

STP **SUPPLEMENT**

USSR: new initiatives for normalizing relations with China

Maoist nationalities policy

Peking: an "open door" policy again?

5

STP

SUPPLEMENT

SOCIALISM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE

5

Published
bimonthly
in English, French,
German and
Spanish

Abridged articles are marked with an asterisk (*)

Address:
STP Editorial Office,
APN Publishing House,
7 Bolshaya Pochtovaya
Street,
Moscow 107082,
USSR

Editing completed August 5, 1982

© Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ № 5 К ЖУРНАЛУ
«СОЦИАЛИЗМ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА»
№ 9, 1982 г.
на английском языке
0-35

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*Dear comrades,
Chinese hegemonists say that
they are internationalists and
friends of Islam. But we were
told that in neighbouring
Xinjiang they ruthlessly treat
Muslims. Is this really so?*

Gulam Muhammad, student,
Kabul, Afghanistan

The Afghan reader will find the answer to his question in V. Andreyev's article "What's Going on in Xinjiang" published in this issue.

Numerous questions of our African readers about Peking's policy in Africa are answered by APN observer I. ILYIN in the article "Peking and Africa".

Kaysone PHOMVIHANE,
General Secretary of the Central
Committee, Lao People's Revolu-
tionary Party

WE ARE PREPARED TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Chinese leaders have long become rabid adherents of great-power expansionism and hegemonism. Laying expansionist plans in relation to Southeast Asia, they intended first of all to annex the countries of Indochina. Peking hegemonists have proved themselves traitors to the revolutionary cause of the peoples of the world and of China and have turned into a direct and dangerous enemy of the Lao people. They tried to use our country as a bridge linking China with Kampuchea where their stooges, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, were in power, to exert pressure on Vietnam and subdue it too. Chinese troops were moved to our frontiers threatening Laos with aggression. Acting in close alliance with US imperialism and the extreme rightist reactionary forces of Thailand, Chinese hegemonists encouraged Lao emigrant reactionaries and used Maoist forces in the region for carrying out subversive acts against our country.

... Resolutely countering the hostile policy of the reactionary grouping in Peking's ruling circles, we are patiently trying to do all we can to preserve and strengthen goodneighbourly relations between the Lao and Chinese peoples. Guided by the interests of the two countries and of preserving peace in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world, we are prepared to normalize relations between our country and the People's Republic of China on the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of either country, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equa-

lity and mutual benefit, joint settlement of all problems bearing on the relations between the two countries through peaceful negotiations.

Pravda, April 28, 1982

From the report delivered by
Comrade K. Phomvihane at the
Third Congress of the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party, April 27, 1982

I. ALEXANDROV

ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

From the newspaper *Pravda*

Relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, two neighbouring states, have always been and continue to be of great importance. They constitute not only a bilateral problem but also an important factor affecting the interests of a vast region and the world as a whole.

"We all remember the time when the Soviet Union and people's China were bound by ties of friendship and comradesly cooperation," Leonid Brezhnev said in his speech in Tashkent on March 24, 1982. "We have never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries to be a normal phenomenon."

The revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people has always enjoyed a comprehensive support of the Soviet people, the CPSU, our state, the Communists and other progressive forces of all the countries. After

1949, when the People's Republic of China was formed, the peoples of the USSR and China were united by common ideals and goals in their struggle for the restructuring and development of society on the principles of socialism. Cooperation based on the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950, acquired the magnitude and diversity unprecedented in the history of our countries. The Soviet Union assisted in every way it could in the establishment and progress of people's China.

The interaction between the USSR and new China on the international scene was directed at this as well. The Soviet Union never supported in any form the so-called "concept of two Chinas". The USSR has always recognized and recognizes today the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over the Taiwan Island. During acute international crises our country took a firm position of solidarity with and support for its ally. The USSR had always stood for the removal of injustices that once existed with regard to the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

The strengthening of the international positions of the PRC and the ensuring of its security and independent existence, as well as China's contribution to the cause of social progress and socialism both within the national framework and in the international plane were related to the Soviet Chinese alliance, to China's cooperation with all the countries of the socialist community and to its policy generally meeting the socialist principles.

Soviet-Chinese relations actually became the most important of those favourable foreign policy factors that were needed by the PRC to accomplish the tasks of social, political and economic progress.

Even today, when the wave of anti-Sovietism does not abate in China, they have to admit there that it was that early period of the PRC's existence—keynoted, as is known, by friendship and mutually-beneficial cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries—that was particularly fruitful for the country's progress along the road of socialist transformations, the development of its economy, science and culture, the improvement of the well-being of the broad masses of the working people, and the solution of the problems inherited from old, semicolonial China.

The USSR has never been the initiator of the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. Conversely, it has sought constructive dialogue in every way.

The Soviet Union believes that the settlement of political problems could ensure in the best possible way the normalization of bilateral relations. As far back as the 1960s, the USSR proposed a series of major initiatives. The Soviet proposals on summit meetings, on the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force and a non-aggression treaty, on holding talks to normalize and improve inter-state relations and on signing a document on principles of mutual relations between the two countries are well known. The 26th Congress of the CPSU reiterated the Soviet Union's intention to build relations with the PRC on a good-neighbourly basis. It stated that all the earlier Soviet proposals aimed at normalizing relations with China remained in force, just as our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people remained unchanged.

The USSR has repeatedly voiced its desire to reach agreement on any measures acceptable to both sides to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect of their interests, non-intervention

in each other's internal affairs and mutual benefit, of course, without any detriment to third countries. This applies to economic, scientific, cultural and also to political contacts—to the extent to which both sides are prepared to take some concrete steps or other in any of these spheres.

As for bilateral contacts proper, after the “cultural revolution” Soviet-Chinese relations have been maintained at a certain level. As before, embassies are functioning in both states. Trade is carried out on the basis of the sides' mutual interests, although its volume does not correspond to the potentialities of the two countries. Regular railway and air traffic and postal and telegraph communications are maintained between the USSR and the PRC. Conferences of the mixed commission on shipping in the frontier areas of rivers are held annually, a mixed railway border commission operates, and contacts exist between individual departments of the two states on questions of interest to them. The participation of representatives of both sides in different international forums, conferences, symposia and sports competitions held in the USSR and China has expanded. Non-official visits of scientists and specialists from the Soviet Union to the PRC and from the PRC to the Soviet Union are becoming practice.

The recent proposals made by the Soviet Union to the Chinese side on establishing contacts in science and technology and on exchanging groups of students reflect the constructive position of the USSR.

The speech of Leonid Brezhnev on March 24, 1982, in Tashkent plays a special role in normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations. The new Soviet initiatives contained in that speech are the direct extension and further development of the Soviet Union's prin-

cipled policy towards China and of the numerous constructive proposals which have already been put to the Chinese side.

It was stated in Peking that the Chinese side had paid attention to the considerations voiced by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet but that it would judge the position of the USSR by "practical deeds".

But when it comes to "practical deeds", the leaders of the PRC are making a whole range of preliminary demands which the USSR must meet before any Soviet-Chinese talks begin. These include renunciation of support and assistance to the Mongolian People's Republic, the Indochinese countries and Afghanistan, the unilateral withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union from the border with the PRC, and recognition of China's "rights" to vast areas of the USSR. These demands, made earlier, were reiterated in the statements of high-ranking party and government leaders.

What can be said about these demands? To begin with, it is clear that their authors still have no desire to reckon with the realities of international affairs and that the piling up of all sorts of preliminary conditions bordering on ultimatums in no way testifies to the striving of the Chinese side to find a way out of the blind alley in which Soviet-Chinese relations are at the moment.

As for the Soviet Union, it has never allowed itself to make disrespectful statements about its Chinese neighbour nor made any preliminary conditions for sitting down to the negotiating table.

