of definite emotions developing in people's relations with one another. All of these emotions can be placed into two large groups: 1) *conjunctive*—those which bring people closer together and uniting their emotions. In each instance of such a relation the other side emerges as the desired object, in regard to which preparedness is demonstrated for cooperation, joint activities, etc.; 2) *disjunctive* emotions—those which disconnect people, when the other side emerges as an unacceptable object, perhaps even as the object of frustration, in regard to which no wish to cooperate arises, etc. The intensity of both types of emotions can vary greatly. The specific level of their development cannot, of course, be unimportant for the activities of the group. However, the analysis of only these interpersonal relations cannot be considered sufficient for the description of the group. Practically, relations between people form not only on the basis of direct emotional contacts. The very activities provide for another set of relations. Therefore, it is an extremely important and difficult task in social psychology to simultaneously analyse two sets of relations within the group: both interpersonal and mediated by joint activities. Looking ahead, it can be said that it is precisely at this point of the analysis that the approach of Soviet social psychology differs essentially from the traditional approach of Western social psychology.

Traditional social psychology focussed its attention primarily on interpersonal relations increasing the stock of methodological means for their study much earlier and to a significantly greater degree. The most important of these methods is the widely known *sociometrics* proposed in social psychology by Jacob Moreno and worked out within a definite theoretical conception. The unsoundness of this conception is presently well known. However, the methodics worked out in the framework of this theoretical outline turned out to be extremely popular and were accepted almost without criticism.

The essence of these methodics consists in the exposure of the system in "sympathy" and "antipathy" between group members, that is, the exposure of the system of emotional relations in the group. This is arrived at through each group members' realisation of the definite "choices" under a set cri-

teria from the whole membership of the group. Our task does not include the detailed interpretation of the methodics. It is necessary only to note that sociometrics is widely applied for the obtaining of "photograph" of interpersonal relations in the group and often for determining the level of development of positive or negative emotional relations. The "diagnosis" of the group established through the sociometric method cannot by any means be considered final. Even less so can it be considered a diagnosis, since sociometrics provides the means to grasp only one side of group activities, revealing only an immediate level of relations. Returning to the proposed outline of interpersonal and social relations, it can be said that sociometrics does not grasp the connection which exists between the system of interpersonal relations in the group and the system of social relations the given group functions within. Therefore it ends up being limited and insufficient to provide the diagnostics of the group (to say nothing of the limitations involved in its inability to establish the motives behind choices made, etc.).

The analysis of interpersonal relations forming within social relations allows for the placement of the proper accents on the question of the *position of communication* in the complex system of connections between man and the outside world. However, a few words must first be said on the problem of communication as a whole. This is a specific problem for Marxist social psychology.¹ The very term "communication" does not have an exact analogue in traditional social psychology not only due to the fact that the widely applied English term "communication" is not an exact equivalent, but also because the contents of "communication" can only be completely clarified in the conceptual lexicon of Marxist social science. Of course, the structure of communication to be examined below can be divided into such aspects which are described or investigated in different systems of socio-psychological knowledge. However, regardless of the external resemblance of these processes, the gist of the problem as it stands in Marxist social psychology is different in principle. Both sets of human relations—social and interpersonal—are revealed and realised through communication. Thus the roots of communication are found in the material life activities of individuals. Communication

¹ See: G.M. Andreyeva, "The Development of Social Psychology in the U.S.S.R.", in: *Soviet and Western Perspectives in Social Psychology*, Oxford, 1979, pp. 57-68.

is also the realisation of the individual's entire system of relations. According to Alexei Leontiev, in normal circumstances the relations of the individual to the surrounding objective world are always mediated by his relations to people and society.¹ In other words, they are included in communication. It is especially important to emphasise the idea that in real communication not only are the interpersonal relations of the people manifested and their emotional attachments, hostility and other attitudes revealed, but social relations, i.e. relations impersonal by nature are also intertwined in the fabric of communication.

The various relations of the individual are not restricted only by interpersonal contacts. The position of the individual in the narrow framework of interpersonal connections in the broader social system also requires a definite "construction" of the aggregate of his connections, and this process can be realised also only in communication. A society cannot exist outside of communication. It emerges in society as a means of uniting individuals and along with this a means for the development of these very individuals. This is the main explanation for the simultaneous existence of communication as both the reality of social relations and also the reality of interpersonal relations. This is obviously what Antoine Saint-Exupéry meant when he said: "We forget that there is no hope of joy except in human relations".²

Each set of relations is naturally realised in specific forms of communication. Communication as the realisation of interpersonal relations is the best-studied socio-psychological process. There is a tendency to identify communication and interpersonal relations. Although these processes are interconnected, their identification can hardly be considered proper. Communication, including that with in the system of interpersonal relations, is caused by the joint activity of people and therefore must be realised under those very *diverse* interpersonal relations, both in the instances of positive and negative attitude of one individual to another. The type of interpersonal relations is important in the construction of relations, existing in specific forms even when relations are extremely strained. This also pertains to the description of relations on the macrolevel as a realisation of social relations.

¹ See: A.N. Leontiev, *Problems of the Development of the Mind*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 357.

² Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *Wind, Sand and Stars*, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1939, p. 45.

In this instance, too, whether the groups or the individuals as representatives of social groups communicate among themselves, the act of communication must unavoidably take place, even if the groups are antagonistic. Such an ambivalent understanding, in both the wide and narrow sense of the word, is the specific approach of Marxist social psychology. Its necessity stems from the very logic in understanding the connection between interpersonal and social relations.

Marx gave special attention to this question. In describing the phenomenon of communication, Marx used the German term *Verkehr* (intercourse)¹, and not the word "communication". This was not done by accident. He wanted to emphasise the connection of communication with relations in society, and this is contained to a larger extent in the word *Verkehr* than in the word "communication". Marx felt it important to emphasise the idea that communication is an unconditional companion of human history (the significance of communication in the philogenesis of society can be spoken of in this sense), and, at the same time, an unconditional companion in the everyday activities and contacts of people. The *historical* change of the forms of communication can first be traced, meaning their change with the development of society and the development of economic and social relations. The most difficult methodological question is resolved here: in what way is the process realised in the system of interpersonal relations which, by its nature, demands the "participation" of individuals? Marx deserves credit for the solution of this problem. Being a representative of a certain social group (a class, for instance), a person communicates with another representative of a different social group (a representative of another class, for example) and *simultaneously* realises two types of relations: impersonal and personal. The peasant, selling his wares on the market, receives a definite sum of money for those wares. Money here plays the role of the most important means of communication in the system of social relations. At the same time, this peasant haggles with the buyer and communicates with him in the very same "personal" way, and human speech provides the means for this communication. A form of direct communication takes place on the surface of the phenomena with communication behind it compelled by the very system of social relations and in the given instance—relations of

¹ See: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 32.

commodity production. Although an abstract can be made from the "second plan", in real life this "second plan" of communication always exists, and must be taken into consideration.

However, there is the principled question of the *connection of communication with activities* in any approach. Arguing with the French school of sociology, Alexei Leontiev noted that in the analysis of communication when the role of transformative activities is underestimated, the individual takes on the appearance of a communicating rather than a practically acting social being.¹

In contrast, Soviet psychology begins with the *unity of communication and activities*. Such a conclusion logically stems from the concept of communication as the reality of human relations, stating that any forms of communication in essence are the specific forms of people's joint activities: people do not simply "communicate" in the process of carrying out their various social functions, but rather, they always communicate in certain activities, "concerning" it. Thus an active individual always communicates: his activity unavoidably comes in contact with the activities of other people. It is this contact that creates definite relations of this active individual not only in regard to the object of his activity but also to other people. Communication forms a community of individuals carrying out joint activity.

All researchers accepting the principle of activities in psychology support the fact of the connection of communication with activities. However, the character of this connection is interpreted differently. Sometimes activities and communication are considered not as interconnected processes existing parallel with each other, but as two sides of the individual's social being, his way of life.² In other instances communication is understood as a definite *aspect* of activities: it is included in any activity, is its element, while the activity itself can be considered a *condition* of communication.³ Finally, communication can be interpreted as a special type of activity.⁴ However, in all the varying points of view, not a single one denies the connection between activities and communication, recognising the necessity of analysing them together, as a unity.

¹ See: A.N. Leontiev, *Problems of the Development of the Mind*, p. 335.

² See: B.F. Lomov, *Methodological and Theoretical Problems of Social Psychology*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 257 (in Russian).

³ See: A.N. Leontiev, *Problems of the Development of the Mind*, p. 287.

⁴ See: D.B. Elkonin, "Problems of Periodisation in Child Development", *Voprosy psikhologii*, No. 4, 1971.

The divergence of positions is much more obvious on the level of theoretical and general methodological analysis. In regard to experimental practice, the positions of all researchers are more common than varied. The acknowledgement of the unity of communication and activities and the attempts to reveal this unity in the experiment is what unites researchers. The broadest understanding of the connection of activities and communication, when communication is considered as an aspect of joint activities (since the very activities are not only work but also communication in the work process), and as a unique derivation seems to us to be the most correct. Such a broad understanding of the connection of communication and activities corresponds to a broad understanding of communication itself as the most important condition for the individual's appropriation of the achievements of humanity's historical development, be it on the microlevel in the immediate surroundings or on the macrolevel in the entire system of social links.

The acknowledgement of such an organic connection of communication with activities dictates the ways in which communication is to be studied, often on the level of experimental research. One of these ways consist of the need to research communication not so much in their form, but rather in their content. This requirement is different from traditional research of the communicative process typical of Western social psychology where communication, as a rule, is studied primarily in the laboratory experiment. It is namely from this point of view of form that the means of communication, the type of contact, the frequency or the structure are analysed of both the single communicative act and the complete communicative networks. If communication is understood as an aspect of activities, as a unique means for the organisation of these activities, then the analysis of only one form of this process is not sufficient. Here an analogy with the research of activities themselves can be drawn. The essence of the principle of activity can be found in the fact that, unlike in traditional psychology, activity is considered not simply by form (meaning not only by stating the individual's activity), but by content (the object of the activity is revealed). Activities, when understood as object-related activities, cannot be studied outside the description of this object. Along the same lines, the essence of communication is revealed only if the content of communication is disclosed along with the fact of its taking place and the means of this communication. In actual practice, the main question concerning the activities of the individual can be found not in the way

he communicates but rather in the object of communication. Here again an analogy with the study of activities is appropriate if the analysis of the *object of activities* is important there, then the *object of communication* is important to an equal degree here.

Of course, the singling out of the object of communication should not be simplified: people communicate not only through those activities they are connected with. In order to demonstrate two possible "pretexts" of communication, Soviet social psychology employs the divisions of "role" and "personal" communications, although this division is not absolute.

The idea of the "intertwining" of communications with activities suggests that, the very activities are *organised* and *enriched* by means of communication. The construction of a plan of joint activities demands an optimum understanding of the goals, the tasks of the activities, the clarification of the specifics of their object and even the possibilities at the disposal of each individual. The inclusion of communication in this process allows for the "coordination" or "lack of uncoordination" of the activities of individual participants. This coordination of the activities of separate individuals can be carried out owing to the functions of influencing intrinsic in communication which results in the enrichment of activities as well as their organisation. This then gives rise to new connections and relations between people.

When considering the complex character of communication, it is necessary to identify its structure to make possible the analysis of each of its elements. We suggest that the structure of communication be described by pointing out three interconnected aspects: the communicative, the interactive and the perceptive. The *communicative* aspect of communication, or communication in the narrow sense of the word, consists in the exchange of information between communicating individuals. The *interactive* aspect is found in the organisation of interaction between communicating individuals, i.e. in the exchange of actions as well as knowledge and ideas. The *perceptive* aspect of communication signifies the process of the partners' perception of each other based on this mutual understanding. These terms are, of course, extremely conditional. Sometimes others are applied, in which, for instance, communication is divided into three *functions*: the informational-communicative, the regulational-communicative and the affective-communicative.¹ The problem lies in the need to thoroughly

¹ See: B.F. Lomov, *Methodological and Theoretical Problems of Social Psychology*, p. 266.

analyse the content of each of these aspects, or functions, including on the experimental level. Of course, in reality each of these aspects does not exist in isolation from the other two, and their separation is only possible in analysis, and in particular in the construction of a system of experimental investigations. All of these established sides of communication appear in small groups, i.e. under the conditions of immediate contact between people. The question of the means and mechanisms of people's influence upon each other in joint mass actions must be examined separately. The processes of mental contamination (suggestion) and imitation in social psychology traditionally pertain to these mechanisms. Although each of these is, in principle, also possible in cases of immediate contact, they take on a far greater significance in situations of communication of large masses of people. Unfortunately, these problems are investigated in other scientific disciplines, particularly in sociology, to the detriment of social psychology. At the present stage it has not yet started to investigate these problems. Hence the difficulties in the study of the psychology of large groups.

**COMMUNICATION AS AN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION
(THE COMMUNICATIVE ASPECT OF
COMMUNICATION)**

Communication in the narrow sense of the word refers to the fact that, in the course of joint activities, people exchange various proposals, ideas, interests, moods, emotions, sets, etc. All of this can be considered as information, allowing the process of communication to be understood as a process of the exchange of information. In many systems of socio-psychological knowledge, the entire process of human communication is interpreted in terms of the theory of information. However, such an approach cannot be considered as methodologically correct, since highly important characteristics as, for example, *human communication* are omitted which are not reduced only to the process of transferring information. Still another substantial oversight here is that in this approach basically only one direction of the flow of information is considered, namely, the one from the communication to the recipient (the introduction of the concept of the "feedback connection" does not change anything). Only the formal aspect is analysed when human communication is investigated from the point of view of the theory of information: the way in which the information is *communicated*, but in actual fact, under the normal conditions of human communication, information is not only communicated, but also *formed, improved and developed*.

Therefore, in including the potential for the application of certain positions of the theory of information in describing the communicative aspect of communication, it is necessary to place precisely all the accents and to reveal the specifics in the very process of the information exchange going on in communication.

First, communication cannot be considered as the dispatch

of information through some sort of transmitting system or as its reception by another system because, unlike the simple "movement of information" between two systems, between two contraptions, we are here involved with the *relations* between two individuals, both being *active subjects*: their mutually informed state presupposes an adjusting of joint activities. This means that each participant in the communicative process also presupposes the activity of his partner. He cannot consider him simply an object. The other participant also appears as a subject and hence it is necessary, while directing the information towards him, *orientate*, on him, i.e. his motives, goals and attitudes must be analysed (an addition to the analysis of one's own goals, motives and attitudes, of course). In such an instance it is necessary to presume that the answer to the information sent forth will be *new* information sent back by the partner. Therefore, in the communicative process an active exchange of information takes place rather than just a simple "movement of information". According to Jaromir Janoušek, the main "increase" in a specifically human exchange of information is found in the special role the *significance of information* plays for each participant. Information acquires significance because people do not simply "exchange" meanings but attempt to derive some general *sense* from the exchange. This is possible only under the condition that the information is not simply received but also comprehended. Therefore each communicative process represents a unity of activities, communication and knowledge.

Secondly, the character of the exchange of information between people is different from the exchange of information between cybernetic devices because partners can *have influence* upon each other through a system of signs. In other words, an exchange of such information necessarily presupposes an *influence* on the behaviour of the partner, that is, the sign changes the condition of the participants of the communicative process (Alexei Leontiev asserted that in this sense the sign in communication is similar to the tool in work). The communicative influence arising here is nothing other than the psychological influence of one communicant on another with the purpose of changing his behaviour. The effectiveness of communication is measured by the success of this influence. This, in a definite sense, signifies the change of the *type of relations* which formed between the participants in communication. Nothing of the kind takes place in "pure" information processes.

Thirdly, the communicative influence as a result of an exchange of information is possible only when a person sending the information and a person receiving the information possess either the *same or similar systems of coding and decoding*. In everyday language, this rule is expressed in the phrase "everybody must speak the same language". This is especially important in the light of the fact that the communicator and recipient in the communicative process are constantly changing places. Any exchange of information between them is possible only under the conditions of the intersubjectivity of the sign, i.e. if the signs and, more importantly, the meaning fixed in them are known to all participants in the communicative process. Only by the acceptance of a single system of meaning can the mutual *understanding* of the partners be ensured. Social psychology borrows the linguistic term "thesaurus" for the description of this situation, signifying a common system of meanings accepted by all members of the group. But even *knowing* the meaning of the same words, people can have a different notion about them. Social, political and age differences are all potential reasons for this. Lev Vygotsky noted that "the idea is never equal to the meaning of the word." Therefore, in speech forms of communication the participants must possess an identical understanding of the situation of communication as well as identical lexical and syntactical systems. This is possible only with the inclusion of communication in a certain general system of activities.

Finally, specifically *communicative barriers* may arise in human communication. These barriers are not in any way connected with vulnerable positions in channels of communication or with errors in coding and decoding. They possess a sociological or psychological character. On the one hand, such barriers can arise due to the absence of a common understanding of the situation of communication, caused not merely by the various "languages" of the participants in the communicative process, but also by the distinctions of a deeper nature, existing between partners. These distinctions can be social, political, religious and professional, providing for different interpretations of the same concepts used in the process of communication, as well as various world outlooks. Such barriers are caused by objective social reasons, such as the membership of the partners in different social groups. When such distinc-

¹ L.S. Vygotsky, *Selected Psychological Investigations*, Moscow, 1956 p. 379 (in Russian).

tions surface, the inclusion of communication in a wider system of social relations comes into the limelight. The process of communication is, of course, realised despite the existence of these barriers: even military enemies conduct negotiations. But the whole system of the act of communication is complicated to a significant degree because of these barriers.

On the other hand, barriers in communication can have a more obviously expressed psychological character. They can arise on account of the individual psychological peculiarities of the communicating persons (excessive timidity, reticence of insociability, for instance), or due to a special type of psychological relations formed between them: hostility towards each other, distrust, and so on. In this instance, the connection between *communication* and *relation* absent in cybernetic systems, emerges rather distinctly. This posits the question on learning the rules of communication, in socio-psychological training, for example, which will be examined in detail below.

The stated peculiarities of human communication do not allow it to be considered only in terms of the theory of information. Certain terms of the given theory used for the description of this process require to be reconsidered. However, this does not exclude the possibility of borrowing some concepts from the theory of information. The concept of the "purposefulness of signals" can be used, for instance, in the construction of a typology of communicative processes. In the theory of communication this term can be divided into a) the *axial* communicative process, when the signals are directed towards a single receptor of the information, that is, towards individual people, and b) the *retial* communicative process, when the signals are directed towards a large number of addressees. The research of retial communicative processes acquires a special significance in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution in connection with the huge development of mass information. In this instance, a *social orientation* of the participants as well as the simple transfer of communication takes place, since the dispatching of the signals to the group forces the recipients to realise their belonging to the group. The ability of communication to create such an orientation testifies to the fact that the essence of the given process cannot be described only in terms of the information theory. The distribution of information in society goes through a unique "filter" of "trust" and "distrust". This filter works in such a way that absolutely true information can be considered unacceptable and false information, acceptable. It is extremely important

psychologically to explain under what circumstances one channel of information or another can be blocked by this filter. On the other hand, the means exist to aid in the acceptance of this information and to weaken the operation of the filter. *Fascination* fills this role, creating a certain supplementary "background", on which the basic information takes precedence, since the "background" partially overcomes the filter of mistrust. An example of fascination might be speech accompanied by music or light effects.

The information originating with the communicator can take on two forms: motivational and ascertaining.

Motivational information is expressed in orders, advice and requests. It is formulated in order to stimulate some sort of action. Stimulation can assume various forms. It can be *activation*, i.e. inducement to an action in a set direction; *interdiction*, i.e. also inducement but of a kind that prohibits unwanted types of activity, and *destabilisation*, the discord or disruption of certain autonomous forms of behaviour or activities.

Ascertaining information emerges in the form of communication. It is found in different educational systems and does not presuppose an immediate change of behaviour, although in the final account, the general rule of human communication applies in this instance, too. The character of communication itself can vary: it can be externally "neutral" or presupposing an active position of the communicator.

The transfer of any information is only possible through the use of signs, more precisely a *system of signs*. There are several systems of signs applied in the communicative process and the classification of communicative processes can be effected in relation to these systems. Verbal communication (the system of signs using speech) and non-verbal communication (the system expressed through unspoken signs) are two groups in a somewhat rough division. However, this second type demands a more detailed division. The research of recent years has provided a wealth of material in regard to the forms of non-verbal communication. Presently, there are four forms that can be set off: kinetic, paralinguistic, proximic and visual communication. Each of these groups has its own system of signs and therefore, for all practical purposes, there are five types of communicative processes. Each of these must be looked at separately.

Verbal communication uses human speech as its system of signs. It is a system of phonetic signs which includes two prin-

principles: lexical and syntactical. Speech is the universal means of communication, because during the transfer of information through speech, the least amount of meaning is lost. A high degree of communality of the awareness of the situation is necessary in this instance on the part of all participants in the communicative process. The coding and decoding of information is realised by means of speech. The communicator codifies information in the process of speaking, and the recipient decodes it in the process of listening.

From the point of view of the transfer and perception of the meaning of communication, the pattern *C-Co-R* (communicator-communication-recipient) is asymmetrical. For the communicator the meaning of the information *precedes* the process of codification (the statement) since he has a definite intention at the start. Then he incorporates this meaning in his system of signs. For the recipient, the meaning of the communication is revealed *simultaneously* with its decoding. The significance of the situation of joint activities is particularly manifest in this instance. Awareness of these activities is included in the process of decoding itself, while the revealment of the meaning of communication is very difficult outside this situation.

The precision of the recipient's understanding of the meaning of information becomes obvious to the communicator only when a shift in the "communicative roles" takes place, in other words, when the recipient becomes the communicator and through his statement reveals his perception of the meaning of information. Dialogue as a special type of "conversation" represents a consistent shift of communicative roles, in the course of which the meaning of the spoken communication is revealed. In point of fact, "an enrichment and development of the information" takes place here.

The measure of coordination in the actions of the communicator and the recipient in the situation of their alternating assuming of these roles depends to a large degree on their inclusion in the general context of activities. Czechoslovak researchers have conducted a number of experiments which reveal this dependence (in particular, the level of operation with the *common* meanings of signs used by the partners was established, the success of communication in the dialogue when partners ensure the thematic thrust of the information, and also its bilateral character).

Everything that was said about the essence of communication as a whole, wholly refers to the use of speech as a system of signs in the process of communication. This signifies that

not simply a "movement of information" takes place through speech, but the participants in communication influence one another in a special way, trying to convince one another, i.e. to cause a definite change of behaviour. Two different tasks can be present in the orientation of the partner in communication. Alexei Leontiev proposes designating them as *personal speech orientation* and *social speech orientation*,¹ which reflect not so much the various addressees of communication as the primary content of communication.

A large quantity of experimental studies have been performed to explain the conditions that promote the effects of spoken influence, particularly in the area of "persuasive communication". So-called experimental rhetoric, the art of persuasion through speech, has been developed on the basis of this research. Carl I. Hovland proposed the "matrix of persuasive communication", representing a model of speech communication process which designates each of its individual sections to take account of all the variables included in this process. The idea behind such a model (and there have been proposed several of them) is that not a single element of the communicative process be overlooked in order to promote an effective influence. This can be demonstrated by the simple model devised by Harold D. Laswell for the study of the persuasive influence of mass information. There are five elements included in Laswell's model of the communicative process:

Act of Communication

Who	Communicator
Says what	Content
In which channel	Media
To whom	Audience
With what effect	Effect ²

There is a considerable amount of research conducted in connection with each element of this outline. For example, the characteristics of the communicator are comprehensively described providing for increasing the effectiveness of his speech,

¹ See: A.A. Leontiev, "Communication as an Object of Psychological Research", *Methodological Problems of Social Psychology*, Moscow, 1975, p. 118 (in Russian).

² Harold D. Laswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society", in: *The Communication of Ideas*, Ed. by L. Bryson, New York-London, Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948, p. 37.

and types of his position during the communicative process are revealed in particular. There can be three such positions: *open*—the communicator openly declares himself a supporter of the stated point of view and evaluates the various facts to support this point of view; *aloof*—the communicator remains neutral, correlating the opposite points of view, which does not exclude his orientation on any of them though not openly declared; *closed*—the communicator keeps secret his own point of view, sometimes even resorting to special measures in order to hide it. Naturally, the content of each of these three positions is determined by the task and goal pursued in the communicative process, but what is important is that in principle each of the mentioned positions possesses definite possibilities for the promoting the effect of influence.

The means of promoting the influence of the *text of communication* have also been comprehensively studied. It is namely in this area that the methodics of content-analysis are applied, establishing definite proportions corresponding to various parts of the text. Work involving the study of the *audience* is of particular significance. The results of research in this area refute the view that logically and truly well-founded information automatically changes the behaviour of the audience. It has been explained (in the experiments of Joseph Thomas Klapper) that there is no automatism of any kind in the given instance: the most important factor turns out to be the mutual influence of the information and the orientations of the audience. This circumstance has given birth to a whole series of investigations on the role of the audience's orientations in the perception of information.

The examined schema plays a definite role in the cognition of the ways and means of influence in the process of communication. However, this and similar outlines determine only the structure of the process of communication, this process being a part of the more complex phenomenon of communication as a whole. Therefore, it is important to reveal the content also in this aspect of communication which consists in that the *mutual influence of people on one another* is realised in the process of communication. To describe the process of mutual influence in full, it is not enough to know the structure of the act of communication. It is also necessary to analyse the motives of the participants, along with their goals and orientations. For this, the systems of symbols must be considered which, together with speech communication, are included in the system of activities. The communicative

process would be incomplete if we did not consider the non-verbal means.

The first system of signs that needs to be pointed out is the optical-kinetic system which includes gestures, facial expressions and pantomime. This system makes use of the property of general motor functions, primarily of various parts of the body (hands, face, etc.), to express the emotional reactions of the individual. Therefore, the inclusion of the optical-kinetic system of signs in the situation of communication adds definite nuances to communication as a whole, which prove to be non-monosemantic in the use of the same gestures in various national cultures. (There is a well-known misunderstanding that takes place sometimes between a Russian and a Bulgarian because the movement of the head up and down signifies agreement for a Russian but disagreement for a Bulgarian). The significance of the optical-kinetic system of signs in communication is so great that there is presently a special line of research—kinetics—devoted to the study of these problems.

Paralinguistic and extralinguistic systems of signs also supplement verbal communication. The paralinguistic system is a system of vocalization, the quality of the voice, its range and tone. The extralinguistic system includes pauses in speech, coughing, crying, laughter and the tempo of speech itself. All of these supplements increase the semantically significant information not through additional speech information but by "near-speech" methods.

The *space and time organisation* of the communicative process form another system of signs and carry a semantic load as components of communicative situations. Thus, the partners facing each other, for instance, increases the opportunity for contact, symbolising attention to the speaker, just as a shout from behind can have negative connotations. The advantage of certain forms of the spatial organisation of communication have been experimentally demonstrated both for two partners in the communicative process and also in the case of large audience.

It is precisely these standards worked out in various cultures and subcultures with respect to relatively temporal descriptions of communication which emerge as supplements to semantically significant information. A timely start of diplomatic negotiations symbolises politeness in regard to the other party of the negotiations, whereas being late in such a situation is likely to be interpreted as disrespect. In certain special

spheres (especially in diplomatic ones), possible "tolerances" of tardiness and their corresponding meanings are worked out to the minutest detail.

Proximics has presently accumulated a large amount of experimental material at its disposal, concerning the standards of the space and time organisation of communication. The founder of proximics, Edward T. Hall, studied the first forms of the spatial organisation of communication for animals, calling proximics "spatial psychology". A special method was proposed for the evaluation of the intimacy of communication based in regard to humans on the study of the spatial organisation in this form of communication. This research has a large applied significance, primarily in the analysis of the success in the activities of various discussion groups. It has been demonstrated in a set of experiments what, for example, is the optimal arrangement of members of two discussion groups from the point of view of the "convenience" of the discussion. Of course, it is not the means of proximics that ensure success or failure in discussions; their content, trends and directions are determined by the higher levels of human activities. The optimal organisation of space in communication plays a definite role only "under similar other conditions", but even then they should be investigated.

Research has been conducted in this area in connection with specific sets of spatial and temporal constants of communicative situations. These more or less separate sets are given the name of "chronotops". The chronotops described are the chronotop of the "hospital ward" and the "wagon companion", for example. Specifics of the situation of communication sometimes create unexpected effects of influence, for instance, the not always explainable frankness with regard to the first meeting in the case of the "wagon companion". Research of such chronotops is still in an embryonic state, while it could help reveal the mechanisms of communicative influence to a significant degree.

There is still another specific system of signs used in the communicative process and that is eye contact found in the area of *visual* communication. Research in this area is closely connected with general psychological research in the area of *visual* perception—eye movement. Eye contact as a system of signs seems at first glance to hold very limited significance, depending on the intimacy of communication. In original research of this problem "eye contact" was referred

to the study of intimate communication. Michael Argyle even worked out a definite "formula of intimacy", explaining dependence of the degree of intimacy on the type of parameters such as the distance of communication, permitting the use of eye contact in different measures. The spectrum of such research has now become significantly wider. The signs connected with eye movement are included in a wider range of the situations of communication. In Soviet psychology in particular, a large amount of work is dedicated to the visual communication of children. It has been established that a child will primarily focus its attention on the human face. Experiments on adults show that this vital reaction itself is displayed on two horizontally located circles (an eye analogue). This phenomenon is extremely important for such professions as teaching and any profession connected to the sphere of management to say nothing of its significance in medical practice. Just like all other non-verbal means, eye contact is a supplement to verbal communication.

The general question of methodological character is important for the four systems of non-verbal communication. Each one involves its own system of signs which can be considered as a definite *code*. As was already mentioned above, every piece of information must be codified and more over so that the systems of codification and decodification are familiar to all participants in the communicative process. If the system of codification is more or less generally known in the instance of speech, in the instance of non-verbal communication it is important to determine what, in every instance, can be considered as a code and, mainly, to ensure each partner's understanding of the same code. In an adverse situation, the systems described do not provide any sort of semantic addition to verbal communication.

The concept of "semantically significant information" exists in the general theory of information. It is the quantity of information which is given not at the entrance of the system but at its exit, the information which "has an effect". In the process of human communication this concept can be interpreted as semantically significant information—namely, that information which influences the change of behaviour, the information that has meaning. All non-verbal systems of signs aid in revealing in full the semantic aspect of information. It is clear, however, that such a supplementary exposure of the meaning is possible only when the participants completely understand the signs and code used in

the communicative process. Some sort of units within each system of signs, analogous with the units in the system of speech, must be given precedence for the construction of a code understood by all involved. The problem of the establishment of such units in non-verbal systems is rather difficult; however, various attempts are being made at resolving it.

Ray L. Birdwhistell has made one of these attempts in the area of kinetiks. In developing the methodological problems of this field, he proposed the division of human body movements into units, basing his reasoning on a principle analogous with the principle of structural linguistics. Body movements are divided into units and then more complex constructs are formed from these units. The totality of these units represents a unique alphabet of body movements. The smallest semantic unit was proposed to be called the *kin* or *kineme* (analogous with the phoneme in linguistics). Although a separate kin has no significant meaning, when it changes, the entire structure changes, too. Kinomorphs are formed from kins (similar to phrases), which are perceived in situations of communication.

Entire "dictionaries" of body movements were compiled on this basis. Work even appeared on the "quantity" of kins in different national cultures. But Birdwhistell himself came to the conclusion that it was not yet possible to compile a satisfactory dictionary of body movements, since the concept of kins remained undefined and disputed.

Proposals concerning the compilation of a dictionary of gestures have a more local character. The existing attempts are not sufficiently strict (the question of units has yet to be solved), but nonetheless, a definite "catalogue" of gestures in various national cultures has been successfully compiled, though the problem of codes here remains unsolved.

Apart from the selection of units, there is still the question of the "localisation" of various expressive movements, gestures or body movements. A more or less monosemantic "grid" of the basic zones of the human face, body, arms, etc., is needed. Birdwhistell proposed the division of the body into eight zones: the face, head, right and left hand and foot, the upper half of the body and the lower half of the body as a whole. The point of the creation of a "dictionary" is primarily to associate units with definite zones. A "recording" of body movement is obtained in this case which adds to the monosemanticity, aiding in the fulfilment of the function of code. However, the indefinite state of the unit does not provide for the reliability of these methodics of recording.

A more modest variant was proposed for the recording of facial expressions. There are 20,000 descriptive facial expressions noted in literature. Paul Eckman proposed the methodics under the name FAST in order to somehow classify these expressions. The face is divided into three zones by horizontal lines (the eyes and forehead, nose and nose region and the mouth and chin). Six divisions of basic emotions are then made which are often reflected by means of expressions: joy, anger, surprise, disgust, fear and sadness. The fixation of emotions in each "zone" allows for the more or less definite registration of facial movements. These methodics are widely spread in medical practice (pathopsychology) and many attempts are presently made to apply them in normal situations of communication. However, in this case the problem of codes has still not been solved completely.

There is a large amount of research conducted in Soviet social psychology where the problems of non-verbal communication are solved through the consideration of problems of emotions in general psychology on the one hand and the principle of activities, on the other. It has been established in particular that joint activities increase the potential for a more precise reading of expressions and the optimal decoding of information.

Therefore, the analysis of all the systems of non-verbal communication shows that they undoubtedly play a large auxiliary role (and sometimes an independent one) in the communicative process. All the systems of non-verbal communication, in addition to their ability to increase or weaken the verbal influence, help to reveal such an essential parameter of the communicative process as the intention of its participants. The solution of methodological problems is necessary for their scientific study. These systems, along with the verbal systems of communication, ensure the exchange of information necessary for people in the organisation of joint activities.

Chapter Six

**COMMUNICATION AS INTERACTION
(THE INTERACTIVE ASPECT OF COMMUNICATION)**

The interactive side of communication is a conditional term, signifying those components of communication connected with the interaction of people and with the spontaneous organisation of their joint activities. Research into the problem of interaction has a long tradition in social psychology. This tradition is, however, very contradictory. On the one hand, there is a large amount of research into the problem of interaction, elaborating upon numerous experimental methods. There is a special theoretical orientation that the starting point of the analysis of interactions is based upon (interactionism). On the other hand, the place of interaction in the general mechanism of social behaviour and the social activities of the individual is explained extremely superficially. There is no precise solution, in particular, concerning the correlation of interaction and communication, the role of interaction in the structure of communication, and so on.

The connection between communication and interaction of people is intuitively rather obvious, but it is very difficult to separate these concepts and through this separation make experiment more precisely oriented. Some authors simply identify communication and interaction, interpreting them both as the communicative process (an exchange of information); others prefer to speak about the connected but nonetheless independent existence of communication and interaction. Part of these discussions are generated by terminological difficulties connected, in particular, with the fact that the term "communication" is used in both its broad and narrow sense.

If we adhere to the outlines proposed in describing the structure of communication, allowing communication in the broad sense of the word (as real interpersonal and social relations) to include communication in the narrow sense of the word (as an exchange of information), then it is logical to presume that interaction is the other aspect of communication—in comparison to the communicative aspect. The question “What other aspect?” still needs to be answered.

If the communicative process emerges on the basis of certain joint activities, then the exchange of knowledge and ideas with regard to these activities inevitably presupposes that the mutual understanding reached is realised in the new joint attempts for further organisation and development of these activities. The participation of a large number of people simultaneously in these activities signifies that each one must make his own special contribution, permitting the interpretation of interaction as the organisation of joint activities.

It is extremely important for the participants during the course of interaction to organise an “exchange of actions” and to plan common activities, as well as to exchange information. Under this planning, the regulation of the actions of one individual is possible “by means of plans maturing in the head of another”¹, making activities really collective. This takes place when the carrier of the activities emerges as the group rather than the individual. Therefore, the question about the “other” aspect of communication revealed in the concept of “interaction” can now be answered: it is that aspect which represents not only an exchange of signs which change the behaviour of the other partner, but also the organisation of *joint actions*, permitting the group to realise certain joint activities for its members. Such a solution to the question excludes the isolation of interaction from communication, and also excludes their identification. Communication is organised in the course of joint activities, “with regard to them”. It is namely in this process that the exchange of both information and the very activities is necessary, working out the forms and standards of joint actions. The interactive side of communication is revealed, therefore, in the description of human actions which are also a part of interaction.

There have been several attempts in the history of social

¹ B.F. Lomov, *Methodological and Theoretical Problems of Social Psychology*, p. 253.

psychology to describe the structure of this interaction. The so-called "theory of action", or the "theory of social action", in which the description of an individual action was proposed, has been widely spread. Sociologists Max Weber, Pitirim Sorokin and Talcott Parsons and others have addressed this idea. An attempt was made in Talcott Parsons' work, in particular, to outline the general categorial apparatus for the description of the structure of social actions.

According to Parsons, interpersonal interactions lie at the basis of the whole system of human activities. Specific elements of these interactions are: a) the figure, b) the "other" (object that the action is directed towards), c) standards (the interaction is organised upon), d) values (shared by each participant), e) situation (in which the action is realised).

The proposed outline of action proved to be unsuccessful. It was so abstract that it held no significance for the theoretical analysis of specific types of action. The very principle of the separation of certain abstract elements in the structure of interactions was methodologically incorrect. It is in general impossible to grasp the profound side of actions under such an approach because it is determined by the content of social activities as a whole. The idea to begin the analysis from the content of social activities formed in Soviet social psychology, and proceed from this point to the structure of separate actions was then turned to, that is, to go in the exactly opposite direction.

There have been other attempts to construct a structure of interactions. The latter are not divided into separate acts but rather into the stages that interaction goes through: spatial contact, mental contact, social contact, etc. The construction of these stages, although interesting in itself, was not lacking in the deficiencies typical of the preceding attempt. Spatial and mental contact in this outline emerge as a prerequisite for the individual act of interaction. In present-day experiments, the majority of researchers work with the phenomenon of interaction as such, without making satisfactory attempts to establish their anatomy.

They often turn to constructing the classification of the interaction. It can be stated without a doubt that people enter into an endless amount of various types of interaction. It is extremely important for experimental research that at least certain basic types of these interactions be identified. The dichotomic division of interactions into two opposite

types, *cooperation* and *competition*, is more widely spread. Different authors use different terms to designate these two basic types. In addition to cooperation and competition there are agreement and conflict, adaptation and opposition, association and disassociation, and so on. The division of the various types of interaction is clear in all of these concepts. In the first case, such manifestations are analysed which promote the organisation of joint activities appearing as positive from this point of view. The second group pertains to those interactions which, in one way or another, "undermine" joint activities, being definite obstacles for joint activities themselves.

Hans Hiebsch and Manfred Vorweg offer a specific point of view with regard to this question. They consider cooperation to be the more specific type of interaction. It emerges as the basic subject of social psychology. The goal of the discipline must be the search for the collective power potential arising in cooperation. The authors cited the ideas of Marx on the significance of cooperation emphasising the importance not only of the appearance of new power forming from the merging of many powers, but also of the "mere social contact" which "begets in most industries an emulation and a stimulation of the animal spirits that heighten the efficiency of each individual workman".² In the opinion of Hiebsch and Vorweg the very task of the search for the general description of cooperation stands before social psychology, because it leads to the summarising, levelling out and organising of many powers included in a single activity. One of the most important tasks in social psychology is undoubtedly included in this approach, especially in socialist society. However, an absolute is also not to be made from the study of *only* cooperation. Another type of interaction connected with conflict and competitive types of relation also has great significance.

Traditional social psychology long ago turned away from the concept of conflict as a purely negative phenomenon. At present in the West, a lot of work is devoted to the analysis of the positive and negative sides of conflict. Serge Moscovici justifiably remarks that there are definite ideological requirements behind this research connected in particular with

¹ See: H. Hiebsch und M. Vorweg, *Einführung in die marxistische Sozialpsychologie*, p. 159.

² Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 309.

the necessity to explain conflicts as "legal" forms of relations in the conditions of capitalist society.

The attempt of American researcher Morton Deutsch to interpret the Marxist concept of class conflict as an "ordinary form", an ordinary type of socio-psychological interaction is well known. This attempt is very vulnerable, first of all due to the lack of indication of the type of society in which the relations between classes are considered. Although it is obvious that every conflict has its psychological side, it must be kept in mind that such a conflict arose through objective social factors. It cannot be reduced to a simple psychological "opposition" of two partners. The recognition of the possible problem of the conflict in social psychology requires the precise designation of the specifics in the analysis of this phenomena in the framework of the given scientific discipline. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to construct a definite theoretical outline in which this phenomenon can be examined in social psychology, with the goal of determining its particular point of view on this problem. According to Marxist social psychology, the measurements in the psychological analysis of the conflict cannot apply to the study of social conflicts on the macrolevel. Unlike sociology, where the main task is the exposure of the objective nature of social conflicts, social psychology must focus its attention on two questions: on the analysis of *secondary* socio-psychological aspects in each conflict (realisation of the conflict by its participants, for example), and on the singling-out of an *individual* class of conflicts caused by specific socio-psychological factors. Both of these tasks can be successfully solved only under the existence of an adequately understood outline of research. It must involve at least four basic characteristics of the conflict: the structure, dynamics, function and typology. The analysis of each of these four characteristics also exists in traditional social psychology. However, the study of such characteristics must be subjected to the two demands of social psychology named above. It cannot be said that this task has been solved in full in present-day Soviet social psychology, although several such attempts have been made. Meanwhile, the problem in researching the conflict has many practical supplementary aspects, primarily in the working out of various forms of relations to research (permission, prevention, lessening of the conflict, etc.).

In studying various forms of interaction in Soviet social psychology, special attention is devoted to the analysis of

socialist competition as a special form of interaction, not easily transferred to the other side of the dichotomy: cooperation-competition. A very complex union of the moments of cooperative activities (mutual assistance and collaboration), and moments characterised by competition (rivalries and contests), takes place in socialist competition. Competitiveness as a general attempt of the individual to "realise" himself is combined here with the attempt to help another person. Thus a special type of activeness of the individual is formed, called "competitive activeness". It is caused by the specifics of motivation in socialist competition and also the specifics of those special relations which form during the course of competition. A special complex of problems is given precedence in social psychology in connection with the analysis of the individual—namely, in this specific type of activeness. The formation of such orientations has extremely important consequences for the surmounting of conflicts arising in the course of competition. Therefore, the examination of such a form of interaction is not possible in the abstract plan and requires study in the context of real collectives.

The specific nature of relations arising in the course of socialist competition once again bears witness to the possibility of a more general requirement forming in Marxist social psychology concerning the necessity to include the content analysis in the study of any socio-psychological phenomena. Analysis only of the forms of the research into interaction proves to be insufficient. The principled importance of the problem of the content of activities, in which one form of interaction or another is realised, becomes obvious. The content of these activities can vary greatly. A cooperative form of interaction can be established, for instance, in the fulfilment of some kind of asocial, criminal acts—gang robbery etc., as well as in the conditions of production. Therefore, not every form of cooperation requires stimulation. On the contrary, activities disputable in the case of asocial activities can be positively evaluated in other circumstances. Cooperation and competition are only forms of the "psychological pattern" of interaction. The content in this and other instance is determined by a wider system of activities that includes cooperation or competition. Therefore, when analysing these two types of interaction, an analysis of the social context of activities is necessary.

Although the division of two polar types of interaction also plays a definite role in the analysis of the interactive

side of communication, it proves to be insufficient for experimental practice. Therefore there is a search in social psychology for a division of more "particular" types of interaction which could be used in the experiment as units of observation. Robert F. Bales made one of the well-known efforts to this effect, working out a pattern, which permitted the registration of various types of interactions in the groups according to one plan.¹

Bales' schema received rather wide-spread popularity regardless of a group of critical remarks made in its address. One of them said the twelve categories proposed by Bales for the description of interactions had no logical basis, just as the introduction of three, four or five groups of such categories was illogical. The obvious question arose as to why these twelve descriptions of all possible types of interaction were exhaustive. The second objection involved the absence of a single foundation in the proposed enumeration of interactions this division was based on. The list included alternately both purely communicative manifestations of the individual (relating to the sphere of the exchange of information, the statement of opinion), and their spontaneous manifestations in "actions" (the rejecting of the "other" during the execution of some sort of action). The main argument that keeps this schema from gaining too large a significance is its complete omission of the content description of general group activities (only formal moments of interactions are included).

Here we run up against a very important methodological question yet to be concretely answered in traditional social psychology: whether or not the content side of activities is revealed in methods of socio-psychological research. A negative answer is implied in traditional approaches. This inability is, even more so, considered as a distinctive feature of social psychology. It is included in the determination of the subject of this discipline which, according to such a point of view, must investigate only those forms of interactions which answer the question "How?" but not the question "What?". The isolation from the social context is justifiable in this instance. All the methods relying on the basis of such theoretically-based positions will inevitably appeal only to the formal aspect of interactions. They can be applied in the absence of other methods at the definite stage of development of social psycholo-

¹ See: R.F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups*, Cambridge, Mass, Addison-Wesley Press, 1950.

gy, but it must be remembered that they give information relative to only one component of interaction—its form.

In traditional social psychology the difficulty in an experimental study of the content side of interactions generated a tendency to simplify the situation of analysis and to concentrate attention primarily on the research of interaction in the dyad. This sort of research conducted within the framework of the "dyadic interactionism" theory is an example of how little even the most thorough study of the process form does in providing for the understanding of its essence. The well-known mathematical game theory "prisoner's dilemma" is applied in the research of "dynamic interactions" investigated in detail by John Thibaut and Georg Kelly. A dyad has been worked out in the experiment. Two prisoners are incarcerated and deprived of the possibility to communicate. A matrix is constructed, demonstrating their possible strategies of interaction under interrogation, where each will answer not knowing precisely how the other has answered. Taking the two extreme possibilities of their behaviour, "confession" or "denial", the result will then vary, depending on the alternative each prisoner chooses. Four situations can emerge from the combinations of their different strategies: both confess, the first confesses and the second doesn't, the second confesses and the first doesn't, or neither confesses. The matrix fixes these four possible combinations and then advantages for each "player" are counted, which occur in the various combinations of these strategies. This "advantage" is also the "solution" in every model of the game situation. The application in the given instance of certain positions of game theory creates an alluring perspective not only for the precise description, but also for the prognosis of the behaviour of each participant in the interaction. However, numerous limitations now arise, which entail the application of these methods to the real situations of human interactions. To begin with two types of game are examined in game theory: one with a zero and one with a non-zero sum. The first type presumes that the advantage of one participant is exactly equal to the disadvantage of the other. This situation is rarely met in real interactions even of only two participants. As far as the games of a non-zero sum, found quite often in real manifestations of human behaviour, are concerned, their apparatus is significantly more complicated and the degree of formalisation is

significantly less. It is no coincidence that they are less often applied in socio-psychological research. The applied game apparatus with a zero sum leads to extreme impoverishment of the real interactions of people. In numerous situations the interactions of people very seldom resemble the prisoners in working out a strategy of their behaviour. Of course, these methodics cannot be rejected because in formally analysing the strategy of interactions, they permit the establishment of certain means for constructing such strategies. This also explains the potential application of methods in certain special investigations.

On the whole, the existing patterns of the analysis of interactions in traditional social psychology in the majority of instances completely separate interactions from the broad social context.

At the same time, the importance of the interactive side of communication led to the formation of a special direction in the history of social psychology which considers interactions as the starting point of every socio-psychological analysis. The name George Herbert Mead is closely linked with this trend, which was given the name of "symbolic interactionism".

Following William James, Mead explained the social nature of the human "self" stating that interaction played a decisive role in the formation of this "self". He also used the ideas of Charles Cooley with regard to the so-called "looking-glass self". The personality is understood as a sum-total of man's mental reactions to the opinion of other people. However, with Mead, this question is solved in a more complicated manner. The formation of the "self" actually occurs under the influence of others, but not due to the fact that people are, in essence, simple reactions to the opinions of others, but because this influence is realised in situations of joint activities. The personality is formed in them, becoming conscious of itself within them, not simply as that viewed through others, but acting jointly with them, particularly with the "significant other". A person's notion of himself, of his own "self", forms in conformity with this. Following William James, Mead divided the "self" into an "I" and a "me". The "I" is the impulsive, creative side of the "self", a spontaneous answer to the demands of the situation. The "me" is a reflection of the "self", a standard for controlling the activities of the "I" from the point of view of social interactions, which also require conformity with them. The constant reflection of the "I" through the "me" is needed

for the maturity of the personality, because it promotes the personality's adequate perception of itself and its characteristic actions.

Therefore the idea that the personality forms in interactions with other individuals, comparing his actions with those pertaining to him that have developed in his acquaintances is central in the interactionist conception. Mead's theory contains substantial methodological miscalculations in spite of the importance of positing the problem.

First, the role of *symbols* in this concept is given too great significance. The outline of interactions described above is determined by a system of symbols, meaning activities and behaviour of the individual in situations of interactions in the final analysis depend on the symbolic interpretation of these situations. And although society to a definite degree regulates the actions of the individual through symbols, Mead made an absolute of this role, attributing the entire accumulation of social relations *only* to the existence of symbols.

Here lies the second important miscalculation in the conception of symbolic interactionism. Interaction is here again separated from the *content* of object-related activities on account of the fact that the wealth of macrosocial relations of the individual are essentially ignored. Only the relations of spontaneous interactions remain as the sole "representative" of social relations. Since the symbol remains as the "last" social determinant of interactions, the analysis is limited only by the description of the *given* field of interactions. It is not spread out over broad social connections where the given act of interactions is located. A certain "closing" of interactions in a fixed group occurs. Of course, such an aspect of analysis is also possible and quite necessary for social psychology, although it is obviously insufficient.