It was clearly stated anew in Leonid Brezhnev's speech in Tashkent that the Soviet Union is prepared to seek agreement without any preliminary conditions

on measures to improve Soviet-Chinese relations that would be acceptable to both sides and, of course, do no damage to third countries.

When Peking makes obviously unacceptable preliminary conditions as "payment" for the possible improvement of relations between the USSR and the PRC, this cannot be viewed as anything short of a show of the deliberate unwillingness to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations.

It should be added here that the Peking leaders and the press of the PRC continue to make statements and turn out publications that are hostile towards our country, calling for the establishment of an international anti-Soviet front and a "framework for joint counteraction" to the USSR. Defying the truth, Peking propaganda portrays the Soviet Union as China's main enemy and the "main source of the war threat".

It is difficult to shake off the impression that the Peking leaders are guided by short-sighted calculations prompted not by the interests of socialism and the Chinese people but by the sinocentric and hegemonistic ambitions rather than the genuine and long-term interests of the country. Exploiting international tension and contradictions between the USSR and the USA and getting the Western capitalist countries to invest more heavily in the modernization and militarization of China under the promissory note of anti-Sovietism given to them, the Peking "hawks" are pushing the imperialists in every way into confrontation with the USSR, although everyone understands to what irreparable consequences it may lead in the age of nuclear missiles.

The USSR has never interfered in the internal affairs of the PRC. At the same time we criticize a

number of aspects of the policy (primarily foreign policy) pursued by the Chinese leaders because this policy does not correspond to the socialist principles and norms and does damage to the Soviet Union, to the entire socialist community and to the cause of world peace. We criticize primarily the blocking of the course of the Chinese leaders with imperialist policy, not only because this course heats up the international situation, which is already explosive, but also because it complicates the prospects of socialism in China.

The historical experience of China itself and our present-day reality convince us that the imperialists have never been, are not and will never become friends of socialism. They only look for a chance to "bleed white" the socialist states, in particular, by dragging them into confrontation, into the arms race.

It is believed in the Soviet Union that the improvement of Soviet-Chinese interstate relations is long overdue precisely because it is prompted by the vital interests of the peoples of both the USSR and China.

The Soviet approach to China is not opportunistic, it is not determined by a striving to cash in on difficulties in its relations with the West, primarily with the United States. No, this approach is prompted by concern for peace and the good of the peoples. There is every possibility for making Soviet-Chinese relations a stabilizing and constructive element on a regional and a global scale.

Sooner or later unresolved problems will have to be removed from Soviet-Chinese relations. A genuine settlement of these problems would meet the aspirations and interests of the peoples of the two countries, the interests of improving the international situation as a whole.

R. NERONOV,
G. STEPANOVA

SOME TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPC

From the journal "Problemy Dalnego Vostoka"

The deep crisis afflicting China and the Chinese Communist Party is the result of the departure from Marxism-Leninism in theory and practice. The present Peking leadership has had to reappraise many important aspects of the Maoist theory and practice. But it continues Mao Zedong's course for accelerated militarization of the country, for whipping up anti-Sovietism, aggravating international tension and making common cause with imperialism.

The Peking leaders' reluctance to break with the Maoist legacy is graphically illustrated by the decision adopted at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee (June 1981) on some questions of the CPC's history since the formation of the PRC, which formalizes refurbished Maoism as the ideological and political basis for the development of Chinese society.

The decisions of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee purport to create a semblance of Marxist revival of the Party, to rehabilitate Mao Zedong and Maoism, to present Peking's foreign-policy course as supposedly based on proletarian internationalism and the peaceful coexistence principles. At the same time, they are the direct result of the

previous stage in the CPC development highlighted by the struggle between various trends on China's political arena.

Under the Flag of Adjustment

After Mao Zedong's death and the arrest of the "gang of four" some new features were observed in the life of the CPC. Its leadership took a series of measures to form a rigidly controlled, obedient Party apparatus and to use it for achieving strategic aims in the spirit of hegemonism and chauvinism.

According to the present Constitution of the CPC, the Party's organizational principle is democratic centralism, but actually this principle is not applied because for years and even decades the most important demands of inner-Party life have been flouted in the CPC. A sort of the "tradition" of arbitrariness and lawlessness has taken shape and the principle of accountability of leading organs of all ranks to the Party masses is not observed. Analysis of Party publications in the PRC shows that for many years Party leaders have been actually beyond the framework of party discipline. Organizational confusion is rife in the Party and lower organizations have only executive powers and are often in a state of chaos. The role of all-China Party congresses has been minimized and nothing has been done to define the powers, and the order and procedures for calling congresses. Still operative is the vicious Mao Zedong practice of solving key all-Party questions not at the congress but at closed administrative-Party conferences of high-ranking functionaries, at which the upper echelon informs about decisions already taken. An agreed decision is then submitted as a ready-made document to a congress

or plenary meeting and is adopted in fact without change.

True, recently control bodies, liquidated during the "cultural revolution", were set up in the Party apparatus. The Central Commission for Discipline Control has been formed at the CPC Central Committee and relevant commissions at provincial and district Party committees. The Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee has been set up anew and vested with the guidance of current Party work.

The institution of control organs and the secretariat in the Party apparatus outwardly looks like a renunciation of the Maoist practice of forming extra-constitutional groups which acted over the head of the CPC Central Committee and even members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (e.g. the Group for the Affairs of the Cultural Revolution, headquarters, committees of support for the "left", etc.). But in reality this is not quite so. It is still too early to speak of "normalization" of the organizational life and structure of the CPC. The fact of the matter is that the reinstatement of control organs and the secretariat was dictated not so much by the desire to return to the "glorious traditions of the Party" as the Chinese propaganda asserted, but by the requirements of the inner-party factional strife. The unceasing struggle of various groups in the top echelon of the CPC leadership necessitated the creation of control organs which would provide some guarantee against arbitrary persecution and reprisals and, at the same time, make it possible to nip in the bud undesirable tendencies in the localities.

Revision of "cases" dating to the periods of Mao Zedong's large-scale reprisals ("the struggle against the rightists", "cultural revolution" and so on) and

also party purges have become the main aspect of work of the commissions under the flag of adjustment of the norms of Party life. As a rule, persons subjected to purges were accused of compromising the style of Party work and contravening the laws of the state and they were automatically denounced as supporters of the "gang of four". Thus, the reinstated control organs in the Party apparatus were turned into an instrument for another factional clash within the leadership.

A Chronic Disease

This disease is the factional struggle. Though the documents of the last, eleventh CPC Congress spoke of the inadmissibility of factional struggle in the Party, and with the aim of "checking it" a number of declarative clauses and provisions were introduced in the Constitution, factionalism has not yet been overcome. Nor can it be otherwise, as internal struggle in the Party leadership is stimulated by objective causes. The struggle in the Peking top echelon on the country's socio-economic, ideological and foreign-policy orientation intensifies from time to time.

One of the consequences of the fierce factional struggle are endless "purges" among leading CPC functionaries and in administrative organs. After Mao Zedong's death his closest associates in the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council were removed. Following the arrest of the "gang of four" its supporters were removed from leading posts all over the country. Among them were thousands of leaders of the provincial and district level, political workers and commanding officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, down to the

divisional and corps level. At the eleventh CPC Congress which met in 1977, over 40 per cent of the CPC Central Committee members were not included in the newly elected Central Committee. After the congress "purges" were repeatedly conducted on the scale of the CPC—from the Central Committee to local Party organizations. Between 1977 and 1981 nearly all heads of Party committees and local governments at the provincial level were replaced.

The unabating struggle in the Peking upper circles is causing disarray and crisis of confidence in lower Party organizations. Rank and file members are totally disoriented and cannot grasp what is going on, fearful of following new and new political guidelines. The thing is that for many years all Party activists and local executives had been educated in the left-Maoist spirit of renunciation of material incentives and scorn for them, and made to rely on ultra-revolutionary slogans, continuously carry on the "revolution" and the struggle against "enemies". After December 1978 a new course was steered: alliance with members of rich rural strata, encouragement of good work through bonuses, formulation of slogans of the type "It's good to become rich", admission of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals to the Party, and so on. In the lower party organizations this modification of the internal political course during the period directly after Mao and in the three years of Hua Guofeng's rule is therefore taken with apprehensions and misgivings as to whether the wind of reforms will not blow in the other direction, whether the supporters of the "left"-Maoist faction will not come back. Functionaries in the localities prefer to assume a passive position and do not want to take independent decisions.

The process of renewal of the leading members

of the Party apparatus at different levels is a serious stage of preparation for the next congress. At this stage the Peking top crust tries to draw into the "leading groups" those CPC members who can, firstly, adopt the political, economic and social course of the Peking leadership and, secondly, effectively apply it. This is the main condition for giving rehabilitated leaders leading posts in the CPC. To all appearances, the process involves hundreds of thousands of Party functionaries, since the problem affects practically all links of the Party apparatus—from Party leaders at the level of communes and large enterprises to the leadership of Party committees at the provincial level and higher.

As before, a question of primary importance is the composition of the CPC. According to the statements of Chinese leaders, out of the 39 million Party members at present about a half do not meet the present demands. All the indications are that these "non-conformists" are to become the primary objects of "adjustment" of Party ranks, just as a part of the old Communists who have likewise "ceased to meet" these demands. With the aim of "improving" the Party's composition, special attention has lately been given to the admission of intellectuals to the Party. Though the social composition of the Party is not divulged, the petty-bourgeois influence in the CPC continues to prevail, as numerous reports confirm.

On the Eve of the Next Party Congress

The decision to call the 12th congress of the CPC was adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee (eleventh convocation) in February 1980. This is necessitated by the intention to consoli-

date the new regrouping of forces in the Party leadership, to endorse the "purge" of some persons and the promotion of others, to introduce respective amendments into the Party Constitution and sanction the departure from the line of the previous congress, which is virtually an accomplished fact.

The text of the Party Constitution is likely to undergo considerable changes at the 12th congress. It is characteristic that substantial adjustments in the CPC Constitution are introduced practically every four years. This is in itself an indicator of organizational instability and confusion in the Party.

The draft of the new Constitution was discussed and adopted by the fifth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee. The decisions of the fifth and, especially, the sixth plenary meetings testify that a number of clauses in the new Constitution will actually adjust the "left"-Maoist guidelines, giving them a new interpretation or even negating them. The positive appraisals of the "cultural revolution" will be probably withdrawn and the clauses on the holding of posts by leading functionaries will be changed. The clause on "Mao's ideas" will appear in a different interpretation. By and large, the documents of the forthcoming 12th CPC congress will revise a number of fundamental provisions of the previous, eleventh congress, and will reappraise the "cultural revolution", the personality of Liu Shaoqi and some of Mao Zedong's theses, e.g., on the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It should be pointed out that for some time now the Peking leadership has had increasingly wider recourse to the materials and decisions of the eighth CPC congress. But this is done inconsistently and in a contradictory way. Thus the call for following such

Congress postulates as the principle of democratic centralism, observance of collective leadership methods, struggle against the personality cult and others may be qualified as positive even if unsupported by deeds. On the other hand, the severing and discarding of the most important resolutions concerning the demand to be guided by Marxism-Leninism in Party activity (and not by "Mao Zedong's ideas" as written down in the present CPC Constitution) and follow the principles of proletarian internationalism and the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries attest to the fact that the CPC leadership is still holding the positions of reactionary nationalist Maoism. Basically, the present CPC leadership tries to exploit the name and banner of the eighth congress for its own aims rather than adhere to its resolutions. Exploiting the authority of the eighth congress and its resolutions, borrowing certain provisions from its documents, it tries to bolster the declining prestige of the Party among the people.

That the Maoist "tradition" of solving major Party questions by making a round of the all-China congresses of the CPC is alive was confirmed by the sixth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee held instead of the extraordinary 12th congress of the CPC at the end of June 1981. Like the previous plenums, it signalled the consummation of one more stage in the inner-Party struggle and resulted in a compromise decision. The main aspects connected with the work and decisions of the sixth plenum are :

— The plenum confirmed that the firm ideological and theoretical foundation of the CPC and society as a whole "for a long period of time" remains modified Maoism with its immutable components—great-power hegemonism, chauvinism and anti-Sovietism;

— the materials of the sixth plenum of the CPC Central Committee testify that the present Peking leadership continues to speculate on Marxist-Leninist terminology, trying to make it appear that the CPC continues to adhere to the Marxist-Leninist positions, and remain the vanguard of the Chinese working class;

— the plenum's resolution on some questions of the history of the CPC since the formation of the PRC, though it contains a forced recognition of Mao Zedong's "serious mistakes", nonetheless proves that the present Peking leadership cannot overcome the grievous Maoist legacy and draw appropriate conclusions from the past mistakes;

— reshufflings made by the sixth plenum, as a result of which Hua Guofeng ceded his post to Hu Yaobang but remained Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, fully corroborate the compromise character of the accords reached between the rival groupings in the Party leadership.

The sixth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee and the decisions it adopted bear witness to a crisis in the Party and society as a whole, to the fact that the Party is confronted by a host of unsolved tasks, that these tasks cannot be solved unless the ruinous Maoist legacy is jettisoned.

* * *

An objective analysis of the situation in the CPC shows that the deep ideological and organizational crisis in the Communist Party in China cannot be surmounted on the basis of the methods now proposed in Peking. However much the CPC propaganda machine might insist on the need to reach ideological unity on the basis of the main provisions of the De-

cision on some questions of the history of the CPC since the formation of the PRC, this unity cannot be achieved.

It is increasingly clear that the militaristic, hegemonic aims of Maoism contradict the objective interests of the Chinese working class. The CPC is directly influenced by this contradiction which undermines and destabilizes its structure.



HARD TIMES FOR CHINESE SCHOOLS

From the newspaper *Pravda*

China is nowadays in acute need of qualified specialists, literate workers, peasants and office employees.

The Chinese press admits that to this day the country has no universal primary education. The "Guangming ribao" has reported on the plight of the Chinese school more than once. In Peking, for instance, many schools are housed in ramshackle buildings and are short of desks, text-books and qualified teaching personnel. In provinces the situation is still worse. In the Qinghai province, the newspaper wrote, 82 per cent of young people are illiterate, and in Inner Mongolia the

proportion is 40 per cent. In the last ten years, as a result of the Maoist "revolution in education", "Renmin ribao" reported, the overwhelming majority of Chinese children and adolescents in the country could not go to school and only about 6 per cent of school leavers can continue their studies at higher schools.

The dangerously bad condition of many schools affects the pupils' health. Of Peking school leavers, 44 per cent, "Guangming ribao" alarmingly wrote, cannot study at higher schools on grounds of health and 48 per cent cannot get admission to technical schools.

The teaching profession is one of the least popular in the country and school instruction is often entrusted to non-professionals and semi-literate persons. Last year the budget allocations for education, culture, science and the health service were about 17 billion yuans or just several yuans per each secondary and higher school student, the "Guangming ribao" wrote. "Day in day out we are speaking of the need to extend education in China," the newspaper wrote, "but we do not allocate the funds for this".

The consequences of the ill-famed "cultural revolution", which praised ignorance and a negative attitude towards cultural values, make themselves felt to this day. If in the past the parents did all they could to give their child an education, today, the

newspaper "Zhongguo qingnian bao" reports, they use every possible pretext to keep their offspring from schooling. As attested by the journal "Zhongguo qingnian", China has today at most 1.1 million people with full-scale higher education and 1.2 million with secondary specialized education. As is known, in the 1950s several million specialists were trained with the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but the majority of them suffered reprisals in the 1960s.