Although the question of social determinants of interaction is posed in this concept, its solution has been simplified. The "generalised other", who must carry social influence within itself, has yet to be generalised in the full sense of the word. He has been excluded from any aspect of content activities present only in "purely" communicative acts. Therefore, although Mead's theory is called the theory of symbolic *interactionism*, meaning that it places emphasis on interactions, it does not, in essence, distinguish between the two different sides in communication as an exchange of information and an organisation of joint activities. It is no coin-

cidence that many supporters of this theory use the concepts of "communication" and "interaction" synonymously.¹

Although Mead's approach to the analysis of interactions differs principally from Bales' theory or the theory of dyadic interaction, the basic methodological miscalculation remains the same. The processes of interaction are divorced from the context of those real activities they grow out of. And if this connection between communication and activities (or any of its sides) is broken the result of this break is an immediate divorce of the observation of all these processes from the broad social background they occur in. The limitation which was caused by the refusal to study the content side of communications is especially obvious in the example of research into interactions in traditional social psychology.

The only condition under which this profound moment can be grasped involves consideration of interactions as forms of the organisation of people's specific activities. The general psychological theory of activities also formulates certain principles for socio-psychological research in the given instance. Similar to that in individual activities, its goal can exist not on the level of separate actions, but on the level of activities as such. In social psychology the meaning of interactions is revealed only given their inclusion in certain general activity. The consideration of interactions as forms of the organisation of activities is a concrete means of their "inclusion" in the context of activities. Here the obvious transfer to the study of the *group*, in which these joint activities are realised, takes place. The most important task of social psychology forms under this psychological analysis of joint activities, although the very category "joint activities" is not a purely psychological category, just as the category of "activities" in general is not. Alexei Leontiev's works convincingly show why the category of "activities", and in particular "joint activities", justifiably exists in the system of psychological science. In any case of joint activities, the division of these activities is realised between all participants, meaning that definite relations occur among them, where every partner perceives another, evaluates his contribution to the joint activities, "examines" the strategy and motives of the other, etc. Therefore, the definite correlation of individual "contributions"

¹ See: Timotsu Shibutani, *Society and Personality. An Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., 1961.

made by the participants in a single process of activities make up the psychological content of the various forms of joint activities. These contributions can only be determined when all the numerous models in the construction of activities are revealed. Three possible forms or models are presented in Soviet social psychology for the organisation of joint activities: 1) "joint-individual activities"—when each individual does his part of the general work independently of the others (example: certain production teams where each has his own assignment); 2) "joint-consecutive activities"—when the general task is fulfilled consecutively by each participant (example: conveyor); 3) "joint-mutual-action activities"—when the interactions of each participant simultaneously have a part with all the others (example: a sports team, a designer's office).¹ The psychological "pattern" of interactions is unique in each of these models and experimental research establishes this picture in each specific instance.

In the experimental research of S. V. Sarkisyan, for example, the varying degree of closeness of cooperative connections (brought about by different types of joint activities in the shops of one industrial enterprise) was shown to generate completely different descriptions of the processes of interpersonal perception (the varying capacity of fixed traits of another person, the different structure of perceived signs), causal attributes (the primary registration of definite groups of signs), etc.²

However, the task of the research of interactions does not end here. The interactions of *relations* forming between participants still must be analysed. This system of human interactions is fundamentally different from the "distribution" of obligations, or functions which may exist in automatic systems.

If the process of communication as a whole emerges only as a reality of social and interpersonal relations, the each of its sides, including interaction, is realised if there are definite relations of both the first and second plans. Social relations "are present" in interactions thanks to real social activities, a part of which (or a form of organisation of

¹ See: L.I. Umansky, "Methods of Experimental Research of Socio-Psychological Phenomena", in: *Methodology and Methods of Social Psychology*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 57-58 (in Russian).

² See: *Interpersonal Perception in the Group*, Ed. by G. M. Andreyeva and A. I. Dontsov, Moscow University Publishers, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian).

which) are interactions. Interpersonal relations are also "present" in interactions. They determine both that *type* of interaction which arises in the specific given conditions (be they cooperation or rivalry), and the *degree* to which this type of interactions is expressed (whether cooperation will be more or less successful). The emotional basis inherent in the system of interpersonal relations, which generates various values, orientations and precepts of partners in communication, "colours" interactions. But at the same time this emotional shading (positive or negative) of interactions cannot determine in full their existence or absence: interactions exist even in the conditions of "bad" interpersonal relations in a group. To what degree they are determined by interpersonal relations and to what degree they are "subjected" to the social activities carried out by the group depends both on the level of development of the given group and on the system of social relations the group exists in. Therefore abstract examination is arbitrarily chosen from the context of activities of interactions lacking in meaning. The *motivation* of the participants in interactions cannot be revealed in each specific act, because they are generated by a wider system of activities.

It is precisely in the conditions of this lack of meaning and the description of specific manifestations of interactions outside the content of social activities that these interactions unfold. In principle, interactions are "equal" in their form of appearance. This is quite obvious in the example of contemporary research of "altruistic behaviour". Does altruistic behaviour of an individual promote his becoming a criminal? In the context of traditional research, the answer would be affirmative, but in the real social situation, it would be negative. Strictly speaking, the limits of a single act of interaction are insufficient in the determination of the type of interaction being observed in the given investigation. Only a wider social context permits an answer to that question.

Moreover, it is important to explain what relation the hierarchy of each participant's activities has to the general activities. The fact that each individual *realises* his contribution to the general activities has significance here. It is namely this realisation which helps him to correct his strategy in interactions. It is obvious that the degree of understanding between partners in interactions depends on the success of the organisation of their jointly coordinated actions which allow for the possibility of their "exchange". In the given instance, as in any situation of communication, "an equal understanding

of the situation" is required, revealing in particular the concepts of strategy and tactics of the partners' behaviour. The strategy and tactics of interactions can only be worked out on the basis of mutual understanding. Moreover, if the strategy of interaction is determined by the character of those general relations presupposed by performed social activities, then the tactics of interaction are determined by the spontaneous notion about the partner. It is the unity of these two moments that also creates a real situation of interaction. Its most important characteristic is the joint decision-making. Therefore, the way, the intentions, motives, and orientations of one individual "are superimposed" on his notion about the partner and the way they are displayed in the acceptance of the joint decision must be explained to understand the mechanism of interaction. In other words, the future analysis of the problem of communication requires a more detailed consideration of how the image of the partner is formed in communication, since success in joint activities depends on the precision of this image.

Chapter Seven

**COMMUNICATION AS PEOPLE'S PERCEPTION OF
EACH OTHER
(THE PERCEPTIVE ASPECT OF COMMUNICATION)**









As was already established, there must be a mutual understanding between participants in the process of communication. This mutual understanding can, however, be interpreted in different ways: either as the understanding of the goals, motives, and orientations of the partner in interaction, or as not only the understanding but also the *adoption* of these goals, motives and orientations, permitting not simply a "conformity of action" but also establishing a special type of relations of closeness and affection that are expressed in emotions of friendship, sympathy and love. These two sides of mutual understanding serve as a basis for two lines of research: in the first instance—analysis of interactions and in the second—analysis of so-called "attractions". However, in both instances how the partner is perceived has great significance. In other words, the process of one person perceiving another emerges as an obligatory component part of communication.

Before revealing the characteristics of this aspect of communication, the terms applied here must be clarified. Jerome Seymour Bruner's introduction of the term "social perception" signified the social determination of perceptive processes. Later on in socio-psychological research, however, it took on a different meaning. "Social perception" began to be called the process of perception of so-called "social objects", implying different people, social groups and large social communities. It is namely in this sense that the given term is rooted in socio-psychological literature. Therefore, the perception of an individual by another person pertains to the field of social perception, but does not exhaust it. If we imagine the schematic processes of social perception in their full capacity,

then we will end up with a very complex outline (see Fig. 1). The outline includes different variants of both the subject and object perceived. When the individual is the subject of perception, he can perceive another individual belonging to his "own" group (1); another individual belonging to "another's" group (2); his own group (3); "another's" group (4). If large social communities, also perceivable in principle, are included, then four different processes also take place in this instance, each one possessing its own special features. Matters become even more complicated when a group, rather than an individual, emerges as the subject perceived. Then it is necessary to add to the list of social processes of perception the group's perception of its own member (5), the group's perception of a representative of another group (6), the group's perception of itself (7), and the group's perception of the other group as a whole (8). Although this second case is not traditional, almost every one of the "cases" mentioned here is investigated in social psychology under different terminology. Thus, the group's perception of its own member is revealed in any sociometrical procedure. In essence, all research in ethnic psychology is devoted to the group's perception of the individual belonging to another group. The group's perception of itself is found in those cases when the self-assessment of the group is studied, and the group's perception of another group relates to the field of intergroup relations currently very popular in social psychology.

When analysing the problem of mutual understanding between partners in communication, it is expedient to speak not about social perception in general (meaning not about all the variants designated in the schema) but about interpersonal perception (which obviously corresponds only to positions 1 and 2). It is namely the direct inclusion of these processes in communication that is considered here.


There is still another point that must be clarified. The perception of social objects, as it has been successfully explained in a great deal of experimental research, possesses such a large number of specific traits that the use of the word "perception" seems to be lacking precision. In any case, a group of phenomena found during the formation of the notion about another individual does not fit into the traditional description of the perceptive process in general psychology. Therefore, the search for a more precise term to signify the described process continues in socio-psychological literature. The basic goal of this search is found in the need to include in a fuller capacity some other cognitive processes in the pro-



S **Subject of perception**

O **Object of perception**

 **The individual**

 **The group**

cess of perception of another person, such as, for example, the process of realisation of another person, and so on. Many researchers prefer in this instance to apply the French expression *connaissance d'autrui*, signifying not so much the "perception of the other" as the "knowledge of the other". In Soviet psychological literature the expression "knowledge of another person" is often used as a synonym for "perception of another person".¹

This broader concept was brought about by specific traits of the perception of social objects. The perception of an object's physical characteristics, as well as the formation of the notion about his intentions, thoughts, abilities, emotions, orientations, etc. relate to this concept. The content of social perception also includes the formation of notions about those relations which link up the subject and object of perception. It was namely this which permitted Bruner to assert that supplementary factors hold an especially great significance in the processes of perception of social objects, while playing a less than essential role in perceptive processes in general. Thus, such character traits as the selectiveness of perception are very uniquely revealed here, since the significance of the goals of the perceiving subject, his past experience, etc. are included in the process of selection. The fact that the new impressions about the object of perception are categorised on the basis of similarity with previous impressions provides a basis for the origin of stereotypes. Although all these phenomena have been experimentally registered also in the perception of physical objects (in the experiment of binocular competition, for example), their significance in the area of people's perception of each other increases to an enormous degree.

The idea concerning the *active* part of the subject of perception in transactions was also emphasised in the research of "transaction psychology" (Paul Cantrell, William Ittelson, Franklin Peirce Kilpatrick), the role of expectations, wishes, intentions and the past experience of the subject as specific determinants of the perceptual situation. Taking into account all these circumstances is especially important when the knowledge of the other person is considered as a component part of the process of communication, as a basis not only for the understanding of the partner, but also for the establishment of coordinated actions with him, including relations of intimacy, affection and others.

¹ See: A.A. Bodalev, *A Person's Perception and Understanding of Another Person*, Moscow, 1982 (in Russian).

In the most general plan, it can be said that the perception of another person signifies the perception of his external signs, their coordination with the personal characteristics of the perceived individual and the interpretation on the basis of his actions.

Since a person always enters communication as a personality, he is perceived by another person, a partner in communication—also as a personality. We, in the words of the distinguished Soviet psychologist Sergei Rubinstein, seem to “read” the other person, deciphering the meaning of his external data on the basis of the *external* side of behaviour.¹ The impressions arising here play an important regulating role in the process of communication. First, because in perceiving another, the perceiving individual is himself formed. And secondly, because success of coordinated actions with another person depends on the measure of precision in the “reading” of this other person.

The notion about the other person is closely connected with the level of personal self-awareness. This is a double connection. On the one hand, the wealth of notions about oneself also determines the wealth of notions about the other person. On the other hand, the more completely the other person is revealed (in a greater number and in deeper characteristics), the more fully developed the notion about himself becomes. This question was posed by Marx, “...man first sees and recognizes himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind.”² Although in the case of Marx, the given question is analysed with regard to philosophy, its posing and solution also have great methodological significance for the socio-psychological analysis. Looking at another person, like in a looking-glass is possible not only on the plane of a broadly abstract approach to the notion of oneself, but also in each specific situation of communication. We can find the same idea, in essence, on the plane of *psychological* analysis in the works of Lev Vygotsky. “The personality becomes for itself that which it is in itself, through what it presents to others.”³ We can see here the similarity in form to Mead’s idea, who introduced the image of the “generalised other” into the analysis of

¹ S.L. Rubinstein, *Principles of Psychological Development*, Moscow, 1959, p. 180 (in Russian).

² Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 59.

³ L.S. Vygotsky, *The Development of Higher Mental Functions*, Moscow, 1960, p. 196 (in Russian).

interaction. However, if Mead's idea was the generalised image of the individual included only in the situation of spontaneous interaction, Marx's reasoning has a different character in principle. When he says that Peter perceives his nature through Paul, it is presumed that *society*, an enormous quantity of people stands behind Paul, connected through a complex system of relations. If this reasoning is applied to the concrete situation of communication, then it can be said that the notion about oneself is formed through the notion of other forms inevitably under the conditions that this "other" is not taken abstractly, but in the framework of broad social activities including interactions.

The individual "correlates" himself with another person primarily in the development of joint solutions. In the course of the cognition of another person, several processes are simultaneously realised: the emotional evaluation of this other, the attempt to understand the structure of his actions, the basic strategy of the change in his behaviour, and the construction of the strategy of his own behaviour. However, this process includes a minimum of two people and each of them is an active subject. Consequently, the correlation of oneself with another is realised seemingly from two sides: each of the partners likens himself to another. This means that in the construction of a strategy of interaction, *each* must take into account not only the demands, motives and orientations of another, but also how this other understands *his* own demands, motives and orientations. All of this leads to the idea that the analysis of self-awareness through another includes two sides: *identification* and *reflection*. Each of these concepts demands special discussion.

Although the concept of "identification" was primarily developed more completely in psychoanalysis, it is used in different theoretical systems. It expresses the empirical fact, established in a number of experimental investigations, that the likening of oneself to another is the simplest means of understanding another person. This is, of course, not the only means, but in real situations of interaction people use this method and judge the internal condition of the partner in communication, attempting to put themselves in his place. Identification emerges therefore as one of the mechanisms of cognising and understanding of the other person. A lot of experimental investigations exist of the process of identification and of finding out its role in the process of communication. A close connection is established, in particular between identification

and *empathy* (two phenomena somewhat similar in content).

Empathy is also defined as a means for the understanding of another person. However, in the given instance it is more of an attempt to emotionally conceive the problems of the other person rather than just to comprehend them. Empathy opposes understanding in the strict sense of the word. The word "understanding" is used in the given instance only in a metaphorical sense. Empathy is affective "understanding". Its emotional nature manifests when the problems of another person, the partner in communication for example, are not "thought through" so much as they are "felt through". The mechanism of empathy is similar to the mechanism of identification in certain traits. And in both instances there is the question of the ability to put oneself in another's place, to look at things from his point of view. However, looking at things from someone's point of view does not necessarily signify an identification of oneself with that person. If I identify myself with someone, this means I form my behaviour in the way the "other" forms his behaviour. If I show empathy to him, I am simply aware of his line of behaviour (relating to it sympathetically), but I am able to form my own behaviour differently. In both instances, the behaviour of the other person is taken into account, but the result of our joint actions will be different: it is one thing to understand the partner in communication, *standing* in his place and acting from it, and it is another thing to understand him, learn his point of view, even sympathise with it, but act according to one's own point of view. Both of these aspects are important, and both of them have a definite experimental tradition of research in social psychology.

Both instances require the solution to still one more question from the point of view of the description of communication: How will this "other", the partner in communication, understand me? Our interaction will depend on this. In other words, the process of understanding one another becomes more "complicated" through the phenomenon of *reflexion*. In this instance the meaning of "reflexion" is not the one used in philosophy as the subject's knowledge of the subject itself, but in a somewhat more conditional meaning. Reflexion in social psychology is understood as the realisation by the acting individual of the way he is perceived by the partner in communication. This is not simply the knowledge or understanding of the other, but the knowledge of the way the other understands me, the unique doubled process of mirror reflections of one another. It is "the deep consistent mutual reflection, containing the reproduc-

tion of the internal world of the partner in interaction and, moreover, in this internal world in its turn the internal world of the first researcher is reflected."¹

The tradition of research of reflexion in social psychology is a rather old one. At the end of the last century O. Holmes, in describing the situation of dyadic communication between a certain John and Henry, asserted that in reality there is a minimum of six people acting in this situation: John as he really is (in Holmes' words, "as God created him"); John as he sees himself; John as he is seen by Henry.² Correspondingly, there are the same three "positions" for Henry. Later on, Theodore Newcomb and Charles Cooley increased the number to eight people, adding another stage of reflexion to each side. The number of these mutual "reflexions" is, in principle, unlimited, but for practical purposes in experimental research, they are usually limited to two steps of this process. Hans Hiebsch and Manfred Vorweg produced models of reflexion in a general way. They designated the participants of communication as *A* and *B*. Then the general model of the formation of the reflexive structure in situations of dyads can be represented in the following way.

There are two partners, *A* and *B*. Between them is established communications *A-B* and reverse information on the reaction of *B* to *A*, *B-A*. In addition to this, both *A* and *B* have notions about themselves, *A'* and *B'*, and also notions about the "other"; *A* has a notion of *B-B'* and *B* has a notion of *A-A'*. Interaction in the communicative process is realised thus: *A* speaks as *A'*, relating to *B''*. *B* reacts as *B'* to *A''*. Since all of this is so close to the real *A* and *B*, further investigation is necessary because neither *A* nor *B* know that they are not corresponding with objective reality *A'*, *B'*, *A''* and *B''*. Between *A* and *A''*, and also between *B* and *B''* there are no channels of communication. It is clear that communication will be most successful when the least amount of breaks in the lines *A-A'-A''* and *B-B'-B''* occur. The significance of this correspondence is easily shown in the example of the interactions of the orator and the audience. If orator (*A*) has an uncertain notion about himself (*A'*), about the audience (*B''*) and, most importantly, about the way in which the audience perceives him (*A''*), his mutual

¹ I.S. Kon, *The Discovery of "Self"*, Moscow, 1978, p. 110 (in Russian).

² See: Joseph Edward McGrath, *Social Psychology. A Brief Introduction*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1964.

understanding with the audience will be excluded and, consequently, interaction also. Approaching the whole complex of notions is a complicated process requiring special efforts. A varied socio-psychological training in the development of perceptive capabilities is one way of achieving it.

The construction of models of the above type plays an important role on the theoretical and experimental plane. However, in Soviet research the analysis of reflexive structures of the group united by a single joint activity acquires a greater significance than the model of dyadic interaction. Then the pattern of occurring reflexions is explained not from its own position but from the general context of both the activity and the interpersonal relations applied in this activity.¹

Having examined the mechanism of mutual understanding, we can now analyse the process of people's cognition of each other. Research into interpersonal perception in social psychology can be divided into two large classes: 1) the study of the *content* of interpersonal perception (the characteristics of the subject and object of perception, their properties, etc.); 2) the study of the *process* of interpersonal perception (the analysis of its mechanisms and accompanying effects).

The content of interpersonal perception depends both on the characteristics of the subject and those of the object, because such a perception is, at the same time, also a definite interaction of the two participants in the process. Moreover, this interaction has two sides: the participants' evaluation of each other and the change in their characteristics of each other due to the very fact of their presence. *Every* participant in the process of interaction tries, in evaluating the other, to construct a definite system of the *interpretation* of his behaviour. The interpretation of another person's behaviour can be based on the *knowledge* of the reasons for this behaviour. But in everyday life people often do not know the real reasons for the behaviour of another person, or else they know them insufficiently. Thus in the conditions of a deficit of information they begin to *ascribe* certain reasons for another's behaviour, sometimes even creating models of behaviour or some kind of more general characteristics. This ascription is realised either on the basis of the resemblance of the perceived

¹ See: K.Ye. Danilin, "Analysis of Reflexive Structures in Small Group Studies", in: *Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Social Psychology*, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian).

person's behaviour to some other model that the subject has had past experience with, or on the basis of the analysis of his own motives applied in an analogous situation (mechanism of identification). An entire system of ascription arises as a result of this.

A special branch of social psychology called the research of *causal attribution* studies these processes. The theories of causal attribution in Western social psychology (Georg Kelly, E.J. Jones, Richard Eugene Nisbett, Lloyd Herbert Strickland), rely on the behaviourist or cognitivist principles which leads to a group of methodological limitations. However, the experimental study of this process presents a definite interest.

Fritz Heider was one of the first psychologists studying the phenomenon of attribution who considered the references in *social psychology* to the "naive" psychology of the "man in the street", meaning common sense, as justifiable. According to Heider, it is characteristic of people to reason in the following way: "a bad person possesses bad traits, a good person possesses good traits", etc. Therefore, the ascription of reasons for behaviour and characteristics are realised under this model: "bad" people are always ascribed bad traits, and "good" people—good ones. Although such an explanation meets the accepted maxim of common sense, it also shows the extreme subjectiveness of the process of attribution. Scientific psychology can, of course, state this fact as that inherent in the everyday perception of a person by a person, but the problem lies in the study of the foundation and the borders of the manifestation of such a subjective approach.

The *idea of contrasting notions* is allotted a large place in the theory of causal attribution. A "bad" person is ascribed negative traits, and the one perceiving him evaluates himself in contrast as a carrier of the most positive traits. This idea was presented on a more operational level in the well-known experiments staged by Georg Kelly. He established by experiment that the failure in an interaction is often evaluated differently by the participant and the observer. The participant of the action "blames" for the failure primarily objective circumstances (the "environment"), and, at the same time as a person in the position of the observer, he "blames" the executor.

All similar types of experimental research, regardless of their disputable theoretical interpretations, pose an extremely important question of a more general plane—the question of the role of the set, or *orientation* in the perception of a person

by a person. This role is particularly significant in the *formation of the first impression* about an unfamiliar individual. The role of the set is revealed in this instance in the experiments of A.A. Bodalev.¹ In one of his experiments, two groups of students were shown a photograph of the same person. Beforehand, the first group was told that the man was a hardened criminal, and the second group was told that he was a famous scholar. After that, each group was asked to provide a verbal portrait of the man in the photograph. For the first group, the deep-set eyes demonstrated suppressed anger, the pronounced chin showed his inclination to stop at nothing in crime, etc. With regard to the second group, the same "deep-set" eyes spoke of profound thoughts and the pronounced chin, of a strong will in the surmounting of difficulties on the road to knowledge, and so on.

These and other investigations attempt to find the answer to the question about the role of the perceiver's characteristics in the process of interpersonal perception. What namely are the significant characteristics, under what circumstances do they show, and so on. Another group of experimental studies is devoted to the characteristics of the object perceived. The success or failure of interpersonal perception also depends to a significant degree on these characteristics. The individual psychological peculiarities of various people are different, including a greater or lesser "exposure" of themselves for perception by other people. On the level of common sense, these distinctions are fixed rather precisely ("he is secretive", "he has something up his sleeve", etc.). However, these common sense arguments do little to aid a researcher in the prognosis of the success of interpersonal perception.

In order to ensure such a prognosis of the situation of interpersonal perception, another area of research must be taken into account, connected with the exposure of various "effects" growing out of people's perceptions of each other. The "halo effect" and also the "novelty" and "primacy" effects are the most often investigated. The "halo effect" is explained by the formation of the specific orientation on the person perceived and also the characteristics ascribed to him of definite qualities on the basis of this orientation. The "halo effect" involves the idea that the information on an individual, is "categorised" in a certain way being superimposed on the

¹ A.A. Bodalev, *A Person's Perception and Understanding of Another Person*.

image which was *already* created in advance. This earlier existing image plays the role of the "halo", screening the real traits and manifestations of the object of perception.

The essence of the halo effect in the formation of the first impression about a person appears in the fact that a generally favourable impression leads to positive evaluations of the unknown qualities of the person perceived and, on the contrary, a generally unfavourable impression promotes the predomination of negative evaluations. It has been established in experimental research that the halo effect appears more clearly when the perceiver has the minimum amount of information on the object of perception, and also when judgments involve moral qualities. It is this tendency to obscure some characteristics and light up others that plays the role of a halo in the perception of a person by another person.

The "primacy" and "novelty" effects are closely connected with the halo effect. Here the matter concerns the significance of the determined order of information about an individual for forming a notion about him. In Abraham Samuel Luchins' experiment, for example, a familiar man was presented to four groups of students. The first group was told that he was an extrovert; the second group was told that he was an introvert; the third group was told at first that he was an extrovert and then that he was an introvert; and the fourth, the exact opposite of the third. All groups were asked to describe the individual in terms of the qualities of his personality. No problems arose in the first two groups' descriptions. In the third and fourth groups, the impressions of the individual corresponded precisely with the order in which the information was presented: the former information prevailed. Such an effect was called the "primacy effect" and was registered in those instances when an unfamiliar man is perceived. In the "novelty effect" the exact opposite happens in situations of perception of a known person. Here the latest, newest information holds the greater significance.

On the broad plane, all of these effects can be considered manifestations of a special process, namely that of *stereotyping*, which accompanies the perception of a person by another person. The use of a stereotype, an established image of a phenomenon or a person, somewhat simplifies the interaction with that phenomenon. Stereotypes in communication, arising in particular in people's cognition of each other, have a specific origin and a specific meaning. As a rule, a stereotype develops on the basis of limited past experience as a

result of an attempt to construct conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. Very often a stereotype develops in relation to an individual's membership in a certain group, a certain trade for example. The most often expressed professional traits of the representatives of this trade in the past are considered as traits inherent in each representative of the given trade (all teachers are didactic, all bookkeepers are pedants, etc.). There is a tendency here to "derive meaning" from past experience, making conclusions based on the resemblance to these past experiences regardless of their limitations.

Stereotyping in the process of people's perceiving each other leads to two different results. On the one hand, simplifies the process of cognition of another individual; in this instance, the stereotype does not necessarily carry a value load. No "change" takes place in the perception of another person as concerns his emotional acceptance or non-acceptance. Although stereotyping does not promote the creation of the true-to-life image of the other and is often replaced with a stamp, it is, in a certain sense, necessary because it simplifies the process of cognition. On the other hand, stereotyping can lead to the creation of prejudices. If a judgement is built on the basis of limited past experience, and this experience was negative, each new perception of the representative of the same group will be tainted with hostility. The formation of such prejudices is fixed in a large amount of experimental research, but naturally they have a greater negative influence not in the laboratory conditions, but in real life conditions where they can seriously harm the communications of people, as well as their interaction. The ethnic stereotype is especially widespread. This stereotype arises when preconceived conclusions with relation to a whole ethnic group are made on the basis of limited information on individual representatives of that group. We will consider this question in greater detail somewhat later. Now it must only be emphasised that an extremely complex nature of the process of interpersonal perception creates the need in social psychology for a thorough investigation of the problem of precision in a person's perception of another person.

This question is primarily connected with the solution of a more general theoretical and methodological problem: what in general signifies "precision" in the perception of social objects? We can verify precision in the perception of physical objects by comparing the results with the objective measure-

ments of certain qualities and properties of the object. In the instance of the cognition of another person, the impression received about him by the perceiving subject cannot be contrasted with anything, because the methodics for the registration of the numerous qualities of an individual's personality do not exist. Of course, various personality tests can prove to be of some help in this case, but such tests for the measuring and bringing to light of all the characteristics of an individual do not exist (consequently, if these contrasting is possible, then only for those characteristics for which tests have been elaborated). Also, as has already been mentioned, the test cannot be considered as the only instrument of studying the individual, since there are limitations in every personality test.

The limitation of tests is connected with both the definite repertoire of measured characteristics and with their general cognitive possibilities brought about by the fact that the characteristics within them that are fixed and changed are only those set ("perceived") by the experiment, and not those inherent in the person in reality. Therefore, each comparison carried out in a similar fashion is always a comparison with the data of a third person resulting from someone's cognition. A similar problem arises when expert evaluations are used. Experts are people who know the person acting as the object of perception well. Their judgements (expert evaluations) are contrasted with the data of the subject's perception. Expert evaluations have an advantage over tests: here we are dealing with criteria unlimited in the selection of parameters in interpersonal perceptions¹ as found in the application of tests. These expert evaluations play the role of the external criteria presented as "objective data". But we are again, in essence, faced with two groups of *subjective* judgements: the subject of the perception and the expert (who also emerges as a subject of perception, meaning that his judgements by no means exclude an element of evaluation).

Nonetheless, tests and expert evaluations in certain instances are applied as external criteria, although their application does not eliminate the basic difficulty—the absence of the possibility to verify the precision of the perception of another person by means of a direct comparison with the data of objective methods—which creates the need to search for

¹ See: Yu.M. Zhukov, "Problems Involved in Measuring the Precision of Interpersonal Perception", in: *Academic Papers of Moscow University (Psychology)*, No. 1, 1978, p. 31 (in Russian).

other approaches to the very understanding of the problem and the ways of solving it.

One of these ways is the comprehension of all the "obstacles" standing in the way of interpersonal perception. All the effects we have examined that arise in this process can be related to these "obstacles". Of course, the knowledge of the fact that impressions of a person are categorised mainly on the basis of past experience, or that the primacy effect acts in their formation helps, in an indirect way, to establish a lack of precision in interpersonal perceptions. However, the knowledge of these mechanisms can only point out the *fact* of a lack of precision, but cannot help in the determination of its *measure*. This also pertains to another group of means, namely to the more intent study of the perceptive abilities of the subject of perception. In this instance, we can establish (rather precisely), the correlation of the characteristics of the perceiver and the object perceived. There are four groups of factors established in experiments on interpersonal perception: a) the variables, through which the subject of perception describes himself; b) previously known individuals; c) relations between himself and the object of perception; and d) the context of the situation in which the process of interpersonal perceptions is realised. By correlating these four groups of factors, we can determine to *which side* the perception may shift in each specific instance.

The attractive idea to find the means by which people's perceptive abilities can be developed arose long ago in social psychology. Many experiments were staged in order to reveal whether or not there is a definite stability in the ability of separate individuals to "read" the characteristics of other people. These experiments did not provide a mono-semantic answer. In approximately 50 per cent of the testees such stability was fixed and in the other 50 per cent it was not. The same kind of contradictory results were also obtained in the studies concerned with whether or not the art of a more precise perception of another person can be learned. Regardless of the fact that this question is still debated efforts in this direction are nonetheless undertaken. They are connected with the application of socio-psychological *training* for these goals. This training is applied for the instruction in the art of communication as a whole, but some of its special methods are oriented on the promotion of perceptive "sensitivity", i.e. the precision of perception.

The training programmes applied in this instance vary.

The most simple and unexpected is the fixing of the attention of those persons for whom the precise perception of other people is especially significant (teachers, doctors, leaders of various ranks) on the fact, that various "current notions" are widely current, related to the connection of the physical characteristics of a person and his mental peculiarities. These unique "stereotypes" are based not only on "life experience", but often on scraps of knowledge, scarce information on different psychological conceptions spread in the past (e.g. the ideas of Ernst Kretschmer on the connection of the types of physical make-ups with character traits, the ideas of physiognomics in correlating the traits of the face with certain psychological characteristics, etc.). The very fact of drawing attention to these ideas has a great significance, since few people realise that these factors enormously complicate the process of interpersonal perception. Alexei Bodalev obtained very interesting data on this: from 72 people he questioned as to the way in which they perceive the external features of other people, 9 answered that a square chin is a symbol of a strong will and a large forehead symbolises intelligence; 3 testees identified coarse hair with a rebellious nature; 14 said stoutness was a sign of good nature; two persons felt that fat lips were a sign of sexuality; for 5 people, a short stature represented power, and for 5 others beauty was a sign of stupidity.¹ No kind of training can completely eliminate such commonplace generalisations. However, it can shatter the individual's conviction as to the "undoubted nature" of his judgement of other people.

One of the methods applied in training involves teaching to view oneself from aside, comparing one's personal notions about oneself with the way one is perceived by others. Of special significance here is the set of concepts and categories used in his descriptions by the subject himself and by other people. This rapprochement of one's own and others' notions about oneself also, to a definite degree, promotes the precision of perception. However, in this connection, as in many other problems of social psychology, the fundamental question remains as to in *which* groups this training should take place. In the West, substantial experience accumulated in the organisation of such work has shown that skills acquired in special training groups are not necessarily preserved in real situa-

¹ See: A.A. Bodalev, *A Person's Perception and Understanding of Another Person*.

tions of interaction. Therefore, in correspondence with the general methodological orientations of Marxist social psychology, training in the precision of perception in real groups united by joint activities is particularly useful. Hans Hiebsch and Manfred Vorweg took note of the fact that the closeness of one's own and another's notions about one person is greater in groups existing for a long time and united by a single system of activities. However, the question whether or not a long communication with an individual brought about by joint activities promotes the precision of perception has yet to be answered in full. Many of experimental studies show that the bias developing towards the object of perception over a long period of contact serves as a source of the distortion of the image perceived. Thus, in the investigation of this particular question, involved in characterising communications we come upon the necessity of further research into the context of specific groups and the specific activities of these groups.¹

A particular group of problems in interpersonal perception arises in connection with the part played in this process by specific emotional regulators. People do not simply perceive each other, but rather, enter definite relations with each other. A whole range of emotions develop on the basis of evaluations made, from a negative attitude towards one person or another to sympathy or even love for them. The area of research involved with the formative mechanisms of the various emotional relations to the person perceived has been called the research of *attraction*, which is both the *process* of the formation of emotional relations and the *product* of this process, i.e. the specific *quality* of these relations. The multiple meanings of this term should be emphasised and kept in mind when attraction is being investigated not separately, but, rather, in the context of the third, perceptive side of communication. The question here arises primarily concerning the mechanism involved in the formation of affection or friendly emotions towards an individual or, on the contrary, aversion for him, and also, what is the role of this phenomenon (the process and its product) in the structure of communication as a whole, in its development as a definite system, including the exchange

¹ See: *Interpersonal Perception in the Group*, Ed. by G.M. Andreyeva and A.I. Dontsov; See also: G.M. Andreyeva and L.J. Gosman, "Interpersonal Relationships and Social Context", in: *Personal Relationships*, Vol. 1, Ed. by Steve Duck and Robin Gilmour, London, 1984.

of information, interaction and the establishment of mutual understanding.

The inclusion of attraction in the process of interpersonal perception reveals rather distinctly the characteristics of human communication already noted above, namely the fact that communication is always the realisation of definite relations (both social and interpersonal). Attraction is connected primarily with this second type of relations realised in communication.

Research into attraction is a comparatively new area of social psychology, whose origin is connected with the elimination of certain prejudices. It has long been thought that such phenomena as friendship, sympathy and love could not be treated as objects of scientific analysis, that they rather belong to the domain of art or literature. An opinion exists to this day that the scientific consideration of these phenomena encounters insurmountable obstacles, not only on account of their complicated nature but also because of various ethical difficulties that arise here. However, research conducted on interpersonal perceptions forced social psychology to "accept" these problematics, and at the present time there is a great deal of experimental work and theoretical generalisations in this area.

Attraction can be considered as a special type of social orientation (attitude), or set on another person, where the emotional component predominates when this "other" is evaluated primarily in the categories characteristic to affective evaluations. Empirical research (including experimental) is also devoted mainly to the elucidation of those factors which lead to the appearance of positive emotional relations between people. The role of similarity in the characteristics of the subject and object of perception in the process of the formation of attraction, and the role of "the ecological" characteristics of the process of communication (the closeness of partners in communication and the frequency of their meetings, etc.) are studied in particular. In many works a connection has been revealed between attraction and a special type of interaction forming between partners, for example, in the conditions of "assisting" behaviour.

However, theoretical interpretations of research data do not attest to the existence of a satisfactory theory of attraction. There is not a large amount of research devoted to the study of attraction in Soviet social psychology. An attempt to examine the phenomenon of attraction in the context of the methodological orientations worked out for group analysis would no doubt prove interesting.

Research of attraction in the context of group activities opens up a wide perspective for a new interpretation of the function of attraction, and of the function of the emotional regulation of interpersonal relations in the group in particular. This type of research is only in its primary stages,¹ but it is important to immediately identify its place in the general structure of social psychology. The natural development of the idea on the specifics of human communications as the unity of its three aspects maps the way for studying attraction specifically in the context of communication of the individual in the group.

¹ See: G.M. Andreyeva and L. J. Gosman, "Interpersonal Relations and Social Context", in: *Personal Relationships*, Ed. by Steve Duck and Robin Gilmour, London, 1981.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANS OF INFLUENCE
IN THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION**

The study of the three aspects of the communication process shows that each of these aspects includes definite means of the individuals' influence upon each other. However, since communication is connected with activities, and activities are organised in groups, the process of joint group activities is the main determinant of people's influence upon each other. All purely psychological mechanisms of influence are applied through these activities. The isolated study of the means of influence outside the context of activities is possible only in analysis. In reality, both influence by means of signs, mechanisms of identification and reflexion realised in the course of activities are determined—on the content plane—by its characteristics. If the goal of influence is the change of the behaviour and activity of the partner in communication, the direction of this change is determined by the goals of joint activities. However, the forms of communication are numerous and in certain instances the demand for accidental, spontaneously formed groups, not united by joint activities arises. The classification of groups considered in social psychology will be discussed in detail later. Now it is important to emphasise the need for analysing the means of influence in the process of communication in those cases when neither dyads nor small groups are involved but a completely different level of communication is examined in more numerous groups, and often not even in groups in the strict sense of the word, but rather in those communities of people that formed by chance and existed for a short period of time.

The absence of prolonged contact between people in such instances does not exclude the fact that communication is

extremely important and significant in their vital activities.

The division of the means of influence into infection, suggestion and imitation is traditional for social psychology. The phenomenon of fashion is also often examined in this group. The study of these phenomena is historically connected with the first socio-psychological theories (imitation, for one, enjoyed special attention from Gabriel Tarde) and is realized in the context of the psychological research of large communities (masses, crowds, etc.). It is obvious that the interest in the mentioned means of influence was lost in connection with the transition of social psychology to an active development of experimental research and the shifting of the accent to smaller groups. In addition to this, there is an opinion current among certain psychologists that these problems are in general "old-fashioned" and do not deserve the attention paid to them.

The crux of the matter is not that the problems are outdated but rather that the new stage of development in the discipline presumes application of new methods of research into these old problems. With regard to the phenomenon of the existence of such specific communities of people as the crowd, the public or a large audience of spectators, the very fact of this existence cannot be doubted, the same as the existence of specific forms of communication and influence under these conditions. On the contrary, the complication of social life, the development of the mass forms of the consumption of culture and art, mass leisure time activities, and of the mass media demand a particularly thorough study of the given class of phenomena. The examination of this problem in Marxist social psychology is fundamentally different from the patterns involved in the investigation of the aforementioned means of influence in social psychology in the West, where the whole designated area is qualified as that of "collective behaviour". From the point of view of the theory of the collective developing in Soviet social psychology (see Chapter 13), the way the problem is posed is incorrect. All the communities examined in the given area *are not* collectives, most of all because of the fact that they are not connected by the communality of joint activities. Therefore the behaviour of people in the examined situations is just "mass" behaviour which, according to the correct observations of Yu. Sherkovin, presents itself as an "extra-collective" behaviour.¹

¹ See: *Social Psychology*, Ed. by G.P. Predvechny and Yu.A. Sherkovin, Moscow, 1974, p. 281 (in Russian).

Its most distinguishing feature can be found in the spontaneous transfer of information and a communication characterised by the individual acting practically without personal control over the situation. Naturally, the means of influence acquire specifics here in comparison with those which are formed under the conditions of communication not only in a collective, but also in less-developed groups united, however, by joint activities.

There is no doubt as to the existence of the means of influence traditionally described in the given area of social psychology; we shall examine each of them at length later on.

Infection has, for a long time, been investigated as a special means of influence integrating large masses of people, especially in connection with the origin of such phenomena as panic, mass psychosis, etc. The phenomenon of infection was known at the earliest stages of human history and was expressed in numerous ways: mass outbursts of various emotional states forming during ritual dances, manifestations of sportive enthusiasm, in situations of panic, etc. Since infection develops in a mass of people, it involves a mechanism for the repeated mutual strengthening of emotional influences among communicating people. The individual does not experience organised, premeditated pressure here but, rather, unconsciously assimilates models of someone's behaviour, submitting to him. Many researchers acknowledge the origin of a particular "reaction of infection" in large, open audiences when the emotional state is increased by means of repeated "reflection" along the lines of a typical chain reaction. Naturally this effect primarily has a place in unorganised communities, most often in a crowd.

The *panic* situation is one where the strengthening of influence takes place through infection. Panic occurs as a definite emotional state either as a result of a deficit of information on some sort of frightening or incomprehensible news, or of an overabundance of such news. The primary reason for panic is the appearance of some sort of information capable of evoking a kind of shock. Subsequently, panic gains strength by means of a relevant mechanism of mutual repeated reflection. Infection occurring in situations of panic cannot be underestimated in contemporary society. A well-known incident of mass panic took place in the US on October 30, 1938 after the broadcast of Herbert George Wells' *The War of the Worlds* organised by the radio company NBS. A large number of the listeners of varying ages and educational

standards experienced a state of near mass psychosis, believing that Martians had invaded the Earth. Although many knew that the dramatisation of this literary work was performed on radio (it was announced three times during the broadcast), thousands of people "personally" witnessed the appearance of Martians. This phenomenon has been specially studied by American psychologists.

Panic is a phenomenon not easily analysed. It cannot be spontaneously observed primarily because it is never known in advance when it will take place and secondly, because it is very difficult to be just an observer in a situation of panic. The power of panic lies in the fact that any person "within" a panic situation yields to it to a certain extent. Research into panic relies on description made *after* the peak of the event. These descriptions permitted the isolation of the basic cycles typical of the process as a whole. The knowledge of these cycles is very important in order to stop panic. This is only possible if the forces capable of introducing an element of rationality into the panic situation are found, which assume the role of "leadership". In addition to the knowledge of these cycles, an idea of the psychological mechanism of panic is also necessary, in particular of such special features of infection as an unconscious acceptance of certain models of behaviour. If there is a person in the panic situation capable of producing a model of behaviour which will help restore a normal emotional state in the crowd, the panic may be stopped.

The question of the role played by the level of development of evaluations and orientations (sets, attitudes) inherent to a certain community of people is especially important in the analysis of infection. Although this question is insufficiently investigated in science, in practical work forms of including these phenomena in situations of infection have been found. In mass spectacles, applause is the stimulus "turning on" the common evaluation of a popular actor preceding infection. It can play the role of an impulse upon which the situation will then develop according to the laws of infection. The knowledge of such a mechanism is employed in bourgeois propaganda where a special system is worked out to increase the effect of influence with the goal of leading the audience to unleashed excitement. Fascist propaganda, in particular, employed a special psychological service, which developed the means to lead an audience to the state of ecstasy.

The measure of the subjective ability of different audiences to infection depends on the personality development level of

the audience and more specifically, on the level of its self-awareness. In this sense it is justifiable to assert that infection plays a significantly less role in contemporary societies than at the early stages of human history. It has been noted in historical studies that the higher development level of a society has been reached, the more critical individuals' attitude to powers which automatically switch them on to the road leading to some action or another; consequently, the mechanisms of infection weakens.

According to the tradition formed in Western social psychology, this phenomenon is usually examined under the conditions of anti-social and unorganised behaviour (various natural disasters, etc.). However, manifestations of conscious social mass actions are often referred to this bracket, too. The interpretation of these actions from the point of view of the processes of infection lessens their significance which, in the final analysis, is a sign of a definite ideological position employing a false theoretical pattern of the analysis. The task of Marxist social psychology is to effect a concrete analysis of the mechanism of infection and its forms in the situations of varying social significance. The role of infection in organised, socially-approved behaviour has hardly been investigated at present, e.g. the infection by personal example in various mass situations of production, etc. It is possible that new aspects of the phenomenon of infection will open up in these cases, for instance, its ability to compensate in case of insufficient organisation, etc.

Therefore it cannot be said that the problem of infection has become outdated under contemporary conditions. No level of self-awareness can eliminate such mass forms of infection as the excitement in a stadium during a sporting event, for example. Social psychology, unfortunately, presently possesses only fragmentary descriptions and observations of this phenomenon but in essence no research on them has been done.

Suggestion is the goal-oriented, undisputed influence of one person on another person, or on a group. In suggestion, the transfer of information is realised based on its noncritical perception. Often all the information transmitted from one person to another is classified from the point of view of activity of the communicator, distinguishing between *communication*, *persuasion* and *suggestion*. It is the third form of information that is connected with noncritical perception. It is presumed that an individual who receives information through suggestion is incapable of its critical evaluation. Naturally, in

different situations and for different groups of people, the measure of indisputability that allows for the noncritical reception of information varies.

The phenomenon of suggestion has been investigated in psychology for a long time. It is studied to a large degree in connection with medical practice or with certain specific forms of instruction. It is still insufficiently studied in social psychology, however. The phenomenon of "suggestion" as a socio-psychological phenomenon is highly specific and therefore it is legitimate to speak about the special phenomenon of "social suggestion". In Russian psychology the question of the significance of suggestion was first posed in Vladimir Bekhterev's work *Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life* (1903).

The question of correlating suggestion and infection inevitably arises in the analysis of suggestion as a specific means of influence. In Soviet psychological literature there is no unequivocal answer to this question. Some authors consider suggestion as a type of infection along with imitation. Others, on the contrary, emphasise the following distinction between suggestion and infection: 1) in infection, a common experience of a general mental state by a large mass of people is realised, while suggestion does not presume such an "equality" in experiencing emotions. The suggestor does not experience the state that the suggestee does. The process of suggestion is one-sided: it is not the spontaneous adjustment of the condition of the group, but the personified, active influence of one person upon another person, or upon a group; 2) suggestion, as a rule, carries a verbal character, while in infection, other means of influence (rhythm, etc.) are employed in addition to speech.

On the other hand, suggestion is different from persuasion. Vladimir Bekhterev also showed that suggestion directly evokes definite mental states, not needing proofs or logic. *Received* information is reached in suggestion on the basis of a *ready-made conclusion*, while in persuasion, that conclusion must be made by the subject independently. Persuasion, therefore, is primarily intellectual, and suggestion—a more emotional-volitional influence.

There are certain established laws determining in which situations and under what circumstances the effect of suggestion increases. Thus the effect in suggestion depends on age, physical condition, and so on. The main thing is that specific socio-psychological factors operate in suggestion. It has been established in numerous experimental studies that the authority

of the suggestor is the decisive factor for the effectiveness of suggestion, since it creates a special supplementary factor of influence—the trust in the source of information. This “trust effect” depends both on the personality of the suggestor and on the social group which the given personality represents. The authority of the suggestor plays the role of so-called “indirect argumentation”, a unique type of compensator for the absence of a direct argumentation which is a specific characteristic of suggestion.

Like in the situations of infection, the results of suggestion depend on the personality of the suggestee. The phenomenon of counter-suggestion expresses a measure of opposition to suggestion shown by a separate personality. In practical work, the means to block out this “mental defence” has been worked out to a significant degree. These measures are designated by the common term of “counter-counter-suggestion”. The phenomenon of counter-suggestion can be used for the “defence” of a personality against a suggestive influence, while the phenomenon of counter-counter-suggestion is used for the elimination of this defence. Thus, if counter-suggestion acts as the means of mistrust of the suggestor, this mistrust can be eliminated through the inclusion of supplementary information on the suggestor, and this complex of measures will represent a counter-counter-suggestion. It may be assumed that, in answer to these supplementary efforts, the individual will attempt to devise a new group of defensive measures, but research has yet penetrated only the first, upper level of counter-counter-suggestion.

On the theoretical plane the phenomenon of suggestion is studied in close connection with the problems of social perception and also in the context of group solidarity. The analysis of communication as a process of people's cognition of one another shows that the fixed (or formed) social orientation preceding the perception plays a significant role in this cognition, and it can be considered as a unique factor of suggestion in the given context. In such an aspect research into suggestion loses its descriptive character and can be firmly shifted onto an experimental basis. As far as the connection of suggestion with the conformity of individuals is concerned, as well as with the problem of group solidarity, these questions demand separate treatment which will be done later.

Research into suggestion has great significance for such spheres as propaganda, commercials, etc.

Elements of social suggestion can also be used in areas of

instruction and education. The content side of the process of education is determined by the dominant ideology, norms and values accepted in the given society. Social psychology, while working out a mechanism of influence, must take account of this content side. The problem consists in the selection of adequate methods and means of influence with the main one being the method of persuasion, ensuring a conscious reception of the information communicated. However, elements of suggestive influence can be applied as subsidiary means, especially in certain special situations of the educational process. The determination of the "measure" of the inclusion of these elements in the process of influence depends primarily on the degree of investigation of the given problem in the framework of social psychology. Unlike infection, the phenomenon of suggestion can become the focus of experimental research. Therefore, a disdainful attitude to the given problem must be overcome and it should be included in the currently studied problems of social psychology.

Imitation also pertains to the mechanisms and means of people's influence on each other, primarily under the conditions of behaviour outside the collective, although its role in groups, and especially in special types of activities, is also rather great. The specific features of imitation are found in the individual's *reproduction* of the traits and patterns of demonstrated behaviour. Imitation has a large place to play in the history of social psychology. Gabriel Tarde's "theory of imitation" examines imitation as a universal means of individual behaviour and in the final analysis, as a basic mechanism involved in the development of society.

This theory is a classical example of an attempt to create an absolute out of the role of imitation in society. On the more general methodological plane, it is a rather widespread variant of the idealistic concept of the nature of social relations where all social problems are considered the result of certain psychological mechanisms. Emile Durkheim justifiably noted that in such an approach, completely different types of social phenomena are all mixed up, meanwhile a child's imitation of an adult develops under a completely different laws than the interaction of classes in society. The given model of imitation is inconsistent due to the extreme absolutisation of the principle, to say nothing of the primitive sociological model proposed by Tarde.