The well-known Chinese playwright Shou Duanxian, in his article for youth published in the "Renmin ribao", pointed out that school leavers and higher school graduates of the PRC did not know elementary things, could not correctly draw the majority of the hieroglyphs and were not familiar with

the classics of Chinese and world literature.

Peking sees a way out of this predicament in the propaganda of the so-called policy of "reliance on one's own forces" in education. "Today," wrote the "Zhongguo qingnian bao", "education cannot rely wholly on the state. It is necessary to organize schools by the forces and funds of the communes, enterprises and institutions and to promote self-education. We must also hail organization of schools by private persons." In

practice this involves serious material outlays for enterprises and common working people. Tuition is not free of charge. At a state secondary school tuition fees are 5 to 7 yuans for six months, at a private school they amount to 7-10 yuans monthly.

The shortage of textbooks and aids, institution of paid courses and consultations for those studying on their own, paid admission to libraries—all this does not help, of course, to meet the thirst for knowledge rising among the Chinese youth.

A. BOVIN,
V. LUKIN

MOTIVES AND PROSPECTS

From *Literaturnaya gazeta*

President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China on February 21, 1972, was the first ever visit of a head of the American Administration to China. The talks were crowned with the adoption of the so-called "Shanghai Communiqué". Ten years have passed since that day. The motives of the Chinese-American rapprochement, the development of the Chinese-American relations in this period are discussed by Alexander BOVIN, a political observer of "Izvestia", and Professor Vladimir LUKIN, D.Sc. (History).

V.L. A turning point in the development of American-Chinese relations were Nixon's meetings with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai ten years ago.

This steep shift from extreme hostility to intensive rapprochement in the relations between these two so big and influential states is a rather significant and noticeable phenomenon in world politics. Today, ten years later, we can probably more clearly see the motives of this rapprochement...

A.B. Well, the motives were sufficiently obvious even at that time let alone today.

Peking needed Washington. Firstly, to obtain room for manoeuvre in its anti-Soviet policy and, particularly, to obstruct the establishment of broad Soviet-American cooperation. Secondly, to reinforce its positions on the world scene as a state with global interests and global political influence.

And Washington too needed Peking. Firstly, to provide a more sound basis for its Asian (and Pacific) policy. And, secondly, to have an additional lever for pressuring the Soviet Union. Nixon must have believed that the United States would



Despite differences over the Taiwan problem Chinese-American rapprochement in the military and diplomatic fields continues. Photo: A friendly handshake between Deng Xiaoping and Alexander Haig in Peking.

have a stronger hand in the Soviet-American dialogue if Washington had China as a support background...

V.L. I would add that political developments in the two countries were important too. During the lifetime of the "great helmsman" high-ranking visits went only in one direction: from the United States to China. From the standpoint of the ritual, this is very reminiscent of the Middle Kingdom times, when "barbarian" foreigners came genuflecting before the "Son of the Heavens". This style in relations with the leading imperialist country gave Peking propaganda a chance to create the illusion of the restoration of the former grandeur. The cultivation of these illusions was especially important in the situation of disillusionment and apathy which set in after the "cultural revolution".

For Washington, rapprochement at the initial stages was also facilitated by the fact that in the atmosphere of detente the steps taken by Nixon in relation to China strengthened his political positions in the country.

But for this matter, in such a large-scale and long drawn-out foreign-policy action motives change in the process.

A.B. I would not say that they change. They are rather overlaid and superimposed on one another. At first, as I have attempted to show, political and geo-strategic motives prevailed. Then, after Mao Zedong's death and China's entry upon the road of "four modernizations", economic, scientific and technical ties began to develop. True, the period of the initial euphoria over the potential of the Chinese market ended rather quickly. Slowing down the pace of modernization, the Chinese curtailed their orders respectively. And in general the solvency of the new partner began to cause growing doubts in the American business community. Lastly, in recent years both sides have evinced growing interest in contacts along the military-strategic line.

It would be in place, perhaps, to add the following. The Soviet Union does not have anything against good relations between the PRC and the USA. But, naturally, we are against their anti-Soviet edge. And this is not a problem concerning the Soviet Union alone. Practically, neither the Chinese nor the Americans have or can have real levers for affecting the policy of the USSR. They cannot "roll back" our country. Yet they can hamper detente and they are trying to do this—contrary to the interests of the world community. Thus, Chinese-American relations are today one of the main factors of destabilizing the international situation and stoking up international tension.

V.L. Does this mean that the Chinese-American rapprochement is viewed in both Peking and Washington from the standpoint of a long-term perspective, stable convergence (or parallel direction) of strategic interests?

A.B. I have my doubts. Chinese-American partnership is burdened with considerable difficulties and contradictions. This is, if you like, a partnership without trust or, let us say, with a minimum of trust. The Americans want to play the "Chinese card", i.e., use China in their political aims. But the Chinese too are not unwilling to play the American card. This being so, it is too complex to think in the categories of a long-term perspective. I feel rather that medium-term calculations predominate.



*American imperialism
strengthens its foothold
in China.*

**"Welcome dear friend!
Make yourself at home."
Drawing from "Daily
World" (USA)**

This explains the rather uneven development of Chinese-American relations.

I may be mistaken but I have the impression that both the Americans and the Chinese now view each other with more suspicion than ten years ago.

V.L. But it can hardly be denied that the texture of Chinese-American relations is now more solid. The road to this was rather meandering and, in my view, four stages can be distinguished along it.

The culmination of the first stage was Nixon's visit and the adoption of the "Shanghai Communique". This first dynamic stage was concluded at the end of 1973—the beginning of 1974. Its main results: the establishment of regular and dependable channels of bilateral consultations, the start of a systematic exchange of views on major issues of world politics.

The second stage of the American-Chinese rapprochement may be dated by the beginning of 1974 to the close of 1977. The rates of development of bilateral relations declined noticeably. The cause was the ambiguity of the political situation in both countries. In the PRC it was the illness and death first of Zhou Enlai and then Mao Zedong and the intensification of the struggle for power. In the United States it was the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation. In both Peking and Washington a period of vacillation set in and the results of the past years were reappraised again and again.

The third stage began in the spring of 1978 and continued up to the end of Carter's tenure of office. Stagnation gave way to energetic attempts at further rapprochement. The main results of this stage: establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and the PRC on January 1, 1979 and, accordingly, rupture of diplomatic relations and the military treaty between Washington and Taipei, a higher level of political coordination on an anti-Soviet foundation (especially as a result of Deng Xiaoping's visit to the USA in early 1979), conclusion of an inter-state economic agreement giving the PRC the most-favoured-nation treatment and envisaging considerable expansion of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation and measures to get cooperation going in the military field.

And, lastly, the fourth stage which began last year. Again we see signs of complications, ambiguity and contradictions...

A.B. These contradictions are different. Some of them develop on the surface, while others are deep-seated.

The Americans, hypnotized by the anti-Soviet dominant of Peking's foreign-policy course, are inclined to discount the fact that China, despite all zigzags and twists of its policy, is after all on the other side of the world social watershed than the United States. At present this can indeed be ignored. And America, applauding China's anti-Soviet policy and siding with it, may derive tactical and even strategic dividends. But history is not only the past and the present. It has also a future. And what today looks like a gain may tomorrow or the day after turn into a fundamental reverse for the Americans.

V.L. As far as I can see, you are convinced that sooner or later the Chinese policy will take an evolutionary shift in a positive direction.