Previous experimental investigations permit to establish the real characteristics of this specific means of psychological

influence. Imitation has special significance in the process of child development. Therefore, a large amount of experimental studies of imitation are currently under way in child psychology. However, since the given phenomenon is also included in communication in the given context, too, such research presents a definite interest for social psychology as well.

The role of imitation in children differs from the role this phenomenon plays in the life of an adult. Even for a child, for whom at definite stages of development imitation is a basic form of the assimilation of realities it is characterised by various levels, from blindly copying adult behaviour to motivated imitation. In the latter instance, the "model" of imitation is similar to the process in the adult world. Here imitation is a subsidiary means of the assimilation of the world: the influence of a certain model in the given case is evident, but it often only involves the external pattern of behaviour. It does not touch upon the deep personality characteristics of the individual and often does nothing to change the thrust of the personality. Imitation in adults takes place as a rule in those instances when it is not possible to master an unfamiliar activity by some other means. In such case, imitation serves as the means of mastering some skill, or habit, and sometimes a rather elementary professional action.

In all these cases imitation does not appear in its "pure form". *Knowledge* plays a decisive role in any process of instruction. Therefore, mechanisms of imitation in adults are significantly more complicated, just like the mechanisms of infection and suggestion. In each case an influence is exerted on the individual through the means described above, it encounters a critical attitude towards it on the part of that individual. The problem of influence, in general, cannot be examined as a process with a single direction: an opposite movement always exists from the personality to the influence it experiences. All this acquires special significance in the group. Imitation in this sense is included, to a larger degree than infection and suggestion, in a group context. There are two planes of imitation involving the assimilation of the offered models of behaviour: either a specific individual or the norms of behaviour worked out in a group. In the last instance, the problem of imitation is closely connected with the problem of conformity, in other words, with that of group pressure on the individual. It can only be examined to its full extent while examining in more detail other problems of the group in social psychology.

Any of the examined means of influence require research not only under the conditions of spontaneous behaviour outside the collective, but also in situations of joint group activities. Communication as a whole cannot be thoroughly studied without examining those real social sections in which it takes place. The means of influence must be subsequently examined taking into account the specifics of social groups.

The analysis of communication as a complex, multisided process shows that its specific forms can be very different. "Pure" models of communication can be singled out in laboratory experiments, especially in such simple cases as communication taking place between two people. The significance of such research is indisputable, but so is its limitations. It exposes only the "mechanism" which organises this process. Traditional social psychology has devoted its attention primarily to this aspect. Its methodical applications and technical means of analysis are subordinate to this task. Meanwhile, the profound aspects of communication are, in essence, left out of research. The "mechanism" works in many different ways, depending on the "material" it is involved with. The types of groups in which people unite and in which the processes of communication take place vary to such a degree that the same formal characteristics of these processes can take on completely different meanings. In addition to this, the two planes of communication we singled out in the first part of our analysis are specifically correlated in each individual instance. In order to understand both how the personality is included in these processes and what it introduces into them, the way in which the processes of communication in different groups, i.e. under the conditions of different content of activities, are specifically revealed, must be investigated. The principle of the unity of communication and activities requires a logical transfer from the general characteristics of the process of communication to its study in specific groups.

Section Three

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS

Chapter Nine

THE PROBLEM OF THE GROUP IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The problem of groups where people are united in the process of their vital activities is very important for social psychology as well as for sociology. The reality of social relations is always the reality of relations between social groups. Therefore the question of the criteria for singling out of various groups in society from the multitude of variegated associations is extremely important for sociological analysis. It must be specified that the term "group" in social sciences has, in principle, a double application. In practical work of demographic analysis, for example, conditional groups are involved in statistical research, such as arbitrary associations (groupings) of people possessing some kind of general sign important in the given system of analysis. Thus, for example, it is often necessary to single out a group of people having a definite standard of education, suffering from a cardio-vascular disease, needing a home, and so on. The term "group" is sometimes also used in this meaning in psychology: for example, as a result of test examinations a group of people is "formed" who all showed a certain indicator, and another group of people demonstrated possession of another indicator.

On the other hand, in the entire cycle of social sciences the group is understood as a *really* existing formation in which people are united by some sort of common sign, a variety of joint activities, or else they exist in identical conditions (also in the actual process of their vital activities); besides, all of them *realise* their membership of this formation (although the degree of this realisation can differ greatly).

Social psychology is engaged primarily in groups defined in the second meaning and it is namely on this plane that the

distinctions from the sociological approach must be designated. The search for an objective criteria of the group differences is the main concern of the *sociological* approach, although in principle such criteria can be quite numerous. Lenin noted that the concept of the "group" in itself was too indefinite and arbitrary¹: criteria of group distinctions can be seen in religious, ethnic and political differences, and so on. It is important for each system of sociological knowledge to have some sort of criteria as a base. Marxist social science has a precise principle which permits an orientation on the correlations and coordinations of different groups in society—the place of the group in the system of the given social relations. Sociology analyses, in correspondence with this objective criteria, each social group and its correlations with society and with individuals as its members.

A different point of view is characteristic of the *socio-psychological* approach. In fulfilling various social functions, an individual is a member of numerous social groups. He is formed in a sort of the "intersection" of these groups, being a point where the various group influences intersect. This has two important results: on the one hand, it determines the objective place of the individual in society, and on the other, it tells on the formation of the individual's consciousness. The individual is included in the system of views, notions, norms and values of numerous groups. Therefore, it is extremely important to know what will be the "resultant" of these group influences, which will also determine the content of the individual's consciousness. But, in order to answer this question, we should establish what is meant by the *psychological plane* of the group for individual included in it, and what are its characteristics significant for him. Social psychology runs into a large difficulty here with regard to the sociological approach which it cannot ignore and the psychological approach which also has its traditional views of the group.

If the search for objective criteria for distinguishing between *real social* groups is characteristic for the former, the very fact of the existence of a large number of people among which the activities of the individual take place is important for the latter. This large number of people, "surrounding" an individual, or even interacting with him in some specific situation, can

¹ See: V.I. Lenin, "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book", in: *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 410.

also be interpreted as the "group", but the focus of interest in the given instance is not the content activities of the given group, but rather, the *form* of an individual's activities in the presence of other people or even in an interaction with them. In numerous socio-psychological studies, especially at the early stages of the development of social psychology, the question was posed precisely in this fashion. Although in appearance the "group" here is also analysed along with its influence on the personality, the term takes on a completely different meaning. The group does not act as a real social cell of society, as a "microenvironment" of the formation of the personality. However, it is necessary to take this tradition into account: this approach might be justified in certain goals, especially in the framework of the general psychological analysis (for example, in the explanation of the specifics of definite mental processes in the conditions of the "group"). The question is, whether or not this approach is sufficient for social psychology.

This question must be answered negatively. What provides the definition of the group as just a large number of people for social psychology in which the individual is an element, or even as the interaction of people distinguished by the communality of social norms and moral values found in definite relations between each other? In the first case, it is considered sufficient to establish the existence not of one person, but of many persons (acting side by side or even jointly) as the "group". But because there are no characteristics of this group in the given instance, the *content* aspect of this large number of people is left completely out of the analysis, leaving only the fact that there are "many" people in the given case, i.e. a very formal characteristic of united individuals. The existence of definite relations between a large number of people adds little to the analysis. Although the existence of relations between people in the framework of some kind of association is in itself essential, the absence of the character interpretation of these relations depreciates this addition. There are always some kind of relations formed if there are several people present: these relations arise even if two unacquainted individuals are sat down next to each other. The significance of these relations for the individual can be revealed only when the content of the relations themselves is examined, and this is possible only when relations are understood as essential characteristics of the social group included in a certain system of social activities.

It can now be concluded that the simple verification of

a large number of people or even the existence of relations within this group is insufficient for social psychology. It is faced with the task of uniting the sociological and "general psychological" approaches to the group. Since social psychology is primarily involved with the research of the laws of behaviour and activities of people, brought about by the fact that they are included in real social groups, the analysis must be focused on the content characteristics of such groups and the clarification of the specific influence of a specific social group on an individual. Such a question is characteristic of Soviet social psychology and it is logical from the point of view of the general methodological principles of the theory of activities. The significance of the group for the individual is found primarily in the fact that the group is a definite *system of activities* brought about by its position in the social division of labour. The group itself emerges as the *subject* of a definite type of activities and is included in the whole system of social relations through these activities.

In order to ensure this type of analysis, social psychology must rely on the results of the sociological analysis of groups, which means addressing those real social groups which are singled out in accordance with the sociological criteria for every given type of society. *On this basis*, the description of the psychological characteristics of each of such groups and their significance for each individual member must be carried out. The mechanism of forming the psychological characteristics of the group is an important component of such an analysis. Repeated attempts have been undertaken in social psychology to analyse the phenomenon of so-called "group consciousness". However, since these attempts were undertaken from idealistic positions, they did not lead to a scientific solution of the problem. Therefore, the attempt to construct a certain "group intellect", for example, for a long time compromised the very idea of the analysis of such psychological formations which arise in the group and which do not lead to the psychological characteristics of individuals included in it.

If the group is examined as the subject of social activities, then an attempt can obviously be made to single out certain traits characteristic of it namely as the subject of activities. The community of the content and the forms of group's activities also generates the community of the psychological characteristics of the group, whether we call them "group consciousness" or some other name. Such group formations as group interests, needs, norms, values, opinions and goals

must be regarded as the psychological characteristics of the group. Although social psychology has presently at its disposal neither some corresponding traditions nor the necessary methodic equipment for the analysis of all these formations, it is extremely important to pose the question of the "legitimacy" of such an analysis, since it is namely by these characteristics on the psychological plane that one group differs from another. For the individual belonging to a group, the consciousness of his membership of the group is realised primarily through the reception of these characteristics, i.e. through the consciousness of a certain *psychological community* with other members of the given social group. It can be said that the "border" of the group is perceived as the border of this *psychological community*.

In Soviet socio-psychological literature the concept of "psychological community" is sometimes identified with the concept of the group and sometimes its specificity is emphasised. B.F. Porshnyev considers community as a definite characteristic of the group, suggesting the existence of a so-called "we-feeling" which expresses the demand to differentiate one community from another, "them" and is a unique indicator of the consciousness of an individual's membership of a certain group. A little later we shall demonstrate that this indicator is not absolute, because in numerous cases the "we-consciousness" may not form in the group the individual is really included in. Nevertheless, a definite psychological verification of belonging to the group is interesting for social psychology, since it permits the psychological community to be considered as a unique psychological "cut" of the real social group. It is here that the specifics of the socio-psychological analysis of the group appear. The real social groups, identified according to sociological criteria, are community considered here and the traits are determined within them which, in totality, make the group a psychological community and permit each member to identify himself with the group. (This is expressed in many investigations by the term of "social identity").

In essence, the psychological characteristics of the group are established in such an interpretation, although the term "group consciousness" is not applied. Yuri Sherkovin justifiably notes that the group in social psychology is understood as "a community of people interacting in the name of a conscious goal, a community which objectively emerges as the subject of actions".¹

¹ *Social Psychology*, Ed. by G.P. Predvechny and Yu.A. Sherkovin, p. 50.

The degree of detail to which the community's characteristics are revealed in future analysis depends on the level of the development of this problem in social psychology. Thus, certain authors are not satisfied, for example, with only research of such group characteristics as group demands, goals, and interests, but propose the examination of such characteristics in the group by an analogous with the individual, as group memory, will-power and mentality. However, there is presently not enough convincing theoretical and experimental evidence that the given approach is productive. At the same time, with the solution of certain more concrete questions of social psychology, researchers run up against the need to broaden their notions of the group as the subject of activities. This in particular concerns the problem of social perception. If, as was mentioned above, the perception of social objects is understood under social perception, then the question can be posed as to whether the group can act as both the subject and object of perception. This phenomenon is well-known on the level of everyday practice, when speaking about the definite relation of one group to another. This relation can be friendly, hostile, neutral, and so on. Translated into the language of the research of social perception, this signifies that one group perceives another by some definite means, i.e. it is the subject of the perception.

At the present time, there is no single opinion as to whether the latter of the characteristics mentioned above relate to the psychological description of the group, though other characteristics like group norms, values or solutions have long been treated in social psychology as special group formations. The interest of social psychology in these formations is not accidental. The knowledge of them helps reveal the mechanism connecting the individual and society more concretely. Society influences the personality precisely through the group and it is extremely important to understand in what way group influences emerge as mediators between the personality and society. But in order to understand this, the group must not only be looked at as a "multitude" of people, but as a real cell of society included in the broad context of social activities. It can be said that the specific type and forms of social activities are the basic integrating factor and the main sign of a social group. The general participation of the group in joint group activities brings about the formation of the psychological community, and in this way the group actually becomes a socio-psychological phenomenon, i.e. an object of socio-psychological research.

Research into the group has, of course, always been a task of social psychology. Much research has been conducted on the various aspects of group life, their influences on the individual and so on. However, besides that, (as has been pointed out in practical work primarily in regard of American social psychology), the transfer from the individual to the social owing to the underestimation of the positing of the group problem as a global, methodological problem of social psychology, was often "unconscious". A large number of miscalculations resulted in connection with the loss of social context, reduction of group processes to dyads, and so on.

On a more "operational" level, there is a certain separation of two basic lines of socio-psychological research characteristic of the developing tradition. One of the lines is traditionally connected with the study of various *processes* characterising human communication and interaction. All of the processes treated in the preceding section, i.e. communication, attraction, interaction, perception, etc. have a solid practice of experimental research in Western social psychology. It is in principle, of course, implied that these processes take place not in a vacuum but in a group. However, such a variable as group activities does not appear in research: in any case, it is only mentioned. But the other line of research, traditionally connected with the study of the *group* seems to stand by itself: the size of the group, composition and structure. Group processes (group dynamics) are often mentioned in this line of research, but here a different group of processes is implied. Those examined in the first line are also mentioned, but outside of the joint group activities. Thus an isolated study of the processes and the groups takes place including, at least the essential parameters of the group during the study of processes that occur within it.

It is well known that traditional social psychology primarily focuses on a definite type of group, namely the *small* group where the interpersonal activities forming there are studied. This in itself presents an interest to social psychology. However, it cuts the analysis short at a very important place, where the way in which these interpersonal relations depend on the nature of group activities and consequently explain how they are connected with social relations is found out. The proposals expressed in recent years in Western social psychology on the inclusion of a "social context" in research reflect the dissatisfaction with such a tradition.

All the above-mentioned permits a precise formulation of

the methodological principles of group studies in Marxist social psychology. The task now is to consider the natural laws of human communication and interaction more specifically in those cells of society where they manifest themselves. But in order to carry out this task, a conceptual apparatus must be worked out in which the group can be investigated and its main characteristics described, in addition to the elaboration of definite methodological principles. This conceptual outline is necessary for the comparison of groups and the correlation of the results of experimental research.

Social psychology traditionally studies certain elements of group parameters: *the composition of the group, the structure of the group, group processes, group norms and values and the systems of sanctions*. Any of these parameters can acquire completely different meaning, depending on the general approach to the group applied in research. Therefore the composition of the group can be described, for example, in a number of ways, depending on what is significant in each specific instance—the age, professional or social characteristics of the members of the group. Obviously, there cannot be one set formula for the description of the group's composition, especially because of the great number of real groups. In each particular case, the starting point must be *what kind of real group* is selected as the object of the investigation: a school class, a sports team or a work collective. In other words, we immediately establish a set of parameters for the characteristics of the group's composition depending on the type of activities the given group is connected with.

This can also be said with regard to the structure of the group. There are several rather formal signs of the group structure: the structure of communication, the structure of preference, the structure of "power", etc. However, if we consider the group as the subject of joint activities, the analysis of the functions of each member of the group in these joint activities must take precedence. On the other hand, the emotional structure of the group, the structure of interpersonal relations and its connection with the functional structure of group activities are extremely important characteristics. The correlation of these two structures is often considered in social psychology as the correlation of "normal" and "formal" relations.

The listing of "*groups processes*" is also not a purely technical task. It has already been stated that the "combination" of processes taking place in the group and other

characteristics of the group are problems yet to be solved in social psychology. If we follow the road determined by the basic methodological principle, the processes which organize the activities of the group must be introduced first of all. The problem of their correlation with the processes already worked out in the school of "group dynamics" of Kurt Lewin arises here. The task for Marxist social psychology lies in the need to *interpret* the descriptions of group processes proposed in "group dynamics" in a different theoretical outline and to reveal their contents from the point of view of the concept of the group as the subject of activities.

The other side of the question connected with the characteristics of group processes is in general rarely touched in traditional social psychology. We are now concerned with the *development* of the group. In many investigations this term is applied to signify one of the parameters of the group activities of real groups. The problem of group development, however, was never posed with the intention of exposing the various *levels* of this development and of revealing the specifics of the various parameters of group activities on each of these levels. At the same time, without such an approach the picture of the group's development would not be complete. An integral demonstration of the development of the group and the characteristics of group processes from this point of view has been developed in Soviet social psychology. Of course, the development of group processes allows a more fractional analysis where the development of the group norms, values, the system of interpersonal relations, etc. are examined separately.

Another part of the conceptual scheme, which social psychologists use in investigations, involves the position of the individual in a group as its member. The "status" or "position" signifying the individual's place in group life is the first of the concepts applied here. The terms are often used synonymously, although the concept of "position" has a somewhat different meaning with some authors.¹ Regardless of the wide application of the concept of "status" in socio-psychological research, it cannot be said that it has been precisely defined. The concept is especially widely used in the description of the structure of interpersonal relations, for which special methods of the measurement of the status—namely, the

¹ See L.I. Bozhovich, *Personality and Its Formation in a Child*, Moscow, 1967 (in Russian).

sociometric methods—are primarily suited. However, such a designation of the status of the individual cannot be considered satisfactory. First, because the individual's position in the group is not only determined by his sociometrical status: to what degree the individual is perceived in the structure of activity group relations, as well as the way the member of the group enjoys popularity with other group members is also important. This question cannot be answered by the use of sociometrical methods alone. Second, the status is always a certain unity of the characteristics inherent in the individual, which determine his place in the group and his subjective perception by other group members. It is important to bear in mind the correlation of these two aspects. Thirdly, consideration of the relations within a broader social system, in which the given group is included—the “status” of the group itself—is necessary when characterising the status of the individual. This circumstance is not indifferent to the position of the group member. This third sign of status is also not considered in the definition of the status through sociometrical methods. The question of an adequate methodological means for the definition of the individual's status can only be solved with the simultaneous theoretical elaboration of this concept.

“*Role*” is another characteristic of the individual in the group. Earlier we mentioned what was understood by the concept of the “social role” in Marxist social psychology. These principled positions must be included in the operational definition of the role. The role is usually defined as a dynamic aspect of the status, but this extremely widespread definition does not reveal the real contents of the concept. Apparently, the dynamic aspect of status is expediently characterised through the enumeration of those real functions which are prescribed for the individual by the group, by the content of group activities. If we take such a group as the family, then on its example we can show the interrelationships between the status or position, and the role. Various status characteristics exist for each member of the family. There are the positions of mother, father, eldest daughter, youngest son, etc. If we now describe the set of functions “prescribed” by the group for each position, then we shall receive the characteristics of the role of mother, father, eldest daughter, youngest son, etc. The role cannot be presented as something unchanging: its dynamism consists in the fact that in the preservation of the status, the set of functions

corresponding to it can vary greatly in different groups of the same type and even more so in the course of development of both the group itself and the broader social structure it is included in. The example of the family clearly illustrates this regularity. The change of the role of husband and wife is an actual theme of contemporary socio-psychological research.

The *system of group expectations* is an important component of the characteristics of the individual's position in the group. This special socio-psychological term emphasises the fact that each member of the group is not simply fulfilling some functions in the group but is necessarily perceived and evaluated by its other members. This means, in particular, that fulfilment of certain functions is expected from each role and each position, and not simply a mere enumeration of these functions, but also the definite quality of their fulfilment. The group controls the activities of its members through the system of expected models of behaviour, corresponding to each role. In a number of cases, there is divorce between the expectations that the group has with regard to one of its members and his real behaviour, his real way of performing his role. The two extremely important formations—*group norms* and *group sanctions* enable the system of expectations to be more explicitly defined.

All group norms are social norms, meaning they all represent the "institutions, models and standards of what should be from the point of view of society as a whole and the behaviour of the social groups and their members".¹

In a narrower sense the group norms are defined as rules worked out and accepted by the group. Each member of the group must act according to them, so that joint activities will be possible. In this way, norms perform a regulative function with regard to these activities. The norms of the group are connected with values, since any rules must be formulated only on the basis of the acceptance or rejection of socially-significant phenomena.

The values of each group are formed on the basis of the establishment of a definite attitude to social phenomena, determined by the position of the given group within the system of social relations and its experience in the organisation of definite activities. Although the problem of values is exten-

¹ See: M.I. Bobneva, *Social Norms and the Regulation of Behaviour*, Nauka, Moscow, 1978, p. 3 (in Russian).

sively treated in sociology, it is extremely important for social psychology to be guided by certain established sociological facts. The varying significance of different types of value for the group's vital activities and their various correlations with the values of society are the most important among these facts. With regard to the relatively general and abstract concepts, such as kindness, malice, happiness, etc., it can be said that values on this level are common to all social groups and that they can be regarded as the values of society. However, more specific social phenomena like work, education, culture, are evaluated differently by different groups. The values of different social groups, especially if the latter are involved in antagonistic relations, may clash amongst themselves, in which case it becomes difficult to speak about the values of society. The specific relation to each of such values is determined by the position of the social group within the system of social relations. This is especially clear in the analysis of the norms of large social groups, such as classes. As a rule, the norms regulating the activities and behaviour of group members rely upon group values, although the rules of everyday behaviour may or may not involve some sort of group specifics. Group norms include both generally known norms and specific norms of the given group. The specific analysis can only be ensured if the correlation between these two types of norms is revealed in the vital activities of each specific group and, moreover, in each specific type of society.

The formal approach in the analysis of group norms is a great shortcoming inherent in traditional social psychology. In experimental research this approach primarily involves the individual's *mechanism* of perception or rejection of the group's norms, but not their content determined by the specifics of activities. At the same time the mutual relations of the individual with the group can only be understood in the clarification of *which* of the norms he accepts, and *what kind* he rejects and *the reason* for this behaviour. All of this acquires special significance when the norms and values of the group diverge: many norms regulating the life of a real social group are prescribed by society, but the group can be oriented on values that do not coincide with these norms. This is understood only on the condition that specific groups in specific societies are considered, and therefore the analysis only on the level of general mechanisms does little for the understanding of the socio-psychological aspects of actual social phenomena.

The other side of the problem of norms in group life is the *measure* of their acceptance by each member of the group. This part of the problem has been more elaborately worked out in social psychology. There is a solid tradition of experimental research into the way in which the individual accepts group norms, into how far each individual "deviates" from the observation of these norms, and into how the social and "personality" norms correlate. One of the functions of social (including group) norms is to assist in the presentation of society's demands to the person as a personality and a member of some group, community or society. Therefore both the characteristics of the content of these norms and the process of the acceptance or rejection of group norms by the individual are important. This can be demonstrated by an analysis of the problem of *sanctions*, i.e. mechanisms which the group uses "to return" its member to the proper observation of the norms. There are two types of sanctions: encouraging and prohibiting, positive and negative. The system of sanctions is meant to *ensure* the observation of the norms rather than to compensate for their non-observance. The research of sanctions is useful in the specific analysis of particular groups, because outside this analysis there is nothing except formal connections between the individual and the group that can be established. The content of sanctions must be correlated to the content of the norms and this is not possible outside the analysis of the group's specific properties.

The examined set of concepts that enable the socio-psychological description of the group is only a conceptual outline to be filled in by the contents.


Such an outline is helpful and even necessary, but the problem lies in clearly understanding its function while not reducing it to a simple statement, a kind of an "adjustment" of the actual processes taking place in real groups to fit into that outline.

The classification of groups emerging as the focus of socio-psychological examination is the next step of the analysis. Repeated attempts based on various principles, such as the level of cultural development, the type of structure, the tasks and functions, the predominating types of contacts in the group, etc. have been made to construct a classification of groups. One can easily see that these principles are connected with the arbitrary characteristics of the group. Such basic ideas as the term of the group's existence, the principles of its formation, the accessibility of its membership, etc. are

often added to the above-mentioned. However, all the proposed classifications start from the *forms* of the group's vital activities. In any case, the general methodological approach analysed above is realised in the principles of classification. Since Marxist social psychology examines real social groups as the subjects of social activities, it also presents another principle of group classification, the sociological classification of groups in accordance with their position within the system of social relations serving as its basis. Before turning to such a classification, the applications of group concepts mentioned above must be brought into a system.

Groups in social psychology are primarily divided into the conventional and the real. Research is concentrated on real groups, among which there are those more suitable to general psychological studies. These are real *laboratory* groups. As distinct from these, there are also real *natural* groups. Real natural groups are given precedence in sociological analysis because they present a greater interest for social psychology. These natural groups are subdivided into "large" and "small" groups. (The term "small group" often signifies a laboratory group, but in the given context it refers to the small natural group.) Small groups are the traditional area of research for social psychology. Research into large groups is much more complicated and calls for special consideration. It is important to emphasise that these "large" groups also have varying values in social psychology. Some of them have a solid tradition of research in the West (this is primarily the large, unorganised, spontaneously arising "groups", with the very term "group" being extremely conventional with regards to them); others, like classes and nations, are rather poorly represented in social psychology as subjects of research. The point of the preceding discussions on the subject-matter of social psychology in Marxist tradition requires the inclusion of these groups in the sphere of analysis.

Small groups can also be subdivided into two varieties: developing groups, i.e. those defined by external social demands but still not united by joint activities, and collectives, i.e. groups of a higher level of development, connected with specific aspects of social activities. (The first bracket is called "developing" for lack of a better term). This classification can be graphically presented by the following scheme:



Everything under the heading of "real natural groups" is the object of socio-psychological research. The organised, stable formations of large groups, arising in the course of the historical development of society, present a special interest for the Marxist tradition as objects of analysis. The collectives present a special interest among small groups. All further interpretations of the social psychology of groups will be conducted in conformity with the given scheme. The general laws of communication and interaction analysed earlier will now be examined in the context of those real groups which acquire their own, special content.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE SOCIAL GROUPS

Research into the characteristics of large social groups runs up against a great number of difficulties. The wealth of methods in the study of various processes in small groups often contrasts with the lack of similar methods for research into the psychological make-up of classes, nations and other such groups. Therefore, there is sometimes an impression that the area of the psychology of large groups is not easily analysed in general. The absence of a tradition of such research serves to support this view.

At the same time, social psychology cannot, in general, claim to be social psychology in the true sense of the word without the psychology of large groups. The examination of the psychology of large groups cannot be regarded as a legitimate problem of social psychology (on a par with the problems of the small group, the personality and communication) because it is not *one of* the problems of the given discipline, but its *most important* problem, since the content of socially-significant traits of human mentality is formed on the macrosocial level. No matter how great the role of small groups and the spontaneous interpersonal communication in the processes of the formation of the personality, these groups do not in themselves create historically specific social norms, values, sets and demands. All these and other content elements of social psychology arise primarily on the basis of the historical experience of large groups, the experience generalised by signs, cultures and ideological systems. This experience is only "brought" to the individual through

a small group and interpersonal communication. Therefore, the socio-psychological analysis of large groups can be considered as a "key" to the realisation of the content of the individual's mentality.

Of course, alongside the experience of large social groups, mass social processes and movements hold the greatest significance for the understanding of the content elements of social psychology. The nature of social changes and transformations, the direct participation in revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) movements, the complex processes involved in the formation of social opinion—are all significant factors, determining the psychological characteristics of large groups. It would therefore be more accurate to discuss the need for the socio-psychological analysis of large social groups, mass processes and social movements. However, since these mass processes have large social groups as their subject, this branch can be designated, for expediency's sake, as "the psychology of large social groups".

Before examining the peculiarities of certain large groups, fundamental methodological questions must be answered which ensure the success of such an examination.

The initial question is concerned with which groups are to be considered as "large". Further, what is the psychological *structure* of the large group, its basic elements, their subordination, character and interconnections. The third question involves the type of correlation of the separate individuals' mentality included in the group with the elements of that group's psychology. The fourth question concerns *the means* with which all these phenomena can be examined. In Soviet psychological literature, especially in the works of its distinguished representatives, there are a great number of fundamental propositions which aid in finding answers to these questions.

What is a "large social group"? Proceeding from the general concept of the group, we cannot, of course, confine ourselves to the purely quantitative definition of this concept. In the above outline it was shown that the quantitatively "large" formations of people are divided into at least two types: the incidental spontaneously arising, short-term communities which include the crowd, the public, the audience and *social* groups (in the true sense of the word), i.e. groups formed in the course of the historical development of society, occupying a definite place within the system of social relations in every specific type of society, and therefore permanent

and stable in their existence. This second type pertains primarily to social classes, various ethnic groups (and their main variety—the nation), professional and age groups (young people, women, elderly people, etc. can be considered as groups in this point of view).

It is namely the study of this second type of “large” groups which presents a special interest for traditional Marxist socio-psychological knowledge because of its large significance for the understanding of the historical process. Moreover, the processes taking place in the first type of “groups” are already rather aptly described in various sections of social psychology and in particular in the investigation of the ways of influence in behavioural situations outside the collective.

There are certain common signs typical of all such large social groups which separate them from small groups. There are specific social regulators of social behaviour in large groups that are not found in small groups. These regulators are habits, customs and traditions. Their existence is brought about by specific social practices the given group is connected with and through the relative stability that reproduces the historical forms of these practices. The special features of the life stand of such groups examined as a whole provide such important characteristics as *the way of life of the group*. On the socio-psychological plane, research into the way of life involves the study of special forms of communication, a special type of contacts, arising between people. Interests, values and needs acquire a special significance in a definite way of life. The existence of a specific language often plays a special role in the psychological characteristics of large groups. Language as a common characteristic of ethnic groups can emerge as a certain jargon for other groups like, for example, professional groups or different age groups.

However, the common traits particular to large groups cannot be made into an absolute. Each type has its distinguishing features: the class, nation, some sort of trade and the youth cannot be placed in one bracket. The significance of each type of large groups in the historical process is as different as their various special features. Therefore, all the “penetrating” characteristics of large groups must be provided with a specific content.

The determination of the type of large groups that will be the primary subject of our analysis brings up a second methodological question: what is the *psychological structure* of large social groups? In answering this question, Soviet

social psychology begins with certain fundamental propositions of Marxist philosophy, in particular from that on the place of social psychology within the system of social relations. In a sociological context, the concept "social psychology" signifies a definite level of social awareness, which as a whole reflects social life, while the means, depth and level of the reflection may vary. The social psychology is a more basic form of reflection, presenting ideology to a greater degree. Social psychology is a direct form of such reflection, while ideology is its highest form. Social psychology emerges on the basis of the direct social experience of definite social groups and is therefore, strictly speaking, the psychology of large groups, primarily classes. Unlike social psychology, ideology signifies a theoretical form of the assimilation of social realities. It develops on the basis of scientific research of the laws of the historical process, i.e. on the basis of the study of historical human development as a whole, rather than on the basis of the direct experience of some group. The question concerning the correlation of the psychology of the social group (its "everyday consciousness") with the ideology, and even more so with the very content of the "psychology of the group" is an important question for social psychology.

In the history of Marxist thinking, Georgi Plekhanov devoted much attention to this phenomenon. The so-called "five-member formula" used in describing the structure of society was his creation: 1) the state of the productive forces; 2) the economic relations these forces condition; 3) the socio-political system developing on the given economic "basis"; 4) "the mentality of social man"; 5) various ideologies reflecting the properties of this mentality.¹ The social psychology which Plekhanov defined in other instances as the predominating mood of the intellect and emotions in a given social class of a given country at a given time is here considered as an independent element of the social structure. This idea reveals one of the most important propositions of the materialist view of history. This is namely the view brought about by the socio-economic development of the changes taking place in the people's mentality which provides the link between the economic development and the history of the culture in the broad sense of the word. These are no individual changes

¹ See: Gr. V. Plekhanov, "Fundamental Problems of Marxism", *Selected Philosophical Works* in five volumes, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, 1976, pp. 67-68.

in the orientations, views, and interests, but changes characteristic of large groups. The influence of common conditions of definite group on the consciousness of its representatives is realised in two ways: a) *through the personal life experience* of each member of the group determined by the socio-economic conditions of the life of the whole group, b) *through communication*, a large part of which takes place in a definite social environment with precisely expressed traits of the given group.

The structure of the large group's psychology contains a whole set of elements. In the broad sense it includes various mental properties, mental processes and psychic states similar to those found in the mentality of the individual. Two constituent parts in the psychology of the group can provide a more detailed analysis: the *dynamic* elements, which Plekhanov called the "mood of the intellect and emotions" and the more *stable* formations that include skills, habits, traditions, interests, etc. A number of attempts to determine the elements of the group psychology have been undertaken in Soviet social psychology. Almost all researchers divide its content into two constituent parts: 1) *the mental make-up* as a more stable formation (that can pertain to social or national character, morals, customs, traditions, tastes, and so on) and 2) *the emotional sphere*—as a more mobile, dynamic formation that includes demands, interests and moods. Each of these elements must become the object of a special socio-psychological analysis but this branch of social psychology is currently less developed. The content of each element will be examined at length along with the characteristics of each specific group's psychological features.

The third problem important on the methodological plane is that of *correlating the psychological characteristics of a large group with the consciousness of each individual in the group*. In the most general form, this problem is solved as follows: the psychological characteristics of the group represent that which is *typical*, inherent in each individual and therefore by no means the sum of the traits inherent in each individual. These typical qualities are not "identical" for all, but that which is common for, and inherent to a noticeable degree in, each representative of the given group and which is generated by the common conditions of existence. Therefore, attempts are undertaken in socio-psychological analysis, for example, to construct a special "social type of personality", by which is understood not only the type of personality typical of some

definite period or social structure, but a type of personality typical of a certain social group. Most often than not, this social type of personality is thought as the personality of a representative of a definite class (the working class, the bourgeoisie, etc.), but in principle, the "social type of personality" can relate to the typical representative of some trade or profession (the type of teacher, for example) or an age group. As a rule, an indication of the country or period is provided (a young man of the 20th century, etc.). The fixation of what is "typical" is a very complicated task. All experimental methods can be used in this area. However, the limitations of their application cannot provide the basis for the denial of common traits in the psychology of representatives of a definite social group. These common traits exist *objectively*, since they appear in the real activities of the group.

"Group psychology" exists, of course, in the consciousness of the individuals included in the group; nonetheless, it exists objectively, embodied by means of the system of signs in the needs, traditions, products of culture, etc. It emerges in relation to each individual "consciousness" as a certain social reality, going beyond the limits of consciousness of each individual and acting upon it together with other objective conditions of life. Henri Wallon's idea of the "duplication of the environment", in which a person acts, depends precisely on this fact. Although this reasoning is also justifiable with regard to small groups, it has special significance in reference to large groups.

The exposure of the common, typical traits is impossible studying only the content of the individual consciousness of the group members primarily because not all traits inherent in social psychology are inherent in each individual member of the group. In separate instances, a representative of the group can possess these common characteristics only to a minimal degree. This is explained both by the fact that the group members differ in their individual psychological characteristics according to their degree of involvement in the spheres of vital activities that are the most essential for the group and in that social psychology is largely influenced by ideology. The measure of assimilation of the latter by each individual varies greatly. Therefore, the "mental make-up" of the group and the "mental make-up" of the individual in the group do not fully coincide. The collective experience fixed in the system of signs plays a dominating role in the formation

of the group's psychology and this experience is not realised to the same degree by each member. The level of this realisation is "combined" with the individual psychological special features. Here we encounter the question of the *methods* to be used in investigating the psychology of large social groups.

Since the typical psychological traits of the large social groups' representatives are found in morals, traditions and customs, social psychology in the given case turns to the methods of analysis of the products of culture widely applied in *ethnography*. It cannot be said that such methods are not known in social psychology. Wilhelm Wundt proposed the study of language, myths, and religion for the knowledge of peoples' psychology. They have, of course, undergone essential changes and the general theoretical outline of their application has nothing in common with Wundt's outline. "Intercultural" studies can be regarded as a contemporary application of such methods. The term "intercultural" acknowledges its traditional use only by historians of culture, meaning in essence, *comparative* research not necessarily of just various "cultures", but different social groups in general. In Soviet psychology, in particular, an extremely interesting research on a similar plane was performed by Alexander Luria in Uzbekistan in the 1930s.¹ This was a period of great socio-economic and cultural changes typical of the post-revolutionary development of the former national outskirts of Russia. Luria singled out several different groups of the Uzbek population on the basis of different educational standards, different social experience and assimilation of the new ways of life. He compared the character of the mental processes taking place in these groups (perception, memory, thinking, etc.). This research showed the essential miscalculations of traditional psychological tests connected with the ignorance of the social and cultural context, to say nothing of the interesting results of the research itself.

In the study of the psychology of large social groups, various methods of statistical analysis can also be applied. The results of such research do not always reveal causal relations but rather describe certain functional dependencies within them. They also provide meaningful correlations. Earlier, in the discussion of the types of socio-psychological

¹ See: A.R. Luria, *On the Historical Development of Cognitive Processes: Experimental Psychological Research*, Moscow, 1974 (in Russian).

research, so-called *correlational* research was mentioned on a par with experimental research. It is primarily important in the study of psychological characteristics of large groups.

In addition to the methods of research named, social psychology, uses in the study of large groups methods applied in *linguistics*, since it involves the analysis of systems of signs. Of course, in the given instance such problems arise which are inevitable in the analysis of objects demanding a complex approach, large groups being precisely this type of objects.

The area of research of the psychological characteristics of large groups is the more "sociological" part of social psychology. The psychologically oriented social psychologists, are, in general, inclined to "surrender" the problems of large groups to sociology. It is important to note that the exclusion of the analysis of the psychology of large groups from socio-psychological analysis is presently criticised in Western social psychology. This deficiency is especially criticised with regard to American socio-psychological thought; it is emphasised that the absence of such an analysis eliminates the very "social context" which makes social psychology really social. The difficulties involved in the research of this problem must increase the efforts towards its solution rather than generating attempts to ignore it.

From the four types of large social groups named above, the analysis of classes has the greatest significance in Marxist social psychology. The singling out of this particular social group as a basic unit of the analysis of society's social structure is of great methodological significance. Speaking on the difference between Marxist sociology and other systems of social science Lenin referred to the former's class approach as one of its main traits which permitted the orientation on the various manifestations of numerous personalities acting in history and their reduction to the actions of classes.¹ Accepting this idea of Marxist sociology, Soviet social psychology considers class psychology not simply as an example of the psychology of large social groups, but as a more significant sphere forming the individual consciousness of the personality. In other words, it is assumed that those elements of the psychology of groups which determine the content of the individual consciousness must be looked for here.

¹ See: V.I. Lenin, "The Economic Content of Narodism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 411.

Three basic lines of research into class psychology can be noted from the point of view of social psychology. The first involves the psychological peculiarities of *various* concrete groups. This group of investigations is devoted to the characteristics of the psychological appearance of such social groups as the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc. Some of these investigations are dedicated to the characteristics of class psychology. The second line is concerned with the characteristics of class psychology of *different* classes in a *definite* epoch, the analysis of interconnected psychological traits of different classes which provide a special colouring to that period. Engels spoke about the epoch of early bourgeois revolutions, in particular from the point of view of the special mental disposition of different social groups. The characteristics of the general atmosphere of the epoch no doubt include, along with the description of the economic and political interests of the classes, also the structure of their psychological peculiarities and relations. This line of research is completely valid, although up to this time, it has been to a large degree characteristic of sociology.

The third line of research is the analysis of the *correlation* of class psychology with the psychology of individual members of the class as a special case of the problem of the correlation of group psychology with the psychology of the individual included in the given group. In other words, research into the given instance reveals the mechanisms through which class psychology is embodied in the psychological make-up of the class members. This is particularly important for social psychology.

Of course, no matter what method of analysis is chosen, those common principles must be relied on, which were formulated when the group psychology's position in the structure of social relations was determined. "Class psychology" has always been understood under the characteristics of this phenomenon in both sociological and psychological literature. As a rule, it is namely the psychological characteristics of classes (nations in separate cases) which are implied in the solution of the question of the content and elements of social psychology. Strictly speaking, many of the arguments presented earlier on the general problems of studying the social psychology of the large groups have not been verified for any other groups besides classes. (It is possible that a more thorough investigation of the other varieties of large social groups, such as professions and age groups, will force a change of the very "set" of elements of group psychology.)

Thus in the analysis of class psychology it is necessary to return to the structure of group psychology and reveal the specifics of each element presented in the psychology of the class.

One of the most significant elements in the given instance are *class needs* which represent an element of the social psychology's emotional sphere. Because the class position determines the capacity and composition of the material and cultural goods at the disposal of each member of the class, it also determines the structure of needs, the relative psychological significance and share of each of them. Although the problem of human needs has been worked out quite well in general psychology, the research into large groups' needs is still in its early stages. In particular, the psychological mechanism which creates needs typical of the whole group has also yet to be fully explained. It is, of course, generally clear that the class position of the individual creates a definite hierarchy of his "activities", which also determines the structure of his needs. But this general position is insufficient if the analysis includes more specific, complex factors such as, for example, the real life situation of the various layers of one class or another. Thus the general life and work conditions of the working class also determine its class psychology in general and the structure of its needs as its element in particular. But why is it that a part of this class, e.g. its revolutionary vanguard neglects its own personal material needs in favour of social ones? In what way is the restructuring of the systems of needs realised under the influence of certain factors? This is a question which social psychology must answer.

Interests are another element involved in the emotional sphere of class psychology. The nature of interests has been investigated more thoroughly in sociology than in social psychology. At the same time there is a group of problems which require a socio-psychological analysis. The specific content of class interests is also determined by the whole system of relations in which the given class is included in a certain type of society. It is psychologically important to explain how the class interest, formed on the level of the group (i.e. the class), determines the behaviour and activities of each individual. Moreover, there is still one more moment essential for social psychology in the problem of interests. Interests are formed as those of the whole group, but each member of the class is included not only in the given group; he is a member of many social groups. First, there are many subgroups in the class itself determined

by the level of qualifications, specific spheres of employment, etc. Second, each representative of the class can, at the same time, be a member of a group in the sphere of education (in a school or institute, for example), where he directly interacts with members of another class. There is an interweaving of various interests, each of which is determined by an individual's belonging to a significant social group. The question of the way the individual's interests in this system become more stable and under what circumstances the less radical interests begin to play a dominant role is of fundamental importance. In other words, what is the mechanism of coordination of various interests typical of the individual? What is the reason for the emergence of the class interest as a regulator of behaviour and activities of a large group of people, united in a class?

In addition to demands and interests, so-called "*social feelings*" pertain to the psychology of large social groups. These emotions are the definite characteristics of emotional states inherent in a group. The concept "social feeling" is not generally recognised in literature. It is, to a certain degree, disputable and vague. It can therefore only be used as a descriptive definition of a certain condition of the group's emotional sphere. If this term is correlated with corresponding concepts from the area of general psychology, its less than strict nature becomes obvious. The accepted division of human emotions into affects, emotions and feelings is not sufficiently strict in the socio-psychological lexicon. The third component of the emotional sphere standing out in the general psychological analysis, is signified by the term "social feelings"; it also designates other manifestations of the class' emotional sphere.

The question of whether or not these *social feelings* can be considered as a special variety of feelings is debatable. Strictly speaking, all human feelings are social. Nevertheless, this term exists and it is evidently necessary to understand the word "social" in the sense that "feelings" pertain to a social group as a whole, a class in the given instance. The vagueness of the term does not lessen the significance of the problem itself. It only bears witness to the fact that there is not a developed tradition of research into this area by means of a scientifically conceived apparatus in social psychology. Terminology must be borrowed from other fields, i.e. from literature, philosophy and history, where the very existence of certain social "feelings" and "emotions" was established and described long ago.

Thus in historical studies of the working class, the predomi-

nance of an optimistic mood evoked by the revolutionary upsurge is repeatedly registered in periods of revolutionary actions. In the age of bourgeois revolutions, when the bourgeoisie emerged as a revolutionary force, a dominating type of "social feelings" within this class were the feelings of enthusiasm, confidence and optimistic apprehension of historical changes. Engels said that the bourgeoisie of the period of early Renaissance can be blamed for almost anything except for the existence of philistinism, which he considered a definite formulation of a predominating state not only of intellect but of feelings of a certain class.

In certain classifications of the components of class psychology there are other elements which are definitely related to those earlier described, such as, for example, the set of social roles and its comprehension, and also the "social orientation of the personality", which is revealed through the system of the personality's value orientations, its norms of behaviour and the realisation of the goals of vital activities. However, if a closer look is taken they prove to pertain to the same formations which were mentioned earlier. With regard to the set of social roles, it is determined by the objective position of one social class or another, hence of the individuals included in the class as well. This does not, of course, exclude different variations within such a prescribed set, depending on the concrete life circumstances of each member of the class. There are predominating roles determined by the type of activities and that sphere where these activities primarily take place. It is obvious, however, that it is the awareness of the set of roles rather than the set itself that must be attributed to class psychology. The awareness of the set of social roles is nothing else but the translation into another language of the signs signifying the class interest, especially if we include in the concept of the class interest those moments, which relate to "the social orientation of the personality", namely, value orientations and the awareness of the goals of vital activities.

The question concerning the determination of the most *stable* components in class psychology has not been worked out to a significant degree. The "mental make-up" is the most important of these components, but it is comparatively better exposed on an operational level in reference to the other type of large group—the nation. "The mental make-up" of classes is usually described as a certain mental image, manifested in the definite social character. Again a good deal of interesting material can be drawn from other scientific disciplines—

history, philosophy, and culturology—in relation to the manifestations of the social character's definite traits typical of one class or another, especially at the turning-points of historical development. In socio-psychological literature, however, this problem occupies a rather humble place. The very term "social character" is widely used in neo-Freudian works, in particular in those of Erich Fromm. Yet for Fromm the social character is not necessarily the character inherent in the representatives of a definite social group, or a class in particular. Therefore, some interesting opinions expressed by Fromm do not in any way replace the analysis of the "social character" concept in reference to the class.

The social character is usually descriptively defined as the accumulation of certain historically developing forms of the organisation of activities typical of the representatives of a given class. In other words, the social character is manifested in the typical, stable form of actions of different class representatives present in various situations of their vital activities and distinguishing the representatives of the given class from those of other classes. These descriptions are not sufficiently strict and their further specification will depend both on new facts obtained in research and on the theoretical development of the problem of the character in general psychology. While this problem is not satisfactorily worked out, investigations of the problem of the social character are doomed to remain descriptive to a significant degree. This does not lessen the significance of the problem itself, however. The history of culture, civil history and literature are full of descriptions of specific manifestations of the classes' mental make-up and their social character. The Marxist sociological analysis of the special features of the proletariat as a class draws attention to such manifestations of the social character as "mass attraction", revealed in the various forms of the revolutionary movement. Naturally, in the developed working-class movement it is not so much the psychological "mass attraction" that is seen, but the conscious position formed by the scientific ideology of the proletariat. However, on the level of psychology, of the everyday consciousness of the working class, this trait emerges as the specifics of the social character.

The analysis of the mental make-up of various classes and their separate strata are found in Marx's work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.¹ In the works of Lenin, a psycho-

¹ See: Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, 1979, p. 191.

logical portrait of the petty bourgeoisie is constructed on the basis of a socio-economic analysis of the position of that part of the bourgeois class. Its duality, unending fluctuations, shifting from one side to another, tendency towards compromises or sharp transfers from very radical statements to bewilderment at the very first confrontations with difficulties and setbacks¹ are the essence of the special mental make-up of the large social group. In critical periods this mental make-up appears as a definite way of behaviour and activities. The psychological pattern of those norms which the given social group is guided by can be constructed on the results of these actions.

In the best works of world literature the mental make-up of the representatives of the bourgeoisie is brilliantly described in many images. In the works of Honoré de Balzac, Theodore Dreiser and Maxim Gorky, literature in essence carried out a great amount of "socio-psychological work", representing the type of research called monographic, or research of "the event". The fact that the product of such research exists not in the form of scientific theory, not in the system of scientific concepts but in works of literature does not make the research less valuable. This once again shows that the given material can be investigated not only in scientific standard research.

In addition to the social character, the mental make-up is revealed in *customs* and *habits* and also in *traditions* of the class or social group. All of these formations serve to regulate the behaviour and activities of the social group's members and thus are of great importance for understanding the psychology of the group. In regard to the component of the mental make-up, it is better investigated in reference to the other "large" group, namely the nation (or some other ethnic communities.) The problem of customs and habits, is also, however, quite significant for class psychology. Their totality, including traditions, are the most important characteristics of such a complex feature of a class as *its way of life*. The socio-psychological aspect of the research of the way of life, in particular, consists in determining and explaining the dominating way of behaviour of most representatives of the class in typical mass situations of everyday life, proceeding from the objective position of that class. Habits and customs form under the influence of definite life conditions; then they are strengthened and act as regulators of behaviour. The analysis of habits and customs is a purely socio-psychological problem.

¹ See: V.I. Lenin, "The Economic Content of Narodism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 355.

Methods of research in this area are closer to those of traditional psychology, since certain methods of observation are applicable here. With regard to traditions, a part of them are embodied in the objects of material culture and therefore methods are applied in their study that are known as the analysis of the products of activities.

When studying habits and customs, social psychology must again turn to the sociological analysis of classes because the degree and measure of habits and customs as regulators of social behaviour are not the same for different classes at different periods. Thus, the sociological analysis of the peasantry, for instance, permits social psychology to use the characteristics of precisely that class in the study of its habits and customs. Even in contemporary societies, primarily among the peasantry, many customs inherent in the given national culture are preserved. While a large city with a ramified communication system promotes a certain mixing of customs, habits and traditions of different social groups. Therefore the isolation of the object of research is difficult here. The sociological analysis of the classes is necessary in the given case because the significance of such socio-psychological regulators of behaviour as habits and customs largely depend on the ideology of the class. The interaction of everyday consciousness and ideology acquires great significance in the analysis: the question cannot be solved correctly without a proper understanding of this interaction.

These are the basic directions in the study of various social classes' psychological characteristics. The contribution of social psychology to the study of large social groups, conducted within the entire system of social sciences, revolves around providing an explanatory outline which will show the numerous elements of group psychology which regulate both the mass actions of the members of the group and the actions of its separate representatives. In other words, the task consists in analysing the ways in which the group's psychology is shaped, on the one hand, and the mechanisms by which each member's "*assimilation*" of the social realities is ensured, on the other.

The general problem of large groups, denoted as a problem of the correlation of the group psychology with the individual consciousness of the group members, preserves its significance in the analysis of the psychology of classes. It is important here to understand the mechanism which enables a relatively large mass of people—all their psychological differences notwithstanding—to demonstrate a similarity of various notions,

tastes, and even emotional evaluations of realities in some kind of significant life situations. It is a generally known fact that social psychology does not level out the psychological manifestations of the group members. It is also well known that the "scattering" of various models of behaviour is not infinite for members of the same social class. Investigations of the special features of the working-class psychology in contemporary society show that it is always possible for the worker to occupy a completely different position in a concrete situation of class struggle (in the event of a strike he can become an active leader or, on the contrary, a strikebreaker), but these variations will always be those of behaviour within definite borders. The conditions of the worker's existence place his behaviour within these limits. He will not ever be able, in the situation of a strike for instance, to suddenly start peddling stocks, i.e. to assimilate a model of behaviour characteristic of a completely different class.

Although the members of each class are united in a large number of diverse small groups—the family, the work teams, sports organisations, etc., the significant "repertoire" of behaviour is not determined by these small groups. If the socio-psychological analysis remains only on the level of the small group, then neither the content of the norms, values and orientations nor their possible "set" can be understood. Regardless of the unusual nature of the problem, social psychology has to appeal in the given instance to the analysis of large group psychology, since the small group cannot be investigated to a full extent outside this problem either.

Any problem of the small group can be interpreted in a completely different way in the context of the large group. Stability with regard to group pressure, the change of social attitudes, the measure of the mediation of interpersonal relations by activities, and the behavioural strategy of the sides in a conflict are all investigated on the level of the small group, but not completely. The questions of *which* social orientations change first in the given group, *what* is the measure of stability of the group's members with regard to the group influence in the specific *given* case, and under *which* nature of the conflict do the group members choose one strategy or another, cannot be answered at this stage of the analysis. The analysis of these problems on the level of the separate individual provides no answer to these questions either. Of course, an answer can be given in terms of individual psychological peculiarities of the personalities included in the situation, but the crux of the entire

matter lies in the fact that the manifestation or the non-manifestation of any individual psychological peculiarities depends on the *character of the situations*, on their qualitative characteristics and on the measure of their significance for the given personality. These situations are those of specific life conditions determined primarily by membership of a specific large social group, namely the class. And while classes really exist in society, social psychology cannot ignore this fact in the construction of explanatory models of human behaviour and activities.

Various ethnic groups are another example of large social groups, significant in the historical process. Unlike the psychology of classes, the psychological peculiarities of various ethnic groups, primarily nations, have been investigated much better in social psychology. A special branch of science has been established on the interface of social psychology and ethnography—ethnopsychology. Some authors consider ethnopsychology as a component part of social psychology. However, the elaborate treatment of the problem of the nation's psychology within ethnopsychology is often characterised by specific accents. Out of all ethnic groups the attention is focussed only on the *nation*, though the nations as ethnic communities took shape at a relatively late stage of historical development: their formation is connected with the period of capitalist development. Although the nation is the most wide-spread form of ethnic community in contemporary society, there are other varieties, such as nationalities, national groups, etc. Therefore it would be unjust to reduce ethnopsychology to the study of the psychology of nations alone. The shift in the accent has led to a lack of precision in the terminology applied in this branch of social psychology: with regard to the components of psychology of ethnic groups, they often speak about the "national character" but not the "ethnic character", the "national psychology", "national feelings" and "national self-awareness" but not the "ethnic psychology", although all these formations represent a particular case of the analogous manifestations of social psychology in any ethnic group.

The tradition of psychological research into ethnic groups in social psychology is traced back to Wilhelm Wundt's work on peoples' psychology, where "peoples" were interpreted as ethnic communities. Wundt felt that the psychology of ethnic groups should be studied by the investigation of myths, customs, and language, since these formations make up the psychological structure of ethnic groups. After Wundt, many new approaches to this problem arose in Western

psychology, the main one being that developed in neo-Freudian cultural anthropology.

In Marxist tradition, the problems of ethnic psychology are developed in the light of the theory of the nation. The national (ethnic) affiliation of an individual is an extremely significant factor for social psychology because it fixes definite characteristics of the micro-environment in which the personality is shaped. The ethnic specifics are concentrated to a definite degree in the historical experience of each people, and the assimilation of this experience is the most important content of the socialisation process. The developing personality becomes familiar with the specifics of the national culture, customs and traditions through the immediate environment, primarily the family and school. The way in which this ethnic and most of all national affiliation is realised depends on the specific socio-historical conditions of the given ethnic group's existence and on the predominating ideology. On this depends the correlation of the personality's notions about its affiliation to a specific ethnic group with the evaluations of other ethnic groups.

The system of school education presents the norms of this correlation which predominate in the given society. Therefore the assimilation of ethnic specifics is always realised under the influence of ideology. However, on the level of everyday consciousness, a whole range of characteristics can also be proposed which are typical of the given ethnic group. The psychological structure of the ethnic group reproduces all the elements characteristic of the psychological structure of any large group. However, as we have already explained on the example of the psychology of classes, separate elements of social psychology are typical only of the definite types of large groups. Each of them are filled with a specific content even if they are found in all large groups. All this wholly pertains to ethnic groups as well.

Because the question of the psychological make-up of the *nation* has been elaborately worked out, the structure of the elements in the ethnic group's psychology is usually described as the structure of the elements of the nation's psychology. In the Marxist sociological definition of the nation, one of the most important features of a nation is "the community of the mental make-up expressed in the community of culture". Here, too, the important element of large-group psychology connected with the most stable formations is fixed with regard to the nation. As in the analysis of the psychology of the classes, it is not easy to provide an operational definition for

the concept of the "mental make-up of the nation". Therefore, many attempts have been undertaken in ethnopsychology to find equivalents for this concept which would be more applicable in empirical investigations. The concepts of the "national character", "national self-awareness" or "national psychology" are all used as synonyms for the concept of the "psychological make-up of the nation". However, the introduction of a large number of such concepts will lead to inappropriate terminological variants.

There have been many attempts in Soviet ethnographical literature to organise the entire system of applied concepts and to provide an outline for analysing the psychology of ethnic groups at least on a descriptive level. In keeping with the tradition formed in the study of large-group psychology, the psychology of ethnic communities has two aspects: 1) the most stable part—the mental make-up, which includes the national or ethnic character, temperament and also traditions and customs and 2) the emotional sphere which includes the national or ethnical feelings.¹

It is easy to see that the concept of the "national character" emerges as a kind of equivalent of the "social character", an element of the mental make-up of the class. Therefore the difficulties stated in that instance are also present in this one. It is interesting to note that a rather large unanimity is usually observed in specific investigations when describing the traits of the national character typical of separate national groups (courage, diligence, self-restraint, etc.). Many debatable problems arise with regard to the essence and nature of the national character.

The question of the correlation of the national character with the characters of particular representatives of the given national group is well known. It is another question as to whether or not definite character traits can be the exclusive "property" of one national group while completely absent in another.

In accordance with the general methodological principle in which the mental make-up of the group cannot be the sum-total of the "make-ups" of personalities included in it, the national character as an element of the mental make-up can be considered only as the fixation of some typical traits. Many investigations show that the traits of the national character are seen more distinctly in those situations when groups, rather

¹ See: Yu.V. Bromley, *Ethnos and Ethnography*, Moscow, 1973 (in Russian).

than individuals, are acting. Absolutes cannot be made in the clarification of such typical general traits of a national character, firstly, because in real societies people's national and social characteristics in any group are intermingled. A specific combination of the national and social character is inevitable within each individual class in class societies. Secondly, any trait among those singled out in the national characters of different groups cannot be "rigidly bound" only to the given nation: strictly speaking, each of them belongs to humanity. It cannot be said that diligence, for example, is inherent in one people and sociability in another. Therefore the discussion concerns not so much various "sets" of traits as the degree of manifestation of these traits and the specifics of their formation. The specifics of English humour (although a sense of humour is not inherent in the English alone) and Italian expansiveness (although the Spanish are no less expansive) are not reflected in literature without reason.

A different type of activities is the basic sphere of the manifestation of the national character; therefore, investigation of the national character is possible through the study of the products of activities. The analysis of folk art and language plays a special role, alongside the study of customs and traditions. Language is also important because the transfer of traits of the national character is realised in the socialisation process primarily by means of language. The relative stability of the national character traits is explained by the definite inertia ensured in the transfer of experience from generation to generation regardless of the variability of the social environment.

Such elements of the mental make-up as the temperament and capabilities can also sometimes be referred to the psychology of ethnic groups. However, this question has yet to receive a definite answer in social psychology. Some researchers deny the legitimacy of posing the problem of the specifics in the temperament and capabilities for various ethnic groups in general. In a definite sense, the reason for this is the large number of layers involved in investigating the problems of nations. In the conditions of reactionary ideologies, the question of the aptitude of various nations becomes bogged down by a number of political speculations generated by various forms of chauvinism and racism. The research of these problems in social psychology therefore involves special responsibility.

The problem of the temperament is studied on the level of various ethnic groups, depending also to a large extent on the degree to which the problem is elaborated in general psychology.

There is an opinion among those who believe that the specifics of the temperament can be considered as the specifics of the mental make-up of the nations, that the revelation of specific *combinations* of predominating types of temperaments is important, but the rigid "binding" of a definite type of temperament to a definite ethnic group is inappropriate. There is an even more complicated question concerning capabilities if tests are applied in research. Many authors justifiably note that every test cannot take into account the specifics of various cultures in the conditions under which it is applied. An inaccurate estimation of the test results is possible here as a result of the tests' poor adaptation to the specific conditions of the given culture. This can also provide the basis for nationalistic speculations. That is why a special UNESCO document says that no matter how the anthropologist classifies people, he never includes the classification of mental qualities. Intelligence tests in themselves do not allow us to differentiate between that which was brought about by natural abilities and that which is the result of the influence of the environment, instruction and education. In all cases when distinctions brought about by the influence of the environment were evened out, the tests showed an essential similarity in the mental traits of all human groups, i.e. the average achievements of the members of each ethnic group in the realisation of their potential are approximately the same under equal cultural possibilities. Hence we may conclude that the question of capabilities as an element of the mental make-up of ethnic groups is illegitimate.

The same care is also necessary in the research of certain other specific features of ethnic groups more directly connected with the socio-psychological phenomena. Research into the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance was criticised for ignoring the cultural (ethnic) context. The "resistance to dissonance" and the "sensitivity to dissonance", as shown in the work of Harry Ch. Triandis, are different in European and African cultures. Usually such differences are not taken into consideration and thus socio-psychological investigations can, willingly or unwillingly, provide tendentious material which might be applied in different reactionary ideological doctrines. This example once again shows the high level of responsibility of the social psychologist in studying the psychology of a nation. This field is so closely connected with the problem of the nations' political equality, so firmly included in the ideological context that these aspects cannot be ignored in professional socio-psychological analysis.

Furthermore, a whole group of phenomena which make the research of national character specifics more complicated, develop on the level of everyday consciousness. These phenomena are generated by the process of stereotyping characteristic of each perception of social objects and appearing in particular in the perception of members of different ethnic groups. The origin of ethnic stereotypes is connected with the development of an ethnic self-awareness, a realisation of one's affiliation of a definite ethnic group. The psychological community inherent in each group is expressed in the formation of a definite "we-feeling". For ethnic groups this "we-feeling" signifies the awareness of the peculiarities of one's own group, its distinctions from other groups. The image of other groups in this instance is often oversimplified, taking shape under the influence of certain inter-ethnic relations which form a special social (in the given instance—ethnic) attitude to the representative of another group. Past experience with another ethnic group plays a large role in this, too. If these relations in the past had a hostile character, the same shade will reflect on each newly-met representative of this ethnic group: this is what the negative attitude is reduced to. The image constructed in conformity with this attitude also creates an ethnic stereotype. It is important to emphasise the fact that the ethnic stereotype does not always portray the other ethnic group in a negative light, but it always amounts to a subjective perception of the representative of the other group. The ethnic stereotype develops most often due to limitations of inter-ethnic communication: traits inherent in a single representative of another ethnic group are applied to the whole group. Stereotypes forming in this way later influence the development of ethnic sympathy or antipathy.

Even in case of the "neutral" effect every ethnic stereotype signifies an ascription of some kind of ethnic signs to the representatives of different ethnic groups (this can involve both anthropological properties and cultural norms), i.e. it promotes "approximate", inaccurate characteristics making various types of nationalism and chauvinism possible. Therefore the socio-psychological mechanism that generates ethnic stereotypes and the possible political speculations constructed on this basis must be thoroughly analysed.

The realisation of the peculiarities of one's own ethnic group does not presume an obligatory prejudice against other groups. But this is true while it only concerns the *statement* of the differences taking place. It is very easy, however, to go from such a statement to an *evaluation* of the other group—

then distortion of its image is possible. Here we encounter a psychological phenomenon—*ethnocentrism*, the tendency to perceive life and its events from the position of one's own ethnic group, which is regarded as a model, i.e. given preference. The essence of ethnocentrism consists in the consideration of one's ethnic community as the centre, with all others surrounding it. These notions are psychological formations of mass consciousness as concrete simplified images of one's people, generously laden with positive characteristics far superior to the analogous traits in the notions about other peoples. Therefore ethnocentrism is a sympathetic fixation of the traits of one's own group. This does not, however, presume hostile relations to the other groups, although such relations can arise under certain circumstances.

The character acquired by ethnocentrism depends on the type of social relations, the content of national politics and the ideological orientations. Ethnic stereotypes always form in a certain social context and when they take on a stable form of prejudice, a typically negatively-tainted emotional formation, they can be easily applied as tools in national strife. The socio-psychological analysis of the formation of ethnic stereotypes which explains the mechanism of their origin, in situations of inter-ethnic communication, can make a definite contribution to the struggle against such negative phenomena.

The important characteristics of the psychology of ethnic groups, established by social psychology, is the *relativity* of the psychological distinctions between groups. This pertains to the national character in particular. There is a whole group of investigations, supporting this position and bearing witness specifically to the high degree of relativity of notions about the content of typical characteristics found in various national groups. A different kind of extra-ethnic influences, primarily socio-historical, political and also those brought about by the cultural content, always make their way into ethnic stereotypes.

The complexity of the phenomena of national psychology requires an answer to the question of the reason for people's national peculiarities. A large number of reasons for these distinctions have been pointed to in the history of social thought in different social and ethnological concepts. They were explained by the nation's inborn set of features in theories of the "popular spirit". In various biological interpretations of the social process they were often considered as genetically determined, typical of a race. The roots of these differences were often sought in the anthropological and physical peculiarities

of people, in the geographical conditions, etc. The unsoundness of these concepts, often supported by various political purposes, forced researchers to turn to the analysis of historically formed economic, social and cultural life conditions. That the search was far from always productive can be demonstrated by two examples.

Ethnopsychology, set up as an independent branch of scientific knowledge, accumulated a lot of interesting material in relation to people's mental make-up and behaviour brought about by their ethnic affiliation. However, it was already established at the early stages of research that the smaller the ethnic community considered as an object of the research, the more definite the signs which permit one group to distinguish itself from another. Research provided especially interesting material when it involved the less developed and more isolated tribes. Therefore the vast majority of investigations in traditional ethnopsychology was conducted on tribes populating the islands of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans like, for example, Tahiti, Haiti, etc. Although these investigations established the dependence of ethnical psychology on the conditions of the group's life, the *conditions* themselves in the given concrete situation were extremely specific (in particular, class stratification of the group was often absent.) The transfer of the results of such investigations to large contemporary nations is impossible, because the transfer to these new objects of research demands a socio-class approach that can, in principle, change the formed picture. Therefore, despite the fact that some investigations were valuable in themselves, they remain on an extremely "local" level, and the solution of fundamental problems will not progress through this kind of research.

Another example is connected with the group of theoretical works in neo-Freudian cultural anthropology (Ruth Benedict, Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton, Margaret Mead). This trend introduced the concept of "the base personality", which presupposed an analysis of the means of its socialisation, including the study of the family, the norms accepted by the group, the symbols accepted in the given culture, and so on. It was, in other words, research into the conditions in which the base personality took shape, which account for people's ethnic peculiarities. This was undoubtedly a promising direction of analysis. It was not, however, concluded due to the erroneous methodological and theoretical premises of the researchers: "*Conditions*" were reduced to only cultural symbols, and the socio-economic relations were not considered at all. But without analysing

these, the question of the reasons behind the ethnic distinctions between people and in particular of the psychological distinctions of the representatives of various ethnic groups cannot be answered.

Understandably, the task confronting Soviet ethnopsychology is extremely complicated. The basic research which would provide the founding methodological principles of the Marxist analysis of social phenomena and the reinterpretation of the large amount of material accumulated in the framework of trends developing outside the Marxist tradition is necessary. The political importance of the problem requires particular responsibility in answering these questions. The principle of equality of nations characteristic for the political programme of socialist states does not signify an admission to the "identicalness" of nations. Consequently, the exposure of national peculiarities, including in the mental make-up, remains vitally important. However, an absolute cannot be made from peculiarities, they must be regarded as derivative from the socio-economic conditions. The national character traits should be treated as a product of definite historical conditions and the consolidation of certain traits in a group over generations. These traits can change, though they are relatively stable. Therefore, the national psychology acts as a historical formation: the ethnic stereotype only makes an absolute out of the actual one-sided vital activities of different human groups, brought about by the differences in the conditions of existence and the existing world division of labour. The subsequent "mechanism" of the transformation of the ethnic stereotype into a prejudice and then the fixation of this prejudice in reactionary ideological and political doctrines is by no means a socio-psychological problem. Hence, the complex nature of the object of research requires a complex approach, and joining the efforts of several scientific disciplines—social psychology, psychology, ethnography, etc.

* * *

The analysis of the psychological characteristics of large social groups leads to the posing of a fundamentally important question for social psychology: How do the elements of social psychology "interact" with the mentality of each individual in the group? The research of the way in which the social experience of the group, reflected in the elements of its psychology, reaches the individual is not complete without the inclusion

in its chain of such links as the small group. People unite in the most varied small groups developing under the most varied circumstances in the framework of the social class, nation or professional group. So the next logical step in the investigation of the problem of interactions between the individual and society is the analysis of the psychological aspect of the *small* group.

GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE SMALL GROUP IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The problem of the small group is the most traditional and the most well studied in social psychology. An interest in the research of small groups developed long ago, immediately after the problem of the relationship between society and the individual came into the limelight and in particular, the question of the relationships between the personality and the environment in which it took shape. Any researcher, engaged in the investigation of this problem, intuitively considers the small group as the primary environment in which the personality makes its first steps and continues its further development. It is obvious that from the first days of his life a person is connected with certain small groups; he not only experiences their influence, but it is only in these groups and through them that he obtains his first information about the outside world and hereafter organises his activity. In this sense, the phenomenon of the small group lies on the surface and becomes the immediate object of the socio-psychological analysis.

It is obvious, however, that the phenomenon of the small group does not necessarily relate to the simple problems of social psychology. First of all, just as in the discussion of this question with respect to large groups, the question of groups which are to be considered as "small" is also extremely important. In one American investigation it was calculated that each individual is a member of at least 5 or 6 small groups and the total number of such groups is somewhere between 5 and 6 billion. Only the "static" groups were counted, although in reality groups are constantly forming and breaking up. If we consider the dynamics of this process, then it becomes clear that the small group is a reality extremely significant for the

psychologist, and that he must somehow manage to bind his bearings among this large number of group formations to determine more precisely the object of research and decide which groups should be investigated. In other words, it is necessary to answer the question of what the small group is and what are its parameters subject to investigation by social psychology.

To answer this question, it would be helpful to address the history of small group research. As was already mentioned, the small group, owing to many circumstances, became the unique focus of the researchers' attention. These investigations went through a number of stages, each of which introduced something new to the interpretation of the small group's essence and its role for the individual. In the earliest investigations conducted in the US in the 1920s, the question was elucidated as to whether the individual fares better alone than in the company of others or, on the contrary, the presence of others, heightens the effectiveness of the activities of each individual. The accent was placed on the fact of the simple *presence* of others, and the group itself was interpreted primarily as this very "presence". People's simultaneous individual actions (co-actions) were studied rather than their interaction in the group. The results of the investigations of such "co-active" groups showed that *the speed* of the individual's actions *increases* in the presence of others, but *the quality decreases* (even if the experimental conditions excluded the moment of rivalry). These results were interpreted as the origin of the effect of increased sensory stimulation, when the very sight and "sound" of other people influences the productivity of an individual's activities. This effect is known as the effect of *social facilitation*, defined basically by the fact that the presence of others simplifies the actions of the individual, promoting them. True, in some investigations, a contrasting effect was demonstrated. This effect involved the hindrance of the individual's actions under the influence of the presence of others and was called *inhibition*. However, the study of social facilitation was more widely spread, and the main result of this first stage of research was the discovery of precisely this phenomenon.

The second stage of the development of research marked the transfer from the study of co-active groups to the study of the individual's *interaction* in the small group. In one investigation it was shown that in the conditions of joint activities in the group the same problems are solved more correctly by the group than by the individual; fewer mistakes are made by the

group than by the individual, especially in the early stages, and quicker solutions to problems are made, etc. In one experiment the average speed of the group's solution of the problem was contrasted with the average speed of the solution of the same problem by the individual participants of the interaction. The results turned out in favour of the group. True, in a more detailed analysis it was established that the results also depended on the nature of the activities. However, this idea received no further development and the basic result of this stage of research was the establishment of the fact that the interaction of the group members (and not simply their "co-presence") is an important parameter of the group activities.

The third stage of small group research became much more ramified. The characteristics of the group as such, its structure and the type of individual interaction in the group, as well as the group's influence on the individual began to be revealed, and various approaches to the description of general group activities were formulated. The methods for measuring the various group features were improved. Moreover, the specific points of view of sociology, social psychology and general psychology on the small group began to take shape. These three different "perspectives" of research into the small group can be schematically presented in the following way: 1) when the group is investigated as a unique medium within which the individual's behaviour is realised ("individual behaviour in the group situation"), it is the content of the general psychological approach; 2) when the properties of the group and various manifestations of their properties are investigated, this is primarily the content of the sociological approach; 3) when the interaction is investigated between the group as a special functional essence and individuals as its members, this is primarily an expression of the socio-psychological approach. Of course, all these demarcations are extremely conditional and a certain general methodological principle traced in all three "perspectives" is much more important: the absence of the positing of the problem of the group's connection with broader social communities it is included in and the absence of its singling out as a cell of the social structure, meaning a departure from the solution of the question concerning the content aspect of the social relations existing in the small group.

The interest in the phenomenon of the small group is so great that in a certain sense the entire tradition of social psychology can be considered as the social psychology of small groups.

There are a number of reasons, both subjective and objective, why the small group became a unique focus of the socio-psychological interest in the West. First, this is the general complication of social life caused by the increasingly varying types of human activities and an increasingly complex nature of the entire social organism. The fact itself of people being included in numerous formations according to the type of their activity becomes so obvious that it calls for constant attention on the part of researchers. It can be said that the role of small groups objectively increases in a person's life, in particular because group decision-making becomes an ever more persistent need in production, social life, etc. Secondly, a more specific reason can be found in the very fact that the problem of the small group has proved to be the problem where the interests of psychology and sociology intersect. The formation of social psychology at the interface of these two disciplines makes the given sphere of reality the focus of attention.

A third reason, that of a methodological nature can be added to what has been said. The very specifics of socio-psychological knowledge seem to "justify" the exaggerated interest in the small group. The need for more precise facts and the success of the experimental method in other branches of psychology force social psychology to search for an adequate object where experimental methods, in particular, the method of laboratory experiment, would be applied. The small group is the unit most easily interpreted in laboratory analysis where the experiment is most possible, appropriate and feasible. The same process of group decision-making can be investigated by means of laboratory methods precisely in the small group. Therefore the small group seems to "help" social psychology to affirm its right to existence as an experimental discipline.

However, in certain conditions the legitimate interest in small groups leads to an absolutisation of their importance, the overestimation of which to the detriment of the research into the socio-psychological aspect of mass social processes, became possible because of the general positivist orientation of traditional social psychology. This fact has been known in socio-psychological literature for a long time now,¹ although the connection between the general methodological principles of socio-psychological positivism and the solution of concrete scientific problems has not been fully traced. Meanwhile, the shift of the

¹ See, for example: *The Context of Social Psychology: a Critical Assessment*, Ed. by H. Tajfel and I. Israel, Academic Press, London, 1972.

interest to the investigation of small groups is one of the extremely bright illustrations of the danger which arises from contempt for macro-social problems.

Thus the situation in the field of research into small groups in traditional social psychology is extremely contradictory. On the one hand, many very important questions have been posed, and hundreds of technically very interesting and refined experiments have been conducted. A large number of the processes and effects typical of small groups have been studied in detail. On the other hand, there is no integration of the data obtained and no adequate theoretical schemes necessary for the explanation of these data, so that the basic problems remain unsolved.

Up till now, the question of the small group's definition and its most essential feature (and consequently the principles in the singling out of small groups) has been debated. The question of the quantitative parameters of the small group, its upper and lower limits, is also yet to be solved. The entire problematics of the group processes remains disputed. The existence of a large quantity of seemingly "primary" unsolved questions, which, if left aside, would make the very possibility doubtful, is paradoxical. One of the reasons for this consists in the absence of a single theoretical approach. The problem of the small group equally interests researchers of different theoretical orientations, and the diversity and contrasts of interpretations stimulates the preservation of "blank spaces" in the most cardinal parts of the research.

Therefore, the first question which must be answered in the study of small groups pertains to the definition of the small group, its features and limits. If we choose the most "synthetic" from the countless number of definitions of the small group, it is as follows: the small group is a group with a small number of members who are united by a joint social activity and directly and personally communicate with one another, which is the basis for the emergence of emotional relations, group norms and group processes. This rather universal definition, which does not claim to accuracy and is of a descriptive character, permits a large variety of interpretations depending on the content rendered to the concepts it contains. For example, in the interactional orientation, where the primary concept is that of "interaction", the focus in the definition is seen in the fact that the small group is a certain system of relationships, because the words "joint social activity" are interpreted here in an interactionist sense. Another supporting point for the

cognitive orientation can be found in this definition, too: it is not important whether it is on the basis of joint activities or simple interaction; the main thing is that definite elements of the group cognitive structure, norms and values, arise.

This definition is filled with a new content in Soviet social psychology. If psychological characteristics of actual social groups is regarded as the main point of the group analysis, then, naturally, the establishment of group determination as an element of the social structure of society and as a cell in the broader system of the division of labour acquires a special significance. Moreover, in conformity with the basic principle of Soviet psychological science, the presence of a joint social activity in the small group permits the interpretation of the group as the *subject* of this activity and offers a definite theoretical outline for all future investigations. For the sake of sufficient clarity of this interpretation, that which is essential and significant for the Marxist analysis should be singled out in the proposed definition, and a new definition can be produced: the small group is a group in which social relations stand out in the form of direct personal contacts. This definition includes the basic traits of the small group singled out in other systems of socio-psychological knowledge, along with a clearly-formulated idea of the interpretation of the group in Marxist social psychology.

In such an interpretation the small group primarily possesses the same traits that each group considered in social psychology possesses. This group does not exist in a vacuum but in a definite system of social relations, acting as the subject of a specific type of social activities, as a link in a definite social system, as a part of the social structure. At the same time, this definition fixes a specific trait of the small group which distinguishes it from large groups. Social relations here emerge in the form of direct personal contacts. The widespread psychological term of "contact group" acquires a specific content here. The small group is not simply any contacts between people (because there is always some sort of "contacts" in a spontaneous assembly of people), but contacts in which definite social relationships are realised and mediated by a joint activity.

After these fundamental positions have been defined, the quantitative characteristics of the small group must be established, because the definition of the small group as a small number of people is a tautology. There is a long-standing debate on the "upper" and "lower" limits of the small group. In the majority of investigations, the number of members in the

small group fluctuates from 2 to 7. The modal number 2 corresponds to the widespread notion that the smallest small group is that consisting of two people—the so-called “dyad”.

Although the idea that the small group “starts” from the dyad represents a sound idea with regard to common sense, there is another point of view on the lower limit of the small group, which considers the least number of members to be 3. Consequently, according to this viewpoint, at the base of all the different small groups lie the so-called “triads”. The argument about the least possible membership of the small group would be endless if no arguments are introduced in favour of the one or the other approach. There are attempts in Soviet social psychology to introduce arguments in favour of the triad as the least possible small group. Authors have arrived at the following conclusions based on experimental research of small groups as the subjects and objects of management. Only the simplest, primarily genetic forms of communication such as purely emotional contact, are fixed in the dyad. However, the dyad is extremely difficult to be regarded as the authentic subject of activities since it is impossible to define the type of communication within it mediated by a joint activity. The conflict arising with regard to activities remains, in principle, unresolved in the dyad since it inevitably acquires the character of a purely interpersonal conflict. The presence of the third person creates a new position in the group—the *observer*. This adds an essentially new moment to the developing system of interaction. This “third” can add something to one of the positions in the conflict, thus creating the basis for the settlement of the conflict. This point of view enjoys broad support, yet it cannot be said that the problem is completely solved.

The fact that the small group “begins” with either the dyad or the triad has practically to be taken into account in research. Even now there is a whole school of psychologists in the West who are disposed in favour of dyads which created the theory of “dyadic interaction”. But the choice of dyads by them as the model of the small groups has a more principled significance, too. The application of the mathematical game theory apparatus allows for the “loss” of numerous situations of interaction in dyads. And although the proposed solutions are often interesting, they are limited precisely by the fact that the group is *identified* with the dyad, which is permissible when, in the case of the model's construction, the real processes taking place in the group are simplified. Of course, such a methodological principle as the one in which the dyad, and even more so, the

laboratory dyad is declared to be the only prototype of the small group, can by no means be considered correct.

In recent years it has been more and more often asserted in socio-psychological literature that the dyad *cannot be considered* as the small group. Thus, in the work *Introducing Social Psychology* edited by Henry Tajfel and Colin Fraser, in a special paragraph entitled "What is the small group?", a unique motto of the social psychologist is cited: "Two's a dyad, three's a small group".¹

The question of the "upper" limits of the small group is no less controversial.

Various solutions to this question are known to be proposed in the history of social psychology. The ideas formulated on the basis of George Miller's discovery of the "magic number" 7 ± 2 proved to be more persistent than others. This number was discovered in operative research into memory capacity and it signified the quantity of objects simultaneously held in the memory. The introduction of this "magic number" was an alluring line for social psychology, and for a long time researchers considered the 7 ± 2 figure as the upper limit of the small group. However, subsequent research showed that if the 7 ± 2 figure really provided the capacity of operative memory (which was also debatable), it is absolutely arbitrary in the definition of the volume of the small group. Although certain arguments in favour of such a definition of the small group's upper limits were pronounced (inasmuch as the group involves contacts, the individual must simultaneously support his contacts with all members of the group, and this, by an analogy with the memory, can be ensured by the presence of 7 ± 2 members in the group), it was not confirmed by experiments.

If we turn to practical research, we shall find the most arbitrary figures determining this upper limit: 10, 15 or 20 people. In certain investigations by Jacob Moreno, author of sociometrical methodics, oriented primarily on application in small groups, groups of 30 to 40 people are mentioned with respect to school classes.

In Soviet social psychology the question of the small group's size is solved in conformity with the general approach to group analysis. If the small group is to be studied, it is primarily an actually existing social group and if it is considered the subject of activities, then it becomes logical not to establish any fixed upper limit, but rather to take as such *the size of the given*

¹ *Introducing Social Psychology*, Penguin Books, London, 1978, p. 176.

existing group dictated by the needs of the joint group activities. In other words, if the group exists in the given system of social relations in some specific size and if it is sufficient to carry out the specific activities, then it is this limit that can be considered as "upper" in an investigation. This specific solution of the problem, in our view, is not only permissible, but the most justifiable. The small group, then, is that group which represents a certain unit of joint activities. We obtain its size empirically: for instance, in the study of the family as a small group, families consisting of three people and those consisting of twelve people will be investigated; in the analysis of the work team as a small group, it can be taken as consisting of five people or of forty people, on condition that it acts as a unit in the activities prescribed to it.

The abundance of small groups in society presupposes their huge variety and therefore demands thorough classification for their investigation. The lack of a single meaning in the concept of the small group created uncertainty in its various classifications. There are many different calculations of the number of proposed small group classifications in literature, along with a large amount of data relating to the principles of these classifications. In principle, the most varied bases for the small groups' classification are permissible: groups are distinguished by the term of their existence (long-term or short-term), by the closeness of contacts between members, by the way an individual is included in a group, etc. There are presently about fifty different bases of classification. It is useful to choose not only the most widespread from them, but also those which will be significant in the new approach to the small group forming in Marxist social psychology. There are three classifications most popular with Western tradition: 1) the division of the small groups into the "primary" and "secondary", 2) into the "formal" and "informal" and 3) into "membership groups" and "reference groups". A certain dichotomy stems from each of the three classifications.

The division of small groups into *primary* and *secondary* was first proposed by Charles Cooley, who at first suggested a simple descriptive definition of the primary group referring to this bracket families, groups of friends and groups of closest neighbours. Later Cooley proposed a special trait which permitted to provide the essential characteristics of the primary group—*direct contacts*. But in singling out such a trait, primary groups began to be identified with small groups, and the proposed classification lost its meaning. If the sign of *all* small groups

is their contact ability, then it becomes useless to single out special groups within them where the specific trait will be that very contact ability. Therefore, by tradition, the division into primary and secondary groups is preserved (secondary are those groups where there are no direct contacts, so that various "mediators" are used for communication between members as, for example, means of communication), but subsequently, it is the primary groups that are investigated, since only they meet the criterion of the small group. This classification does not have practical significance today.

The second of the proposed divisions of small groups into the *formal* and *informal* was first introduced by Elton Mayo in the Hawthorne Experiment. According to Mayo, the formal group is distinguished by its members' precisely defined positions, prescribed by the group norms. The roles of all the group members, the system of subordination and the so-called "power structure" are also strictly defined in the formal group. Any group created in the conditions of some kind of specific activity is an example of a formal group: a work team, a school class, a sports team, etc.

The "informal" groups, according to Mayo, emerge and develop spontaneously where neither the status, nor the roles are prescribed and there is no fixed system of mutual relations, meaning the absence of a strict "power structure". The informal group can be created within the formal one (as in Mayo's experiments), when, for example, small groups of close friends emerge in a school class, united by some common interest, and also when two structures of relations interweave within the formal group. The informal group can also emerge by itself, outside of a defined formal group. People meeting by chance for a game of volleyball on a beach, or a more intimate company of friends belonging to completely different formal groups are examples of such type of informal groups. Sometimes, within the framework of such groups (in a group of tourists setting off on a one-day tour), regardless of the informal character, joint activities arise and then the group acquires certain traits of the formal group. Definite positions and roles, although short-lived, can be seen within the group.

It has been established in practice that it is very difficult to distinguish between strictly formal and strictly informal groups in actual reality. Those instances when the informal groups arose in the framework of the formal ones are especially difficult. Therefore attempts have been made in social psychology to avoid this strict dichotomy. On the one hand, the concept

of formal and informal structure of the group (or the structure of formal and informal relations) was introduced and social psychologists began to distinguish between the type and character of relations within groups rather than the type of groups. It is precisely this concept Mayo adhered to, while the transfer of the definition of "formal" and "informal" to the characteristics of groups was rather arbitrary. On the other hand, more radical distinguishing feature was introduced. The concepts of the "group" and the "organisation" began to be distinguished, which is typical of the development of social psychology over the last twenty years. Regardless of the abundance of investigations on the sociology and social psychology of the organisation, a sufficiently precise division of the concepts of "organisation" and "formal group" still does not exist. In a number of cases, the discussion revolves around the fact that every formal group, unlike the informal, possesses some traits of *organisation*. True, this situation has changed significantly in recent years. The social psychology of the organisation emerges more and more as a legitimate area of scientific knowledge, especially important in the working out of problems involved in the psychology of management. In special works, of course, the very concept of "organisation" is made more precise. It emerges as a synonym for the concept of the "formal group" and as a minimum presupposes the designation of a definite aggregate of groups found in a complex system of interdependence and hierarchy.

Regardless of a certain vagueness in terminology, the detection of the very phenomenon of two structures existing in the small group was of great significance. In Marxist social psychology, a large number of experimental studies have been performed, dedicated to the detection of the influence exerted by a definite correlation of the formal and informal group structure on its solidarity, productivity, etc. This problem is particularly important for the issue of the management and leadership of the group.

Therefore, the second of the traditionally formed classifications of small groups cannot be considered as strict, although the classification of group structures based on it is very helpful.

The third classification divides small groups into *membership groups* and *reference groups*. It was first introduced in 1942 by Herbert Hiram Hyman who discovered the phenomenon of "reference groups". Hyman's experiments showed that a part of the members of definite small groups (in this case it was student groups) share the norms of behaviour accepted not by any means within that group but in another group on which

they are oriented. Hyman called groups, in which the individual are not actually included but whose norms they accept, reference groups. Theodore M. Newcomb experimentally registered this phenomenon in the research of student behaviour at the Bennington College. In the works of Muzafer Scherif, the concept of reference groups was connected with the "system of reference-point", which the individual uses for comparing his own status with other people's status. Subsequently, in working out the concept of reference groups, Georg Kelly divided them according to their two functions: comparative and normative, demonstrating that the reference group is needed by the individual as a model for the *comparison* of his behaviour with that model, or for its normative *evaluation*.

Presently, in particular in Soviet social psychology there is a double application of the term of "reference group". Sometimes it signifies a group contrasted to the membership group and sometimes—a group emerging *within* the membership group. In the latter instance, the reference group is usually defined as a "significant circle of communication", i.e. a group of people specially selected from the entire real group as particularly significant for the individual. A situation can emerge in this case, where the norms accepted by the group become personally acceptable for the individual only when they are accepted by the "significant circle of communication". In other words, a seemingly intermediate reference point emerges on which the individual can orientate. Obviously, such an interpretation has a definite meaning, but in the given case it would be more correct to discuss the phenomenon of "reference ability", rather than "reference groups", as a special characteristic of relationships in the group, when one of the members chooses only a definite circle of people as the reference-point for modelling his own behaviour and activities.¹

The division of small groups into membership groups and reference groups opens up broad prospects for applied research, in particular in the study of illegal behaviour. In efforts to explain illegal (deviant) behaviour of minors, for example, the concept of reference groups plays a large role. It is important to explain why a person included in such membership groups as the school class, family, etc., suddenly begins to orient himself not on norms accepted in these groups, but on those of a completely different group in which he is in no way "included"

¹ See: Ye.V. Shchedrina, "Reference Ability as a Characteristic of the System of Interpersonal Relations", in: *Psychological Theory of the Collective*, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian).

(such as shady elements "in the street"). The reference group mechanism of influence permits the primary interpretation of this fact: the membership group has lost its attraction for the individual, so that he now correlates his behaviour with another group. Of course, this is still not an answer to the question of why *this* group has become so significant for him and *that* group has lost him. Special research must be undertaken to answer this question, and as a whole, the entire problem of reference groups must still be worked out, since it is now on the level of the statement of *which* group acts as the reference group for the individual, while there is no explanation as to *why* it is precisely that group. The practice of research into the problem of the reference group, sufficiently developed in Western social psychology, has not provided the answer to this question, since there is no accent made on the content of activities, norms and values of the group: only the mechanism of influence exerted by norms and values in general, but not the *given* definite norms and values is being investigated.

The large number of small group classifications undoubtedly reflects their broad distribution in society and their high level of significance for socio-psychological analysis. The presence of diverse approaches and research strategies also bears witness to this. There are three basic trends in Western research of the small group: 1) the sociometric, 2) the sociological, and 3) the school of "group dynamics".

Sociometric research is connected with the name of Jacob Moreno. A whole trend of small group research grew out of the sociometric methodics he proposed (although not necessarily in the framework of his theoretical concept). This trend became rather popular, especially in applied areas, although the evaluations of the proposed approach vary among researchers.

Its main methodological miscalculation was its sanctioning of a confusion of interests. The focus of small group research in the framework of the given trend was narrowed down to the proposal of the study of *only* the structure of the psychological, i.e. interpersonal relations. Many years later, a programme was outlined for the study of only emotional, direct contacts between people in small groups, which was unjustified not because these emotional contacts are insignificant in group life, but because they were made into an absolute, and ousted all the remaining possible "profiles" in small group research. The process of small group study often boiled down to the research of emotional contacts and the sociometric methods of measuring them became to be viewed as a *basic method* of small group investiga-

tion. And although the methods themselves actually provided definite possibilities for studying the structure of psychological relations in small groups, they could not be interpreted as ensuring the analysis of the small groups as such.

Small group research in the sociometric trend suffers from an essential limitation expressed in the fact that the aspect of small-group *activities* is not only ignored, but it is done so on principle. The introduction of "practical" criteria for the sociometric choice did little to change this since it did not ensure an organic inclusion of relations involved in activities in the research context. Therefore, in evaluating the possibilities of the sociometric method, a supplementary question must always be posed: in regard of what *object* of research these possibilities are discussed. If it concerns the system of interpersonal relations of an emotional origin, the evaluation of the method must be different than if it involves the *general* analysis of the small group. This method cannot be considered as the *general method of the study of small groups*. In the study of the system of emotional relations in the small group proposed by Moreno, these methods are widely applied, which does not mean that they are undisputed in this sphere, since to this time it is not clear what the sociological test measures in its present state. The majority of researchers have long ago rejected the "tele" theory formulated by Moreno, but they are still faced with the task of proving the possibility of measuring *other* characteristics of interpersonal relations with the proposed instrument. Regardless of the wide application of sociometric methods, the question has yet to be discussed in full. No one is now concerned that sociometry measures only sympathy and antipathy (and Moreno himself widened the repertoire of measured characteristics in his last years), but no one has formulated what precisely is measured by sociometry. It is intuitively supposed that it measures the quantity of positive and negative evaluations which the individual gives other members of the group, but this, too, requires an explanation. Another shortcoming of the methods has also been repeatedly noted in the research of emotional contacts: the question of the *motives* for option has also not been answered. Therefore this trend is extremely one-sided and weak in its theoretical premises.

The *sociological* trend in the study of small groups is usually connected with the tradition founded by Elton Mayo in the Hawthorne experiment, meant to increase the production on the relay assembly line for Western Electric. At first, Mayo changed the work conditions in the experimental group (espe-

cially lighting of the work place). An unexpected increase in production was registered not only in the experimental but also in the control group, where no improvements were introduced. When the experiment was repeated with a broader range of work conditions (the pay system, the introduction of extra breaks, etc), the effect was the same. What is more, when the newly-introduced measures were repealed in the experimental group, although the production level decreased to a certain extent, it remained on a level higher than it was previously.

Mayo suggested that the very fact of the workers' participation in the experiment suggested the existence of some other variable: the awareness of participation in something important, and of the attention received in the "inclusion" in the production process provoked a rise in labour productivity even in those situations where there were no objective improvements. Mayo theoretically interpreted this as a manifestation of a special feeling of *sociability*—the need to experience a sense of "belonging" to some sort of group. The most interesting conclusion in the given case involves the existence within the work teams of specific informal relations which came to light only when attention was directed towards the needs of the workers and their personal "fate" in the course of the production process. Mayo came to a conclusion not only about the *existence* of an informal structure in work teams on a par with a formal one, but also about the importance of the latter, in particular about the possibility to use it as a means of influence on the team of workers in the interests of the company. Mayo's research carried a strictly applied character and, therefore, recommendations were aimed at an increase of labour productivity. It is not for nothing that a special political doctrine of "human relations" was later developed on the basis of the recommendations obtained in the Hawthorne experiment.

The theoretical significance of Mayo's discovery consists in its revealing of the existence of two types of structure in the small group, thus opening up a broader perspective for research. After the Hawthorne experiment, a new trend in small group research arose, connected primarily with the analysis of each of these two types of group structure and the exposure of the correlative significance of each of them in the group management system.

The school of "group dynamics" represents a more "psychological" trend of small group research, connected mainly with the name Kurt Lewin. Lewin's work done in America after his emigration from Nazi Germany began with the creation of

a special centre for the study of group dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (the centre was later moved to Michigan State University, where it remains to this day). The direction of the centre's research was based on a set of Lewin's theoretical ideas, connected with the elaboration of a "field theory" used as the basis for the study of small groups. The central idea of the field theory, that the laws of social behaviour are determined by psychological and social forces, was developed in relation to groups where they were studied and measured. The creation in laboratory conditions of groups with preset characteristics and the subsequent study of the functioning of these groups was the most important method of the analysis of the psychological field's forces. The aggregate of this research was entitled "group dynamics".

The basic problematics of research was reduced to the study of the nature of the groups, the conditions of their formation, their interconnections with individuals and with other groups and the conditions of their successful functioning. A greater amount of attention was devoted to the problems of the formation of such group characteristics as norms, cohesion, the correlation of individual motives with group motives and group goals, and finally, leadership in groups.

In answering the main question of the needs which govern people's behaviour, "group dynamics" thoroughly investigated the problem of intragroup conflicts, effectiveness of group activities in the conditions of cooperation and competition, the means of group decision-making, etc. The research made by this trend involved practically the whole set of small group problems.

There is no doubt that Lewin's ideas had a large influence on the recent development of Western socio-psychological thought. There is also no doubt that this trend produced very important ideas with regard to group processes, some of which were thoroughly investigated with extremely original methods which retain their importance up to this day. On the other hand, the whole theoretical context is questionable and outdated. Disagreement with Lewin's theoretical concept does not spell a rejection of his methods. They actually "work" in a new theoretical setting. However, the task of an authentic analysis of these methods, the determination of the degree of their admissible application in the new theoretical context has still to be completed.

Although the three examined trends are incompatible in their value, each of them marks a definite line in the study

of small groups: neither of them proposed such solutions which would allow the approach of the analysis of the small group from the point of view of the specific content of group processes, brought about by the specific character of group activities, although the formal question of the effectiveness of joint activities of the groups has been posed.

In numerous studies of small groups in the West completely different theoretical approaches can be found (the study of group processes in social psychology of a psychoanalytical orientation, or the study of groups from the point of view of interactionism), but not one of them chose the specific type of social relations in the small group as the founding principle. Therefore, all the approaches suffer, although to varying degrees, from abstraction and do not propose a programme of research for real small groups functioning in a *definite* type of society.

DYNAMIC PROCESSES IN THE SMALL GROUP

Small group research has to characterise certain "statics" of the group: definite borders, structure and composition as its premises. The main task of socio-psychological analysis, however, is the study of these processes taking place in the life of the group, which is important for two reasons: first, it is necessary to establish now the common laws of communication and interactions are realised in the small group, because the concrete "material" of communicative, interactive and perceptive processes is created here; second, to show mechanism through which the small group "joins" the individual to the whole system of social influences, i.e. the values, norms and attitudes which form in the large groups. At the same time, it is important to expose the "reverse" movement and in particular the way in which the activeness of the individual in the group realises acquired influences and effects a definite "return". This means that it is important to provide a sort of a cross-section of that which *happens* in small groups; but this is only one aspect of the problem.

Another, no less important task is to show how the group *develops*, what stages it passes in its development, how various group processes are modified at each stage and how the cognitive structure of the group changes. Therefore the totality of such phenomena which can be related to the dynamic processes of the small group is much larger than the way it was defined in the school of group dynamics, for example.

It must be mentioned that the expression "group dynamics" can (and often does) have three different meanings. As has already been mentioned, the given term primarily signifies the *direction* of research of small groups in social psychology

(the school of Kurt Lewin). This, of course, pertains not only to the set of problems studied in this school, but to its whole conceptual structure, meaning the definite form of solution of these problems.

The second meaning of the term is connected with the designation of definite *methods* which can be used in the study of the small group and which were developed primarily in the Lewin school. However, these methods were often used in other theoretical outlines, and the second meaning is therefore not necessarily connected with the Lewin school, but may relate to the specific types of the laboratory experiment in which various group characteristics are established. "Group dynamics" in the given instance is a special type of laboratory experiment specially staged for the study of group processes.

A third possible application of the term "group dynamics" signifies the totality of processes taking place in the small group. In this meaning the term is connected neither with Lewin's theoretical conception nor with his experimental practice. In this case it serves to describe a certain reality in the life of the group. It is this third meaning of the term "group dynamics" that is applied in Soviet social psychology. Group dynamics, unlike the statics of the group, is the totality of those dynamic processes which take place in the group over a definite period of time in the group's existence, and also the progressive development of the group from stage to stage. The set of these processes is determined under such a concept in correspondence with those methodological principles which were examined in connection with the formulation of the problem of the group in Marxist social psychology. The fact that some of the named processes "repeat" the processes Lewin investigated only means that these processes are actually objectively inherent in the small group.