A.B. Whether sooner I do not know, but later—yes. And I think that the Americans, at any rate the more far-sighted of them, realize that the future of Chinese-American relations focussed on anti-Sovietism is clouded with a flimsy screen of uncertainty. There is a rather noticeable divergence of strategic interests. Peking lays emphasis on creating an anti-Soviet coalition composed of China, the United States, Japan and Western Europe. However for all its antipathy towards the Soviet Union, Washington is not inclined to swallow the Chinese bait with closed eyes. No amount of pluses accruing from blocking with China can outbalance, or compensate for, the minuses that might result from a tough and prolonged confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Or take the situation in Asia. So far the Chinese tolerate America's presence and even encourage it. But the stronger China becomes, the less joy it will feel when coming everywhere face to face with the Americans.

V.L. Lately, the squabble over the Taiwan problem has intensified. For China, the problem of Taiwan, the attitude towards the reunification of the island has always been one of the main criteria of patriotism, concern for national interests. This is why, whatever "rational" calculations Deng Xiaoping or any other leader might have, they cannot go too far in making concessions to the United States on this question.

For the United States the problem of Taiwan means quite rational considerations. Account is being taken of Taiwan's rapid economic growth and the possibility of using it as a "shop window", especially against the background of the difficulties assailing the Chinese economy; the importance of trade with Taiwan for the USA (its volume runs at about 11 billion dollars

against 5 billion with the PRC); the growing strategic importance of the island for the USA as an important point lying close to the water routes along which the oil of the Middle East is transported to Japan and the West Coast of the United States itself.

A.B. Apart from Taiwan, the Americans have other causes for a headache. It is attractive to participate in China's modernization. This holds the promise of big money. But an economically developed China is a new competitor. As it is, the United States is at a loss as to what to do with Japan, let alone China.

It is still more attractive to arm China, against the USSR of course. And what if the situation changes and the Chinese turn in the opposite direction? Even when the Chinese attacked Vietnam—and this in principle did not contradict the United States' interests—the Americans had a lot of trouble, for the events escaped their control. And this may happen again. On the whole, for all practical purposes the pluses of today may in any case become minuses tomorrow.

V.L. This might be so. Take the military aspect. At first there was a period when the keynote was the talk about the Chinese military threat to the West, including the rather hysterical racist theses about the "yellow peril". At the initial stages of rapprochement with Peking, on the contrary, the PRC was presented as a weak and helpless dove thinking of nothing else but ways of repelling numerous threats of invasion, though it is well known that in the past 30 years the PRC has systematically and unhesitatingly used its armed forces beyond its borders (11 times, to be exact).

In the second half of the 1970s precedence went to the idea of using the Chinese military potential for solving the global-strategic problems facing the United States. The task was set to strengthen the PRC militarily so as to "counter-balance" the Soviet Union, and lower the latter's manoeuvrability.

But some circles of the United States fear a rapid growth of the military potential of "communist China", especially its navy, aviation and strategic forces. For Washington will not be able to control the use of this potential. And zigzags of the Chinese foreign-policy course are well known to all.

A.B. It would be logical to presume that the Peking top circles are divided as to the directions of the country's foreign policy. Sober-minded Chinese cannot but ask themselves what

China has gained by putting itself into an anti-Soviet cage it has itself built. They cannot but ask themselves: how is China's prestige affected by its embrace with those who support the rotten, tyrannical regimes and, at the same time, interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples? The events round Taiwan stimulate precisely such questions.

After all that has been said it can be put on record that hostile relations with the Soviet Union do not accord either with the national interests of the United States or the national interests of China. And as this is realized in Peking and Washington, a fundamentally new political situation will take shape. And those to gain from this are not just three states but the whole of mankind.

A GRAVE PROBLEM

From the newspaper *Pravda*

Residents of many Chinese cities, especially such major ones as Peking, Shanghai, Wuhan and Canton, prefer spending their evenings at home. It is safer this way. A crime wave is sweeping the country. Workers on evening and night shifts demand that guards be provided to see them home; young women are afraid to walk in public parks. The well-known places of recreation in Peking and in other cities are no longer safe even by day.

It was noted at a conference of representatives of public safety bodies of the five leading cities of the PRC—Peking, Tianjin, Shanghai,

Canton and Wuhan—held in the autumn of 1981 that the authorities had failed to resolve the problem of eliminating crime and keeping law and order.

According to the Japanese "Sankei Shim-bun", a total of 116 death sentences was registered in China in the past three months of last year of which 102 death penalties were immediately carried out in public.

The mounting crime rate among young people gives the authorities a special cause for concern. The "Peking Review" testifies that among the people arrested in the country in 1977-1981 youth under

25 made up the overwhelming majority. Once, laments the magazine, Peking used to be known abroad as the safest city. Today no one could risk claiming anything of the sort any longer.

The files kept on habitual offenders in the Public Security Department of the Dalian railway show that 80 per cent of those under surveillance are young people; in the city of Qiqihar 70 per cent of all criminal acts are perpetrated by young men and women. According to the "Renmin ribao" 624 gangs of juvenile delinquents, 3,400 persons all told, that had terrorised the residents by their brawls and fist-fights were arrested in Wuhan.

Crime is on the rise among schoolchildren.

Thievery, pilfering, swindling, petty profiteering, hooliganism make up a far-from-

complete list of offences committed by adolescents.

According to foreign correspondents "black markets" operate all but openly in the capital and other major cities. In the hutongs, by-streets not far from downtown Peking's street Chananjie, black marketeers offer you a wide range of merchandise all the way from pornography to the latest makes of Japanese watches and tape recorders. Right there, on the street, one can gamble for high stakes. If one has managed to save some money or ration cards for foodstuffs or consumer durables, which are dubbed "second money" in China, one can spend them in dubious "entertainment" joints which have been restored in the past few years.

But what are the causes of such negative phenomena in the pub-

lic life of the PRC? Why do even rather severe measures enacted by the authorities prove ineffective? Objective answers to these questions are hard to find in the pages of the Chinese press. The social, economic, moral, ideological and other causes, discussed in the press, which very often arise from the main cause—the onerous burden of “Mao thought” inherited by the current PRC leadership—are generally deliberately ignored.

The inertia of the “cultural revolution” when crime and violence were, on the “great helmsman’s” direction, elevated to a virtue while morality, culture and humaneness were denigrated is still felt acutely. This incontrovertible fact is acknowledged by Chinese propaganda but all responsibility is placed upon the infamous “gang of four” from Mao’s immediate entourage.

IRONICAL REMARKS



Reminder

This time Lunar New Year in China fell on January 25. Radio Peking recalled in good time that many marriages are contracted on this day and that wives and husbands forced to live apart by work hold reunions. After such reunions, it went on, many women become pregnant. And so newlyweds and couples meeting on New

Year's Day “should pay particular attention to planning the family” and remember the “one family—one child” campaign. It was also announced that on the occasion of New Year's Day pharmaceutical factories would increase the output of “Tanqin” (“Family Reunion”) and other contraceptives.

Bride-Price

Buying brides is a widespread practice in the Chinese province of Fujian. The price varies from county to county but is paid chiefly with goods. In some counties it includes a tidy sum of money plus a bicycle, a sewing machine, a watch, a chest of drawers, and clothes. In others the brides are more expensive: the parents also demand a radio set, a tape recorder, a TV set, and even gold ornaments. Many,

of course, cannot afford such expensive brides. But the "elite" are apt to spend a great deal on weddings. For instance, Hu Zijun, secretary of the Communist Party Committee in Maling County, Sichuan Province, invited 2,500 guests to his son's wedding. The dinner, at which half a ton of pork was consumed, was prepared and served by more than 80 cooks and waiters.

FOREIGN POLICY

I. ILYIN

PEKING AND AFRICA

From the Soviet press

Although it does not predominate in Peking's great-power designs, the African continent nevertheless was chosen by the Chinese leadership as a convenient springboard in its struggle for hegemony in the Third World. This struggle, which Peking has been waging in Africa since the sixties, has nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice and is detrimental to the national liberation movement and the cause of the socio-economic development of independent African states.