The following are the most important of such processes. The first is the *formation* of small groups which can involve not only the direct means of the group's formation, but also the psychological mechanisms which serve to make it a group (the phenomenon of group pressure on the individual which is not referred to "group dynamics" in traditional social psychology, for example; this can also be said about the development of group cohesion). Next, the totality of the processes of group control and guidance is not exhausted by the phenomenon of *leadership* and *adoption of group decisions* traditionally considered in "group dynamics" but also includes many other mechanisms. Another aspect of dynamic processes is

represented by completely new phenomena of group life arising in a specific type of group development, namely in the type in which this process is increasingly defined by the development of joint activities (phenomena of this sort were first discovered in Soviet social psychology and require separate consideration). Such a specific stage as the formation of the *collective* can be regarded as a specific result of group development. The processes of the formation of the collective in the socio-psychological aspect can also be related to group dynamics. In a socio-psychological aspect, processes involved in the formation of the collective can also be ranked as dynamic processes, taking place in the group. All the problems pertaining to the collective are specific problems of Soviet social psychology not only because this is where these phenomena were first exposed and described, but also because the very phenomenon of the collective developed first in socialist society.

The type of group being referred to in the characteristics of the processes connected with the formation of the small group must be precisely established. In following the adopted principle, we will only refer to real natural small groups. Since they exist in the most varied spheres of social life, they are also formed in various ways. They are most often *created* by the factors external with respect to the group, by the conditions of development, for example, of some sort of social institute or organisation in which the small group emerges. In a broader sense it can be said that the small group is created by a certain need of the social division of labour and the functioning of society in general. Thus the production team is created in connection with the development of a new industry, the school class—in connection with the arrival of a new generation, the sports team—in connection with the development of sports in some institution or region, etc. In all these cases the reasons for the development of the small group lie outside the group and outside the individuals forming it: they lie in a broader social system. It is here that a system of prescriptions in relation to the structure of the group and the distribution of roles and statutes is created and the goal of group activities is determined. All of these factors have nothing in common with the psychological mechanisms of the group formation: they are the premises of its existence. The concepts of an “external” and “internal” structure of the group¹ can sometimes

¹ See: *The Collective and the Individual*, Edited by Ye.V. Shorokhova et al., Moscow, 1975 (in Russian).

be found in literature. In such an instance, the "external" structure is interpreted not so much as some sort of structure but rather a totality of the external circumstances conducive to the origin of a group.

The second part of the question concerns the way in which the *psychological* setting of the developing group, generated by the external circumstances, is realised and how it is transformed into an entity possessing all psychological characteristics of the group. In other words, it is a question of the way the social group becomes a group in the psychological meaning of the word. This approach eliminates a problem that has been repeatedly coming up in the history of social psychology, namely the problem of what makes people join together in a group. The answers to this question can hardly be considered satisfactory since they are all abstracted from the real fact of the group's origin in connection with the definite demands of society. Some suggested that the joining of people in the group is brought about by the needs of communication or the necessity of defence in a situation of fear or uncertainty. The inconsistency of these answers can be found in their attempt to explain the *social* process (and the emergence of the group is a social process) by purely *psychological* reasons. Social groups, including small groups, are *given* to the social psychologist as an object of research and his task involves a step-by-step investigation of the transformation of objectively emerging groups into an authentically psychological entity. Two possibilities for research can be found here.

First, the question concerning the adoption of those norms of group life which already exist by every new member entering the group must be investigated. This is not so much a problem of the formation of the group as of the "inclusion" of a new member within it. In this case the analysis can be reduced to the investigation of *the phenomenon of group pressure* on the individual, of his "submission" to the group. Second, the process of the formation of group norms and values under the conditions of the simultaneous entering of many individuals into the group and the subsequent more complete acceptance of these norms and the sharing of group goals by all the group members must be investigated. In this case the analysis can amount to the study of *the formation of group cohesion*.

The first possibility in traditional social psychology was realised in a separate branch of the science under the name of the *investigation of conformism* rather than in the framework of group dynamics. In this type of research conformism is not

considered in the context of the real group as one of the mechanisms in the formation of the psychological community within the social group created by external conditions.

This can also be said about *group cohesion*. It is traditionally investigated not as the condition of the development of real social groups, but as a certain general, abstract characteristic of each one, including the laboratory group. Both of these phenomena must be re-examined from the point of view of the process when the group created by external circumstances (the social process) turns into a psychological entity of people, within which their activities are organised not simply as those which are externally prescribed, but as those "claimed" by the group (the socio-psychological process). *Formation* here applies to the totality of those socio-psychological processes which make the small group psychologically significant for the individual. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider two sides of this process: not only the integration of the existing group, but also the inclusion of a new member within the group and the exposure of the mechanism of group "pressure" on the individual, causing him to join the group.

The phenomenon of group pressure in social psychology is called the *phenomenon of conformism*. The word "conformism" has a definite content in everyday language, meaning "time-serving". The phenomenon of conformism was long ago established in Andersen's tale of the emperor's new clothes. Therefore in daily life this concept has acquired a negative connotation which is extremely harmful to research, especially at the applied level. Things get even more complicated because of this negative connotation in politics, where conformism means compromise and conciliation. In socio-psychological literature we often find references not to conformism but to conformity or conformist behaviour, meaning the purely psychological characteristics of the individual's position with regard to the group position, his adoption or rejection of a definite standard or opinion characteristic of the group and the individual's level of "submission" to group pressure. The concepts of "independence", "resistance to group pressure", etc., are the opposite of conformity. The concept of uniformity, although it has a slightly different shade of meaning, can be regarded as similar. Uniformity also signifies an acceptance of definite standards but only of those standards which do not exist as a result of pressure.

Conformity is established when there is a conflict between the individual's opinion and the group opinion and it is over-

come in favour of the group. The measure of conformity is the measure of submission to the group when the opposition of opinions is subjectively perceived as a conflict by the individual. For a long time social psychology has distinguished between *external* conformity, when the opinion of the group is only adopted outwardly by the individual, but in practice he continues to resist, and *internal* (this is sometimes called authentic conformity), when the individual actually accepts the opinion of the majority. Internal conformity is also a result of an overcoming of the conflict with the group in favour of the group. In research into conformity still another position is revealed which has been fixed on an experimental level. This is the position of *negativism*. When the group exerts pressure on the individual and he firmly resists this pressure, demonstrating an extremely independent position and stubbornly denying all the standards of the group, this is the manifestation of negativism. It is only at first glance that negativism looks like an extreme form of the negation of conformity. In actual fact, as has been demonstrated in numerous investigations, negativism is not genuine independence. On the contrary, it can be called a specific case of conformity, "conformity inside out". If the individual fixes his goal as the contrast to the opinion of the group at any price, he actually depends on the group, since he must actively create an anti-group behaviour, an anti-group position or norm, meaning he is "attached" to the group opinion but only from the opposite side. Therefore, negativism cannot be interpreted as a position opposite to conformity: such a position is independence.

A similar model of conformity was generally accepted for a long time; a different outline, the essence of which will be revealed below, was proposed only in Soviet social psychology.

The traditional model was first applied in the experiments of Solomon Asch, starting in 1951. These experiments are considered classic, regardless of the fact that they are presently severely criticised. The point of the experiment was to reveal the group pressure on the individuals' opinion by means of a "cooperating group". The experimenter made an agreement with all the participants in the experiment except one (the "naive subject") in advance. The "naive subject" answered last and it was revealed whether he stuck to his own opinion (which was correct in the individual solution), or "fell under" the pressure of the group. More than one-third of the "naive subjects" in Asch's experiments gave the incorrect answer, demonstrating conformist behaviour. In the subsequent inter-

view, they were asked about their subjective experience on account of the situation set in the experiment. All those tested affirmed that the opinion of the majority placed a great "pressure" on them, and even the "independent" ones admitted that it was very difficult to oppose the group opinion because it seemed as though you personally were mistaken.

There are many modifications to Asch's experimental method (the method of Richard S. Crutchfield, for example), but in essence it remains the same—"cooperating group", and moreover, the group itself is formed specially for the experiment staged in laboratory conditions. Therefore, in the explanation of both the phenomenon and the degree of different individuals' conformity, this essential peculiarity of the group must be taken into consideration. A number of dependencies were revealed based on the participants' self-accounts and the experimenters' conclusions. Judging from the evaluations of the experiment results by the participants themselves, the reason for pliancy lies in their personal peculiarities (a low self-assessment or some sort of defects of personal perception); however, in the majority of investigations it was proposed that conformity is not a strictly personal characteristic of the individual, although it was also established that the less developed intellect, the lower level of development in self-consciousness and many other similar circumstances influence the level of conformity. At the same time, another conclusion was also drawn: the degree of conformity also depends on such factors as the character of the experiment situation and the composition and structure of the group. The role of these characteristics was not fully revealed because of a number of methodological miscalculations of the experiments.

The most important of these miscalculations primarily concerns the laboratory character of the group which does not allow to take into consideration the *significance* of the expressed opinion for the individual. The problem of the significance of the situation is in general very acute in social psychology. In the given context, the problem of significance has as a minimum two sides. On the one side, the question can be posed as to whether or not the presented material is significant for individuals. In Asch's experiments different lengths were compared. It is easily understood that the comparison of these lengths is an insignificant task. In a number of experiments the material varied; in place of lengths, areas of geometric figures were compared. All of these modifications can, of course, provide for an increase in the significance, but the problem of

significance remains unsolved due to the presence of its other side. The situation is significant for the individual in the strict sense of the word when it involves the real activities, with real social connections of this individual. No matter what objects are posed for comparison to the testees, the significance in this sense cannot be increased. Conformity revealed in the solution of such tasks may have nothing to do with the way the individual will behave in the much more complicated situations of his real life. He easily yields to the group when lengths of lines, areas of geometric figures, etc., are compared, but the holding of an independent opinion in a conflict with one's immediate superior is a different thing. Asch's experiments provide no correlation with the actual behaviour of a person in a real group. The majority of critics justifiably remark that the results of the experiments cannot in general be applied to real situations. The "group" in traditional experiments on conformity is not a real social group but simply a number of people specially gathered for an experiment. Therefore it can be asserted that the group pressure on the individual is not studied here, but rather, the influence of a number of people temporarily united for the fulfilment of a task posed by an experimenter.

The abstract nature of the participants is another methodological miscalculation of the experiments examined. Robert Bales demonstrated this special feature of experiments, noting that little is known about the individuals in Asch's experiments. Various personality tests can, of course, be proposed to the participants in order to expose the distribution of different personality characteristics among them. Yet this is not that which is important here: it is necessary to know the social characteristics of individuals, who they are, what are their values, convictions, etc. This question cannot be answered without answering the first question, what kind of group is referred to. Even the purely individual peculiarities of the participants can have definite significance, but they are nonetheless insufficiently taken into account. One researcher proposed that various individuals in Asch's experiments demonstrated various types of conformity: conformity to the group or conformity to the experimenter. The above-considered effects arising in the course of the socio-psychological laboratory experiment are represented completely in the given instance. The "anticipatory evaluation", the Rosenthal effect, etc. can also appear.

There are, however, deeper principles which depreciate the content of conformity experiments to a significant degree.

A.V. Petrovsky, a Soviet social psychologist who addressed this problem, noted that the very model of possible variants of behaviour adopted by Asch is oversimplified. From his point of view, only two types of behaviour were possible in principle—conformist and non-conformist. But such a model is only admissible in the laboratory group that is “diffused”, not closely connected by the significant characteristics of joint activities. A third type of behaviour, in general not described by Asch, can arise in actual situations of such activities. It will not be a simple union of conformist and non-conformist traits of behaviour (such a result is also possible in the laboratory group), but will demonstrate the *conscious adoption by the individual* of the group's norms and standards. Therefore in reality there are three types of behaviour, and not two, which is not taken into account in Asch's experiments. In A.V. Petrovsky's model they are: 1) intragroup suggestibility, i.e. the undisputed adoption of the group opinion; 2) conformity—a conscious external agreement with an internal disagreement; 3) collectivism, or collectivist self-determination—the relative uniformity of behaviour as a result of the conscious solidarity of the individual with the evaluations and tasks of the collective.¹ It is obvious that a completely new formation is introduced in this model—the collective—which forces the examination not only of the problems of conformity, but also the wider range of questions connected with the small group. This is a special problem which will be examined below. Here it is important only to emphasise that the phenomenon of group pressure as one of the mechanisms in the formation of the small group (more precisely the individual's joining the group) will inevitably remain the formal characteristic of group life until the content signs of group activities, determining a special type of relations between group members, is considered. But this also requires the consideration of the group development on the basis of the development of joint activities.

The second side of the problem of the small group's formation is the problem of *group cohesion*. In the given instance it is not the way in which the individual joins the group and “accepts” its norms, opinions and standards of behaviour that is studied, but the very process of the formation of special connections in the group which permit the external set structure

¹ See: *The Psychological Theory of the Collective*, Ed. by A.V. Petrovsky, Pedagogika, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian).

to change into a psychological community of people, a complicated psychological organism existing under its own specific laws.

The problem of group cohesion also has a long tradition of research. This tradition is based on the understanding of the group primarily as a certain system of interpersonal relations based on emotions. Regardless of the existence of different variations of the interpretation of cohesion, this is the basic premise found in all cases. Thus in the sociometric research into small groups cohesion is directly connected with the level of development of interpersonal relations in which there is a large number of choices based on mutual sympathy. Sociometry proposed a special "index of group cohesion" which is defined as the relation of the general number of reciprocal positive choices to the number of all possible choices. The content characteristics of these reciprocal positive choices here, as in the application of sociometric methods in general, are omitted. "The index of group cohesion" is a strictly formal characteristic of the small group.

Leon Festinger proposed another approach in traditional social psychology. Cohesion was analysed on the basis of the frequency and stability of communicative connections displayed in the group. Cohesion is literally defined as "the sum total of all efforts acting on the group members in order to keep them in the group". Moreover, the "efforts" are interpreted either as the group's attraction for the individual or as the membership's contentment in the group. But attraction and contentment are analysed through the exposure of purely emotional group relations. Therefore, despite a different approach in comparison with sociometry, cohesion here, too, represents certain characteristics of the system of the group members' emotional preferences.

There was another programme in traditional social psychology for the research of cohesion, connected with the name of Theodore Newcomb. Newcomb introduced the special concept of "agreement" by which he attempted to interpret cohesion. His idea was new in comparison to the approaches of Moreno and Festinger. It involved the necessary formation of similar orientations of group members with regard to values significant to them. The undoubted productive advantages of this idea proved unfortunately devaluated, since the development of similar orientations (i.e. the attainment of agreement), was considered as a removal of the tension in the field of the individuals' actions, moreover, the latter is realised on the basis of

definite emotional reactions of individuals. Thus the idea about the emotional basis of cohesion turned out to be fundamental in this variant of the explanation, too, although with reservations.

There is a completely different approach to the research into cohesion, characteristic of Soviet social psychology which relies on the above-formulated principles of the group concept and in particular on the idea that the main integrator of the group is the joint activities of its members. The very process of group formation and its subsequent development is presented here as a process of the ever greater cohesion of the group, but by no means on the basis of the increase of only its emotional attraction, but rather on the basis of an ever greater inclusion of individuals in the process of joint activities. But first other foundations of cohesion must be revealed. We are here concerned with the *cohesion* of the group, and not the *compatibility* of people in the group. Although compatibility and solidarity are closely connected, these concepts signify different aspects of group characteristics. The compatibility of group members signifies the fact that the given composition of the group *is possible* for the group to carry out its functions, i.e. that the group members can interact. The group cohesion also means that the given composition is not simply possible, but that it is integrated as the best form, and that such a level of the development of relations is reached within it under which all the members of the group to the largest degree share the goal of group activities and those values which are connected with these activities. This distinction between cohesion and compatibility brings us to the interpretation of the concept of the essence of cohesion based on the principle of activities.

New principles in the research of cohesion have been elaborated to the fullest extent in Soviet social psychology by A.V. Petrovsky. However, these ideas cannot be considered in isolation from some of the other ideas formulated by Petrovsky and combined in a single conception—"the theory of work-mediated interpersonal relationships in the group". This concept is consequently connected with the attempt to construct a socio-psychological theory of the collective. Although the theory of Petrovsky will be examined later, it is necessary to dwell here on the approach to the study of cohesion.

The basic idea involves the fact that the whole structure of the small group can be presented as being made up of several basic layers ("strata"). The external level of the

group's structure includes the spontaneous emotional interpersonal relations, meaning that which was traditionally measured by sociometry. The second layer represents a deeper formation signified by the term of "value-orientation unity", which is characterised by relations having a mediated character: they are mediated by joint activities. This mediation is expressed in the coincidence of the group members' orientations on basic values which involve the process of joint activities. Relations between members of the group are built in the given instance not on the basis of affection or antipathy, but on the basis of value orientations. Sociometry, having constructed its methods on the basis of choice, did not reveal the motives of this choice. Different methods are therefore necessary for the study of the second layer, which permits the demonstration of the *motives of choice*. This theory also provides a key to discovering these motives: coincidence of value orientations.

The third, deeper layer of the group structure presents an even larger "inclusion" of the individual in joint group activities. On this level the group members share the goals of group activities and consequently, if the method for the measuring of these relations' character were found, then more serious, significant motives of choice by the group members would be revealed. It can be supposed that the motives of choice on that level are also determined by common values, but of a more abstract level, connected with a more general attitude to work, surroundings and the world. This third layer was called the "nucleus" of the group structure and the future development of the problem was connected to a significant degree with the search for the instruments to expose the given layer.

All of the above directly pertains to the concept of *group cohesion*. This characteristic appears here as a definite *process* of the development of intragroup connections corresponding to the development of group activities. The three layers of group structures can also be considered as the three *levels* of group development, in particular the three levels of the development of group cohesion. On the first level (which corresponds to the surface layer of intragroup relations) cohesion is really expressed in the development of emotional contacts. On the second level (corresponding to the second layer—value-orientation unity) the further cohesion of the group takes place and this is now expressed in the coincidence of the basic system of values connected with the process

of joint activities. On the third level (which corresponds to the "nucleus" layer of intragroup relations), the integration of the group (meaning its cohesion) is revealed in the group members' sharing of the common goals of group activities. The essential moment is that cohesion develops not only through the development of communicative practice (as Newcomb stated), but on the basis of joint activities. Moreover, the unity of the group, being expressed in unified value orientations of the group members, is interpreted not simply as a *similarity* of these orientations, but as an *embodiment of this similarity in practical actions* by group members as they carry out joint activities. A third step in the analysis is necessary under such an interpretation of cohesion, i.e. the transfer from the establishment of the unity of value orientations to the establishment of a higher level of unity—the unity of the goals of group activities as an expression of cohesion. As A. I. Dontsov justifiably noted, "if each of the previously mentioned phenomena of cohesion demonstrates integration of only separate layers of intragroup activity, the unity of goal, being a determinant of all layers taken together, can serve as a reference-point of the actual unity of the group as a whole"¹. It can of course be said that the coincidence of the goals of group activities is, at the same time, a higher level of the value unity of the group, since the very goals of joint activities are definite values in themselves. In practical research cohesion must thus be analysed both as a coincidence of values concerning the object of joint activities and as a special kind of "activity *embodiment*" of this coincidence.

The experimental examination of the proposed conception of cohesion is realised in a number of works which can be divided into three major directions. The first of these directions, presented in the works of R. S. Nemov and Y. V. Yanotovskaya, reveals a set of values the unity of which is particularly significant for the group under the conditions of different types of activity (comparative studies are made of groups of students and workers, for instance). The second direction, connected with the works of V.V. Shpalinsky, is oriented primarily on the exposure of the connection (correlation) between cohesion (understood as the presence of value-orientation unity) and other parameters of the group—its work

¹ A.I. Dontsov, "Principles of Socio-Psychological Analysis", in: *Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Social Psychology*, Moscow, 1977, p. 71 (in Russian).

capacity, organisation, etc. The third direction, connected with the work of A. I. Dontsov, focuses its attention on the research into the core layer of group activeness and in particular on the way in which the coincidence of value orientations pertaining to joint group activities is revealed in the *practical activities* of specific groups.

The experiment of A. I. Dontsov conducted in 14 Moscow secondary schools was staged to reveal the way the teachers' *ideas* about the values of their activities (specifically about the "object" of their activities—the pupil) coincided with their actual *embodiment* in the everyday practice of teaching and instruction. In other words, two "layers" of cohesion were revealed—cohesion demonstrated in the evaluation of the pupil standard and cohesion demonstrated in the evaluation of actual pupils. It was established as a result of the research that the community of evaluations of actual pupils by teachers of one school were higher than the coordination of their notions about the pupil standard. In other words, cohesion in actual activities turned out higher than cohesion registered only as a coincidence of opinions (because in relation to the standard there can only be an opinion and not a real activity). The second part of the experiment provided rather curious results. When colleague teachers, and not pupils were subjected to evaluation, the unity of value notions turned out higher when the teacher standard was discussed and lower when the evaluations involved their actual colleagues. The interpretation of this fact, although rather unexpected, nonetheless once again supports the basic principle. The other teacher, colleague, is not the specific "object" of the teacher's activities; therefore, his evaluation, meaning the coincidence of this kind of values is not a parameter of the primary specific activities of the given group. The colleague standard turned out, to a large degree, to be a value included in the immediate practice of the teacher's work. The hypothesis that the actual integration of the group (and consequently also its cohesion) is realised primarily in the course of joint activities was thus confirmed.

Such an approach to cohesion also permits a new approach to the formation of the small group. The small group created by external conditions "experiences" a long process of its own formation as a psychological entity. The development of group cohesion is the most important content of this process. In the course of this development the group does not simply "produce" certain norms and values, and the members do not simply "assimilate" them. A much deeper integration of the group is

realised when the values of the object-oriented activity of the group are to an ever larger degree shared by separate individuals not because they are to a greater or lesser degree "attractive" to them, but because they are included in their own joint activities. Activities become so significant for the life of each group member that he adopts these values not under the influence of the development of communications, persuasion, etc., but as a result of his own fuller and more active inclusion in the activities of the group. Joint activities are the main determinant of the group formation in the psychological meaning of the word, transforming into the internal foundation of the group's existence. The very group changes on the basis of the development of these activities, going through different stages of development and turning into a collective. However, before analysing this level of group activity, certain dynamic processes taking place in the group must be treated.

This is particularly a question of how the group is organised, how it undertakes the functions of its organisation, what is the psychological "pattern" of activities involved in controlling the group. The problem of *leadership* and *management* is one of the cardinal problems of social psychology, since both of these processes pertain not only to the integration of group activities, but also to the psychological characteristic of their object. The "problem of leadership" has long been connected with traditional socio-psychological research into this phenomenon. In contemporary conditions, and in particular in Marxist tradition, the problem becomes significantly wider, turning into that of the *management* of the group. Therefore, it is extremely important to introduce precise terminology and separate the concepts of "leader" and "manager". (In Russian and in German there are two different terms to designate two different types of phenomena whereas in English the term "leader" is used in both cases, which to a certain degree justifies the confusion of these concepts in traditional social psychology). The concept of leadership pertains to the characteristics of psychological relations emerging in the group "vertically", i.e. from the point of view of domination and submission. The concept of management pertains to the organisation of all group activities and the process of their coordination.

In Soviet socio-psychological literature there are definite distinctions in the content of the concepts of "leader" and "manager". Boris Parygin provided the most complete answer to this question, naming the following distinctions between the leader and the manager: 1) the leader is basically called to

realise the regulation of interpersonal relations in the group while the manager regulates the group's official relations as a social organisation; 2) leadership is established in the micro-environment (such is the small group), while management is an element of the macro-environment, being connected with the whole system of social relations; 3) leadership emerges spontaneously, and the manager of each real social group is either appointed or elected, but in one way or another the process is not spontaneous but, rather, goal-oriented and realised under the control of certain elements of the social structure; 4) the phenomenon of leadership is less stable, the promotion of the leader depending to a large degree on the mood of the group, while management is a more stable phenomenon; 5) the manager has at his disposal a more diversified system of different sanctions which the leader does not have; 6) the process of decision-making by the manager (and in general in the system of management) is much more complicated and mediated by a large number of different circumstances and considerations, while the leader makes more spontaneous decisions pertaining to group activities; 7) the sphere of the leader's activity is basically reduced to the small group where he is the leader; the sphere of the manager's activity is much larger, since he "represents" the small group in the broader social system¹.

It is obvious that the leader and the manager are involved in tackling the similar type of tasks. They are called to stimulate the group, orientate it on the fulfilment of certain tasks, and find the means through which these tasks can be solved. Although the leader and the manager are distinguished by the way in which they fulfil their roles, the psychological characteristics of their activities have common traits which permit these activities to be described as identical, although this is not exactly the case. Leadership is a purely psychological characteristic of definite group members' behaviour. Management, to a larger degree, is a social characteristic of the relations in the group, primarily from the point of view of the distribution of the roles of guidance and submission. Unlike leadership, management emerges as a legal process regulated by society. The knowledge of the mechanism of leadership can be used to reveal the psychological content of the manager's activities, but the knowledge of this mechanism alone is insufficient.

¹ See: B.D. Parygin, *Fundamentals of Socio-Psychological Theory*, pp. 310-311.

Therefore, the exposure of the general characteristics of the leadership mechanism is much more expedient as well as the subsequent interpretation of this mechanism in the framework of the specific activities of the manager.

The leader is primarily interpreted as the member of the small group promoted as a result of the interaction of the group members to direct the group for the solution of a specific task. He demonstrates a higher level of activeness, participation and influence in the solution of the given task than the other members of the group. Therefore, the leader is promoted in a specific situation, as he assumes responsibility for certain functions. The other members of the group accept the leadership, building such relations with regard to the leader which presume that he will *lead* and they will *be led*. Leadership must be considered as a group phenomenon, since the leader cannot exist alone, being always an element of the group structure; hence leadership is a system of relations within this structure. Therefore the phenomenon of leadership is a dynamic process of the small group, which can be quite contradictory: the measure of the leader's "claim" and of the preparedness of the other group members to accept his leading role may not coincide. The exposure of the actual possibilities of the leader also means the exposure of the way the leader is perceived by the other group members. The measure of the leader's influence on the group is not always a stable phenomenon: in certain circumstances the leader possibilities can increase and in others, decrease. Sometimes the concept of "leader" is identified with the concept of "authority" which is not quite correct. Of course, the leader acts as the authority for the group, but the authority does not necessarily signify the leader potential of its bearer. The leader must organise the solution of some group task, while the authority does not fulfil this function, he can simply exist as a model, an ideal, while by no means assuming upon himself the solution of a task. Therefore, the phenomenon of leadership is an extremely specific phenomenon not described by any other kind of concepts.

The question of the nature of the leadership phenomenon and the reasons for its origin arose long ago in social psychology. There are three basic theoretical approaches in the interpretation of the origin of leadership.

"*The trait theory*" (sometimes called "charismatic") proceeds from the theses of German idealistic psychology of the late 19th-early 20th centuries and focuses its attention on the inherent qualities of the leader. According to this theory, the leader can

only be a person who possesses a definite set of personal qualities, an aggregate of certain psychological traits. Various authors have attempted to point out those traits or characteristics necessary for a leader. In American social psychology these sets of traits are fixed rather thoroughly, since they must become the basis for the construction of a system of tests for the selection of people "suitable" for leadership. It turned out, however, very quickly that the task of listing such traits did not lend itself to a solution. Initiative, sociability, sense of humour, vigilance, popularity and eloquence all pertain to such traits. However, different authors' distribution of these traits bears witness to the fact that none of these traits occupies a stable position in the general outline. Inconsistency existed even with respect to such traits as the will power and the intellect, which made the possibility of creating a more or less stable list of traits necessary for and existing in a leader somewhat doubtful. After the publication of Ralph Stogdill's work, which made new additions to the list, a rather categorical opinion arose that the trait theory was unsound. Jennings felt that the trait theory reflected the traits of the experimenter rather than those of the leader. Disillusionment with the theory was so great that even a theory of the "leader without traits" was proposed. But it did not in essence give any answer to the question of where the leader was taken from and what was the origin of the very phenomenon of leadership.

A new explanation formulated in the "*situational theory of leadership*" took the place of the trait theory. According to this theory, leadership is basically a product of the situation. In different specific situations of group life, separate members of the group stand out who surpass others at least in one respect. But since it is namely this quality which proves to be necessary in the given situation, the person possessing this quality becomes the leader. Therefore, the idea of the inherent qualities of the leader was discarded and replaced by the idea that the leader is simply more capable of actualising his inherent traits in a specific situation (the existence of these traits is, in principle, also inherent in the others). Properties, traits or qualities of a leader are completely relative. It is interesting that this moment of the situational theory was subjected to criticism by Jean Piaget, who asserted that in such an approach the question of the activeness of the leader's personality is eliminated altogether and that the leader becomes a sort of "weather-vane". The situational theory was not made more valid as a result of a certain supplement: in one

of the variants of the situational theory it was proposed that the chief moment of the leader's appearance is his *promotion*, by the group because it connects definite expectations with the given person—a manifestation of the traits necessary in the given situation (this approach is also called functional).

In order to overcome the obvious weakness of the given theory, Eugene Hartley proposed four explanations as to why *certain* people become leaders and why it is not only the situation that serves to determine their promotion. First, if someone became a leader in one situation, it cannot be excluded that he may become such in another, too. Second, on account of the influence of stereotypes, leaders are sometimes considered by the group as "leaders in general". Third, a person becoming a leader in one situation acquires authority and this authority promotes the possibility of that person being elected a leader once more in the future. Fourth, definite personality traits exist in a person and therefore it is characteristic of certain people to "seek posts", so they behave in a way which "gives them the post".

This line of reasoning cannot be considered completely convincing. It is just so many clever remarks based on observations than an actual analysis of the problem. Nevertheless, the situational theory proved to be rather popular: it is on the basis of this theory that a great deal of experimental research into leadership was conducted in the school of group dynamics.

As has often been the case in the history of science, two extreme approaches gave rise to a third, compromising version of the problem's solution. This approach was proposed in the so-called *synthetic theory of leadership*, according to which leadership is considered as a process of the organisation of interpersonal relations in the group and the leader as the subject governing this process. In such an approach leadership is understood as a *function* of the group and it must therefore be studied primarily from the point of view of the goals and tasks of the group, although the structure of the leader's personality must not be discarded either. Other variables, pertaining to the life of the group, should also be taken into account, the term of its existence, for example. It is obvious that the "synthetic" nature of the approach is identified here with the comprehensive approach to the study of leadership. Of course, in this sense the synthetic theory has a number of advantages. The majority of Soviet investigations on leadership are realised seemingly within the framework of the given theory, although there are serious distinctions in the very principles of the approach

connected with the general concept of the nature of the processes of dynamics in the small group. The new approach involves the consideration of leadership in small groups in the context of joint group activities, meaning not simply the creation of "situations", but specific tasks of group activities and definite members of the group who prove capable of organising it for the fulfilment of these tasks. The distinguishing features of the leader are not found in his possession of special traits but in a higher level of his influence. In the investigations of P. L. Krichevsky, the origin of leadership is explained by means of the mechanism of identification. The group members recognise as the leader a person with whom they can identify themselves, and this identification is realised according to those qualities which are particularly significant in the situations of joint group activities. The separation of the concepts of "leader" and "manager", as has been already mentioned, is characteristic for Soviet research. The class of tasks to be resolved in the group must be precisely established, because the leader and the manager solve *different* tasks. Soviet social psychology cannot claim to have created a special theory for the origin of leadership, although this phenomenon is explained in some experimental studies. The idea of the presence of several different leaders in the group, rather than one, is extremely popular. Before delineating the different areas of the leader's activities, the question of the style of leadership must be elucidated.

It must be immediately specified that the question of leadership, but not management, is investigated in traditional social psychology. But the problem is very often signified as the style of management due to the noted multiple application of terms. Unfortunately, there is an absence of strictness in many classic experiments devoted to this problem. For instance, the idea of the spontaneous promotion of the leader clashes with the basic experiment on the problem of the style of leadership conducted by Kurt Lewin and Ronald Lipitt in the school of group dynamics. The experiment was performed on a group of minors (boys, age 11 to 12) making masks of papier-maché under the guidance of adults. All the three managers of groups (mind that here we deal with adult managers, and not leaders, spontaneously arisen from among the children!), demonstrated a different style of management, and then the experimenters compared the effectiveness of the three groups' activities. The styles of management demonstrated by the adults were given names which since that time

are applied in socio-psychological literature: "authoritarian", "democratic" and "laissez-faire". Kurt Lewin conducted his experiments after he emigrated from Nazi Germany at the start of the Second World War, so these facts assumed a certain political meaning for him. In demonstrating his anti-Nazi position, Lewin adopted the terms "authoritarian" and "democratic" with a certain political sense. These were a kind of metaphors, however, and it would be naive to think that the traits of authoritarianism and democratism in purely psychological experiments took on the same meaning they have in political life. Actually, the discussion involved no more than the psychological characteristics of the process in *decision-making*. There was no kind of political meaning revealed in any of the styles of management treated, yet the terminology introduces certain difficulties into research precisely by virtue of the possible political connotations and associations. A group of authors in Soviet social psychology proposed the rejection of the terminology in general, while introducing new designations to avoid misunderstanding. They proposed the "directive", "collective" and "permissive" (liberal) styles,¹ although it was obvious that the psychological pattern of the designated styles preserved a certain stability. Therefore, it must be determined first what each style of leadership suggested by Lewin signified. Many such attempts were made; the chief result was a more precise definition of a minimum of two sides: the *content* of the decisions proposed to the group by the leader, and the *techniques* (ways and means) of realising these decisions. Thus each of the three styles can be "exposed" according to two characteristics:

Formal Side	Content Side
Authoritarian Style	
Practical, short instructions.	Matters in the group are planned in advance (in their full volume).
Prohibitions without condescension, with a threat.	Only spontaneous goals are defined, distant goals are unknown.
Terse language with an unpleasant tone.	The leader's opinion is decisive.
Praise and censuring are subjective.	
Emotions are not taken into consideration.	

¹ See: A.V. Zhuravlev, "The Style of Leadership and Organisation of Competition", in: *Socio-Psychological Aspects of Socialist Competition*, Moscow, 1977, p. 226 (in Russian).

Non-systematic display of methods.

The position of the leader is outside the group.

Democratic Style

Instructions in the form of proposals.

A friendly tone rather than dry instructional speech. Praise and censuring with advice.

Instructions and prohibitions with discussions.

The position of the leader is within the group.

Measures are planned in full in advance within the group.

Everyone answers for the realisation of the proposals. All the divisions of work are not only proposed but also discussed.

“Laissez-Faire” Style

Conventional tone.

An absence of praise and censuring.

No cooperation.

The position of the leader is unobtrusive.

Matters in the group work on their own accord.

The leader does not give orders.

Work division forms from separate interests or originates with a new leader.

Of course no outline can encompass all sides and manifestations of the style of leadership. The outline can be made even more complex with the introduction of a third basis for division: perhaps in the content of the leader's activities, the style in the narrow sense of the word (methods) or the character of activities. This last parameter begins with the idea that there are several leaders in the group each of which has his own sphere of activities. In Boris Parygin's outline they are distinguished according to:¹

the content of activities: leader-inspirator
leader-executor

¹ See: B.D. Parygin, *Fundamentals of Socio-Psychological Theory*, p. 306.

the style (methods):	authoritarian leader democratic leader
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the character of activities:	universal leader situational leader
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If we take into account all the divisions in this classification and construct the possible combinations of the proposed foundations, then we wind up with eight different types of leader. This outline provides a more detailed description. However, it does not contain all the sides of the leader's activities. A large number of other outlines are therefore proposed in experimental research, each of which has a definite heuristic significance. In L. I. Umansky's works the following types of leader are named: leader-organiser, leader-initiator, leader-erudite, leader-generator of emotional atmosphere, leader of emotional attraction, leader-skilled craftsman. Many of these characteristics can be successfully related to the manager. However, the very phenomenon of leadership has yet to be described sufficiently for the explanation of the distinctions between the positions of leader and manager. The question of the style of leadership is a rather strongly felt deficiency.

In experimental investigations the style of leadership and the style of management are revealed to an equal degree. The methods identified for defining the style of leadership are often considered suitable for defining the style of management. In reality these methodics are not relevant in all these cases. In considering the differentiation of the leader's and manager's functions, and the character of their activities, it must be established in which of their functions the manager "repeats" the psychological picture of the leader's activities and in which ones they are determined by other circumstances.

The question concerning the methods in studying the style of leadership and management demands still further discussion. The majority of proposed methods of research pertain, to a larger degree, to the activities of leaders rather than to the activities of managers. In these cases the range of methods varies greatly. Thus a set of methods was worked out under the direction of Lev Umansky, under the name of "the laboratory apparatus experiment" which included a whole set of special original means to reveal the leader in the group and to determine his style of activities in specially organised game situations. However, all of these investigations were

conducted in informal groups, in a youth camp where the leader often acted as the manager of the group. Therefore, in the given specific instance the exposure of the leader has a point: he can be "fixed" and can act as the manager. In other groups, in the work team for instance, such a situation is impossible. The greatest oversimplification of the problem of leadership and management is the notion of the need for an obligatory coincidence of the qualities of the leader and the manager in one person under any circumstances. Unfortunately, such a notion is current and sometimes leads to research aimed at finding out whether there is the coincidence in the given group of the leader and manager (or of the "official" and "non-official" leader). In the case of discrepancies it is "recommended" to replace the leader with the person who (often according to sociometric methods) "proved to be" the leader. The existence of such recommendations often leads to the disorganisation of group activities, since the leader proves completely unsuitable for fulfilling the role of manager.

Strictly speaking, the methods used for the definition of the leadership style cannot be unconditionally applied for the definition of the style of management. In general the methods used for the exposure of the leader are not suitable, and most often are unnecessary in the determination of the manager: there is no need to "determine" him through psychological methods, since he is fixed by the system of relations in the given group and by its inclusion in the wider social system. Sociometric methods, for instance, are not appropriate in the given instance: they determine the leader only according to the majority of positive choices received, meaning they are at best capable of revealing the "emotional leader", but the manager does not necessarily claim this position. In actual small groups various leaders promoted from the group members in definite areas of group vital activities can, of course, exist alongside managers. In particular, the specific "division of labour" between the leader and the manager arises in scientific collectives.¹ It is important to psychologically define the character of their activities and the specifics of the combination of the manager's activities and the activities of the numerous leaders.

The process of the *adoption of a group decision* is closely connected with the problem of leadership and management

¹ See: M.G. Yaroshevsky, "The Programme-Role Approach to Research of the Scientific Collective", in: *Problems of Psychology*, No. 3, 1973.

because the decision-making is one of the most important functions of the manager, and the organisation of the group for the adoption of such a decision is a particularly complex problem. The fact that group decisions are often more effective than individual ones has long been known in social psychology. In contemporary conditions, when group activities are stimulated in many sections of the social organism, this problem acquires a special urgency. Different methods of adopting group decisions were worked out long ago in everyday practice as well as in social psychology. It is the business of science to fully determine their possibilities.

However, before turning to the specific forms of the adoption of group decisions, certain questions of principle must be explained in the socio-psychological investigation of this problem. The most important of these questions are as follows: what is the "group solution" in general, in other words, how are the individual opinions of the group members united in one solution? What sort of role does the discussion preceding the group decision play in the process of its adoption? Is the group decision really always better than the individual decision and if not, in what instances is it better? Finally, what are the results of the group's adoption of a general decision and what is the significance of this fact for each individual taking part in the decision? Each of these questions arises in social psychology in one form or another, though they are investigated in different ways. The problem of the role of group discussions preceding the adoption of the group decision is the best-investigated problem. On the experimental level it was studied by Kurt Lewin as were the other questions of group dynamics.

The experiment took place in the US during the Second World War. The goal of the experiment was to compare the effectiveness of the traditional form of influence on housewives through advertising (lectures) with the new form involving the development of a group decision on the basis of a group discussion. In the groups listening to lectures a 3 per cent change of opinion was noted and in the groups where a group discussion took place, there was a 32 per cent change. Lewin proposed the following psychological interpretation of the results obtained.

At the lecture the housewives listened passively to the proposals and interpreted the facts they were presented with in the light of their past experience. After the lecture they had *an alternative*, to buy or not to buy the products. They were not prompted into making a certain decision during the

lecture. In the group where the housewives listened to the lecture no social norm arose which the members of the group could follow in the future. Therefore the change of opinion was based exclusively on the effectiveness of the persuasion which turned out to be insignificant. On the other hand, in the course of the group discussion each member of the group felt *included* in the decision-making process, weakening the opposition to that which was introduced. In the course of the discussion it became obvious that the other members of the group were also moving in the direction of a definite decision, and that strengthened the group's position. The solution was therefore prepared step by step, and its adoption transformed into a unique group norm which was supported and accepted by the participants in the discussion.

At the time of Lewin's experiment many other socio-psychological experimental investigations were conducted on the study of the mechanism and effect of the group adoption of a decision and the explanation of the role of the group discussion in this process. Two important laws were revealed: 1) the group discussion reveals contrasting positions, thus giving the participants an opportunity to see the different sides of the problem and decrease their resistance to the new information; 2) if the decision is initiated by the group, it is the logical conclusion of the discussion supported by all those present. Its significance increases because it transforms into a group norm. The results of the group discussion were studied further not only from the point of view of the value of the group decision, but also from the point of view of those results which the very fact of the discussion held for the group on the plane of the reconstruction of the structure of intragroup relations. As far as the influence of the group discussion as a stage preceding the adoption of the group decision was concerned, the thrust of the further analysis made itself felt rather distinctly. An active search began, especially on the applied level, for different *forms* of a group discussion which stimulated the adoption of the decision.

Some of these forms are rather well known. They were not discovered in social psychology but appeared in practical work. Their value was also realised long ago and is even supported in proverbs ("Two heads are better than one", and so on). The various types of *conferences* are one of such widely practiced forms; in terms of socio-psychological analysis they are a specific form of group discussions. It can be said that social psychology is indebted to practical work as concerns

the description of the psychological structure of the conference and the exposure of the reserves for the adoption of optimal group decisions.

New forms of group discussions also arose along with the contemporary investigations of the problem of group decisions. One of these, introduced by Irene Osborne, was called brainstorming. The essence of such a discussion involves the manager's division of the group into two parts in order to work out the collective decision: the so-called "generators of ideas" and the "critics". The "generators of ideas" are the focus of the first stage of discussions: they are required to come up with as many proposals as possible in relation to the solution of the problem discussed. The proposals can be absolutely devoid of any argumentation, even fantastic, but no one criticises them at this stage: the goal is to obtain the largest variation of ideas possible. An extremely important question arises here in connection with the critical ability of the personality revealed in the course of the adoption of a decision. Traditionally, the critical ability of the position is considered as a positive trait which prevents the suggestive influence. It has been established in experimental investigations, however, that at the definite phases of the adoption of a group decision an excessive critical ability plays a negative rather than a positive role. The "critics" enter into action at the second stage of discussions. They begin to sort out the proposals, eliminate the completely unsuitable ones, set aside the disputed ones and accept the successful ones unconditionally. The disputed proposals are discussed under repeated analysis, and as many as possible are retained. In the final analysis the group obtains a rich selection of solutions to the problem. The brainstorming method was very popular several years ago and gained special recognition in the development of technical solutions. There were two special conferences on the method of brainstorming held in England. Yet some of its aspects were overestimated, so that later rather strong skepticism regarding its potential was voiced. Brainstorming cannot, of course, replace all the other forms of group discussion, but in definite situations it has a certain advantage.

The method of *synectics*—literally a method for combining the heterogeneous—is another method of group discussions, it was developed by William Edwin Gordon. It is quite similar to brainstorming since its basic idea involves the working out of the most varied and, in the given instance, contrasting and mutually exclusive proposals at the first stage.

Synectors singled out in the group are "provokers" of the discussion; they also conduct the discussion, although in the presence of the whole group. Synectors are those people who are capable of actively formulating their position in the group. It has been experimentally established that their optimum number is from 5 to 7. They begin the discussion, and later other members of the group join in, but the task of the synectors is to formulate clearly contrasting opinions: the group must "see" the two possible "extremes" in the solution of the problem in order to evaluate them from all sides. In the course of the discussion these extremes are rejected and the decision is adopted which satisfies everyone. The logical method of reasoning by analogy is widely used in the application of synectics. Just as in the instance of brainstorming, this type of discussion is widely applied in the discussions of technical problems, providing a certain effect.

The described forms of group discussion have basically an applied significance. With regard to the theoretical side of the problem, the most important question remains that of the comparative value of the group and individual decisions. An extremely interesting phenomenon was revealed in the investigation called the "risky shift". All of the research into the small group preceding the discovery of this phenomenon used the established fact that the group possesses the property of being a unique "moderator" of the individual opinions and judgements of its members: It rejects the most extreme decisions and accepts a sort of average of the individual decisions. The traditional research into conformism and into the formation of group norms and many other types of investigation played a certain role in the establishment of this fact. The process of averaging the group decisions, opinions, and evaluations was long ago described in social psychology as the process of "normalisation".

Basing on this tradition, it can be asserted that the same fact of "normalisation" must be fixed in studying the mechanism of group decisions. In other words, the group decision winds up being a unique average of the decisions of separate group members. This position was not confirmed, however, in a number of experiments. It was not confirmed particularly in those instances when the adopted decision included a moment of risk. In 1961, James Stoner showed that the group decision included a moment of risk to a larger degree than individual decisions. Keen discussion continues to this time with regard to the explanation of this phenomenon. Serge Moskovici

devoted a large amount of attention to it in his work "Society and Theory in Social Psychology"¹. His basic criticisms of the investigations of the "risky shift" involve the fact that the latter are realised in too narrow a context, the questions are posed in purely technical, statistical terms, and the reason for contradictory tendencies in the group—both towards the normalisation of opinions and their polarisation—is not explained. Moskovicci connected this criticism with the general criticism of American social psychology for its underestimation of theory. As far as the investigations of the phenomenon of the "risky shift" are concerned, they are considered as a unique "interest shift" from the essential problems of social psychology to secondary, technical details.

The discussion also touched upon very important general problems of social psychology, including the question about whether or not the group could be considered as something standing over the individual, whether or not some product of group activities could be forecast on the basis of the knowledge of individual contributions. Of course, these problems cannot be solved only in the investigation of group decisions. But in all the arguments on whether there are actual group formations (existing not simply as a sum or an arithmetical mean from the characteristics of the individuals entering into the group), nobody ever doubted the existence of the group decision namely as a specific product of group activities (this also pertains to the existence of group norms). The great relevance of this problem, particularly on the applied level, stimulates its investigation on the theoretical level. Therefore in the light of the second aspect of group dynamic processes, i.e. group development, it is particularly important to analyse the question of the quality of adopted group decisions at different stages of the group's development.

Another important theoretical problem is the possibility of improving the process of adopting group decisions in various groups. The development of this problem depends on the exposure in experimental investigations of the role of a group discussion as a phase preceding the adoption of the group decision. The skills necessary in conducting an effective group discussion can be developed through socio-psychological training. From the three basic forms of socio-psychological training (open communication, role playing and group discus-

¹ See: *The Context of Social Psychology, A Critical Assessment*, Ed. by H. Tajfel and J. Israel.

sion), group discussion is the most developed. The teaching of group discussion methods ensures more effective group decisions along with changes of many characteristics in the group structure. Therefore, the group discussion leads to a unique phenomenon within the group structure called "*group polarisation*". The essence of this phenomenon can be found in the fact that in the course of group discussion contrasting opinions in various groupings are both revealed and promote their adoption or rejection by the entire group membership. The "average" opinions seemingly disappear while the extreme ones are clearly distributed between the two poles. This exposure of the extreme positions in general promotes a clearer picture in the group in the discussion of a problem. However, the question of which of the two polar points of view will be the basis of the group decision does not have a single answer. As a result of numerous experimental investigations it has been established that, as a rule, a group discussion "strengthens" that opinion which was held by the majority prior to the discussion. This cannot, however, be considered the final data on the subject. The first part of the task, the teaching of group discussion as a form of socio-psychological training, is better worked out than the second part, the exposure of the mechanism forming the group decision in the course of the discussion and the results of the group discussion for the participants. The skill necessary for conducting a group discussion depends on the successful management of the group. Therefore training in this form is especially beneficial to the leaders.

All of the examined dynamic processes taking place in the small group ensure a definite form of effectiveness of group activities. It is also quite logical to consider this question as a constituent part of the problem of group dynamics. The effectiveness of the small group's activities can be investigated on different levels. When the small group is primarily understood as a laboratory group, the effectiveness of its activities signifies only the effectiveness of a specific given task of the experimenter. It is no accident, therefore, that the greater part of experimental work on this problem in traditional social psychology involved laboratory experiments. Such work originated in the school of group dynamics and certain important characteristics of the "abstract" activities of the group were revealed: the dependence of the effectiveness on the cohesion of the group, on the style of management, on the method of adoption of the group decision, and so on. The formal sides

of these interconnections are also extremely important for the comprehension of the nature of group processes. However, such investigations tell nothing about the way in which the character of activities and their content influence the effectiveness of the group activities. Moreover, in traditional social psychology the very nature of the effectiveness of the small group's activities is considered one-sidedly in accepted patterns of investigation of this problem, and this one-sidedness is intensified by the fact that the effectiveness of the group's activities is not only the object of socio-psychological research but also of the interest of economists, for whom the effectiveness of the group's activities means its labour productivity. Since the greater part of the work on effectiveness is conducted on work teams, the problem is often formulated as that of the labour productivity of these work teams.

In reality the productivity of the group's labour is only one indicator of its effectiveness. The *satisfaction* of the group members with their work is another no less important indicator for social psychology. This indicator is, of course, not only important for socio-psychological research, it is of fundamental importance for socialist society in particular, in accordance with its basic goal—the comprehensive development of the personality of each worker. Meanwhile, the other side of effectiveness is rarely investigated in traditional social psychology. More precisely, the problem of satisfaction was formally raised in investigations, but its interpretation has been extremely one-sided, pertaining, as a rule, to the emotional satisfaction of the individual with the group. Meanwhile, the results of experimental investigations provided a contradictory answer to the question of whether or not such satisfaction increases the effectiveness of group activities. This is explained by the fact that effectiveness is connected with such an indicator as *joint activities* of the group, while satisfaction is connected primarily with the system of *interpersonal relations*. The problem of satisfaction has another aspect too—namely, satisfaction with work, i.e. it here also concerns joint group activities. The accent on this aspect of the problem is characteristic for Soviet social psychology. On the theoretical plane, research of this problem is impossible without simultaneously answering the question on the role of group activities as its most important integrator, and also without the solution to the problem of group development and its metamorphosis on a definite stage of development in the collective.

The promotion in Soviet social psychology of such criteria

of the small group's effectiveness as social and labour activities of its members (brought about by their satisfaction with their work) is directly connected with the recognition of the decisive role of such a factor as the transformation of the group into the collective. Important conclusions can be made here in relation to the group's successful fulfillment of the task before it. This is the criteria of *the social significance* of the task. It cannot be revealed in laboratory groups, since it arises in general only in a completely new system of relations forming in the group on the highest level of its development. From this point of view, the further study of a completely new form of effectiveness in small group activities is possible only in the analysis of the collective.

A series of experimental investigations on the problem of the collective provided the first affirmations of this hypothesis. It also provided the basis for raising the question about the very criteria of group effectiveness, significantly increasing their number. Such criteria as the educational influence of the collective on the individual and also the existence of "supernormative" activeness (the group members' desire to achieve higher results) is revealed by the labour productivity of the group, along with the members' satisfaction with their work.

Precise definitions are necessary with regard to traditional criteria. In the investigation of the satisfaction with work both phases of any work activity, preparatory and instrumental must be considered. In the greater number of investigations, the attention is placed on the instrumental phase while not taking into account the fact that the first phase acquires special significance in groups with a high level of development. New qualities of the group and their influence on each individual group member can appear here with special emphasis. Just as with other problems pertaining to the dynamic processes of the small group, the problem of effectiveness must be connected with the problem of the group's transformation into the collective.

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN THE RESEARCH OF THE COLLECTIVE

The problem of the collective, as has already been noted, is a specific problem of Marxist social psychology, setting it apart from all the traditional systems of socio-psychological knowledge. There are two important reasons for the absence of this set of problems in traditional social psychology. This is primarily connected with the character of social relations that traditional social psychology emerged and developed in. According to Marx, a society built on the basis of private property cannot objectively create a community of people which can be defined as a collective. Such a posing of the problem immediately determines the essential distinction between any human groups possible in any society and collectives as special group formations. Because the term "collective" is used in extremely arbitrary meanings, including a synonym for "group", Marx divided the concept into authentic and imaginary collectivism meaning that only authentic collectivism is a quality of special groups—collectives. This signifies that authentic collectivism is not possible in the conditions of the existence of antagonistic classes. It presupposes that "the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association"¹ and such freedom is impossible in a society divided into antagonistic classes. Consequently, authentic collectivism in the full sense of the word can be realised only in socialist society and correspondingly, collectives can be a form of the organisation of people only in such a society. If we are to stick to this

¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 78.

precise meaning of the "collective" concept, then it is clear that a similar object of research is absent in traditional social psychology. According to Marx, bourgeois society knows only a "substitute for the community" and the various group formations, which are these "substitutes", cannot provide material for the analysis of specific characteristics of the collective. The dependence of the very content of the problems of social psychology on the type of society it forms in and the problems it is called to solve are especially evident in this example. The collective is not simply a new subject of socio-psychological research, it is a new phenomenon in social life.

The second reason for the absence of a special point of view on the group and namely its examination primarily from the point of view of joint activities is rooted in the methodological orientation of traditional social psychology. According to this orientation, small groups are studied primarily in laboratory experiments, excluding the analysis of the content of group activities and consequently all the subsequent links of such an approach.

The most crucial task of social psychology in socialist society is the singling out of the problems pertaining to the collectives. This is especially important because the collective by no means acts as the sole object of socio-psychological research in these conditions. Practically all of the social sciences demonstrate an interest in the analysis of this phenomenon dictated by the actual meaning that this problem acquires in socialist society. Collectives act here as the basic form of organisation of workers in all spheres of social life, in industry, in the system of science and culture, in education, in sports, etc. Therefore, the collective can be considered as the object of research in philosophy, sociology, ethics, etc. The socio-psychological approach cannot claim to providing a solution to all the problems connected with the collective. Its place in the investigation of this phenomenon must be precisely defined, giving precedence to that aspect which can be investigated by the means at the disposal of social psychology in the framework of its conceptual patterns. In order to determine this aspect, the general principles of the approach to the group in Marxist social psychology must be recalled. The objectively existing social groups singled out in sociological analysis are here studied as subjects of activities, i.e. primarily from the point of view of the *psychological* characteristics of this subject. In other words, those traits of the group are singled out which are perceived by the members of the given

group as signs of a certain psychological entity. Which psychological characteristics of the group permit it to be perceived by its members as a collective—it is social psychology that must answer this question. But because the determining of psychological characteristics of the group is realised on the basis of a definite methodological principle, namely on the principle of activities, the socio-psychological investigation of the collective presupposes an examination of *the level of development of its activities* and of *the role of its joint activities* in the formation of the very psychological entity and its mediation of all group processes. Therefore in social psychology it is logical to consider the collective as a special quality of the group connected with the joint activities. This special quality is the product of the *development* of groups existing within a definite system of social activities, a definite system of social relations. From this point of view, even in the conditions of socialist society, only such a group can be considered as a collective in which definite psychological characteristics are formed, arising as a result of the development of its basic activities and presenting a special significance for its members. This does not belittle the significance of actually existing collectives, it only describes a certain perspective for their development. For social psychology such an approach is a natural continuation of the research of dynamic processes in the small group developing according to the unfolding of joint activities.

The significance of collectives in the life of socialist society was obvious in the very first years of its existence, long ago generating a tradition of research into this phenomenon. The most fruitful approaches to the research of the collective in the 1920s formed primarily in the area of pedagogical science where numerous problems inevitably appeared pertaining to social psychology. In the 1930s in the works of Nadezhda Krupskaya and Anton Makarenko that specific socio-psychological aspect of research, which was later adopted by Soviet psychology, was distinctly identified in addition to the solution of the pedagogical problem of the collective.

Anton Makarenko started from the methodological positions worked out by Marx. Therefore the most important sign of the collective for him was not just any kind of joint activities, but *socially-positive* joint activities which answered the demands of society. "The collective is possible only under the condition that it unites people in activities clearly useful for

society”¹. Therefore the first sign of the collective as a group of a special type is namely its *purposefulness*, which ensures a special quality of the individuals included in the collective, their individual purposefulness and permits the creation of an organisation with the corresponding bodies of the collective and the singling out of people chosen by the collective to fulfil definite functions. Anton Makarenko strongly emphasised the idea that the nature of relations in the collective possessed a special property: “...The question of the relation of comrade to comrade is not a question of friendship, not a question of love, not a question of neighbourliness, but a question of responsible dependence”.² In contemporary terminology, this idea signifies nothing other than the acknowledgement of the most important role of joint activities as a factor forming the collective and involving the whole system of relations between members of the collective. “Relations of responsible dependence” are those emerging primarily on the basis of such joint activities.

Anton Makarenko describes the collective more specifically as a “free group of workers united by one goal, one action, organised and supplied with organs of management, discipline and responsibility”.³ Such an approach to the collective demands that both the *general type of social activities* constituting the collective and *the means of organisation* determining the whole system of relations in the group be included in the definition. Such an approach also presumes the necessity of the development of the collective, the inevitability of a number of stages which it goes through and the complete development of all the named qualities involved in these stages.

Anton Makarenko, characterising these stages, demonstrated how the movement of the collective can be insured by steps. The most important condition is the uninterrupted development of those very socially significant goals the collective is created for. This presumes the need to describe “perspective lines” of development in the collective, to work out the “dialectic of demands” and to organise “tomorrow’s joys”. The successful combination of all these factors creates an atmosphere in the collective which promotes to the best the development of the new individuals entering into it. According to Anton Makarenko, the individual first finds mutual assistance in the collective

¹ A.S. Makarenko, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1948, p. 97 (in Russian).

² A.S. Makarenko, *Works*, Vol. 5, Moscow, p. 210 (in Russian).

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 7, p. 16.

along with the mutual responsibility that provides for the formation of collective cohesion for the defending the unity of its actions.

The idea running all through Makarenko's discussions on the collective is that the success of all internal processes in the collective can be ensured only if all the norms of relations, the whole organisation of activities within the collective is built on the basis of the correlation of these models in a broader system of social relations, relations developed in society as a whole. The collective is not a closed system, it is included in the whole gamut of relations in society and therefore the success of its actions can be realised only when there is no disagreement between the goals of the collective and society. It is socially significant goals that the collective strives for. This idea is very significant for the subsequent development of Soviet social psychology, because it reveals the specific content of the concept of "social context" in relation to the development of the collective.

Thus practically all the basic questions of the socio-psychological theory of the collective were established in the concepts of the collective developed by Anton Makarenko, although they were elaborated in the "depths" of his pedagogical theory. This concept was radically different from those investigations of the collective which were undertaken in the first years of the Soviet state from a different mechanistic position, be it reflexology or any of the other variants of biological reductionism in psychology. Characteristically, these positions were a rather precise prototype of the future constructions of the group theory in Western social psychology, of which the same principle of refusal to examine the content activities was typical that subsequently became the main reason for the impoverishment of group analysis. Moreover, if this limitation is not always completely obvious in those instances when the group in general was considered, then it becomes completely explicit in the investigation of the collective. In one investigation in the 1930s the idea was introduced that the collective is a "group of interacting people, collectively reacting to some sort of common irritants". In such a definition, all the specific signs of the collective turn out to be omitted; practically any number of any groups could be placed under this definition and the very problem of the collective would be removed.

Vladimir Bekhterev did not escape the formal approach to the collective. In his system of collective reflexology he devoted a lot of attention to this problem. Although

Bekhterev also emphasised two really important signs of the collective—the common goal and the common mood—neither of them were revealed on the content plane. The creation of the common goal was particularly important because *any* common goal does not make a collective, especially in the instance when the goal has an obviously anti-social character. Such indisputable signs as the “common mood”, the “common concentration”, the “common decision or resolution” and the “unity of the goal and actions”, in themselves can be both related to the groups included in the system of socially-useful activities and the groups with anti-social intent.

The importance of Anton Makarenko and Nadezhda Krupskaya's contribution to the solution of the problems involved in the collective is really great, since they created a new stage in the development of this problem in Soviet research of the 1950s and 1960s.

Today the majority of researchers agree in the definition of the basic signs of the collective. There is a certain difference in the terminology, but it is possible to point out the collective's obligatory signs, which are recognised by all researchers. First of all, it is a union of people directed towards a defined, *socially approved goal* (although a united anti-social group, a group of lawbreakers cannot be considered a collective in this sense). Secondly, in this *voluntary* character of unity, “the voluntary” is here understood as a characteristic of the group which makes it, for the individuals in group, a system *of relations actively built by them* on the basis of joint activities. The essential sign of the collective is its *integrity* expressed in the fact that the collective always acts as a certain *system* of activities with organisation inherent to it, a distribution of functions and a definite structure of management and direction. Finally, the collective represents a special form of relations between its members, ensuring the principle of the *development of the personality* not in spite of, but along with the development of the collective.

The part of the socio-psychological theory of the collective which examines the various stages and levels of its development has special significance in contemporary conditions. There are several “models” of development of the collective, each of which fixed special stages or levels in this process. One of the most comprehensive of such attempts is contained, as has already been noted, in the conceptions of Artur Petrovsky (see page 206). The subsequent development of both the theore-

tical ideas and experimental practice permitted a more precise exposure of the main idea of the whole concept and in particular the idea that the unity of action emerges as a *system-forming sign of the collective*.

A more precise definition was introduced from this point of view in the analysis of the multi-level structure of the group¹, where the following levels were singled out: A) *The central section* of the group structure—the object-oriented activities of the group brought about by the broader social structure the given group is included in. The level of its development can be determined with the help of three criteria: 1) the evaluation of the collective's fulfilment of its basic social function (success in the participation in the social division of labour); 2) the evaluation of the correspondence of the group to social norms (correspondence to the socialist way of life); 3) the evaluation of the group's ability to ensure each member the possibility for a full harmonious development of personality. The diagnostics of the collective's level of development presupposes a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of each of these parameters. The dependence of all the processes in the group on the nucleus layer of its activities was investigated in a series of experiments. The fact that the described layer represents a non-psychological formation permits to connect the totality of those social relations the given group exists within with the psychological processes emerging on the subsequent strata.

B) The *second layer* of the group structure represents the fixation of the relations of each group member to the group activities, goals and tasks.

C) The *third layer* corresponds especially to interpersonal relations mediated by activities. It is namely this layer which is described in the greatest detail. In experimental investigations a whole range of specific phenomena are uncovered which are absent in those groups where this active unity is not developed.

D) The *fourth layer* of the group structure is the superficial connections between group members. These are also interpersonal relations, but that "part" of them which are built on immediate emotional contacts where neither collective goals of activities nor value orientations generally accepted by the collective emerge as a basic factor mediating the

¹ See: *The Psychological Theory of the Collective*, Ed. by A.V.Petrovsky, pp. 209-11.

personal contacts of the group members. The predominating means of relations is here the least connected with the common activities of the group.

This idea of the multi-level structure of group relations permits the examination of the route taken by each group as a successive inclusion of the ever deeper layers of the group structure in the mediation of numerous contacts between group members. There is no reason to simplify the question by imagining each stage in the development of some specific group as the presence in it of only one layer of relations. On the contrary, the movement of the group to the collective does not signify that the ever new lower levels of relations gradually disappear, but only that such essential transformations which make the explanation of processes taking place in the group impossible from the point of view of the processes taking place on the lower level alone. Moreover, Artur Petrovsky's hypothesis states that the modification of processes characteristic for the group at the lower level of its development is so essential in the instance when the group has "advanced" to the level of the collective that a "mirror image" of these processes can be made, i.e. they can be imagined to occur with a "reverse sign".¹ However, the latter position is still only a hypothesis, while other positions on the concept have obtained a more or less solid experimental support.

The proposed approach is an attempt to realise certain general principles of Marxist methodology in *the construction of a special socio-psychological theory of the collective*.

It cannot be said that all research of the collective in Soviet social psychology takes place under this conception. However, the basic ideas proposed in it are shared by an overwhelming majority of authors. In particular, the idea of the presence of definite stages in the development of the collective, singled out precisely on the basis of the levels of the development of activities, received broad acknowledgment.

In approaching the given problem, Lev Umansky's idea of levels is combined with the singling out of certain *obligatory parameters* of the collective, which also determine its level of development. Such parameters include the orientation of the collective, its organisation, preparedness and psychological communicative ability. A *continuum* of real contact groups is then established from the moment of the unification of previously unacquainted people for the sake of certain joint activities

¹ Ibid., p. 56.

up to the period of that group's existence when it can be called a collective in the genuine sense of the word, i.e. to the moment of its social maturity. The following "points" are given precedence in this *continuum*: group-cooperation, group-autonomy and group-collective. The differences between the stages run along the noted parameters. The three stages of the group's development and its transformation into the collective in the given outline correspond approximately to the three layers exposed by Artur Petrovsky, on the basis of which the idea of a *different degree* of work-mediation of the whole system of group relations on the corresponding levels of its development was worked out.

There are two significant moments in the contemporary treatment of the socio-psychological theory of the collective observed today. First, the search for adequate methodological means which measure in experimental investigations the degree of expression of those qualities and characteristics in each specific group that provide a basis for the effective diagnostics of the level of the development of that group.

Second, a more specific description of those modifications which occur with each of the known group processes in the instance when the group becomes a collective. Thus a series of investigations is dedicated to the change of socio-perceptive characteristics on the various levels of group development (how the structure of the perception of another person in the conditions of the collective changes, what happens in the collective to the system of mutual evaluations and reflexions between group members, in what way are conflicts solved and for what reasons do they most often arise, and finally, what is included in the "modification" of the processes of attraction in collectives, and so on). Part of the results of separate investigations (the development of attributive processes in the course of group development and the changes of the parameters of interpersonal and inter-group perception) are illuminated in literature.¹ Even this brief list of the problems shows that the examination of the collective as the highest level of group development opens up broad prospects for the enrichment of the problematics of socio-psychological knowledge.

The formulation of the problem of the collective in social

¹ See: G.M. Andreyeva, "Cognitive Processes in Developing Groups", in: *Directions in Soviet Social Psychology*, Ed. by L. Strickland, Springer-Verlag, 1984.

psychology as an independent section in general investigations of groups has more than just a practical significance. The practical recommendations so necessary for optimising the activities of all links of the social organism in socialist society are, of course, the direct results of these investigations. Both the treatment of adequate methods according to the diagnostics of collectives and the study of concrete types of the collective functioning in different spheres of society serve this task. But in addition to this, the singling out of this set of problems and the proposed interpretation of the collective also have a great methodological significance for the future of social psychology as a science. Several lines can be analysed, along which the posing of the problem of the collective in social psychology changes the general situation in the science.

The exposure of the specifics of such a new group formation as the collective shows the highly promising nature of the *application of the principle of activities in social psychology*. The hypothesis that the group can act as the subject of activities now receives experimental affirmation. It is at this stage of the development of the collective that the group acquires the traits of such a subject, because only under the condition of acceptance of the goals of group activities by *all* members of the group, the existence among *all* the group members of a value-orientation unity, the mediation of *all* relations in the group by the object-related activities can the question be posed about the mechanisms in the formation of such attributes for each subject of activities as group needs, group motives and group goals. Thus the description and analysis of the *more developed form* of the group provides a "key" to the investigation of all other group forms. Similarly, in political economy the analysis of the more developed forms of production provides a key to the research of the lesser developed forms.

The analysis of the characteristics of the collective provides for the liquidation of the rift that formed in traditional social psychology between investigations of groups and investigations of processes. *The impermissibility of such a rift shows that* if the content of any group process depends on the content of group activities, moreover, on the specific level of development of these activities, then it is principally impossible to continue the investigation of group processes "by themselves". Neither laboratory conditions, nor the study of the process in its "pure" form can lead to the construction of satisfactory explanatory models, because the explanation of group processes can be successful

only through the analysis of the content of social activities realised by the group in which these processes are observed. Consequently, the construction of the socio-psychological theory of the collective provides for the treatment of a principally new explanatory principle in social psychology.

The exposure of the collective as a special level of group development makes it possible to construct a completely *new classification of groups* and removes the insurmountable difficulty of defining the criteria for such a classification. It is namely the analysis of collectives which permitted researchers of this problem specifically to propose more or less complete classifications of groups. Two such typologies have been proposed in Soviet social psychology. In Lev Umansky's typology, the group *continuum* has both a "zero point" (the moment of the group's creation) and a "negative extension" corresponding to the groups of anti-social character. From his point of view, these are not necessarily fixed anti-social groups (a gang of criminals, for example), but unique modifications of socially positive groups, a "threat" for the latter to degenerate into socially-negative forms due to the development of disintegration processes, emergence of group egoism, and so on. The second coordinate in Lev Umansky's typology serves to define the measure of group influence on the individual. The typology takes on the following appearance (the outline is slightly abbreviated):


Collective Group-autonomy Group-cooperation	Zone of positive influence of the group on the individual
Zone of negative influence of the group on the individual	Disintegration Intra-egoism "Anti-collective"

It is clear from the outline that the two "dimensions" it proposes permit a serious promotion in the socio-psychological classification of real social groups emerging as objects of socio-psychological analysis.

Artur Petrovsky singles out two vectors in his typology, according to the general orientations of the theory of mediated interpersonal relationships: 1) the presence or absence of the work-mediated interpersonal relations through the content of group activities (x) and 2) the social significance of group

activity (y). Vectors form the area in which all groups functioning in society can be distributed. The vector of "mediation" has a one-sided direction, the vector of the "content of activity" permits the distribution of groups on both sides of the "zero point", demonstrating the possibility of two principally different "contents" of activity corresponding or not corresponding to social progress.

The general diagram looks like this:



The five designated figures correspond to different types of groups: figure 1 signifies collectives where there is the maximum social significance of activity and the maximum degree of work-mediated interpersonal relations; figure 2 is the community with a high level of social significance of activities but also with a low level of work mediation (a group just created, where relations have still not developed into collective ones can be considered an example of this); figure 3 is an anti-social group in the content of its activities with a high degree of the mediation of interpersonal relations by this anti-social activity (a highly organised crime group, a strong band of thieves are examples of this); figure 4 also reflects an anti-social group under the condition that relations between its members are mediated by anti-social activity to a lesser degree (from society's point of view, such a group is less "dangerous" although it hinders social progress by the very fact of its existence); finally, figure 5 can be interpreted as a group expressing a very weak degree of the social content of activities (both positive and negative) and the same weak degree of significance of these activities for all the group processes. Examples of such groups are quite hard to find in real life, since in even the most shortlived and spontaneous meeting between people definite elements of joint

activities arise. Therefore the authors of the conception named experimental groups in laboratories as examples of groups signifying position 5.

Although the need for the further perfection of the diagram exists, the basic principles of the conception are here expressed quite precisely and serve as the basis for group classification.

Finally, the introduction of the concept of the collective promotes the rather old and yet very significant problem of *relationships of the group and the personality*. Social psychology addresses this question on all levels of its development and in different theoretical systems. The problem posed by the philosophical forerunners of social psychology on the freedom of the personality and its determination by society was settled on the level of sociological analysis in the Marxist interpretation of the individual as the subject and simultaneously the object of social relations.

Marx's thesis that social relations must be constructed in accordance with the principle that "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all",¹ provides a perspective for the examination of the individual with a new type of group. On the operational plane and in particular in the system of socio-psychological knowledge, it is the introduction of the concept of the collective as an explanatory principle that permits the realisation of this position. The individual is the subject of social activities and its inclusion in the group in no way belittles the subjective properties of the individual. On the contrary, if the group reaches a definite level of development and becomes a collective, then it does not oppose the individual as its member, but rather effects an integration of the subjective properties of its members itself and transforms into a special "aggregate subject" of activities.

On the other hand, the formation of the personality also receives a new explanation. The general proposition of social psychology that this formation is realised both through the assimilation of social impacts and through the active reproduction of social relations can be revealed here more specifically: in each separate instance, a special analysis is needed of the fact through which specific groups social influence over the personality is realised. It can well be presumed that the result will vary depending on this circumstance.

¹ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, 1976, p. 506.

This occurs not because the personality passively “absorbs” these models of behaviour which the group proposes (“good” or “bad”), but because its active position is formed depending on the level of development of the groups in which the process of socialisation is realised.

The elaboration of the problem of the collective allows a new approach to the analysis of such traditional problems for social psychology as intergroup relations.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

The area of the psychology of intergroup relations is the logical next step in the examination of groups and collectives in social psychology. The problems involved have been rather poorly investigated until recently. Evidently one of the reasons for this is the marginal state of the problems, their obvious inclusion in the system of sociological knowledge and other humanitarian sciences which accounts for the fact that the examination of their intrinsically psychological aspect to a significant degree lied outside psychology. And even when an interest in these problems began to develop in social psychology, no special area was created for their study. They seemed to be "dissolved" in other departments of the science. An example of this can be found in Gustave Le Bon's work on intergroup aggression, Theodor Adorno's work on negative orientations on another group, on hostility and fear with regard to the "other" in psychoanalytical theories, etc. The insignificant position of the problems of intergroup relations also explains the absence of the development of a specific socio-psychological approach to the analysis of these relations.

The underestimation of the problems of intergroup relations also provided for an enlargement in the study of small groups characteristic for the development of social psychology of the 1920s and 1930s. The whole investigative strategy was constructed so as to focus attention on the internal structure of these groups, the dynamic processes taking place within them, etc. The social context of social psychology suffered certain "losses" in the underestimation of the problems of intergroup relations.

It is no accident that the situation sharply changed since the time when a critical attitude began to form towards

traditional social psychology. The need to single out a separate area for intergroup relations is dictated by the complication of social life itself, by the fact that this area is primarily the location of complex class, ethnical and other conflicts. But in addition to this, the internal logic of socio-psychological development and the precise definition of its subject-matter also create the need for a thorough analysis of this highly complicated sphere. A direct result of the neo-positivist orientation in traditional social psychology is the appeal for a comprehensive study of the psychology of intergroup relations. It was thought that this could help to overcome the deficit of the causal explanation for intergroup relations and to find their authentic determinants. The beginning of the 1950s can be considered as the crucial moment in this process, although the final formulation of these problems as an independent area of socio-psychological research took place later.

Muzafer Sherif's experiments in a camp for minors in 1954 are the first type of research in this area.¹ These experiments, and their conclusions are quite well known. Their fundamental contribution to the study of intergroup relations must be specially emphasised. Unlike the "motivation" approaches to the study of interpersonal relations, characteristic for the Freudian-oriented researchers, where the central link of research remained the individual in his relations with representatives of other groups, Sherif proposed specifically "group" approach. The sources of intergroup hostility or cooperation must be looked for not in the separate individual, but in the situations of group interactions. The fundamental methodological considerations of interactionism, in the framework of which the given investigations took place, affected the understanding of the nature of these situations. On the one hand, interactions interpreted as the "social" are in reality reduced to directly observed *interpersonal* interactions, not included in the broad system of social activities. On the other hand, purely psychological characteristics—cognitive and emotional processes regulating various aspects of these interactions—are lost in interpersonal interactions. It is no accident, therefore, that subsequent criticism of Sherif's research came from the positions of cognitive orientation. Henry Tajfel conducted his experiments basing on this orientation,² proposing a thorough

¹ See: M. Sherif, *Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology*, London, 1966.

² See: H. Tajfel, "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination", in *Scientific American*, 1970, Vol. 223.

re-examination of all the problems of intergroup relations in social psychology.

Henri Tajfel, in studying intergroup discrimination (intra-group favouritism with regard to one's own group and extra-group hostility towards alien group), disagreed with Sherif as to the cause of this phenomenon. In emphasising the significance of cognitive processes in intergroup relations, Tajfel showed that the establishment of a positive valency of the difference between groups in favour of one's own group can be observed in the absence of an objective basis of a conflict, too, thus acting as a universal constant of intergroup relations. This led him to a broader conclusion that the area of interpersonal relations is primarily a cognitive sphere which includes four basic cognitive processes: social categorisation, social identification, social comparison, and social (intergroup) discrimination. In Tajfel's opinion, the analysis of these processes must represent a specific socio-psychological aspect in the study of intergroup relations.

The fact of group membership in itself, independent of objective relations and contradictions between groups, brings about the development of these four cognitive processes leading in the final account to group discrimination. And although the very important fact of relations between groups is revealed in such an explanation—their perception of each other—one of the most essential links is lost: this is the question of how adequate is the fixation of group distinctions, i.e. how much do the perceived differences between groups correspond to the actual differences. Thus the reinstatement of the rights of the cognitive approach (consideration of the factor of intergroup perception) to the analysis of intergroup relations in contrast to Sherif's interactionist approach again resulted in one-sidedness.

Henri Tajfel helped attract attention to the problems of intergroup relations in social psychology, although the question of the position of these problems can cause some dispute. In Tajfel's point of view, the study of intergroup relations in social psychology can ensure its transformation into an actual social science. The loss of the social context in the American tradition is regarded as the result of its orientation only on "interpersonal" psychology. While fully accepting these arguments, one should only lament the fact that the overestimation of a purely cognitive approach became an obstacle hindering the realisation of the described programme: the explanation of the cause and effect dependencies in the area of intergroup

relations turned out to be isolated from the broader system of social relations which determines them.

The analysis of intergroup relations in the broader context of social relations makes up the specifics of the approach to this problem in Marxist social psychology. Just as in the solution of other socio-psychological problems, the general methodological principle in the investigation of intergroup relations is that of activity. In the given instance, it is revealed as the principle of the work-mediation of intergroup perception. In order to explain the content of this principle, certain preliminary observations must be made with regard to the interpretation of the problem of intergroup relations in Soviet social psychology.

The first of such observations involves defining the subject-matter of socio-psychological research in the area of intergroup relations. As is obvious from the analysis of this problem in traditional social psychology, two questions remain unclear in the course of discussions: the relations of *what kind of groups* must be investigated, and *what* in the area of these relations should be made the object of the socio-psychological investigation. The criticism of the overestimation of the small group's role in the system of socio-psychological knowledge led to the assertion in recent Western works that the relationships of large groups must be considered in social psychology since only this could increase the social significance of the problems of this science. All of Tajfel's research testifies to the striving to go beyond the framework of the relationships of small contact entities, onto a wider level of the problem's analysis. However, the limitation of the area of intergroup relations by the analysis of *only* the relations between large groups is also illegitimate. Social psychology must study the relations between small as well as between large groups. Socio-psychological specifics are found not only in the type of the "unit" of analysis, but also in the point of view on the problem under investigation.

Another question arises here, concerning what should social psychology study in the field of intergroup relations. The specifics of the socio-psychological viewpoint are found in the fact that attention here is focussed neither on the intergroup processes nor the phenomena themselves nor their determination by social relations, but on the internal reflection of these processes on the subjective plane, i.e. the cognitive sphere connected with different aspects of intergroup interactions. The socio-psychological analysis concentrates on the problem of

relations arising in the course of interactions between groups as an internal *psychological* category. However, unlike the cognitivist orientation, the concept of the problem proposed in Soviet social psychology suggests not only a close connection of the subjective reflection of intergroup relations with the actual activities of the investigated groups, but also its determination of all cognitive processes accompanying these relations. Just as in the interpretation of the group itself, the cause-and-effect dependencies, the determination of the cognitive sphere by the specific features of joint group activities is the main direction of the study of intergroup relations. An analogy is appropriate in the given instance: groups exist objectively and the conditions under which the group becomes a psychological reality for the individual, just as the way these intergroup relations exist objectively (their investigation from this angle is the task of sociology) are important for social psychology. The way this fact is reflected in the consciousness of group members and how it predetermines their perception of each other is also important for social psychology.

The second observation concerns the term "perceptive processes of intergroup relations". We have earlier discussed the sense in which social psychology generally applies the term "social perception": its metaphorical nature and its significantly rich content in comparison with the term "perception" in general psychology have been noted. In the proposed outline, the complex model of the social-perceptive process, when the group emerges as both the subject and object of perception, involves the area of intergroup relations. The concept of the group as a whole as the subject of social perception signifies the formation of a completely new intergroup level of analysis of socio-perceptive processes and forces special investigation to compare habitual interpersonal and intergroup perception. V.S. Ageyev conducted a series of investigations on this problem in Soviet social psychology. The special feature of intergroup perception pertains to the fact that we are here concerned with the regulation of individual cognitive structures and their formation into a single whole which differs from the incoming elements. The perception of one group by another is not simply the sum of perceptions of another group by individuals belonging to the subject of perception, but a completely new quality, i.e. a group formation. Ageyev proposed to call this characteristic of intergroup perception "integrity". Unlike its representation as the characteristic of the subject of intergroup perception, its object (the perceived group) possesses

a different characteristic—a “unified state” representing the degree of the spread of the general idea about the perceived group among all the members of the perceiving group.¹ The integrity and unification are specific structural characteristics of intergroup perception. Its dynamic characteristics also differ from the interpersonal perception: intergroup socio-perceptive processes are characterised by greater stability, “conservativeness” and rigidity, since their subject is the group rather than one person, and the formation of such processes is not only the more drawn out, but also the more complex process which includes the individual life experience and the experience of the “life” of the group. The range of possible sides from which the other group is perceived is significantly more narrow in comparison with the case of interpersonal perception. The “image” of the other group is formed depending on the situation of joint intergroup activities.

These joint intergroup activities are not just spontaneous “interactions” (as was the case in Sherif’s experiments). Intergroup relations, and in particular the notions of “other” groups can also occur in the absence of immediate interactions between groups, but they are always work-mediated. However, in the given instance a broader system of social conditions, the socio-historical activities of the given groups, acts as the mediating factor.

Thus the intergroup activities can emerge both in the form of immediate interactions of the representatives of various groups, and in their own extremely mediated, impersonal forms. The approach to the analysis of intergroup relations proposed in Soviet social psychology is the further development of the principle of activities. The intergroup perception which was given precedence as the specific socio-psychological object of study in the field of intergroup relations is in itself interpreted from the point of view of the specific content of joint activities in different groups. The treatment of this problem on an experimental level permitted a new interpretation of many phenomena revealed in traditional experiments.

Therefore, the basic hypothesis in V.S. Ageyev’s investigations concerned the dependence of intergroup perception and in particular its adequacy on the character of joint intergroup activities. In the first series of experiments conducted on student

¹ See: V. S. Ageyev, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1983, pp. 65-66 (in Russian).

groups in a technical school during the examinations, the following served to demonstrate the adequacy of intergroup perception: 1) the prognosis of a group victory in the situation of intergroup competition; 2) the explanation of the reasons behind the victory or defeat of groups in this competition; 3) the notion of the potential successes of one's own or another group in different spheres of activity not directly connected with the experimental situation. The degree of preference for one's own group served as a measure of the adequacy along the demonstrated parameters. The experiment involved the following. Two groups of students were to take the same credit test on the same subject with the same teacher. In two experimental groups the students were told that the group which showed adequate knowledge during the classroom activities would automatically pass the test, while the members of the other group would be required to take the test in the normal way (individually). They were also told that the general group mark will be formed from the marks of individual students. However, the total of these marks would remain unknown to the students: the experimenter would only periodically name the leading group. In the first situation the same group led the whole time, and in the second, the experimenter alternately named both groups as the leading group. In the third situation (serving as the control one), the students were told that the group would not pass the test as a whole, but only those students who led in the classroom activities, independent of their group membership.

The results of this series of experiments on the whole confirmed the proposed hypotheses. The first and second situations in comparison with the control one showed: a) a significantly larger number of statements and replies supporting the members of one's own group and criticising the statements of members of the other group; b) a significantly larger amount of attempts to regulate the choice of students making the statement (the stimulation of statements from those members of one's group which increased the chances of success and the stimulation of unsuccessful statements of representatives of the other group); c) pressure on the examiner (on his choice of the next student). In these situations the pronouns "we" and "they" were more often applied in comparison with the control group (an indication of group identification). The data from the first two situations differed sharply from the control group along all three parameters of intergroup perception. This was especially clear in the explanation of victory or

defeat of one's own and the other group (the success of one's own group was explained, as a rule, by factors within the group, and failure by factors outside the group). Therefore, the common moment of the intergroup situations was the phenomenon of intragroup favouritism.

The conclusion can be made here that intergroup perception depends on the character of joint intergroup activities. In the competitive situation, both experimental groups chose an *adequate* strategy from the point of view of intergroup interactions but the same strategy proved *inadequate* from the point of view of intergroup perception. The question had now to be answered as to whether or not such a strategy of interactions was adequate under any conditions of intergroup activities. In the given series of experiments joint intergroup activities were organised on the principle of a "game starting from zero", with the external criteria of the evaluation of group achievement carrying an ambivalent character (it was not sufficiently clear for the participants because they were not individually informed of their marks and were given only the general, unsubstantiated evaluation of the group activities).

In the second series of experiments the objective conditions of intergroup activities were changed substantially. The experiment was conducted in a Young Pioneer summer camp with two groups, twice ending up in a competitive situation. The children took part in sport competition in the middle of camp term and in the end, worked jointly on a neighbouring state farm. The leaders of the groups, at the request of the experimenters, conducted daily work with the children along with the two stages of the experiment. They emphasised the competitive aspects in group life in every way before the sport competition and did not emphasise these aspects before the work sessions on the state farm. The results of these experiments showed a sharp increase of intragroup favouritism in the conditions of sport competition, while during joint activities in the state farm it decreased sharply.

In interpreting these results, it can be concluded that the most important factor which led to the reduction of inadequacy in intergroup perception is not the situation itself of experimental intergroup interactions, but the principally new activities of different groups, more general ("super-group") goals and values of joint, socially significant activities. Such a fact as the groups' accumulation of experience of joint vital activities has significance here, too. The discrepancy with Henri Tajfel's data is clear, because in his experiments artificially created labo-

ratory groups were used, with favouritism being interpreted as a universal phenomenon.

The following outline of intergroup socio-perceptive phenomena can be proposed on the basis of the above experiments: It includes three basic links:

- The objective conditions of joint intergroup activities;
- The character of spontaneous intergroup interactions;
- The parameters of the processes of intergroup perception

This outline provides a new answer to the question of the correlation of intragroup favouritism as a strategy of intergroup interactions on the one hand, and the characteristics of intergroup perception on the other. Intragroup favouritism expresses the inadequacy of intergroup perception in intergroup interactions if this interaction is isolated from socially significant activities. The stabilisation of inadequate notions about other groups can be overcome if the group is included in socially significant activities with values and goals common to all participants. Such a posing of the question along with the opinion that *any* interaction is sufficient for an increase in the adequacy of intergroup perception are doubtful.

All that has been said above brings a more general methodological problem to light—that of the correlation of cognitive and social aspects of the inadequacy in intergroup perception. These two aspects were not separated in the experimental work of traditional social psychology. Therefore, in Tajfel's research, for example, the conclusion concerning the primacy, universality of the phenomenon of intragroup favouritism can pertain to both the characteristics of the cognitive and the social aspects of intergroup relations. In reality intergroup discrimination (with intragroup favouritism as an expression of this discrimination), very often appearing on the cognitive level (the statement of the differences between "mine" and "alien" group), can in no way be considered as a universal phenomenon in the analysis of social relations between groups. Only under certain conditions can social relations promote the development of intergroup discrimination. Under other conditions they, on the contrary, help to overcome this discrimination. The aforementioned experiments have shown

that socially significant goals and values of joint group activities can help to overcome intragroup favouritism.

The analysis of the problem of intergroup relations in social psychology also has great significance for the enrichment of the problems of groups and collectives. The influence of the character of intergroup interactions on intragroup processes is quite obvious. And although the study of intergroup relations is becoming more significant on the contemporary level of development in social psychology, the underlying aspects of this problem are still not investigated. Soviet social psychology has taken a fruitful turn down the road to the solution of this problem.

Therefore, in the aforementioned investigations of V. S. Ageyev important results were obtained on the influence of intergroup interactions on such intragroup processes as satisfaction from membership in the group, the character of interpersonal relations in the group and the precision of their perception. These questions were studied in more detail in a special series of experiments. In these experiments the comparative characteristics of group processes were revealed which depended on the position the group held in intergroup competition and on the group's "perception" of this position, i.e. on the group's subjective evaluation of the level of its own success. It was discovered that in the instance of the group's consistent failure the quality of interpersonal relations within the group grew significantly worse: the number of links based on mutual sympathy decreased, the number of negative choices increased, and a shift occurred to the increase in the number of conflicts. A very paradoxical fact was established alongside such easily predictable data. The groups evaluating their activities as unsuccessful demonstrated a significantly higher precision in the perception of interpersonal preferences both in their own and in the other group. Moreover, the knowledge of the state of affairs in the other group was even higher than the knowledge of that in their own. It was also revealed that the very interest in the problem of interpersonal relations was expressed stronger in the "unsuccessful" groups, which serves as an affirmation of the hypothesis that the insufficient integration of the group by joint activities reduces the indicators of its effectiveness. More fixed attention is devoted to the problems of interpersonal relations as a result of this insufficient integration on the basis of joint activities. Consequently, the establishment of a similar "shift" can serve as the diagnostic means for defining the level of group development.

These data showed still another alternative in comparison to Muzafer Sherif's description (where the increase of group cohesion was the result of intergroup competition): the dependence of intragroup processes on intergroup relations is much more complicated. The significance of these data is found in their elimination to a certain degree of the traditional notion of the small group as an isolated system. It is obvious that *the framework* of the small group is necessary for the explanation of any intragroup process. The Marxist socio-psychological thesis on the determination of all processes of the small group by a broader system of social relations is further developed and specified: the relations between groups represent the closest sphere of such relations. A unique "intergroup context" arises which represents a variety of the social context.

The second possible line of research, namely the study of the influence of intragroup relations on intergroup interactions is no less important.

Therefore, the study of the problems of intergroup relations in social psychology signifies both the establishment of a new set of socio-psychological phenomena and the expansion of the borders in the analysis of traditional problems.

The study of the problem of intergroup relations in Soviet society has great significance for the improvement of the management of social processes. For instance, the nascent field of research in the psychology of the organisation is based on the data received in the study of the psychology of intergroup relations.

The entire "block" of socio-psychological problems of the group is naturally completed by the field of intergroup relations. The general, "primary" analysis of the laws of people's communication and interaction is now supplemented by the notion of the way these regularities are realised in different groups. The next logical step is the examination how the whole system of these regularities and the whole system of groups the individual is included in maintain influence on the individual and what is the "contribution" of the individual as an active subject into the subsequent construction of the entire system.

Section Four

**SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
IN RESEARCH OF THE PERSONALITY**

Chapter Fifteen

**THE PROBLEM OF THE PERSONALITY
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY**

The entire course of previous discussions brought us to the set of problems connected primarily with the problem of the personality. However, before approaching the analysis of these problems, we must precisely identify that "cross-section" which is specific for social psychology. The numerous and varied definitions of the subject-matter of social psychology reflect the contradictory nature of the place personality problem holds in this science. In our definition of social psychology this problem occupies a legitimate place in this science, but in a specific aspect.

The problem of the personality is tackled by all psychological sciences, and therefore even if we determine the "borders" between them in approaching the personality, we still will not fully solve the question of the specifics of the analysis of the personality in social psychology. The interest in the problem of the possibilities of the human personality in contemporary society under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution is so great that practically all the social sciences address it as an object of research. The problem of the personality (individual) is central in the studies of both philosophy and sociology. It is treated in ethics, pedagogics and genetics. However, the internal logic is important for each scientific discipline, and it requires a more precise definition of the goals set in the study of those problems that prove interesting for many sciences.

The determination of the specifics in the socio-psychological research of the personality is especially important in socialist society. On the one hand, this is brought about by the fact that only the combined efforts of all social sciences can

solve the problem of the shaping of a harmoniously developed personality. The combination of such efforts suggests a *complex approach* to the study of the personality, and this is possible only under the precise definition of each discipline's area of investigation. On the other hand, the exposure of the specifics in the socio-psychological approach to the personality has special methodological significance for the development of Soviet psychology, because it affects the question of the relations between general and social psychology which is solved differently in other systems of psychological knowledge.

Therefore, it is important for social psychology to establish the difference between its own approach to the personality and the approach of its two "parent" disciplines—sociology and psychology. This task is solved in various ways in different systems of sociological and psychological knowledge, because the specifics of the individual (personality) as a subject of research in social psychology can only be understood *depending* on the way it is treated in a specific sociological or psychological conception. Our task primarily involves the consideration of the "borders" designated within the system of *Marxist* social science. Of course, the philosophical premises which lie at the base of the system of sciences about man must also be analysed.

The problem of the personality in Soviet psychology has a definite place in both the structure of Marxist sociology and the structure of general psychology. The department of the "sociology of the individual" is precisely defined in the structure of sociological knowledge just like the "psychology of the personality" within general psychology. Strictly speaking, the location of the "social psychology of the personality" in socio-psychological science must be found in-between these two departments.

The problem of the distinctions between the socio-psychological approach to the investigation of the individual and the *sociological* approach is solved in the same way by different Soviet authors. Its solution is determined by the principled positions of the Marxist theory of social development. If the system of sociological knowledge is primarily concerned with the objective regulations of social development, then the macrostructure of society and all such units of analysis like the socio-economic formations, the laws of their function and development, and consequently the structure of social relations in each specific type of society would, of course, present the main interest here. This does not mean, however, that the problems of the individual have no place in this analysis.

As has already been noted, the impersonal character of social relations as relations between social groups does not deny their "personalised" shading, because the laws of social development are realised only through people's activities. Consequently, specific people, specific individuals are carriers of these social relations. To understand the content and mechanism of action of the laws of social development is impossible outside the analysis of the actions of individuals included in social groups. Therefore, Marxist sociology examines the individual acting precisely as the *representative of a definite social group*. The personality is important for social psychology not as a model of individuality, but as a depersonalised, deindividuated personality, as a social type. This is not to say that specific individuals are completely excluded from analysis. Sociology studies the way characteristics significant for the group are embodied in specific persons and the way these characteristics are presented in different mass actions. The main problem in the socio-psychological analysis of the individual is that of the social typology of the individual, although the sociological analysis concerns other problems, too, particularly those which are special problems of social psychology, for instance, the problem of socialisation.

It is much more difficult to distinguish between the treatment of the problems involved in the individual in general and in social psychology. Hence the numerous points of view expressed in socio-psychological literature on this topic and the absence of a unified approach to the concept of the individual in general psychology.

True, these distinctions *do not involve* the question of the social determination of the individual. They are primarily connected with the ideas on the *structure* of the personality. Discussions have led to the question of whether or not individual psychological peculiarities are "included" in the personality. Different authors give different answers to this question.

Igor Kon has noted that the polysemy in the concept of the individual has led some authors to understand the personality as a specific subject of activities taken in the unity with its individual characteristics and social roles, while others understand the personality as "a social property of the individual, the sum-total of the integrated, socially significant traits, formed in the direct and indirect interactions of the given person with other people and making it, in

turn, the subject of work, knowledge and communication".¹

Although the second approach is most often considered sociological, it also exists as a pole in *general* psychology. The argument here mainly involves the question as to whether the individual must be considered in *psychology* primarily in this second meaning, or the main thing in the system of the given science is the combination of the socially significant traits with individual properties in the personality (and not simply in "a person").

Konstantin Platonov provided a new approach to the structure of the personality. He pointed out different substructures in the structure of the personality which simultaneously act as the levels of the personality: 1) the biological substructure (which includes the temperament, sexual, age and sometimes pathological characteristics of the mentality); 2) the psychological substructure (which includes the individual properties of separate mental processes that became the properties of the personality—memory, emotions, sensations, thoughts, perceptions, feelings and will), 3) the substructure of social experience (which includes knowledge acquired by the person, skills, abilities and habits), 4) the substructure of the individual's purposefulness (including the special hierarchically interconnected group of substructures: inclinations, wishes, interests, aptitude, ideals, individual world outlook and the higher form of purposefulness—convictions).²

In Platonov's opinion, general psychology differs from social psychology precisely by the selection of such substructures as an object for analysis. General psychology concentrates on the first three substructures, and social psychology analyses primarily the fourth substructure. The social determination of the personality, presented in this outline on the level of the fourth substructure in particular, is the subject of research *only* for social psychology. In such an outline in general psychology, the *psychology of the individual* is simply absent.

A principally different approach was proposed by Alexei Leontiev. He formulated certain general premises for the consideration of the individual in psychology. The essence of his premises lies in the consideration of the individual in an inseverable connection with activities. His main idea is that the "personality of man is in no way existing prior with

¹ See: I.S. Kon, *Sociology of the Personality*, p. 7.

² See: *Social Psychology*, Ed. by G.P. Predvechny and Y.A. Sherkovin, Moscow, 1975, pp. 39-40 (in Russian).

respect to his activities, nor is his consciousness; the personality is *generated* by activities.”¹ Therefore, the key to the scientific concept of the individual can only be found through investigating the process of the *generation and transformation of man's personality in his activities*. In such a context the personality acts as the *condition* of activities on the one hand, and *its product* on the other. Such an interpretation also provides a basis for the structure of the personality: if the relations of the collateral subordination of the types of human activities form the basis of the personality, then the hierarchy of these activities is the basis for the exposure of this structure. But since the existence of a motive is a sign of activities, the hierarchy of the individual's motives and also the hierarchy of the demands corresponding to them underlie the hierarchy of activities.

Two groups of determinants—the biological and the social—do not act as equal factors here. On the contrary, the idea arises that the individual exists from the very beginning in the system of social connections and that there is no biologically determined personality on which social connections are subsequently “superimposed”. Although there is no formal enumeration of the structural elements of the personality in this outline, such a structure, in essence, represents a structure of characteristics developed from the characteristics of activities. The idea of social determination is realised very consistently here.

What possibilities exist for social psychology in this sphere? In Boris Parygin's works², the specifics of socio-psychological research of the individual are contained in the model of the personality which proposes a union of the sociological and general psychological approaches. The sociological approach is characterised by the consideration of the individual primarily as the object of social relations, and the general psychological approach is characterised by the accent made only “on the universal mechanisms of the individual's mental activity”. This line of reasoning would be correct were the discussion concerned only with such systems of sociological and psychological knowledge where the aforementioned one-sided accents are present. This assertion does not in any way pertain to Marxist sociology or the Soviet school of psychology.

¹ A.N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, Moscow, 1975, p. 173 (in Russian).

² See: B.D. Parygin, *Fundamentals of Socio-Psychological Theory*, p. 109.

The analysis of the model of the personality which is ostensibly characteristic for general psychology and is limited only by the integration of biosomatic and psycho-physiological parameters of the structure of the personality is particularly objectionable. As has already been noted, the tradition of cultural-historical conditionality of the human mind founded by Lev Vygotsky is diametrically opposed to this assertion. Separate mental processes as well as the personality are considered to be determined by social factors. It cannot be asserted that in the process of the simulation of personalities only the biosomatic and psycho-physiological parameters are taken into account. The personality cannot be understood outside its social characteristics. Therefore the general psychological posing of the problem in *Soviet* general psychology is in no way different from the socio-psychological approach on such a basis.

The definition of the specifics in the socio-psychological approach is sometimes descriptive. The tasks underlying the solution are considered simply on the basis of practical research. The tasks involve the social determination of the individual's personal mental type, the social motivation of the individual's behaviour and activities in various socio-historical and socio-psychological conditions, the individual's class, national and professional peculiarities, the rules of the formation and manifestation of the individual's social activeness, the ways and means for increasing this activeness, the individual's self-education and the rules governing the formation of mental type in the new communist society. Each of these tasks is very important in itself, but the proposed list does not provide an answer to the question of the specifics in the socio-psychological investigation of the personality.