Major Objectives

At all stages of their hegemonic course on the African continent Maoists have provoked and encouraged conflict and crisis situations there. Back in the sixties China exploited the contradictions between the national liberation movement, on the one hand, and imperialism and colonialism on the other. In the seventies and early eighties Peking dangerously toughened its policy in Africa, Southern Africa included. The Chinese leadership began to support the policy of the West, the USA in the first place, prodding imperialists and racist colonial regimes to use armed force against

the national liberation forces in the socialist-oriented countries.

During the events in Angola and the Horn of Africa Chinese diplomacy was doing all it possibly could to exacerbate the conflicts and obstruct their settlement. Unlike its policies in the sixties, when Peking showed its interest in intensifying and prolonging the crises by openly calling for a "popular war" and acting accordingly, now it is supporting the imperialist forces and their strike detachment, the military-industrial complex, in their struggle against progressive regimes. Let us recall, for example, that China rebuked the United States for its "inactivity and connivance with Angola". In 1979 one of the Chinese leaders, Li Xiannian, provoked the West "to ideologically prepare for defeating" Ethiopia, Angola and other countries that had embarked on the path of socialist transformations.

The Chinese leadership has joined hands with the imperialists and racists in their struggle against African national liberation movements. Cases in point are Peking's support for domestic and external reactionaries resisting the democratic government of Angola, and China's supply of arms to the reactionary forces fighting against Socialist Ethiopia.

On many crucial questions concerning Africa Peking and Washington hold similar or identical positions, use the same arguments when attacking the revolutionary liberation struggles of the African peoples and discrediting the Soviet and Cuban aid to these peoples.

Simultaneously Peking is pursuing its own selfish interests in Africa purporting, among other things, to spoil the good relations of the African states with the socialist community countries. To this end Peking


strives to buttress the right-wing regimes and back up those groups and organizations whose policies and actions suit it. And, conversely, it openly and covertly does its utmost to weaken the states refusing to toe its line.

Cooperation with Racists

Last August, *The Washington Post*, quoting reliable sources (the US CIA), reported on the close col-

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

The American Administration is putting offensive weapons which could be used against China's neighbour countries and peoples into the hands of China's hegemonists.



The Pentagon's
innovation

Drawing by
N. Lisogorsky,
"Krasnaya zvezda"

laboration between the racist RSA and China in the nuclear industry. The newspaper wrote that China supplies enriched uranium to South Africa, and stressed the mutually beneficial character of their relations.

The world public has long been worried over nuclear preparations in the RSA. As is known, in September 1979, a nuclear device was tested in the south of the Atlantic Ocean—a result of the joint effort of the RSA, Israel and some Western countries that had supplied the racists and Zionists with nuclear technology. Also, it transpired that China had a hand in that test.

According to press reports, cooperation between South Africa and China in the nuclear field was discussed during Alexander Haig's visit to Peking last year. The American side was very much satisfied with the results of the talks.

The racists' ties with Chinese hegemonists are not anything new. Some time ago China concluded an agreement on oil deliveries with the RSA, in contravention of the UN resolutions on sanctions. In the last two years RSA-PRC trade has grown ten times to reach \$ 500 million at present. In addition to oil South Africa imports from China fabrics for army and police needs, handcuffs, locks for prison cells in exchange for gold, chromium, copper, nickel, uranium and other strategic raw materials. "China," wrote South African newspaper *The Star*, "wants the RSA to remain a stable pro-Western regime, because the black majority rule is against Peking's long-term strategic aims." China's commercial ties with the RSA have considerably expanded via Hongkong which occupies a leading place among the Asian countries as far as trade with the racists is concerned.

In developing their trade and economic ties both the PRC and South Africa are prompted by the desire to enlarge markets for their products. Besides, China is keen on obtaining advanced technology for developing its mineral deposits, especially gold, and on mastering the method of getting oil from coal discovered in the RSA. These and other factors make the racists confident that their relations with China will be developing successfully.

Direct contacts between the racists and Peking are also being furthered. The years 1979-1980 saw a series of meetings between Chinese and South African officials. In 1979 a Chinese delegation went to RSA-occupied Namibia to negotiate China's prospects of arms sales with the Pretoria administration and the South African occupational army command. Moreover, Peking sent its military advisers to Namibia where they, hand in glove with Chilean junta emissaries, train armed gangs for conducting subversive activities against the People's Republic of Angola.

One more indicative fact is that from the mid-seventies the Maoist press ceased carrying reports about the arms deliveries made to Pretoria by Britain, France and the FRG, about the activity of the imperialist monopolies in South Africa and the Western financial support to the apartheid regime. Not one word of condemnation has been said about Pretoria's military ties with Israel and the Taiwan regime.

In the System of Neo-Colonialism

Among the methods and means Peking uses to bolster up its positions in Africa a no minor part has been assigned to "development aid". In 1980 China's financial commitments to 39 countries of the continent

stood at \$2,800 million. However, often, such a long time passes between the promise of credit and its granting that the African countries lose all hope of ever receiving Chinese aid.

Africa holds first place among the regions of the developing world in the number of projects being built or scheduled for construction with China's assistance under technical-economic agreements (as of 1980, more than 300). The percentage of the fulfilled obligations here is not high either, the ratio between the actual and promised aid being roughly 1:3.

In fact, all China-undertaken projects are small or medium-sized. And this is not accidental, for heavy industry, poorly developed because of the low level of engineering and technology, and the lack of skilled personnel, remains the heel of Achilles in China's economy. It was only once that China did not keep to the rule and undertook a large project believing, probably, that the political effect would make up for both expenses and technological flaws. However, the TANZAM railway connecting Tanzania with Zambia, failed to justify the hopes placed in it.

According to the journal *Afrique-Asie*, the railway, which was opened about six years ago, is actually idle. In its time Peking raised a propaganda ballyhoo around this project. The railway was referred to as "an example of Chinese-African friendship and fruitful cooperation". Meanwhile, TANZAM, which cost \$450 million, has been unprofitable since the outset and unfit for use. In the first two years there were 600 accidents on the line; seventy per cent of China-made locomotives and 50 per cent of carriages failed during service. In April 1981, passenger traffic was stopped altogether.

In the present Chinese economic policy oriented towards the capitalist world the developing nations are coming to play an ever greater role as a source of finance and markets for Chinese products. In 1975-1979, trade with these countries yielded China a net profit of four billion dollars in hard currency. Its trade exchange with Africa looks more like trade expansion: for many years on end China has had an invariably favourable balance in her trade with the countries of that continent.

At the same time China is trying to lay her hands on Africa's natural riches joining, as it were, in the system of neo-colonialism. In recent years Peking, which only a while ago denigrated all foreign aid to the African countries save its own, has been urging them to promote technical and economic ties with the imperialist states as "reliable partners". Thus, China's technical and economic relations with the African countries have been turned into a political weapon of both the Peking leaders and international imperialism out to keep these countries as an appendage of the world capitalist economic system.

* * *

Describing Peking's current policies, Moses Mabida, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), wrote: "Its loyalty to the principles of scientific socialism helped the SACP early to detect the deviationist tendencies in the PRC leadership, the great-power chauvinism of its leaders, their hegemonic ambitions. We are gravely concerned about the alliance being formed between Peking and Washington, about the negative attitude of the Chinese leaders to the struggle for national liberation in Africa, and their constant propping of groupings opposing

the parties and governments that are friendly to the socialist world."

China's counter-revolutionary policy of aligning with imperialism and the racist regime, its splinter activity in the ranks of the national liberation movement could not but be exposed in Africa, and not only there.

Not just isolated and chance facts but very distinct counter-revolutionary tendencies in Peking's African policy as well as its practical deeds, testify to the desire of the Chinese leadership to perpetuate imperialism and racism on the continent, and show its hostility to the national liberation movement.