The appeal to investigate the individual in the process of his communication with other individuals has not been answered in social psychology either, although such an argument is sometimes voiced. It must be rejected in principle because the research of the individual in the communicative process is given precedence in general psychology. In contemporary *general* psychology the idea of communications as a problem in the framework of this science is rather persistently presented.¹

The specific socio-psychological approach to the investigation of the individual must be defined as follows: first, depending

¹ See: B.F. Lomov, *Methodological and Theoretical Problems of Social Psychology*, pp. 244, 248.

on the interpretation of the subject-matter of social psychology and second, on a definite interpretation of the individual in general psychology. If we begin with the definition of the subject-matter of social psychology we provided at the beginning of the book (as a science studying the rules of people's behaviour and activities, determined by their inclusion in actual social groups, and also the psychological characteristics of these groups), and also with the concept of the individual proposed by Alexei Leontiev, then we can answer the given question. Social psychology uses the definition of the individual which general psychology provides, explaining *in what form*, i.e. primarily *in which specific groups* the individual, on the one hand, *assimilates* social influences (through what system of his activities), and, on the other hand, in what way and in what specific groups he *realises* his own social essence (through what specific types of joint activities).

The distinction of such an approach from the *sociological* approach does not lie in the way socio-typical traits are presented in the individual, which is unimportant to social psychology, but in that it reveals how these socio-typical traits have been formed, why in some conditions of the individual's formation they are manifested completely, while in others different socio-typical traits have appeared despite the individual's membership of a definite social group. The accent here is placed on the microenvironment of the personality to a larger extent than in the sociological analysis, although this does not exclude the investigation of the macroenvironment it formed in. Such regulators of behaviour and activities as the entire system of interpersonal relations, in which the emotional regulation is studied alongside the work-mediation of interpersonal relations, are taken into account in social psychology to a larger degree than in the sociological approach.

This approach is different from the *general psychological* approach in the fact that social psychology examines the behaviour and activities of "the socially determined personality" *in specific real social groups*, the contribution of each individual to the activities of the group and the reasons that influence the size of this contribution to the general activities. More precisely, two groups of such reasons are studied: the reasons rooted in the character and level of development of those groups the individual acts in, and the reasons found in the individual himself.

The main orientation in the study of the individual for

social psychology can be considered the *relations of the personality with the group* (not simply the individual in the group, but the result received from the relations of the personality with a specific group).

The problematics of the personality in social psychology can be formulated on the basis of such distinctions between the socio-psychological approach and the sociological and the general psychological.

The main point in this approach is the exposure of those regularities to which the behaviour and activities of the individual included in a definite social group are subject. But these problems should not be seen as a separate "independent" block of research conducted outside the investigation of the group. Therefore, all the problems that were solved for the group and, on the other hand, from the side of the individual, and not the group, need to be examined for the solution of this task. This will then be, for instance, a problem of leadership, but with a certain nuance connected with the personality characteristics of leadership as a group phenomenon; or the problem of the individual's motivation when participating in collective activities (where the regularities of this motivation will be studied in connection with the type of joint activities and the level of group development); or the problem of attraction presently examined from the point of view of characterising certain traits of the individual's emotional sphere, taking on a particular shape in the perception of another person. In brief, these specifics in the socio-psychological examination of the problems of the individual are *the other side* of the examination of group problems.

There is, at the same time, still another group of special problems which are to a lesser degree involved in the analysis of groups and which also pertain to "the social psychology of the personality". If the main focus of the analysis of the personality in social psychology is its interactions in the group, then an explanation is first of all needed concerning the groups through which society influences the individual. The specific life of the individual and those sections of the micro- and macroenvironment his development takes place in must be studied for this explanation: in traditional socio-psychological terms, this is the problem of *socialisation*.

The way the individual acts in the conditions of active communication with others in those real situations and groups where his vital activities take place is another socio-psychological problem connected with the study of the individual.

In the traditional language of social psychology, this problem can be signified as the *problem of social orientation*. It also has a logical place in the general scheme of notions current in social psychology on the interactions of the individual and the group.

There is no reason to think that the singling out of such problems is effected only on the basis of speculations. There is also an appeal to the practice of experimental investigations in addition to the attempt to formulate a general logical approach. In both areas the largest amount of research has been carried out by social psychologists. This does not mean, however, that new sides in the problem of the individual cannot come to light in the future development of social psychology under the widening sphere of its theoretical searches and experimental practices. The need for a special analysis of the so-called socio-psychological qualities of the personality (appearing in communication, for example) is emphasised more and more often. If, however, we follow the definite logic in the construction of a system of socio-psychological knowledge, then the problems of socialisation and social orientation must be acknowledged as both "legitimate" and the most urgent in the study of the individual.

Of course, the "legitimacy" of these problems can be proved only under the condition that the corresponding problems will be treated in sociology and general psychology. In this case social psychology will involve questions not characteristic to its nature and will treat its own questions in more detail in order to make a contribution to the complex investigation of the individual.

SOCIALISATION

The term "socialisation" is not interpreted in the same way by various representatives of the psychological sciences, though it is widely current. In Soviet social psychology there are two additional terms which can be considered as synonyms for the word "socialisation": "development of the personality" and "education". What is more, sometimes the concept of socialisation evokes a rather critical attitude connected not only with the use of the term but with the essence of the matter as well. This critical attitude exists among sociologists and psychologists alike. The grounds for this criticism sometimes vary and sometimes coincide. Without resorting to a precise definition of socialisation for the time being, let us say that the intuitively guessed content of this concept consists in the process in the "individual's entering into the social environment", "his assimilation of social influences", "his joining in the system of social connections", etc.

One of the objections is usually formed on the basis of such an interpretation. If the individual cannot exist outside the system of social connections, if it is socially determined from the very beginning, then what is the sense in referring to his "entering" into the system of social connections? Will it not be a repetition of an old mistake in social psychology if it is asserted that a newborn human being is still not a human being and that he still must go through the process of "humanisation"? Do not the concepts of socialisation and humanisation coincide? The whole tradition of the Soviet school of social psychology is opposed to such a notion. A.S. Vygotsky insisted that a newborn child is already fixed as an element of a definite culture, definite social

relations, etc. Therefore socialisation can in no way be identified with humanisation.

Another objection concerns the degree to which the term "socialisation" is connected with the tradition of psychoanalysis, which left a definite imprint on the interpretation of the process itself. Some authors are of the opinion that this process cannot be examined in general in the framework of another conceptual outline.

Finally, the possibility of a precise isolation of the concept of socialisation from other concepts broadly applied in psychological and pedagogical literature (the "development of the personality" and "education") evokes some doubt. The idea of the development of the personality is one of the key ideas of Soviet psychology. What is more, recognition of the individual as the subject of social activities provides a special methodological significance to the idea of the development of the personality: a developing child becomes such a subject, meaning his process of development is senseless outside his social development, and outside his assimilation of the system of social connections, relations and his inclusion in these. The terms "development of the personality" and "socialisation" seem to coincide in this instance. If the process of the development of the personality is thought of as the active interaction of the personality with the social environment, then *each* of the elements in this interaction should be considered and a closer attention paid to one side of interaction does not spell its absolutisation or an underestimation of the other component. The authentically scientific interpretation of socialisation does not in any way lessen the problem of the development of the personality but, on the contrary, presumes that the individual is a developing, active social subject.

The question of correlating the concepts of "socialisation" and "education" is more complicated. The term "education" is used in Soviet psychological literature in two meanings—the narrow and the broad sense of the word. In the narrow sense of the word, the term "education" signifies the process of goal-oriented influence on a person from the side of the subject of the educational process with the purpose of transferring to him a definite system of notions, concepts, norms, etc. The emphasis here is placed on the goal-oriented, planned character of the process of influence. A special institute or a person is picked for the realisation of the above-mentioned purpose as the subject of influence. In the broad sense of the word, "education" is understood as the influence on the person

by the whole system of social connections, his assimilation of social experience, etc. The subject of the educational process in this case can be the whole society and, as is often said in everyday speech, the "whole life". If we use the term "education" in the narrow sense of the word, then socialisation differs in meaning from the process designated by the term "education". If this concept is applied in the broad sense of the word, then the difference is eliminated. Now a precise definition can be worded: Socialisation is a *two-sided* process, including, on one side, the individual's understanding of social experience through his entering into a social environment, a system of social connections, and on the other side (which is often insufficiently emphasised in research), a process of the individual's *active production of the system of social connections* by his vigorous activities and an active inclusion in the social environment.

The first side of the process of socialisation—the acquiring of social experience—is the characteristics of the way the environment acts on a person. The second side characterises the moment of the person's influence on the environment through his activities. The activeness of the individual is presumed here because each impact on the system of social connections and relations demands the adoption of a definite solution and, consequently, includes the process of goal formation, the process of mobilisation of the subject and the process of the construction of a definite strategy of activities. Therefore, such a concept of the process of socialisation is not opposed to the process of the individual's development, but simply permits the division of various points of view on the problem. If the interest of age-group psychology tends more towards the problem "from the side of the individual", then social psychology is more concerned with the problem "from the side of the individual's interaction with the environment".

If we begin with thesis of general psychology, that the personality develops rather than being present at birth, then it is clear that the process of socialisation, by its content, is a process of the formation of the personality beginning with the first minute of a person's life. In social psychology, there are usually three spheres in which the formation of the individual is realised: activities, communication and self-awareness. Each of these three spheres must be examined separately. The process of *expanding, increasing* the social connections of the individual with the outside world can serve to characterise all the three spheres.

With regard to *activities*, the expansion of the "catalogue" of activities takes place during the process of socialisation,¹ meaning the development of ever new types of activities. Two extremely important processes take place here: first, an orientation in the system of connections existing within each type of activity and between its various types. Alexei Leontiev noted that this orientation in the system of activity connections is realised through personal meanings, i.e. it signifies the exposure of significant aspects of activities for each individual, and not simply a clarification of these but their assimilation. The product of such an orientation could have been called the personal choice of activities. The second process develops as a result of this—a definite centering occurs around the main, chosen activity; attention is concentrated on it and all the rest activities are subordinated to this main one. If the essence of these transformations in the system of activities of a developing individual is briefly expressed, this process can be said to be the expansion of the individual's possibilities as the subject of activities. This general theoretical outline serves as the basis for experimental investigation of the problem. The latter as a rule is carried out at the interface between social and developmental (age-group) psychology. The question studied in these sciences for different age groups concern the individual's mechanism of orientation in the system of activities and the motivation of the choice serving as a basis for the centring of activities. From a purely psychological point of view, the examination of the processes of goal formation is especially important in such investigations. Unfortunately, these problematics traditionally pertaining to general psychology, have yet to be treated in its socio-psychological aspects, although the orientation of the individual in its given system of immediate connections, as well as in the system of personal meanings cannot be described outside the context of those social "units" (social groups) in which human activities are organised.

The second sphere, *communication*, is examined in the context of socialisation, also from the side of its expansion. From a purely theoretical point of view, such an expansion of the sphere of communication is taken for granted, since communication is inseverably connected with activities. However, this general statement is insufficient and the task of

¹ See: A.N. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, p. 188.

experimental investigations is to show, first, how and under what circumstances this increase in the connections of communication is realised, and, secondly, what the personality gains from this process. Investigations of this plane also carry the traits of interdisciplinary research, since they are equally significant for developmental and social psychology. Certain stages of ontogenesis (preschool age and adolescence) are examined in detail from this point of view. With regard to other stages of human life, the nearly complete absence of research in this area is explained by the controversial character of another problem of socialisation, the problem of its stages. We will treat this question below.

The third sphere in the development of the individual is the development of his *self-awareness*. In the most general form it can be said that the process of socialisation signifies the formation of a "self-image" in a person. In many experimental investigations, including longitudinal, it is established that the "self-image" does not emerge in a person at once, but forms over the entire course of his life under numerous social impacts. From the point of view of social psychology, it is particularly interesting to explain here the way the inclusion of a person in different social groups determines this process. Does the fact that the quantity of groups can vary extremely greatly play a significant role, meaning that the quantity of connections in communication also varies? Or does such variable as the quantity of groups have no significance, making the main factor the *quality* of the groups (from the point of view of the content of their activities and the level of their development)? How does the level of development of the person's self-awareness determine his behaviour and activities (including in groups)? These are the questions which must be answered in the investigation of the socialisation process.

Unfortunately, there are many contradictory views namely in this sphere. This is connected with the many different concepts of the personality which have already been mentioned. First of all, the very definition of the "self-image" depends on the conception of the personality adopted by the author. According to Alexei Leontiev, the whole question depends on what makes up the "self-image". In Soviet social psychology, there are several different approaches to the structure of "self". One was proposed by Volf Merlin who divided the structure of self-awareness into four components: consciousness of identity (the distinction of oneself from the rest of the world),

the consciousness of "self" as an active essence, a subject of activities; the consciousness of one's own mental properties; a socio-moral self-evaluation. The latter forms on the basis of accumulated experience in communication and activities.¹ There are other concepts of the structure of a person's self-awareness, too. However, all authors agree that self-awareness must not be considered as a simple list of characteristics, but rather as the individual's concept of himself as a certain integral whole. It is only within this integral whole that we can talk about the existence of some structural elements. The development of self-awareness in the course of socialisation is a process controlled and defined through the individuals constant assimilation of social experience in the conditions of an increase in the scope of his activities and communication. Although self-awareness pertains to the deepest, most intimate characteristics of human personality, its development does not make sense outside of activities. Only in activities is the definite "correction" of one's notions about oneself constantly realised in conformity with the notions others have formed. "Self-awareness not based on actual activities, leaving it 'outside', inescapably finds itself in a fog, turning into an 'empty' concept."²

Hence the process of socialisation can only be understood as the unity of the three designated spheres. Taken as a whole, they create an "expanding reality" for the individual in which he acts, perceives and communicates, mastering not only the nearest microenvironment but the entire system of social relations as well. As he masters them, the individual simultaneously introduces his own experience into them. There is no other form of the mastering of realities besides their active transformation. This general principled proposition of Soviet psychology signifies the need for social psychology to reveal that specific "alloy" which occurs on each stage of socialisation between two sides of this process, the assimilation of social experience and its reproduction. This task can be solved only through the determination of the stages of socialisation, and also the institutes organising these processes.

The question of stages in the process of socialisation has

¹ See: V.S. Merlin, "Problems of the Experimental Psychology of the Personality", in: *Academic Papers of the Perm Pedagogical Institute*, Vol. 77, Perm, 1970 (in Russian).

² I.S. Kon, *Sociology of the Personality*, p. 78. See also, I.S. Kon, "The Self as a Historical-Cultural and Ethnopsychological Phenomenon", in: *Directions in Soviet Social Psychology*, Ed. by L. Strickland, Springer-Verlag, 1924.

its own history in the system of psychological knowledge. Because the questions of socialisation were examined in more detail in the system of Freudianism, the tradition in studying the stages of socialisation formed also in this direction. In the psychoanalytical point of view the period of early childhood is of special significance in the development of the personality. This view has led to a rather strict establishment of the stages of socialisation. In the system of psychoanalysis socialisation is seen as a process coinciding chronologically with the period of early childhood. According to orthodox psychoanalytical tradition in social psychology, the experimental investigation of socialisation at this level is considered beneficial even today. On the other hand, the time limits of the socialisation process were somewhat extended quite a long time ago in unorthodox psychoanalytical works. Experimental works based on the same theoretical principle appeared, investigating socialisation in the period of adolescence and even youth. Other schools of psychology, not based on Freudianism, place a special accent today on the study of socialisation particularly in the period of youth. Thus, the "spread" of socialisation to the periods of childhood, adolescence and youth can be considered generally accepted.

There is, however, a very heated discussion concerning the subsequent stages of socialisation. It involves the fundamental question of whether or not such an assimilation of social experience, which forms a significant part of the content of socialisation, takes place at a mature age. In Soviet social psychology there is a definite stand on this question, although it cannot be considered to be shared by all researchers. It is based on both the general principle of activities and on the realisation of this principle in socio-psychological knowledge. Because the very concept of socialisation presumes an assimilation of social experience primarily in the course of labour activities, the relation of the stages of socialisation to labour activities serves as a basis for their classification. If this principle is adopted, three basic stages can be established: pre-labour, labour and post-labour.

The *pre-labour stage* of socialisation includes the entire period before the start of labour activities. This stage is divided into two more or less independent periods: a) early socialisation, encompassing the time from a child's birth to his school days, meaning the period developmental psychology calls the period of childhood; b) the stage of learning, including the whole period of youth in the broad sense of the word. All of

one's learning in school unconditionally pertains to this period. There are various points of view concerning the period of learning at an institute or technical school. If the relation to labour activities is adopted as the criterion for the establishment of the stage of socialisation, then learning at an institute, technical school, etc., cannot be related to the next stage. On the other hand, the specifics of learning in such educational establishments are quite significant in comparison with secondary school, and as a result, it is difficult to consider this period of a person's life in the same outline as the period of learning at school. This question is interpreted in two ways in literature. The problem itself is extremely complicated in both the theoretical and practical plan: the student body is one of the important social groups in society and the problems of socialisation in this group are extremely vital.

The *labour stage* of socialisation encompasses the period of a person's maturity, although the demographic borders of "mature" age are conditional. Defining this stage is not difficult as it is the whole period of labour activities. Some researchers assert that socialisation continues in the period of labour activities, while other hold that it ends with the completion of education, with the end of youth. Moreover, the accent placed on the second side of the socialisation process, namely, on that during his labour activities a person not only assimilates but also reproduces social experience, renders this period a special importance. The borders of the socialisation process established in the system of psychoanalysis serve as a well-known obstacle for the reexamination of the framework of this process in other systems of psychology. On the theoretical plane, the establishment of the labour stage of socialisation logically follows the recognition of the leading role of labour activities for the development of a personality. It is difficult to agree with the idea that work as the condition for the manifestation of the essential forces puts an end to the assimilation of social experience. It is even more difficult to acknowledge that the reproduction of social experience ends at the stage of labour activities. If we approach this problem from the point of view of the personality's formation, this will not add up the arguments in favour of the restriction of the chronological borders of socialisation to the period of youth. Of course, youth is the most important time in the formation of the personality, but labour at an adult age cannot be underestimated in the analysis of the factors of socialisation.

Another problem lies in the near absence of a tradition

of theoretical and experimental research in this period. But this is not the first of such situations social psychology has confronted in reconstructing its whole system of knowledge along new methodological principles. It is difficult to overestimate the practical importance of the question under discussion: the inclusion of the labour stage of the personality's development in the "orbit" of the problems of socialisation acquires special significance for all institutions in the system of education.

The *post-work stage* of socialisation represents yet another highly controversial issue. This stage is even newer in comparison to the problem of socialisation at the labour stage, while can serve as a definite excuse for the dispute. The posing of this problem has been evoked by those objective needs of society towards social psychology which are generated by the very course of social evolution. The problems of the elderly age becoming very real for a number of sciences in contemporary society. These problems are especially significant for socialist society. The increase of life expectancy, on the one hand, and the definite social policies of the state, on the other (meaning the system of maintenance in old age), has placed emphasis on the position of the elderly in the entire structure of the population. Most of all the share of elderly people in society is increasing. The labour potential of retirees is also growing. The boom in the disciplines of gerontology and geriatrics is not accidental, and it is no coincidence that developmental psychology is also drawn, although cautiously, to these problematics. In social psychology this problem is formulated as that of the post-labour stage of socialisation. Basic arguments in the current discussion are diametrically opposite. According to one of them, the very concept of socialisation is senseless in application to that period of a person's life when all his social functions shrink and are discontinued. From this point of view, in reference to the demonstrated period, the terms "assimilation of social experience" and its "reproduction" in general cannot be applied. The very same insurmountable difficulties occur in the attempts to interpret the post-labour period in a person's life as a period of the development of the personality. The idea of "desocialisation" which follows the completion of the process of socialisation is an extreme expression of this point of view. Another view proposes a completely new concept of the psychological essence of elderly age. Quite a large number of experimental investigations have proved that the social activeness of elderly people can be preserved. From the point of view of this proposition, which describes the socialisation process in social

psychology, elderliness is considered as an age which makes an essential contribution to the reproduction of social experience. However, the question of the changes in the type of the individual's activeness in this period is inevitably posed.

Although this question has not received a monosemantic answer, various ways of utilising the elderly's activeness are proposed in practical work. This already speaks in favour of the idea that the problem has at least the right to be discussed.

The singling out of the stages of socialisation from the angle of their relation to labour activities is of great importance for social psychology. The type of social groups the individual enters into in the social environment is also important in the development of the personality, both from the point of view of the content of their activities and their level of development. As we have seen, the high level of group development, the collective, determines the content of these processes, which combine to form the life activities of the group, in a new way. The question is still to be explained of whether or not the fact that the personality was mostly included in the groups of a higher level of development has an essential significance for the type of socialisation and its results. If we turn to such a problem as a conflict, then does the type of conflict the individual is faced with have significance for his personality? What kind of influence on the personality can the individual's functioning in immature groups with a high level of interpersonal conflicts exert? What forms of his social activeness are stimulated by his prolonged stay in groups with a strongly expressed mediation of interpersonal relations by activity and with a rich experience in the construction of the cooperative type of interaction under the conditions of joint activities and, on the contrary, with a very low grade of these parameters?

This set of problems currently has not been investigated in experimental research, and not developed in theoretical terms. Research in this area which would include those new theoretical and experimental approaches, which were developed in the treatment of the problem of the collective, is especially promising. This connection comes into the lime light when examining the problem of the institutes of socialisation.

Society's influence on the individual at all stages of its development is realised either directly, or through the group, but according to Jean Piaget, the set of the means of influence can be reduced to norms, values and signs. The legitimacy of this group can, of course, be disputed, since norms, values and signs do not belong to the same category: both norms and values

can be communicated and, hence, assimilated, only through signs or a system of signs. Therefore, it would be more correct to say that society and the group transmit a system of norms and values to the developing personality *by means of signs*. Those specific groups in which the individual is drawn into the system of norms and values and which emerge as unique translators of social experience are called the *institutes of socialisation*.

Such institutes of the pre-labour stage of social development are: in the period of early childhood—the *family and preschool children's institutions*, which play an increasingly larger role in contemporary, especially socialist, societies. The view of the family as the most important institute of socialisation has a rather long-standing tradition in social psychology. As regards preschool children's institutions, they have yet to be considered by this scientific discipline. "Justification" for this can be found in the assertion that social psychology is involved with groups where the developed personality functions and therefore the whole area of groups connected with the *development of the personality* simply falls outside the scope of the analysis. The legitimacy of such a solution is a much-debated topic, but it must be noted that more and more often the idea is expressed either of the inclusion of *developmental social psychology* as a section into social psychology, or the creation of an independent branch of research. Until this time, preschool children's institutions have only been an object of investigation in developmental psychology, while the specific socio-psychological aspects were not touched upon. The practical necessity of the analysis by social psychology of those systems of relations which emerge in preschool institutions is quite obvious. Unfortunately, there are no such longitudinal investigations which would show the dependence of the personality's formation on the type of social institutes included in the process of socialisation in early childhood.

School is the basic institute in the second period of the early stage of socialisation. In addition to developmental and pedagogical psychology, social psychology also demonstrates a great interest in this object of research. However, investigations connected with school have long ago been differentiated in these two adjoining areas, to say nothing of pedagogics, meaning that they pertain to junior schoolchildren, adolescents and senior age pupils, whereas such distinctions are not found in social psychology. Therefore, at best, there is a "random selection" of age groups. At the same time, the senior schoolchildren,

those in the period of life closely connected with youth, present a special interest for a social psychologist. This is a very important period in the formation of the personality from the point of view of socialisation. Igor Kon called this period the period of "role moratorium" of the personality, because it is connected with the constant option, in the broadest sense of the word: profession, partner in marriage, system of values, etc.¹ On the theoretical plane, the personality's activeness can be determined in various ways, but in experimental research, it is often studied through the analysis of the methods applied in decision-making. From this point of view, youth is a fine natural laboratory for a social psychologist, being the most intensive period of the adoption of vital decisions. The research of the extent to which such an institute of socialisation as school ensures, improves or teaches the adoption of such decisions is of fundamental importance for social psychology. The whole complex of school problems, traditionally studied in pedagogy, more and more often comes up against a deficit of socio-psychological knowledge. The question of the "social psychology of the school" seems to be extremely pressing.

The inclusion of the period of an instruction at institute of higher learning in the second stage of socialisation is a question which must also be answered. Research into institutes of higher learning has not yet been performed in this context up to this day, although the problematics itself of the student body occupies an increasingly significant place in the system of various social sciences.

The *work collective* is the most important institute among the institutes of socialisation at the labour stage. The overwhelming majority of investigations carried out in social psychology are based precisely on the material of work collectives, although it must be acknowledged that the exposure of their role as institutes of socialisation is still insufficient. Of course, any investigation of a work collective can be interpreted on this plane. Actually, each analysis of, for example, the style of leadership or group decision-making characterises some sides of the work collective as an institute of socialisation. However, not all aspects of this problem are elucidated here. The theoretical positing of the question of the reference group in social psychology is filled with a new content if it is considered in the context of the institutes of socialisation, their strong and weak points, and their potential in effecting the transfer of socially positive experience.

¹ See: I.S. Kon, *Sociology of the Personality*, p. 166.

The question of the institutes of the post-labour stage of socialisation is as controversial as the question of its existence. Various social organisations whose membership consists primarily of pensioners can be regarded as such institutes merely on the basis of everyday observation, but this is insufficient.

Of course, each of the institutes of socialisation considered above possesses a whole set of other functions, and their activity is not to be reduced to that of transferring social experience alone. The examination of these institutes in the context of socialisation only signifies a unique "extract" from the entire aggregate of social tasks they are carrying out.

A product of socialisation called the "effects of socialisation" meaning the psychological phenomena which testify to the degree and measure of socialisation, is sometimes spoken of in the investigation of this process in social psychology. The list of these effects is quite varied. Boris Ananiev considered the formation of social sets, complicated phenomena of activity motivation, the formation of definite character traits, including socially typical and nationally typical, effects of socialisation. Although the characteristics of such a list again depend on the concept of the personality, its signs and essential traits, the very posing of the problem gives precedence to an aspect which is very important for social psychology—that which includes not only the microenvironment of the personality's formation but also the large social groups, in which its vital activities take place in the socialisation process.

It was established in the analysis of large groups that the psychology of such a group fixes the socio-typical and that it is presented in varying degrees in the psychology of separate personalities making up the group. The level of representation in the individual psychology of the socio-typical must be explained, the process of socialisation permitting the search for such an explanation. The group in which the process of socialisation is realised under the conditions of a large group is important for the personality. The very institute of socialisation realising its influence on the individual seemingly confronts the system of impacts which is brought about by the large social group, in particular through its traditions, customs, habits and way of life. The concrete result of socialisation depends on the balance that is bound to emerge from the interaction of the systems of such influences. Therefore, the problem of socialisation in future investigations must appear as a unique link in the study of the correlating role of small and large groups in the development of the personality.

SOCIAL ORIENTATION

In social psychology the problem of social orientation (attitude) holds the most important position in personality studies. While the process of socialisation explains the way the personality assimilates social experience and his active reproduction of this experience, the formation of social orientations answers the question of how this acquired social experience is interpreted by the individual, and also how it is specifically manifested in actions. Only under the condition that this mechanism is studied, can the question be solved as to what specifically regulates a person's behaviour and activities. The needs and motives which compel the individual to enter into activities must be analysed first of all in order to understand what precedes the development of real actions. In the general theory of the personality, the correlation of the needs and motives for the understanding of the mechanism inducing one to act is considered. However, what determines the choice of motive remains unclarified. This question has two aspects: *why* do people in definite situations act in one way or another, and what compels them to opt for the *given* motive? The concept of *social orientation* (attitude) to a definite degree explains the choice of motive. It is widely applied in everyday practice to make "prognoses" on the behaviour of an individual: "Of course, N. won't go to that concert, since he has a prejudice against variety shows"; "I doubt I'll like him: I generally don't like military men", etc. On this everyday level, the concept of social orientation is used somewhat like the concept of "relation". However, the term "orientation" has its own particular meaning in psychology, its own tradition of research, so that the concept of "social orientation" must be correlated with this tradition.

Special attention has been devoted to the problem of set in the school of Dmitri Uznadze. Sometimes the content of the concepts of "set" and "social orientation" are considered identical, even more so because the definitions of the content of these two concepts are very similar: "inclination", "sense of purpose", "readiness", etc. At the same time, the sphere of action of the sets, as Uznadze understood them, and the sphere of action of "social orientations" must be precisely defined. Uznadze's definition of sets is as follows: "A set is the entire dynamic state of the subject, the condition of preparedness for a definite activity, a condition brought about by two factors: the need on the part of the subject and the corresponding objective situation."¹ A behaviour set on the satisfaction of a given need in a given situation can be fixed in case of the recurrence of this situation; then a fixed set emerges as distinct from the situational set. At first glance, this would seem to be an attempt to explain the thrust of an individual's actions under definite conditions. However, in a more detailed examination, this posing of the question does not apply in social psychology in general. The proposed concept of the set is not connected with the analysis of social factors which determine the individual's behaviour or with the individual's assimilation of social experience, or with the complex hierarchy of determinants defining the nature of the social situation in which the individual acts. The set in Uznadze's interpretation primarily concerns a person's realisation of the simplest physiological needs. The concept of the set as the unconscious excludes the application of this concept in the study of more complex, higher forms of human activities. This in no way belittles the significance of the examination of the problem on a general psychological level, or the possibilities of developing these ideas with reference to social psychology.² However, we are presently interested in the difference in the principles underlying the approach to the problem by Uznadze's school and by a group of other concepts connected with the treatment of an analogous problem.

Many researchers recognise the existence of special states of the individual preceding his actual behaviour. Vladimir Myasishchev discussed this circle of questions in his conception

¹ D.N. Uznadze, "Experimental Foundations of the Psychology of the Set", in: D.N. Uznadze, *Psychological Investigations*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 150 (in Russian).

² Sh.A. Nadirashvili, *The Concept of the Set in General and Social Psychology*, Tbilisi, 1974 (in Russian).

of a *person's attitudes*. Attitude, understood here "as a system of a person's temporal connections as the personality-subject with reality as a whole or with its separate aspects",¹ precisely explains the purpose of the individual's future behaviour. Attitude is also a unique predisposition of a person to some kinds of objects, which expects to be the person's exposed in real actions. What makes attitude different from the set is the fact that in the former, both the various, including social, objects this relation involves and the most unique, including complex, from a socio-psychological point of view, situations are assumed. The sphere of the individual's actions based on relations is practically unlimited.

In the works of L. I. Bozhovich,² these processes are also analysed in a specific theoretical outline. It was established in the investigation of child personality development that a sense of purpose emerges as an internal stand of the individual with regard to the social surroundings and to separate objects of the social environment. Although these stands may differ in relation to the wide variety of situations and objects, a certain dominating tendency can be fixed in them which permits to prognose behaviour. The individual's *sense of purpose* can in itself be considered as a special predisposition of the individual to act in a definite way, embracing the whole sphere of vital activities, up to the most complex social objects and situations. Such an interpretation of the individual's sense of purpose enables one to view this concept along with that of the social orientation.

Alexei Leontiev's idea of *personalised meaning* can be connected with this concept. In the theory of the personality, when the personalised meaning of the objective significance of the external circumstances of activities is stressed, the question also arises about the direction of expected behaviour (or activities of the individual), corresponding to the personalised meaning which the object of the given individual's activities acquires. A detailed treatment on the place the problem of the set occupies in the theory of activities is not needed here: we shall only attempt to interpret the social orientation in this context as personalised meaning, generated by the relationship between the motive and the goal. Such a posing of the problem does not exempt the concept of the social orientation from

¹ V.N. Myasishchev, *Personality and Neuroses*, Leningrad, p. 150.

² See: L.I. Bozhovich, *Personality and Its Formation in a Child*, Moscow, 1969 (in Russian).

the sphere of general psychology, as well as the concept of "attitude" and "purposefulness" of the individual. On the contrary, all the ideas examined here support the right to existence of the concept of "social orientation" in *general* psychology, placing it alongside the concept of "the set" in the sense rendered to it in the school of Uznadze.

The further explanation of the specifics of the social orientation in the system of *socio-psychological knowledge* can involve a completely different tradition, developing primarily in Western social psychology. The distinctive feature of this line of research consists not only in the fact that it relies on different theoretical and methodological principles, but also in that the question concerned *social* psychology from the very start. In other words, the accents in the explicit structure of research were placed on the problems of socio-psychological knowledge. This research was transformed into an independent area of social psychology which over a long period of time presented one of the best elaborated in Western social psychology.

The history of the research of attitudes can be divided into three periods: 1) from the introduction of this term in 1918 to the Second World War (a characteristic trait of this period is the rapid growth of popularity of the problem and of the volume of research); 2) the 1940s-1950s (a characteristic trait of this period is the decline of research into the given problem in connection with the encountered difficulties and deadlock positions); 3) from the end of the 1950s to the present time (a characteristic trait being the revival of an interest in the problem, and the appearance of a set of new ideas, including the acknowledgement of the crisis condition of research in this area). We must provide certain details of the general picture.

In 1918, William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, studying the adaptation of Polish peasants immigrating from Europe to America, established two kinds of dependence indispensable for a full description of this process: the individual's dependence on the social organisation, and the social organisation's dependence on the individual. This dual dependence was only a modification of the old problem of interaction between the individual and society. Thomas and Znaniecki proposed to denote this dependence by the concepts of "social value" (for characterising social organisation) and "social set"—"attitude" (for characterising the individual). Thus, they introduced the concept of "attitude" into socio-psychological literature for the first time. It was defined as "the individual's

psychological experience of value, significance and point of the social object" or as "the individual's state of awareness in relation to a certain social value". It must be mentioned that the introduction of this concept into social psychology was also based on certain investigations in experimental psychology but nonetheless here it received a new, independent interpretation.

A unique "boom" in the research of the phenomenon of attitude began after its discovery. It seemed as though the solution of many earlier examined problems in social psychology just "waited" for the discovery of this phenomenon. There were many contradictory interpretations of attitude. Gordon Allport counted 17 definitions of this concept, outlining the traits of attitude which were noted by all researchers:

- a) a definite state of consciousness and the nervous system;
- b) expressing preparedness to reaction;
- c) organised;
- d) on the basis of preceding experience;
- e) having a directing and dynamic influence on behaviour.

The dependence of attitude on the preceding experience and its important regulating role in behaviour were established in this way.

At the same time, a group of proposals concerning the perfection of methods for measuring attitude were being investigated, primarily through various scales. It was quickly revealed that the development of the scales rests on the continued lack of a solution to certain content problems pertaining in particular to the structure of attitudes. It was still unclear *what* the scale would measure. Moreover, because all measurements were constructed on the basis of a verbal self-account, a vagueness developed in the separation of the concept of "attitude" from the concept of "opinion", "knowledge", "conviction", and so on. The development of methodological means stimulated the subsequent theoretical search. It was realised in two basic directions—as an exposure of the functions of attitudes and as an analysis of its structure.

It was generally clear that attitude met certain important needs of the subject, but which demands in particular, still had to be established. Four *functions of attitudes* were acknowledged: 1) *adaptive* (sometimes called utilitarian)—the attitude directs the subject to those objects which help it reach its goals; 2) *the function of knowledge*—the attitude provides simplified instructions pertaining to the means of behaviour with regard to a specific object; 3) *the function of expression* (sometimes called the function of value, or self-regulation)—the attitude

acts as the means of freeing the subject from internal tension, the means of self-expression; 4) *the function of defence*—the attitude provides for the solution of the individual's internal conflicts.

Attitude can perform all these functions because it possesses a complex, multi-sided structure. In 1942, Mahbon Brewster Smith introduced the *three-component structure* of attitude which involves: a) the cognitive component (the awareness of the object of social orientation); b) the affective component (the emotional evaluation of the object, the exposure of feelings of sympathy or antipathy towards it); and c) behavioural (connotative) component (the logical behaviour towards the object). The social orientation was then defined as the awareness, evaluation and preparedness to act. The three components have been revealed in numerous experimental investigations, including in those conducted by Carl I. Hovland (the "Yale Studies"). Although they provided interesting results, many of the problems were left unsolved. What the scales measured remained as unclear as before—either the attitude as a whole or one of its components (the impression developed that the majority of scales could only "grasp" the emotional evaluation of the object, i.e. the affective component of attitude). In laboratory experiments, investigations were carried out according to the most simplified outline, exposing the attitude towards one object, so it was unclear whether or not this attitude would be included in the broader social structure of the individual's actions. Finally, another difficulty arose concerning the connection of attitude with actual behaviour. This difficulty was revealed in the well-known experiment of Richard T. LaPiere in 1934.

LaPiere travelled around the US with two Chinese students. They visited 252 hotels, and in all cases (except one) they received a normal service. There was no difference between the service accorded to LaPiere himself and the Chinese students. After the completion of the trip (two years later), LaPiere sent letters to the 251 hotels, asking whether he could again count on their hospitality if he took the same trip with the same two Chinese students. He received answers from 128 of the hotels with only one agreeing. Fifty-two per cent refused and the rest only gave evasive answers. LaPiere interpreted the results as signifying a *discrepancy* between the attitude (relation to people of the Chinese nationality) and the real behaviour of the hotel owners. The conclusion can be made about the existence of a negative attitude from the answers to the letter, while in actual behaviour was not seen, on the

contrary, the behaviour corresponded to a positive attitude.

This conclusion was given the name of "LaPiere's Paradox" and provided the basis for deep skepticism regarding the study of attitude. If real behaviour is not constructed according to attitude, then what is the point in studying the phenomenon? The loss of interest in attitudes was to a significant degree due to the display of this effect.

In subsequent years, different measures have been taken to overcome the difficulties in the study of attitude. On the one hand, technology for measuring attitude has been improved (evoking the opinion that LaPiere's scale was imperfect), and on the other hand, new explanatory hypotheses have been proposed, some of them very interesting. Milton Rokeach, for example, proposed that there are two attitudes in the individual—one towards the object and the other towards the situation. Either one or the other can be "turned on". In LaPiere's experiment, the attitude towards the object (relation to the Chinese), was negative, but the attitude towards the situation "prevailed"—the hotel owner acted according to the accepted norms of service. Daniel Katz and Ezra Stotland came out with an idea that different aspects of attitude are displayed in different situations, either the cognitive or the affective component. There were many other explanations for the results of LaPiere's experiment.

The difficulties of researchers are partly connected with general methodological difficulties presently observed in American social psychology. This is well illustrated by an example from the investigation of attitudes: the problem was studied in detail and the technology for research was well thought out. However, satisfactory explanatory models could not be successfully created. At least two general methodological defects are inherent in the studies of attitude. On the one hand, research is conducted, as a rule, in laboratory conditions. This both simplifies the research situations and isolates them from actual social context. On the other hand, even if the experiments are conducted "in the field", the explanations are nevertheless constructed through an appeal to the microenvironment, isolated from the examined individual's behaviour in a broader social structure. The study of *social orientations* can hardly be productive in such conditions.

The tasks of the contemporary study of social orientations in Soviet social psychology involve the unification of the traditions which formed in relation to the concept of this phenomenon in Soviet general psychology and the positive experimental

material which is found in numerous Western investigations. At the same time, it is necessary to promote, on a new methodological and theoretical basis, such ideas which would permit the surmounting of difficulties met in Western social psychology. The *integrity* of attitude was lost as a result of the attempts to find a progressively more detailed description of its characteristics and structure. Therefore, the first task involves the return to the interpretation of the social orientation as an integral formation and the understanding of this integrity in the social context. The second task is to demonstrate the influence of the whole aggregate of social conditions on the formation of an attitude and through this overcome the limitations found in traditional investigations.

The attempt to solve these two tasks is contained in the *disposition conception of the regulation of the individual's social behaviour* developed by Vladimir Yadov.¹ The basic idea of this conception is that a person possesses a complex system of various dispositional formations, which regulate his behaviour and activities. These dispositions are hierarchically organised, i.e. its higher and lower levels can be distinguished. The definition of these levels of the dispositional regulation of the individual's social behaviour is realised on the basis of Dmitri Uznadze's outline in which a set always arises in the presence of a definite need, on the one hand, and in the situation of the satisfaction of this need on the other. However, the sets studied by Uznadze occurred only when "meeting" elementary human needs and in the rather simple situations of their satisfaction.

Yadov proposed that on other levels of needs and in more complex, including social, situations other disposition formations take effect, which occur every time when "meeting" a definite level of needs and a definite level of situations of these needs, satisfaction. In order to map out a general outline of all these dispositions, it is necessary to describe, if only conditionally, the hierarchy of needs and the hierarchy of situations in which the person can participate. In the given instance, needs are classified on a single basis—from the point of view of the individual's inclusion in various *spheres* of social activities. The *hierarchy of needs* reflects the hierarchy of these activities. Basing on Marx's idea that the process of the satisfaction of needs is in essence appropriation by the individual of one form of activities or another, Yadov established the hier-

¹ See: *Self-Regulation and Prognosis of the Individual's Social Behaviour*, Ed. by V.A. Yadov, Leningrad, 1979 (in Russian).

archy of the forms of activities on the basis of the extension of the borders of the individual's activeness. The closest family surroundings are the first sphere where the needs of the person are realised. The next sphere is the contact (small) group where the individual directly acts. Further there is a broader environment of activities connected with a definite sphere of work, leisure and everyday life in general; and at last, the surroundings of labour activities understood as a definite social-class structure in which the individual is included through the assimilation of the ideological and cultural values of society. Therefore, there are four levels of needs corresponding to the spheres of activities in which they are fulfilled.

An extremely conditional *hierarchy of situations*, structured according to the length of time in which the basic quality of the given conditions is preserved, was also proposed. In such an instance the object-related situations, quickly changing and relatively short-term, are the lowest situational level. The next situational level are the situations of group activities typical of the activity of the individual in the framework of the small group. The more stable activity conditions take place in the spheres of work (taking place in the framework of a profession, industry, etc.), leisure, and everyday life. These conditions of activities determine a third situational level. The fourth level embraces the most prolonged, stable conditions of activities, characteristic of the broadest sphere of the individual's vital activity in a definite type of society and the economic, political and ideological structure of its functioning. Therefore, the situational structure the individual acts within can also be portrayed by characterising its four levels.

The corresponding disposition occurs at the border of each level of needs and the situations of their satisfaction. Yadov defined four levels of dispositions: 1) *the first level* forms the elementary, fixed orientations as they were understood by Uz-nadze. They emerge on the basis of vital demands and in the simplest of situations (in the conditions of family surroundings and in the lowest "object-related situations"). This level of dispositions can be considered as the set. 2) *The second level* contains the more complicated dispositions which emerge on the basis of the individual's needs in communication, realised in the small group and correspondingly in those situations which are determined by the given group's activities. Here the regulative role of the disposition lies in the individual's development of definite relations with those social objects which are included

in activities on their given level. Such dispositions correspond to *attitude* which, in comparison with the elementary fixed set, has a complex, three-component structure containing the cognitive, effective and behavioural components. 3) *The third level* corresponds to those dispositions which reflect the general thrust of the individual's interests in the specific sphere of social activeness (in specific type of work or leisure, etc.). These are *base social orientations* which are not so much an expression of the relation to a separate social object as to more significant social areas. Just as with attitude, base social orientations have a three-component structure. 4) *The fourth, highest level* of dispositions forms a *system of value orientations of the individual*. These value orientations are also a variety of dispositional formations but they differ from the preceding levels of dispositions by their regulation of the individual's behaviour and activities in the most significant situations of his social activeness. The individual's attitude to the goals of vital activities is expressed in the system of value orientations, as well as his relation to the means of fulfilling these goals, i.e. to the "circumstances" of their fulfilment which can be determined only by the general social conditions, the type of society and its system of economic, political and ideological principles.

The proposed hierarchy of dispositional formations acts as a regulative system with regard to the individual's behaviour. Each level of disposition can be correlated with the regulation of different types of activities: the first level signifies the regulation of direct reactions of the subject to the actual object-related situation; the second regulates the acts of the individual occurring in usual situations; the third regulates certain system of acts or that which can be referred to as behaviour (of course, not in a behaviourist sense); and finally, the fourth level regulates the integrity of behaviour, or the individual's particular activity. "Goal orientation at this high level represents a certain 'life plan'. The individual life goals connected with the main social spheres of an individual's activities in the area of work, knowledge, and family and social life are the most important element of this plan."¹

The elaboration of the given conception permits an approach to all the problems of attitudes from principally new positions. It includes a social orientation in the broader context and

¹ V.A. Yadov, *On the Dispositional Regulation of the Individual's Social Behaviour*, Moscow, 1975, p. 98. See also: *Self-Regulation and Prognosis of the Individual's Social Behaviour*.

accords it a defined, important but limited position in the regulation of the whole system of the individual's activities. The predisposition of an individual or his preparedness to act in one and not another way can be understood through attitude in specific spheres of communication, in rather simple situations of everyday behaviour. However, for more complicated situations, implying findings solutions to vitally important questions and the formulation of vitally important goals, attitude is not capable of explaining the individual's definite motives of activities. More complicated mechanisms are used here for the regulation of the personality. The personality is considered not only in its "nearest" activities, but as a unit of the broad system of social connections and relations included both in the nearest environment of social interaction and in the whole system of society. Therefore, its activities are regulated by the entire system of social relations. Although definite levels of the dispositional mechanism are included on different levels of these activities, their higher levels—and this is not necessarily immediately obvious—also play their role through complex systems of mediation, in the regulation of social behaviour on lower levels in some way or other.

The fact that the cognitive, affective and behavioural components are manifested in specific forms on the higher levels of the disposition and, more importantly, each one claiming its own, specific share, is also very important. Of course, the affective component plays a significant role in the relatively simple situations requiring action with specific social objects. The highest levels of regulation of the individual's behaviour and activities, where these activities themselves can be understood only on the condition of their comprehension and interpretation in rather complex system of concepts, is a completely different matter. Here the cognitive component of dispositions is predominantly expressed in the formation of the disposition no matter whether they are base social orientations or, in particular, value orientations). The system of an individual's value orientations, which includes the attitude to the basic values of life, such as work, morals and political ideas, cannot be supposed to be constructed primarily on emotional evaluations. Therefore the complexity of the hierarchical system of dispositions permits a new approach to the understanding of the correlation between the three components of dispositional formations.

The results of LaPiere's experiment can be reconsidered from the angle of the proposed concept. The discrepancy between the verbally expressed attitude and the actual behaviour

is explained not only by the fact that "the attitude toward the object" and the "attitude toward the situation" took part in the regulation of behaviour, or by the fact that the cognitive or the affective component of the attitude prevailed, but by deeper reasons as well. Different levels of disposition "work" in each specific situation of behaviour. They can be distinguished by their content, for example, in the situation described by LaPiere, the value orientations of the various hotel owners (as representatives of a definite social layer) could have formed under the influence of the norms of the dominant ideology and included negative attitudes towards people of non-American origin, false stereotypes with regard to Chinese people, etc. This level of disposition also "worked" in the situation of the written answer to the question of whether hospitality would be shown to people of Chinese nationality. At the same time, in the situation of a specific answer concerning their actual visiting a hotel, that level of disposition "worked" which regulates the rather habitual and elementary actions. Therefore there was no contradiction between such an attitude and the actual behaviour of the hotel owners. The discrepancy arose between the disposition of a higher level and the behaviour of another situational level. If there were methods to reveal the character of actual behaviour on the level of principled vital decisions, then perhaps the coincidence of value orientations and actual activities would have also been demonstrated. Of course, this is only a hypothesis. In reality, such a continuation of the experiment did not take place. However, the possibilities of the conception, of dispositional regulation of an individual's behaviour have been verified in other investigations, and in those investigations it demonstrated its great feasibility as an explanatory model in the interpretation of experimental data.

The problem of *changes* in social orientations is one of the main problems in their investigation. Daily observations showed that any of the dispositions a specific subject possesses can change. The degree of their changeability and mobility depends on the level of one disposition or another. The more complicated the social object the individual has a definite disposition towards, the more stable the disposition. If we take attitudes for a relatively low level (in comparison to the value orientations, for instance) of disposition, then the problem of their changing becomes especially urgent. Even if social psychology learns to discern in which instance the individual will demonstrate a discrepancy between attitude and actual behaviour, the prognosis of this real behaviour will still depend on whether

or not the attitude towards one object or another changed in the period of time we are interested in. If the attitude changes, behaviour cannot be forecast till the direction the change of attitude will take is known. The study of the factors which bring about changes in social orientations is becoming a fundamentally important socio-psychological task.

In traditional social psychology, many different models have been introduced to explain the process of changing social orientations. These explanatory models are constructed in correspondence with those principles which are adopted in one investigation or another. Since the majority of the research of attitudes is realised in the area of two theoretical orientations—the behaviourist and the cognitivist, explanations based on the principles of these two trends are widely spread.

In the "Yale Studies" conducted under the direction of Carl I. Hovland, the *principle of teaching* was used as the explanatory principle for the comprehension of the change of attitudes. A person's attitudes change depending on the way various social orientations are supported. Changing the system of reward and punishment can influence and change the social orientation. The explanation of the changes of social orientations through their support is unacceptable in principle from the point of view of the methodological principles of research we have adopted. If each attitude is formed on the basis of previous life experience, social in its content, then a change is possible only on the condition of the "inclusion" of social factors. Support in the behaviourist tradition is not connected with such factors. Subordination of the social orientation by the highest levels of disposition once again proves the need to address the whole system of social factors in the investigation of the problem of attitude changes.

In the cognitivist tradition, the so-called "*theory of conformity*" provides an explanation for change in social orientations (Fritz Heider, Theodore Newcomb, Leon Festinger, Charles Osgood, Percy Tannenbaum). Change in the orientation takes place when a discrepancy arises in the cognitive structure of the individual; for instance, a negative orientation toward some object comes against a positive orientation toward a person who gives a positive characteristic to this object. Discrepancies can arise for various other reasons, too. What is important is that the individual's need in restoring a cognitive conformity (a regulated, unequivocal perception of the external

world) is the stimulus for a change in attitude.¹ This explanatory model also ignores all social determinants of the change of social orientations and is therefore useless.

In order to find an adequate approach to the problem of change in social orientations, the specific socio-psychological content of this concept must be very precisely defined. These specifics involve the fact that the given phenomenon is brought about both by its functioning in the social system and the traits of the actively participating individual included in the complex interweaving of connections with other people. Therefore it is insufficient to bring to light either the aggregate of social changes preceding the change of social orientations and their explanation, or only the changing conditions of the "meeting" of the need with the situation of its fulfilment. The change of the social orientation which the framework of social psychology must be analysed both from the point of view of the content of *objective social changes*, affecting the given level of dispositions, and from the point of view of the *changes of the individual's active position*, taking place not simply "in response" to the situation, but by virtue of changes caused by the individual's development.

The designated demands of analysis can only be met under the condition that the orientation is examined in the context of activities. Until recently, the concept of social orientation did not have a place in the interpretation of the personality from the angle of the principle of activities. Investigations of orientation and of activities ran parallel with each other, as if they were. Such a non-intersecting progress of research was unproductive both in the analysis of general psychological mechanisms of orientation and, even more so, in the analysis of social orientations. If a social orientation arises in a definite sphere of human activities, then its change can be understood through the analysis of the changes in those very activities. The most important change amongst these in the given instance is the change in the correlation between the *motive* and the *goal* of activities, because only in this case can the personalised meaning of activity and hence, the social orientation change for the subject.² Unfortunately, experimental investigations to prove this idea are still not performed, although the idea deserves close attention,

¹ See: *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (A Source Book), Ed. by Perey Tannenbaum, Robert Abelson, Elliot Aronson, William McGuire, Theodore Newcomb, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1969.

² See: A.G. Asmolov, *Activity and Orientation*, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian).

opening up the perspective for prognosing the changes of social orientations corresponding to the analysis of the change in the motive and the goal of activities and the change in the nature of the process of goal orientation.

Of course, this perspective demands the solution to an additional group of questions connected with the problem of social orientation examined in the context of the principle of activities. Only the fulfilment of the entire set of these problems will provide an answer to the question posed at the beginning of the present chapter: what role do social orientations play in the choice of the motive of behaviour? The answer to this question will not only allow to identify changes in the individual's social orientations, but also to ensure their purposeful changes. The importance of this problem can hardly be overestimated on an applied level.

Section Five

**PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY**

Chapter Eighteen

**SPECIAL FEATURES OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY**

Social psychology currently involves very real problems not only in its development but also in the primary needs of daily life. The difference of applied research in social psychology from research conducted in the framework of a "pure" science must be understood in order to analyse the basic potential applications of socio-psychological knowledge.

There are several basic types of research in the system of contemporary scientific studies. One of the classifications is constructed on the basis of such criterion as the connection between the tasks of research and the immediate needs of practical work. All research can be divided into the fundamental and the applied according to this criterion. But this is such a "strong" sign of scientific research that it modifies all the other characteristics of research activities to a significant degree. It is obvious that the general difference between any fundamental and applied investigation is found in the fact that a fundamental study is oriented primarily on the establishment of the laws of development of the studied object, and an applied one is oriented on the establishment of the means of applying to practical work that which was discovered in the fundamental investigations. The question of their correlation is one of the most vital problems in contemporary scientology. It becomes particularly acute in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, which influences all spheres of social life, including the daily life of the people, their culture and mentality. As a result of the changing status and role of science in society, its authority has also grown, complicating the organisation of scientific, including applied, research.

The very appearance of applied research in science bears

witness to the sharp growth in the role of science in contemporary society. Results of scientific investigations are included in the development of the most varied areas of social life. In socialist society where the possibilities of a creative direction through social processes are increasing more and more, the direct "applications" of science to practical work play a special role. Therefore the question of the connection of science with practical work in the Soviet Union is a question of state politics. There are special organisations which carry out applied research and special "services" created in various sections of the social organism representing various sciences. This growth of the role of applied research calls for a discussion on the question of how the relations between the applied and the fundamental areas of knowledge must be built.

Applied investigations in the various areas of science have certain common traits. It is helpful to separate them in order to reveal the specifics of applied research in social psychology. The goal of each applied investigation is the immediate solution to a practical task, a quick application of the results of the investigation for the optimisation of particular aspects of society's material or spiritual life. This is precisely what brings about the special features of applied research.

First, applied research is primarily organised according to the order of some social institute. Therefore the relation of "customer—executor" arises in the structure of relations between science and practical work. These relations require special regulation. Therefore, in every applied investigation made by order certain norms and established legal rules operate, involving definite rights and obligations of the customer and executor.

Secondly, there is the problem of language of applied research, since this is the sphere of communication of professional science with the non-professional environment. This means that the professional jargon existing in a group of sciences is not applicable to the results of applied investigations. Results must be applied in a form making them not only accessible to the customer, but also "ready for use" in society. Regardless of the trivial character of this fact, the given problem is the most complicated of our time since the gap between professional and everyday language sometimes reaches a substantial degree. The problem of the "translation" of scientific terms into practical language is not always easily solved. In each particular case the level of accessibility of the applied special terminology must be analysed, as well as the measure of its necessary simplification.

Third, applied research uses a specific *type of hypothesis*. The source of these hypotheses is not necessarily a corresponding theory: more often than not the hypothesis is formulated on the basis of practical needs, which imply a wide range of possible solutions, and one of the variants is verified in the investigation. An extremely important conclusion follows: the correlation of the level of the acquired generalisation to the tested hypothesis is a norm of every scientific investigation, i.e. the generalisation need not make any other claim than the affirmation or rejection of the tested hypothesis. The result of the investigation must contain a precise answer to the question posed. This does not exclude that additional far-reaching results may be obtained in the investigation which the researcher can use in the future. Yet the immediate goal of the applied investigation is the verification of the hypothesis put forth by practice.

Fourth, in the applied investigation there is a need for the demonstration of the directions, and sometimes the *terms and stages of their application* in practical work rather than just a precise formulation of recommendations. This is not required in a fundamental study, although it is preferable here, too. An applied investigation without such a plan will evoke dissatisfaction on the part of the customer.

All that has been said above demonstrates the need in applied research for a special qualified researcher with the necessary skills and a great moral and social sense of responsibility. Of course, all of these qualities become particularly significant in the case of applied research involving relations between people.

The rapid development of socio-psychological research in the Soviet Union was stimulated to a significant degree by the needs of practical work. This has left an imprint on the formation of this scientific discipline. If the typical course of development of a science involves the development of fundamental investigations leaving behind the development of applied research with the fundamental research "fixing" the problematics and the applied verifying the truths, received in the fundamental investigations, by practice then the matter takes on a different form in social psychology. Practice cannot "wait" for that moment when all questions have received a final answer in fundamental science. Practical needs are both pressing and demand rather quick solutions. Such a situation generates both positive and negative moments in the development of social psychology. The positive moments consist in the fact that the

different areas of the national economy and culture finance socio-psychological investigations and thus create favourable conditions for the development of science. The negative moments are connected with the fact that social psychology is often unprepared to answer certain questions raised by practice, and, given the situation of urgent social need it attempts to facilitate answers, which causes a relatively low quality of applied research. This takes place not due to a lack of diligence on the part of social psychologists, but because the level of development of the science does not always permit a comprehensive answer to practical questions. The researcher can react in two ways in this situation: he can strictly delineate the volume of his own possibilities and discard those questions which cannot be answered on the given level of development of the science; or he can agree to tackle all proposed problems, "accepting" them as an order and knowing beforehand that the answer will not be based on a proper level of knowledge. The first position is harder to take: many think that such a "confession" of inadequacy on the part of social psychology to answer definite questions is a compromise of the science. At first glance the second position looks more attractive and also more "courageous". However, the second strategy can prove to be much more detrimental for social psychology than the first.

Of course, social psychology's prestige in society depends on the value of its practical applications. But this prestige can hardly be expected to continue for long, if the practical recommendations are not based on preceding "purely" scientific fundamental investigations. The development of fundamental investigations on the basic problems of social psychology are the most important condition for the development of the applied science. A position that precisely demonstrates what social psychology can and cannot do today is much more correct on a contemporary level. In those areas where applied socio-psychological investigations are possible, the social psychologist must approach them with the maximum sense of responsibility. The adopted specific traits of applied investigations are also proposed in their full extent in social psychology. They too are often overwhelmed by a whole complex of specific difficulties.

It must be remembered that every socio-psychological investigation conducted "in the field" is the intervention of the researcher into the life of the real collective, where definite relationships form, real people act in a real world with their own thoughts, feelings and attitudes. Social psychology's arrival in this real situation must not disturb this natural process. It is here

in particular that a number of difficulties await the social psychologist.

They are primarily connected with the *peculiarities of methodics* applied in social psychology. All of them are based on the fact that the source of information is the person. The strategy of applied research is constructed on the researcher's constant interaction with people included in the real process of vital activities. But a person in an actual social situation is not a testee in a laboratory, where he is, in a sense, "excluded" from his life problems when involved in an experiment built according to a definite plan. In giving answers to various questions, fulfilling the assignments of the experimenter, he is acting in accord with the experimenter. In the process of his real work, educational or sport activities where he was found by the sociologist conducting the "field" studies, such a person ceases to be a testee in the traditional sense of the word. He is primarily a member of his collective, fulfilling special functions, and the investigation is evaluated by that which fixes his activities. This means that in answering the questions of the interview, filling in the sociometric card, etc., he is not fully excluded from the system of relations surrounding him. This gives socio-psychological "field" research a large advantage, helping it to escape the "sterile" situations occurring in the laboratory while at the same time generating a specific difficulty. This difficulty involves the registration of such "variables" which are very hard to take into consideration. Let us suppose here that the researcher comes to the lab and wants to study the nature of "vertical" relations in the collective between the workers and the foreman. Let us assume he addressed the worker who has just been criticised by the foreman, and this criticism seemed unjust to him. This purely emotional evaluation of the situation at the moment of the investigation can cause a "shift" in the data which will distort the whole picture of relations. The social psychologist conducting "field" experiments must know how to find coefficients of such possible distortions, which is not always so simple.

Another problem concerns the *time* of the investigation. All the socio-psychological methods are cumbersome, and their application requires a significant amount of time. If the investigation is conducted during the work day, it can disrupt the rhythm of production. If it is conducted when the shift is over, this means that people will be delayed for a long period of time, and thus their own plans may be interfered with. So only the "volunteers" are left (most often this is what really occurs), signifying that a certain shift takes place in the selec-

tion, not to say about the fact that certain methods require that every member of the work collective be interrogated. There is no sole solution to these problems. In each specific instance ways must be found which provide for the least amount of losses. But, of course, these difficulties should always be kept in mind. Only then can the negative effects be eliminated and the optimal solution be found.

The observation of certain ethical norms is also important. The social psychologist conducting an applied experiment, fills the order of the administration, management, etc. The exposure of the group characteristics and the general climate always involves, explicitly or implicitly, certain critical remarks addressed to those people whose activities cause deficiencies and who are, at the same time, the ones who ordered the investigation. The social psychologist must be circumspect so that his interference does not complicate relations in the real collective. The precise designation of his own role is very important. Sometimes in real groups where a socio-psychological investigation is conducted for the first time, the researcher is considered as a member of some commission, an inspector, etc. Instead of answers to the questions there are various requests and sometimes even complaints. In this case the researcher must explain the reason for his presence as precisely as possible, as well as the goal of his investigation, his own functions and tasks. Of course in doing this he must observe all the rules which the tasks of the researcher dictate.

The characteristic difficulty for every applied investigation connected with *language* sharply increases in social psychology. Both for social psychology and psychology in general, those concepts which are widely used in everyday speech and are overgrown with incidental connotations are especially difficult to apply. Such psychological terms as "personality", "activities", and "values" are widely applied in everyday life. Any methodics involving these terms without their thorough operational definition can produce an unwanted effect if the testees will understand the proposed terms in the sense that they are accustomed to in everyday situations. This means that the first problem for social psychology from the point of view of language demands in the investigation, involves a unique "adaptation" of this language to the testee. This rule must be observed also because certain terms can turn out to be unclear or understood only in application to particular situation. The context in which the terms are used by people on the basis of their personal life position is also important.

Another side of the problem of language in the applied investigation is connected with the application of certain special socio-psychological terms which, owing to a number of circumstances, seem to be compromised through their use outside the context of science. The word "conformist" with its negative connotation in everyday life and in the political world, can be considered an insult if addressed to the testee by the researcher. The same situation arises for certain leaders if their style is referred to as "authoritarian". The social psychologist must consider the way the terms are used in everyday life which can possibly produce such situations.

However, the difficulties connected with language are not the main ones in socio-psychological applied research. Much more significant problems are found in connection with the possible distortion of socio-psychological information emerging in actual life conditions and in questions of ethics. Therefore an applied investigation requires high moral qualities and a sense of social responsibility from the social psychologist. Everything must be subordinated to the skill to understand one's investigation in the context of real life, the real demands of society, the real right of each individual to keep the "interference" of science from complicating his life and even more so, bringing him harm.

High moral and social responsibility of the social psychologist is also an obligatory condition in answering the question on the *effectiveness* of applied research. It is clear from all that has been said above that applied research financed by some specific customer must have a definite "return" or else it will not receive its necessary support. For many other areas of science where applied practical research developed long ago, the question of effectiveness does not present any difficulty. This pertains in particular to applied research in economics, for example. In the system of psychological sciences such areas as the psychology of labour and engineering psychology also possess rather hopeful definitions of effectiveness in their investigations. As a rule, the economic effectiveness is considered in the given instance, meaning the direct economic advantage received from the adoption of certain results of the investigation. In social psychology the problem of effectiveness is not so simply resolved. Two aspects must be distinguished within it: how can the effectiveness of each investigation be manifested (and correspondingly, how to measure it), and what is the effectiveness of social psychology on the broad plane (i.e. what are the possibilities of the given science in principle in adopting the results of

investigations)? Each of these aspects has its own particular problems.

The *effectiveness of each separate applied investigation* can, of course, also be found in the direct economic advantage provided by the recommendations of the social psychologists. It is easy to imagine a situation where an investigation, for example, of the psychological climate at an industrial enterprise leads to such an essential increase in labour discipline and improvement in work conditions that it creates a sharp increase in production. The effect of socio-psychological interference will receive financial expression in this way. True, such a consideration cannot be guaranteed to be free from error. It can only tell whether or not the changes in the work collective of the industrial enterprise took place because of the changes in the psychological climate. Or, perhaps, completely different processes also took effect here containing new "variables" (for example, the improvement of the work conditions not owing to the recommendations of the social psychologist, but due to the objectively changing possibilities of material insurance). It is not so easy to separate the various reasons in this case.

But this is not the main problem. Let us suppose that we are attempting to determine the economic gain from the adoption of some socio-psychological recommendations. Will this mean that we are able to take into consideration all the aspects of effectiveness of the applied investigation? Of course not. The effectiveness of the socio-psychological investigation cannot be measured only by the calculation of the degree to which a certain group works more economically than another. The other side of the question, the social development of the group as a whole and each individual member are no less important. A favourable psychological climate can lead not only to an increase in labour productivity, as well as to improved discipline and a reduction in the fluctuation of personnel but also to a better general feeling, greater sociability, more considerate relations between workers, etc. There are no units for measuring such moral, purely psychological advantages. Consequently, in the evaluation of the effectiveness of applied investigations in social psychology these aspects must be fixed, even if only on a descriptive level. The improving of the means for defining the effectiveness of applied investigations is a real necessity in social psychology.

Another important circumstance arises here. The problem of "application" is solved specifically in social psychology.

The social psychologist himself is not always able to effect the application of his own recommendation. He can provide a very serious analysis of the activities of a manager at some enterprise, for example, and show that relations are unfavourable to separate teams because of the manager's failure to ensure the optimum working atmosphere. He can show that a certain foreman, team leader or a shop superintendent is not carrying out his functions well and that he must be replaced. But the social psychologist can not do the replacing. Each institution and each enterprise has its own system of promotion and replacement of personnel. There are also administrations, trade union and social organisations for answering this question but it can in no way be answered by the social psychologist. Therefore, in a number of cases there is a rift between the "knowledge" of solutions to the problems and their actual solution. Various links in the organisation of the social process are the subjects of knowledge and solution. If the role of social psychology in applied investigations is to be regarded as purely consultative, then the question of the effectiveness of such investigations arises anew. An accumulation of a certain type of experience is needed for the answer to this question.

The second aspect of the problem of *effectiveness* of socio-psychological research concerns the *science as a whole*, as well as its applied areas. However, this problem is particularly acute in connection with the practice of applied investigation. The question here concerns what can be expected in principle from social psychology from the point of view of its role in society: in the final analysis this must lead to a well-adjusted system of investigations. It can be assumed that the development of social psychology will take place rather rapidly, and that the numerous special questions, like the questions of the organisation of applied research, will be successfully answered. What then can society demand from social psychology? What will social psychology be able to do for society? In other words, the old question, "What is within the competence of social psychology?" must now be considered against the broader background of the potential of psychological science as a whole.

Certain Western psychologists declare that the discipline has the right to manipulate the human personality. In Burrhus Frederic Skinner's book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* this idea was more completely expressed in the development of the so-called "rational behavioural technology". The ideas in this work so blatantly contradict the ideas of humanism and the freedom of the human personality, that they received most

unfavourable criticism in world psychological literature. Many of the critics of Skinner's book openly declared that the described perspective reminded them of fascism. The idea of the manipulation of the human personality carried to its logical end leads to an unacceptable prospect of "interference" of psychology in the holy of holies of the human personality. For both ideological and theoretical reasons the proposed answer to the question of the possibilities of psychological science cannot be accepted.

The answer to this question in the framework of the Marxist socio-psychological tradition of knowledge depends on the basic principles of a materialistic concept of history. Society develops according to objective laws which do not deny the role of people's conscious activities. The possibilities for people's conscious activities increases according to the level of social progress. The progress of human freedom is found in the fact that people begin to recognise not only the nearest but also the distant results of their actions. The condition for a growth in the role of people's conscious actions in society is an increase in the degree of freedom outside of nature and also in the area of social relations.

The entire complex of social science is called to play a part in the perfection of management through social processes. Social psychology must also find a special place in the solution of this general task. It must give precedence to those social processes where it, in particular, can function in the most advantageous manner. Thus the answer to the question of its possibilities and limitations is included in the following: *social psychology must provide for the optimum relations between people and the perfection of conditions for the development of the "essential powers" of a person.* Social psychology does not dictate actions for each person, but tries to develop relations between people in which each can freely make a choice. This choice will be the optimum from society's (the group's) point of view and also from the individual's point of view. If we now turn from the general question to a more specific description of the social psychologist's role in providing effective recommendations, then it becomes clear in the examination of the following example.

If the social psychologist conducts his investigation at an industrial enterprise, his position can conditionally be signified as a person in the center of varied relations, those between the administration and the workers, between the trade union and the workers, etc. All the aspects of these relations are of an

interest for the social psychologist, and his recommendations concern all these relations. He does not "influence" the trade union, the representatives of the administration or the workers; he "influences" the *relations* between them, optimising them.

One circumstance must be kept in mind in this. It would be naive to think that all the problems occurring in the various spheres of social life would be immediately solved as a result of the recommendations received in applied investigations. An overestimation of the possibilities of applied research is as dangerous as ignoring the results. Two groups of limitations must evidently be taken into account here.

Social psychology is primarily concerned with the *psychological* side of social phenomena. The development of social relations is realised according to particular laws and an exaggeration of the role of the psychological side is inadmissible. Any investigation of interpersonal relations in the group, no matter how it is qualified, *does not involve* all the factors determining the behaviour of the members of the studied group. A concrete explanatory model of the group's function can only occur as the result of *complex* investigations undertaken by all social sciences.

Secondly, although an applied socio-psychological investigation can provide good recommendations, their investigation depends on a number of practical considerations, economic possibilities, the presence of the work force, etc. In order to precisely identify social psychology's borders of effectiveness, a class of problems must be worked out in advance, which it can actually solve in each sphere of social life.

To properly organise applied research in the area of social psychology from a professional point of view, a satisfactory training of personnel should be ensured and a system of socio-psychological service must be established. The setting up of a psychological service in the Soviet Union is presently being discussed. This would mean the creation of a system of such organisations which would manage a whole group of applied investigations in various spheres of social life. The tasks of social psychology occupy a rather obvious place in the numerous tasks which a psychological service must solve.

At present applied investigations are carried out by scientific collectives at universities and institutes—academic and educational—with agreements based on creative cooperation with enterprises, on a voluntary basis, etc. In addition to this, special organisations exist which conduct such investigations not "from the outside" of the corresponding departments but "from

within" them, primarily in the system of the national economy and culture. However, while these organisations are not tied up in a single system, such investigations are sporadic. The situation is better in the areas of industry and sports, in particular in the system for the preservation of social order. But even here the link of the *psychological service* does not possess sole status, a sole system of demands or a single list of staff.

The creation of a psychological service is meant to liquidate all these deficiencies. The precise formulation of the problematics of research, the formation of a unique list of the functions of social psychology in each specific area of social life, be it industrial production, the everyday services, or some other area of social existence, is the preliminary condition for the creation of such a service. The various sociological and socio-psychological laboratories established in numerous industrial institutions and also the departments for a scientific organisation of labour, which more and more often employ psychologists, are prototypes of such a psychological service in industry. There is an officially legalised position of psychologist at enterprises in many branches of industry and special branch institutes are set up for raising the qualifications of the management personnel, where psychologists sometimes work at special chairs and sometimes within the framework of some other chairs. Although this form of activity is not directly connected with applied research, but represents pedagogical work, it is also an important channel for the spread of psychological knowledge, and especially knowledge in the psychology of management in production.

However, this is not always the case. There are whole branches of economics and culture where the need for socio-psychological applied research was felt long ago, but a system of psychological service has not yet been created. This pertains to the areas of mass information, trade, everyday life, etc. In order to better realise specific problematics of applied research in each of the spheres mentioned, it is useful to examine the basic directions of potential socio-psychological investigations on an applied level.

BASIC DIRECTIONS OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN SOVIET SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Industrial production is the main customer of socio-psychological applied research, involving a rather precise complex of tasks that may be solved by the social psychologists in this area. The socio-psychological problems in industrial production can be broken into two groups: 1) the problems of the management of production and scientific organisation of labour, and 2) the problems of formation of production collectives. The development of a special form of the psychologist's participation pertaining to the two groups mentioned is one of the special forms of his participation in an industrial institution—the compiling of a plan of social development for the work collective of an enterprise. The elaboration of this plan is not the responsibility of the social psychologist alone. The whole work collective takes part in this work, along with social organisations and also special subdivisions within the institution which are assigned to perform this work. However, some sections pertaining primarily to his area of competence are precisely designated for the social psychologist on the plane of social development. They include the section connected with the perfection of the system of management and interpersonal relations, and the section connected with the planning and prognosis of the forms and means for educational work in the work collectives.

These general tasks are elaborated differently in various institutions, but there are certain specific ones which are typical, such as the psychological climate of the collective, satisfaction with work, the fluctuation of personnel, the adaptation of newcomers and socialist competition. Among these problems, most attention is given to psychological climate.

The *psychological climate* is most often defined as the integral composition of the group (collective), its relatively typical, stable emotional disposition, reflecting the actual situation of labour activities (types, conditions, and organisation of labour) and the character of interpersonal relations. Such a definition is not sufficiently strict and rather represents a description of the phenomenon. Regardless of the broad practice of investigation of the psychological climate,¹ to make this concept operational is more difficult. Different authors understand the psychological climate as a varied set of the characteristics of the overall condition of the collective. As a rule, the predominant emotional condition, the mentality of the collective's members manifests in their satisfaction with their work, namely in the given collective at the given enterprise. Consequently, at least three groups of relations are needed to interpret the psychological climate:

- 1) vertical relations between the group members (management, the collective's perception of the manager and the degree of participation in management and satisfaction with it);
- 2) horizontal relations between the group members (solidarity of the collective, the character of interpersonal relations, the way and means of solving conflicts);
- 3) attitudes towards labour (satisfaction with work, the effectiveness of the collective's activities, etc.).

Because the manifestations of the psychological climate vary, the same as people's behaviour and in various systems of their relations, there is no and cannot be any sole method for the investigation of the psychological climate. Practically *all* methods known to the social psychologist are applied in the given instance. Social psychology in each situation creatively approaches the choice of methodics. These methodics can include a combination of observations, interviews, sociometrics, polar profiles, various means of group diagnostics, special methods for establishing the style of leadership, etc. The professional preparedness of the psychologist working at the industrial enterprise is also distinguished by his ability to determine the needed methods of investigation.

The studies of the psychological climate can be correlated to the corresponding problems of social psychology. The area of *vertical relations* presumes the investigation of the style of man-

¹ See, for example, *Social Planning in Industry and the Problems of Its Effectiveness*, Ed. by Ye. S. Kuzmin and V. A. Sukhin, Leningrad, 1978 (in Russian).

agement, particularly the correlation of the manager's business and personality qualities, his relations with his subordinates (in particular as concerns the application of sanctions and his subordinates' satisfaction in the application of these sanctions) and the character and frequency of conflicts arising in the system of management—subordination. In studying these phenomena it is of course necessary to investigate the formation of social orientations on the manager and on the subordinate, along with the exposure of all the components of these orientations. The problem of the subordinates' perception of the manager and the manager's perception of the subordinates, particularly the precision of such a perception, presents a special interest.

In the area of *horizontal relations* research usually involves the character of business relations between members of the work collective (exactness, mutual assistance, competition, methods of organising joint activities), and also interpersonal relations (this traditionally involves the system of positive and negative emotional connections, the psychological status of each member of the collective, the system of evaluation and self-evaluation of the group members; sometimes the problem of compatibility is studied here which requires the knowledge of certain individual psychological characteristics of the group members).

The *attitude towards labour* is investigated on two levels in studying the psychological climate of an industrial enterprise: as the general satisfaction with work (the character of the work, conditions, pay, material and moral stimuli, participation in management, etc.) and the intention to continue working at the given enterprise. In the latter instance, research also includes the question of the fluctuation of personnel, although this question in its full volume does not pertain to the competence of the social psychologist since the problem also has a characteristic economic side. Investigation of the attitude towards work can only be successful if the objective indicators of the labour activities of each worker are correlated with the subjective indicators—his own "attitude". In certain investigations the system of objective and subjective indicators has been revealed in great detail. In the investigation of "A Person and His Work", conducted under the direction of V.A. Yadov,¹ the objective factors of the attitude to work were interpreted

¹ *A Person and His Work*, Ed. by A.G. Zdravomyslov, V.A. Yadov and V.P. Rozhin, Moscow, 1967 (in Russian).

as indicators of productivity, initiative and discipline. The subjective factors were considered as indicators of the attitude to work at the given enterprise, the attitude to trade and to the level of personal skills. In other words, the attitude to work signifies the orientation on labour and therefore the methods of investigation in the given instance coincide with the methods of research of social orientations. Attitude towards work expresses the measure of a person's satisfaction with his activities and therefore emerges as the most important characteristic of the psychological climate. From the point of view of the theory of the collective it would be extremely important to find out how much the interpersonal relations in the collective are mediated by the relations of activities in the given instance, meaning, in particular, satisfaction with work.

Therefore the investigation of the psychological climate at an industrial enterprise includes a large range of socio-psychological problems. The content interpretation of the data received in each separate group (horizontal relations, vertical relations and attitude to work) is conducive to a general evaluation of the climate. The integration of the three lines of data is still somewhat difficult. Various researchers introduce a concept of the *type* of socio-psychological climate demonstrating four possible types: a) favourable, b) contradictory, c) semi-favourable and d) unfavourable. However, it cannot be said precisely which aggregate of indicators in the three groups provides a "favourable" (or "unfavourable") climate. Only a continuation of research will provide a final answer to that question.

The problem of *communications* within the production collective is a relatively new problem of socio-psychological research at the industrial enterprise. In numerous investigations of the psychological climate it was explained by the fact that very often members of smaller subdivisions of the large industrial enterprise (teams, shops, shifts) turned out to be secluded in the framework of their own team, shop, shift, etc., in the circumstances of a favourable psychological climate within that subdivision. In this case, they were weakly informed about the enterprise as a whole, its indicators, the significance of the given section within the whole enterprise, the rhythm of its work and the quality of its output. At the same time, it was established that the level of information about the enterprise as a whole had a positive impact on the general atmosphere of each subdivision. This empirical fact can be theoretically explained by the inclusion of each collective in a broader social structure and the awareness of this inclusion always creates

a new, additional motivation in activities which acts as an element of more general activities. Therefore, the problem of the informed state of the collective meaning the problem of the development of communication has become a topic of special research.

The problem of *management* is a constantly recurring theme in the investigations in industry. This is brought about by the fact that it pertains to the most varied branches of knowledge and its development involves economic specialists along with psychologists. Here social psychology has its own rather precisely designated aspect of research.

The main part of this aspect is the issue of the need for a leader to possess definite psychological qualities. Numerous applied investigations are oriented namely on the elucidation of this question. Various personality tests are applied with this aim in view. Special methods are constructed, often providing the descriptive characteristics of the ideal manager. Many actually necessary properties are often grasped through these methods derived from everyday experience. However, in conducting an applied investigation of this problem the unresolved state of many relative questions on that level must be kept in mind.

A paradoxical situation sometimes occurs. The professional psychologists know all the arguments against a theory of "traits", for example, which explains the phenomenon of leadership, and the failure of all the attempts to construct a basic scientific list of a leader's "traits". Nonetheless, they diligently explain at the applied level what traits a leader must possess. They explain this by saying that problems in life "do not wait" and at least "something" must be done for their solution. Regardless of the apparent weightiness of such an argument, it can hardly be completely agreed with. Of course, vital problems "do not wait", but this does not mean that they should be solved by means which are long considered unfit for science. The situation of the "traits" of the leader illustrates well that very instance when an important step must be taken, namely informing the customer that science has yet to develop the means to solve his problem. Such a position has nothing in common with the simple refusal to investigate an important problem but it does not create an illusion with regard to ostensible possibilities.

There are presently tasks in the problem of administration which social psychology can solve. These include the problem of correlating the style of management with the effectiveness

of group activities, the problem of the resolution of conflicts occurring on the psychological level, the problem of management through the adoption of a group decision, and many others. With regard to the quality of managers, certain approaches can be pointed out, which do not contradict the treatment of the question on a theoretical level: for example, the analysis of the compatibility of the manager and the collective, the exposure of the role of the "feedback connection" (the manager's knowledge of how his subordinates perceive him) in the administration, etc. Moreover, when there is the task on the applied level to investigate certain problems of administration and management, the practical need arises to investigate many *adjoining* questions, which only indirectly pertain to management, although they are extremely important for its optimization. Therefore we also take note of the omnipotent character in the problem of management. It is the only possible view of the problem given the contemporary state of the discipline. The failure of the researcher to solve this problem by exposing the "traits", "qualities" and "characteristics" of the manager only serves to discredit social psychology.

The present task of the psychologist at the industrial enterprise is not simply to conduct applied investigations on proposed issues, but also to propagate socio-psychological knowledge with the aim of the formulation of the problematics. The point of these activities must involve the *explanation* to the customer of the current state of social psychology so that his proposals would be based on actual possibilities of the science. Namely, the psychologist must show the necessity, possibility and validity of studying a certain set of problems. Professional training makes it necessary for him to occupy an active position, based both on the understanding of the actual problems of the enterprise and on a precise idea of social psychology's possibilities.

Another important area of the social organism presenting an interest and in need of socio-psychological research is *the system of mass information and propaganda media*. The problematics of socio-psychological research in this sphere is rather actively investigated. There are successful example of applying the results of these investigations, i.e. implementing their recommendations in practical work.

It can be said that all the components of the previously examined formula which reveals the structure of the communicative process are presently objects of applied research: the communicator, communication, the audience, the channel,

effectiveness. In each of the groups of research dedicated to the study of a separate component, more interesting and important themes have come to the fore. This is connected with the fact that mass communication, also meaning the area of propaganda influence, is a variety of people's mass communication where information is spread primarily by technical means (the press, television, radio). This whole process is organised and directed by certain social institutes. Such a high social orientation of mass communication and the mediation of intercourse within it through technical means leaves a definite imprint on the structural components and the separate sides of the communicative act.

In the system of mass information the communicator acquires a seemingly "collective" character because his role here is not one of an individual, but a certain social group. This is demonstrated by the fact that a number of people participate in the preparation of information, its editing, form, etc. Therefore, in the given area of communication the borders between such functions as production and translation are precisely distinguished. Communicators serving only as translators of the ideas of others (a radio or television announcer, for example) nonetheless play a large role in the process of influence. The *audience* is also very unique in mass communication. It consists of groups of various sizes with varying degrees of organisation, from such a small group as the family to the participants in a mass meeting, etc. In almost any conditions (excluding the special instance of a lecturer addressing a small group), the audience in mass communication remains anonymous since the communicator never knows who will be receiving his information. Here it is a question of the "feedback", which frequently does not immediately take effect, thus greatly modifying the whole communicative act. Such specific peculiarities can also be established in relation to other components of the structure of the mass communicative process.

All of this demands special investigations with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of propaganda on the audience. The specifics of the *channel* must also be taken into consideration in the organisation of applied investigations: certain problems emerge in the study of the communicator's perception if he is a television announcer and completely different ones emerge if he is a radio announcer. The psychological mechanisms of influence operating in written and oral communication, etc. are also different. Applied research in the area of mass communication and propaganda must therefore pertain to each specific channel: the psychological service must be organ-

ised differently for radio, television, the press and oral public speeches (the area of lecture propaganda).

There is already a definite amount of experience in this area of research. Several years ago sociological and socio-psychological research was conducted on the reading audience of the four largest Soviet newspapers: *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud* and *Literaturnaya gazeta*. There was also a series of investigations done with the Estonian newspaper *Edazi*. These investigations were not only conducted with the participation of interested members of the editing staffs, they were also financed by these very staffs.

The possibility for publication is a serious problem in all applied research. Of course, each applied investigation cannot expect the publication of its results; these results are contained in different kinds of documents—various summaries, accounts, etc. But certain more significant investigations must be, at least as a summarised accounts, brought to the attention of specialists. Otherwise, effective work on methods is hampered: each researcher must “invent the bicycle” anew. In this sense matters are much better in the area of sociological research of mass communication.

The socio-psychological investigations are presently rather poorly organised. Isolated, particular and extremely “local” studies are sometimes performed on the initiative of the researchers themselves, and sometimes to direct orders of television studios, for example.

The situation is a little better in the investigation of the problems of lecture propaganda. The basic set of problems studied here involves the following: the effectiveness of lecture propaganda, the specifics of the audience and its perception of the lectures, the art of oration, the skill of the lecturer and his role as a factor of effective influence on the audience, the problem in establishing a psychological contact with the audience, and so on. Special conferences devoted to psychological-pedagogical problems of lecture propaganda play an important role in stimulating an interest in the above-listed problematics.

Other actual problems in the psychology of mass communication are investigated on the applied level on the initiative of various scientific and educational institutions, as a rule without organised support from the customer. This is the situation, for example, with the extremely important problem of the perception of the communicator. One of the peculiarities of the perception of the communicator in general and in the

conditions of mass communication in particular involves the fact that the recipient perceives simultaneously both the communication rendered by the communicator and also the communicator's personality. Research conducted under the direction of N.N. Bogomolova (when the objects of investigation were popular television announcers), showed that both of these factors must be taken into consideration to increase the effect of the impact. Such characteristics of the communicator traditionally given precedence in social psychology like "confidence" and "attractiveness" acquire special significance in applied research.

There is a cycle of investigations dedicated to the optimisation of contact between the communicator and the audience through the application of different forms of intercourse. These are the so-called "monologue" and "dialogue" forms of intercourse. Although these investigations are directed primarily towards the audience of an oral public presentation, their recommendations can also be partially applied in other systems of mass communication. However, in the case of these investigations, when they are organised by the efforts of co-workers from scientific and educational institutions without special support from the customers, they are inevitably of an excessively local character. Recommendations formulated on the basis of limited experimental data must be verified on a large number of subjects. The creation of special subdivisions of the psychological service in radio and television studios and in editorial departments of newspapers is necessary for the consolidation of all these investigations. Only in such conditions will social psychology be able to fulfil the task of increasing the effectiveness of mass information.

The sphere of scientific activities is a relatively new sphere of application for social psychology. Questions must be continually answered connected with the psychological mechanisms and laws of the extremely complex system of contemporary science organising and controlling research. The specifics of the development of science in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution consist primarily of a sharp growth in the significance of collective forms of activities. This to a significant degree transforms the stable stereotype of scientific creativity as that of separate outstanding individuals, since the production of knowledge is the result of the work of many people in research "combines". The basic type of social section engaged in the production of scientific knowledge thus changes: if formerly it was a "scientific school", presently it is more

likely a "research collective". An extremely high integration of members takes place in such a collective, with the products of scientific creativity increasing being those of collective efforts: group projects, group decisions, group expertise, etc. The small group is becoming the subject of investigative work.

This faces social psychology with a new set of applied tasks, primarily pertaining to the exposure of the peculiarities of the particular scientific collective in comparison with other types of work collectives, the perfection of the socio-psychological climate within it, the means of control, the increase in the effectiveness of its activity, etc.

The most important problem here is the exposure of "collective scientific activities". Such activities involve an obvious contradiction for traditional psychology: these activities are simultaneously "joint" and "creative", whereas creative activities (and corresponding scientific activities, too) have always been regarded as individual in traditional psychology. Although contemporary scientology already long ago insisted that the character of communication in the scientific community rather than only the personality of the scientist must be analysed¹, the traditional approach prevails. The personality is, as before, considered the subject of creativity (in the given instance—the personality of the scientist), and its microenvironment, including communication, emerges only as a condition of the creative act. The task of the social psychologist is to understand the nature of joint creative activities and provide a psychological description.

A model of such activities must be constructed and at least two questions must be answered for the fulfilment of this task: 1) what are the specifics of the combination of the individual participants' contributions to the collective scientific activities (in other words, can these specifics be interpreted as a unique division of the creative act into components contributed by each scientific worker)? 2) how do "new formations" (the most essential scientific component and the sign of scientific creativity) occur in the process of collective scientific activities?

An interesting solution to these questions is contained in the "programme-role approach to scientific research" developed in Soviet social psychology by M.G. Yaroshevsky.² One

¹ See: D. Pelts, and F. Andrews, *Scientists in Organisations. Productive Climates for Research and Development*, New York-London-Sydney, 1976.

² See: *Problems of Management Through the Scientific Collective*, Ed. By M.G. Yaroshevsky, Moscow, 1982 (in Russian).

of the basic ideas of this conception involves the existence in every scientific collective of basic "scientific roles": "generator", "critic", "erudite", etc. Extremely specific "role profiles" of each worker are singled out, meaning that his "contribution" to the overall activities is significantly different from the "contribution" of the others. These distinctions are more obvious than those between workers' "contributions" in a production team, where they perform more or less similar functions. The question of whether or not each scientific role is connected with such a "contribution" which can be related to authentic creative activities is particularly difficult to answer. If the activities of the "generator" can indisputably be considered as creative, then an interpretation of the activities of the "critic" or the "erudite" as such is much more difficult. If creativity is considered in its usual way in psychology, meaning the illumination, the spontaneous birth of the new, then only the "generator" can be considered as its subject, while all the other scientific roles should be evaluated only as those of performers. In this instance, there cannot be any kind of joint creative activities.

However, the programme-role approach provides another answer to this question. Here the very concepts of a "new idea" and the "new" in science are subject to examination. In the solution of complicated contemporary scientific tasks the "new idea" is only *new* when it is contrasted with a large volume of knowledge accumulated in the past when it is comprehensively "worked out" taking into account the conditions of its realisation, etc. In this case, all the participants of the collective scientific process are its creators, and social psychology must help practical workers to measure each member's contribution in the given scientific collective. Both a thorough psychological description of each scientific role and a detailed analysis of the motivation of each scientist are necessary for this, since the effective combination of scientific roles presumes a highly motivated state of each member of the collective. Finally, the investigation of the specifics of the very process of communication between scientists, particularly their psychological preparedness to accept, process and preserve a diverse information is no less important.

The specifics of each of the identified socio-psychological processes in the scientific collective are obvious. This generates a whole set of difficulties for the management of such a collective. Thus the different "contributions" by different members make the criteria for the evaluation of their effectiveness

unclear. This can also create an inadequate notion of success on the part of particular workers, which may generate a unique type of conflicts. In such conflicts it is sometimes difficult to separate the business side and the "interpersonal" side. The manager of the scientific collective must be able to solve such conflicts in order to ensure a high level of effect in the activities of his subdivision. At the same time, his own position in the collective is specific: is it necessary for the manager of the scientific collective to combine the functions of administrator and the generator of ideas, or can these roles be filled by different people? These are questions yet to be answered by social psychology.

The programme-role approach attempts to answer these questions, too. It examines the *research programme* as the most important instrument for the manager of the scientific collective. The programme is understood here as a systems formation involving three components: the object-logical (which serves as a basis for the organisation of pure research activities), the scientifically-social (the character of interactions between scientists, the type of cooperation and competition between them), the personality-psychological (the means of influence of the two initial components on the motivation of each separate researcher, on his individual creativity). In this way the research programme of the scientific collective mediates all the relations between its members, representing the very "active" beginning which is considered in the Soviet psychological theory of the collective as the main determinant of its development.

The programme-role approach is widely used in applied investigations conducted primarily in scientific institutions: scientific-research institutes and laboratories and institutions of higher learning. The social psychologist can realise threefold activities on the basis of such investigations. First of all, he can work out specific recommendations based on the diagnostics of the situation in each collective (for example, what is the optimal means of singling out stages for the realisation of the research programme so that they are clear for the members of the scientific collective: how to construct a system of scientific roles in the collective and describe the role profile of each worker; how to regulate interpersonal relations in general and interpersonal conflicts in particular, etc.). These recommendations are mainly addressed to the managers of the scientific collectives. The second type of activities of the social psychologist involves consultation work. In the given instance,

consultation can be given both to the managers and to members of the collective, promoting in the latter instance awareness of the situation in the collective, one's particular role within it, and the increase of the sense of satisfaction with work. Finally, the third type of work is the direct instruction of the managers of scientific collectives in the methods of administration, in particular as concerns the knowledge of socio-psychological mechanisms of communication and interaction. Such instruction is organised in various forms, from traditional lectures on socio-psychological problematics to the organisation of special socio-psychological training for persons heading scientific collectives on various levels of the system of scientific institutions (the director of research institutes, the leaders of a laboratory, heads of chairs, etc.).

Investigations in this sphere are conducted as a rule on a voluntary basis by workers of socio-psychological institutions and in partnership with colleagues. However, the requests for socio-psychological "help" for scientific research collectives are so urgent that they require the creation of a special "psychological service" in the sphere of science.

Another area in the application of socio-psychological knowledge in practical work is the service of the *family*. Social psychology has traditionally devoted a lot of attention to the family, regarding it as an example of a natural small social group. All the peculiarities of such a group acquire definite specifics in the family but none the less, the knowledge of the laws of the formation and development of small groups can make a certain contribution to the development of optimal forms of relations, in this microsection of society as well. Certain groups of tasks can be singled out, which can be solved and are sometimes already being solved by social psychology.

The first part of such tasks is connected with the *psychological instruction of young people for the creation of a family*. In recent years the question has often arisen concerning the school's responsibility in this area, but the school's role is reduced to discussing the problems of sex education. The importance of this question is obvious, but preparation for marriage and the creation of a family also include the problems of psychological training. This means that children must not learn the specifics of family relations, including their psychological content, from accidental information gleaned from gossip. For example, such questions as family roles, the changes taking place in the content of these roles in the age of the scientific and technological revolution, the "adaptation" to their new con-

tent, are all questions pertaining to the competence of social psychology. Certain elementary information about the family as an institute of the socialisation of a child is also useful not only for young married couples but also to young people preparing to get married. In other words, the first form of "application" of social psychology in this area can be its educational function, including the elements of socio-psychological knowledge in the programmes for the preparation of young people for family life.

However, there is also a second form of such "application"; the ensurance of the so-called "service of acquaintance". This is a new yet vital question for Soviet society. In many scientific publications, in discussions organised by state and social organisations there is a question concerning the fact that contemporary way of life under certain conditions creates difficulties for part of the people in finding a partner in life. These difficulties can take on two forms. On the one hand, the absorption of basic masses of young people in studies or work "localises" the sphere of communication. In this case, if we take, for example, the type of production where the work involves only men or only women, the natural environment of communication makes contacts with people of the opposite sex rather difficult. Work and leisure organised on the basis of a production principle restricts the possibilities of communication with people of a certain age, not married, single, etc. In the given instance, social psychology can offer no help: here it is necessary to turn to various state and social measures like the creation of clubs, various forms of friendship institutions between enterprises, evenings to which members of another collective are invited, sports competitions, etc.

But there is another side to the problem. There are definite psychological barriers developing in young people which prevent them from establishing relations with members of the opposite sex. Here the help of the psychologist is quite necessary. With regard to social psychology, it can assume upon itself the function of organiser of the "service of acquaintance", no matter which of the two variants of difficulties took precedence. Each "club meeting", each consultation must include a professional instruction in communication. It is perfectly clear that an "electronic match-maker" cannot solve all the problems. The selection of a partner in marriage cannot exclude questions of the psychological organisation of their relations. A set of recent experiments bears witness to the fact that the success of "acquaintance" in many cases depends on the degree of socio-

psychological knowledge of the organisers of such a service.¹ Special measures taken for the foretelling of the future strengthening of the family are not accidental, so the presence of the social psychologist is obligatory in such work.

But even when people get acquainted by themselves, decide to marry and start preparations for doing so, there are quite a number of questions to be answered which pertain to social psychology.

An important sphere of family consultations is the regulation of family relations ensuring a greater stability of the family. Applied investigations examine the form and structure of family conflicts and the ways of their solution. Moreover, all this must not simply become the "theme" of investigation: the social psychologist must teach normal communication in the family.

Contemporary social psychology employs certain means for such teaching, namely socio-psychological training. Each training course is not only labour-intensive, it also involves prolonged work carried out by the social psychologist who, is on the staff as a family consultant. Such experience is presently widespread and a psychological service of the family can be expected to develop comprehensively.

The third group of tasks to be tackled by the social psychologist to ensure the optimal development of the family is the investigation of inner-family orientations arising with regard to children: whether there are children, how many, etc. Such an orientation is known in demographics as the "reproductive orientation". In recent time, many demographic studies have shown that in a large number of families a definite orientation forms on a family with a small numbers of children, often with a single child. Demographics long ago turned to social psychology in order to reveal the mechanism and reasons for the formation of definite reproductive orientations, and such investigations have won a firm place for themselves among other investigations dealing with socio-psychological problems of the family.

A special section of social psychology, the problems of interpersonal attraction, can be included in applied research in this area. The laws of the formation of the sense of attachment, friendship and love have only recently become objects of scientific studies. The distrust experienced by certain researchers concerning the possibility of scientific "interference" in

¹ See: A.T. Harchev, M.S. Matskovsky, *Contemporary Family and Its Problems*, Moscow, 1978 (in Russian).

such subtle and intimate aspects of human relations disappears when the experience gained in the work of family consultations is studied (the experience of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and West Germany is interesting in this respect). A deep analysis of these regularities and laws permits the creation of optimal socio-psychological training programmes, involving not only the study of communication, but also the establishment of conditions for the exposure of those qualities which can attract people to each other.

* * *

Only some of the areas of social life where social psychology can be applied have been listed here. The most important task presently facing applied research of this scientific discipline is the precise division of two groups of questions: 1) What *in principle* can social psychology do with its means of analysis, i.e. what is the class of tasks in each sphere of social life social psychology can solve?, and 2) what is it presently doing? The answer to the first question is: the exposure of the *prospects* of social psychology in the applied sphere. The answer to the second question is: the discussion of *practical and organisational* measures which must be realised so that applied investigations become effective as well as possible. A definite answer to the first question can be found in the present book, but to answer the second question, another, special book should be written.

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Общественно-политическая литература

Галина Михайловна АНДРЕЕВА
СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ ПСИХОЛОГИЯ

На английском языке

Редактор русского текста *Пчелкина Э. М.*
Редактор английского текста *Марков А. В.*
Художественный редактор *Г. А. Семёнова*
Технический редактор *С. Л. Рябинина,*
Е. В. Антонова

ИБ № 17753

Сдано в набор 11.05.89. Подписано в печать 23.02.90.
Формат 84×108¹/₃₂. Бумага офсетная № 1.
Гарнитура тип. таймс. Печать офсетная.
Условн. печ. л. 17,22. Усл. кр.-отт. 17,85.
Уч.-изд. л. 21,78. Тираж 9630 экз.
Заказ № 0821. Цена 2 р. Изд. № 46128.

Ордена Трудового Красного Знамени издательство
«Прогресс» Государственного комитета
СССР по печати.

119847, ГСП, Москва, Г-21, Zubovskiy bulvar, 17

Ордена Трудового Красного Знамени
Московская типография № 7
«Искра революции» В/О «Совэкспорткнига»
Государственного комитета СССР по печати.
103001, Москва, Трехпрудный пер., 9.



Prof. Galina Mikhailovna Andreyeva, distinguished scientist, head of the Chair of Social Psychology at Moscow University is the author to more than 120 scientific works, including textbooks, monographs and collections under her editorship (*Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Social Psychology, Contemporary Social Psychology in the West, Interpersonal Perception in the Group, Communication and Activities.* etc.). Galina Andreyeva is a member of the Central Council of the USSR Society of Psychologists, of the Board of the Soviet Sociological Association, and of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. Her *Social Psychology* was awarded the Lomonosov Prize in 1984.

*Galina
Andreyeva*
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