FACTS TESTIFY

DISCRIMINATION IN THE GUISE OF "AMITY"

From the foreign press

According to the Ghanaian historian Hevy, who in 1963 wrote a book entitled "An African Student in China" on the strength of his personal experience, "the Chinese, even doctors, think that the Africans have dark skin be-

cause they do not wash themselves".

The author's irony is obvious but it is not without bitterness.

Hevy notes that Africans studying in China often encounter manifestations of racial discrimination against

them. If, for instance, an African student danced with a Chinese girl she would be immediately afterwards subjected to a humiliating interrogation. According to Hevy, out of 118 African students, who studied in China at the time he was there, 96 students left the country without completing their studies because they were dissatisfied with the conditions of education and everyday life and low teaching standards; 10 students wanted to leave but could not for a number of reasons.

Twenty years have passed since then but the problem of discrimination against representatives of young independent states staying in China, far from being resolved, has even further sharpened. The journal "Africa" published in London wrote in its November 1981 issue that in 1978 and

1979 Peking was the scene of mass protest demonstrations staged by African students there. A joint petition handed in to the Chinese authorities by students from the developing countries spotlighted the facts of "glaring racial discrimination" which had led to a grave deterioration of relations between students and the local population.

Instances of racial discrimination against students from Asian and African countries were noted by the "Asia Week" published in Hongkong. Young men and women from the developing countries, it wrote, are separated from the local student body, they do not have decent living conditions.

At the same time professional qualifications which young people from developing countries can obtain in China are below international standards. For this

reason upon returning to their homelands graduates of Chinese educational establishments find it more difficult to get a job than those post-graduates that received their diplomas in other countries. Considering this, the governments of a number of African and Asian states have decided not to send their students for training in China.

At first sight the policy of discrimination being pursued by the

Peking leadership is puzzling, to put it mildly. For Peking is unsparing of its bombast to assure the developing countries of its "amity". Chinese leaders never tire of reiterating their "invariable support" for the Third World countries. Now the question is how does all this tie in with the facts of racial discrimination against the students from the developing countries in China. ■

DISTURBING WINDS FROM THE SOUTH

From *Literaturnaya gazeta*

Earlier this year Ulan-Bator, the capital of the Mongolian People's Republic, was the venue of a meeting of writers from ten socialist countries. During the forum Leonid Pochivalin, a writer from the Soviet Union met the well-known Mongolian publicist Bazaryn Dashtseren. We present L. Pochivalin's account of their meetings and conversations.

In the space of several days representatives of writers' unions from ten socialist countries discussed their professional affairs and questions of literary criticism. However the writers did more than "talk shop". The current dangerous world situation placed its imprint upon the speeches delivered at the sessions and our talk between them. We discussed "hot spots" in the world, including the continuing Chinese provocations against Vietnam, imperialist attacks upon Poland, mid-East unsettlement and provocations against Afghanistan...

"We do not feel at peace either", said Bazaryn Dashtseren. "Disturbing winds are blowing from the south."

Dashtseren was on the Mongolian delegation. He is member of the Board of the Union of Mongolian Writers, a well-known publicist and also an eminent Sinologist.

During intermissions I would often meet Dashtseren for a talk over a cup of coffee. We discussed not only literature but also world issues.

"Today every writer ought to be concerned about these issues," he said to me. "Such is the situation in the world."

And after a pause he continued: "At our meeting today it occurred to me that we have representatives from ten socialist countries here but not one from China. They could not attend for they would have been alien to us. Alien, I say! Well, we did quarrel in olden times. But now, they claim in China that they are building socialism; the party that heads the state there calls itself communist. But the border with China which runs

along our south and for the Vietnamese Nguyen Ngok¹ in the north, still gives cause for concern."

Listening to Dashtseren I recalled how I once travelled from Hongkong to China. The Hongkong train brought us to the very border: there was no further traffic, and in order to get to China we had to cross a bridge. Carrying suitcases we strode along the track. The British flag flapped in the wind back of us; right ahead of us, atop a tall and thin mast, there blazed a red flag, so familiar, so near and dear in colour. But the people wearing the service caps of frontier guards that met us on the other end of the bridge sullenly frowned on seeing the Soviet passports...

Dashtseren went on meanwhile:

"I had seen much of the border since childhood. I am from the Eastern aimak; it is adjacent to China. To us, arats,² the south had never since earliest times promised anything good. Chinese merchants, officials, usurers would come from there and try to impress on us, Mongolians, that we were a nomadic tribe and, consequently, second-class people, and must obey them, these representatives of a 'great civilization'. Wars were also visited upon us from the south... And today the arat also glances with mistrust in that direction. Particularly alarming is the current military collusion between China and the USA; alarming is the fact of an immense Chinese army deployed beyond the southern border. One fancies that its shadow is cast over our land... And this is a neighbour with whom we would sincerely like to be friends!"

We walked through Ulan-Bator and discussed China and the Chinese. We recalled meetings with ordinary Chinese people, their amazing industriousness, patience and modesty, their difficult life.

"Good times seem to have passed so quickly," said Dashtseren. "After the rout of militarist Japan and formation of the People's Republic of China our southern border indeed became a border of peace. We hoped that we would at last have good neighbours not only in the north but also in the south. But the mid-sixties came, and a 'cultural revolution' began in China. One border provocation followed another. Trade and economic relations, and direct telegraph and telephone communications and air traffic with China were disrupted; traffic on the Moscow—Ulan-Bator—Peking railway was almost paralyzed.

¹ A participant in the forum—Ed.

² Arat is a countryman, a cattle-breeder—Ed.

The border area in the north of China was declared a zone of 'military preparations'. Airfields, strategic roads and military bases were being built there...

"That extremely hostile policy of the Peking leadership made us strengthen our defences, protect our fairly long border with China, re-install frontier troops which had been disbanded after the rout of militarist Japan and formation of the PRC." "And how do your relations with your southern neighbour develop today?" I asked.

"We again meet with the same hostility," he replied. "But the methods by which they have been trying to indoctrinate us are growing more ingenious. As formerly, a secret war is being waged against the MPR, attempts are being made to send spies and saboteurs into our country and use the 'huaqiao' permanently residing in our country for hostile purposes. China today exhibits more sophistication. For instance, the methods of Chinese radio-propaganda have somewhat altered; it has ceased to be so crude in its hostility. The Mongolians are no longer told to overthrow their government. Instead attempts are being made to pit them against the USSR and other socialist countries, to present China as the only friend of the Mongolians, as their 'big brother'. Behind all this is the same great-Han chauvinism. In his time Mao Zedong did much to revive it; but after the death of the 'great helmsman' this decrepit chimera of the past was not abandoned. Just the reverse: they stake upon it."

Dashtseren is familiar with many works of Chinese politicians, men of letters and literary critics. More and more often they speak of the restoration of "Great China". They are still engaged in so-called cartographic aggression. Claims are laid to lands that have always been Mongolian and indeed to the whole of Mongolia. Emphasis is placed upon the falsification of Mongolian history. Various research institutes are established and international symposiums are called to study questions of Mongolian history. Efforts are being made to discredit Marxist Mongolian studies in the socialist countries. In China today they try hard to "scientifically" substantiate an old great-Han idea whereby the Mongolians are not an independent nation but merely a national minority of China.

"The expansionist ambitions of China are openly supported by the West's imperialist circles. It is being increasingly claimed in the West that after the death of Mao Zedong a process of de-Maoization began in China, that the Peking leaders today pursue a more reasonable diplomacy. I think this is being

said with a selfish aim, in order to blunt our vigilance. We ourselves do not see any such changes. As before, China is threatening its neighbours. It has not become peaceable. And we have no grounds for feeling at ease."

V. LUNIN

PEKING'S DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN LATIN AMERICA

A feature of Peking's diplomacy last year was notable invigoration of the PRC's contacts with the Latin American countries. In 1981 Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council, for the first time since the formation of the PRC, visited Latin America. He took part in a conference on international economic questions, held in Cancun, and then paid an official state visit to Mexico. Huang Hua, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not ignore Latin American

states either; he visited Venezuela and Colombia. His deputy Zhang Wenjin, for his part, made a tour of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Chile and Ecuador. In the meantime Peking was visited by the President of Venezuela, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela and Colombia.

What is behind China's interest in Latin America and Peking's spurt of diplomatic activity in that region in 1981?

Apparently an answer to this question should be sought in the general approach adopted by the Chinese leadership vis-a-vis the Asian, African and Latin American countries. In the past few years the patently pro-imperialist, pro-American policy of Peking has done much to undermine its prestige among the developing countries. This is first of all true of the liberated countries of Asia and Africa. The peoples of those countries have had numerous occasions to learn from bitter experience what the high-sounding speeches by Chinese leaders on their alleged solidarity with the peoples' liberation struggle and support for developing countries conceal. In Asia that was the territorial claims to its neighbours, the war of aggression against Vietnam, unleashed in February, 1978, and the incessant

armed provocations along China's border with the SRV, the pitting of one state against another and the stoking up of tensions around Afghanistan and Kampuchea, support for the separatists in India, Burma and Indonesia and enlisting of ethnic Chinese for subversive purposes. In Africa Peking's misdeeds include the betrayal of the Angolan people, the splitting of national liberation movements and the maintenance of ignominious ties with the racist regime of South Africa.

As for Latin America, due to their historical and geographic conditions the states of the continent have had relatively weak links with China. Because of the geographical remoteness Latin American states do not clearly realize Peking's expansionism and the real scale of its hegemonistic ambitions. Nevertheless,

these states are wary of the foreign-policy activities of Peking orienting itself towards the USA. Many Latin American countries negatively react to Peking's "sweetheart" relations with Pinochet's junta in Chile and the consolidation of its friendship with the Guatemalan dictatorship.

Therefore, wishing to buttress their unstable positions and gain a foothold within the developing countries Peking's leaders have carried out a series of diplomatic manoeuvres, particularly in Latin America. In so doing they take into consideration the growing political weight and authority of the Latin American countries in world affairs, in the non-aligned movement and in international organizations. Besides, Peking shows increasing interest in the Latin American sources of strategic

raw materials and resources, it wants to acquire certain types of industrial products and military hardware (at prices lower than those in the markets of advanced capitalist countries) and seeks technical cooperation in such fields, important to China, as oil production and refining.

However, first and foremost, at the current stage Peking bends its efforts towards establishing and consolidating political relations with the states of the region. Notably, it has mounted its "diplomatic offensive" upon both the bourgeois-democratic and military-dictatorial regimes. In seeking to win the sympathies of the Latin American states Peking makes up to them in international affairs, plays up to them when it comes to questions relating to the establishment of a new economic order. Peking,

however, does not forget its own interests speculating on the "community of destinies" and its alleged identity with the Third World.

At the same time China's approach to the problems facing the region, to its relations with the Latin American countries, has laid open the pro-imperialist essence of Peking's policy, its striving to draw Latin American states into the so-called "structure for joint resistance to hegemonism" and its desire to use them to achieve its global anti-Soviet strategy.

Thus, during their trips to the countries of the region both Huang Hua and Zhang Wenjin tried to arouse in their interlocutors feelings of mistrust for the USSR and Cuba invoking the events in El Salvador. Peking even tries to make it appear that it is Moscow and Havana that bear responsibility

for the events in that country, alleging that their "interference in the internal affairs of El Salvador exacerbates the situation in that country and in the entire region." In so doing, the Chinese politicians demonstrated their "appreciation" of Washington's "concern" over the development of events in El Salvador and, in effect, justified US intervention in the affairs of that country. China took the similar position regarding Nicaragua at the time of the liberation struggle in that country. In that period Peking, playing up to the Americans, also "shared" US apprehensions that the overthrow of the dictatorship in Nicaragua would trigger a chain reaction of uprisings against the dictatorial regimes in Central America which Washington seeks to prevent by all means. It was then that Peking's

propaganda dubbed the region "the fourth hot spot of the planet", next to the Persian Gulf area, Indochina and southern Africa.

Consequently, as is the case in Asia and Africa, the "strategic teamwork" between Peking and Washington is spreading to affect Latin America, too. It is not fortuitous that the visits to Latin America made by Jeane Kirkpatrick, a special representative of the US President, and China's minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua, in the summer of 1981 occurred at about the same time. It seemed that they were at one in their anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban propaganda outpourings and attacks upon the national liberation movement.

Commenting upon Huang Hua's trip the Venezuelan newspaper "Tribuna Popular" wrote that the visit "was part

and parcel of the anti-communist and anti-Soviet actions within the framework of the propaganda being churned out by the Peking clique whose position is based upon alliance with the most reactionary forces of the globe." R. Larrazabal, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Venezuela, exposing the aims of China's policy in the region said: "China is using every possible means to secure its presence in the Central American and Caribbean regions and, with this end in view, together with the United States, is trying to prop up the anti-popular military junta of El Salvador and other dictatorial regimes, such as, for instance, the Duvalier dictatorship on Haiti."

Thus, Latin America occupies an ever more conspicuous place in China's foreign policy.

How will the development of relations with the PRC tell on the Latin American countries? What will be the impacts of the intensified Chinese policy upon the countries of the continent? What new "hot sports" will erupt in Latin America as a consequence of the subversive activities being conducted by Washington and its Peking partners? The practice of relationships between the PRC

and the Asian and African developing countries, China's support for the dictatorial regimes in Latin America, "concerted action" by the USA and China and the hegemonistic thrust of the foreign policy being pursued by the current leadership in Peking do not warrant optimistic answers to these questions.

APN

CHINA'S ARMY—A TOOL OF HEGEMONISM

From the Soviet and foreign press


The building of the armed forces of China is based upon the Maoist military strategic concepts determined by the hegemonistic policy of Peking's current leadership. The army is regarded as a major tool in China's political strategy aimed at making the country into a strong militaristic power.

Strategy, Peking Style

The principal postulates of China's military doctrine are the same as they were under Mao Zedong. Just as Mao, his heirs consider war to be "a shortcut" to the achievement of their hegemonistic goals. China's domestic and foreign policies are geared towards war preparations.

A future war, in Peking's view, will be either "big" or "small". In the "big" war combat operations will range over a wide front on the ground, in the air, on the seas and even in outer space both with the use of nuclear weapons or without them. Peking acknowledges the tendency towards coalition wars in the contemporary epoch, including in a coalition countries with different social systems.

As for the "small" wars, they are interpreted to mean armed conflicts and wars between individual countries limited in time and space. In that event,



Over recent years China has spent about 10,000 million dollars on the purchase of foreign military technology.

Photo: Peking's buyers on the capitalist countries' military technology market.



Peking's leaders assert, conventional weaponry and matériel will be employed. However, this does not exclude the possibility of such wars growing into "big" nuclear wars.

The Chinese leadership regards limited armed conflicts as an instrument of its great-power hegemonistic policy, as a means of intimidating, "punishing" and "inflicting" retribution upon neighbouring states, especially those whose territories and populations are smaller than China's. It is precisely according to this scenario that events develop along China's borders with India, Vietnam, Laos and other countries of Asia.

The aggressive hegemonistic essence of Peking's military doctrine and all the practical activities having to do with the preparation of the country and army for a future big war found the most concentrated expression in the "four modernizations" programme. Having defined the fulfilment of this programme in the PRC Constitution as "the general task of the entire people for the new period (until the end of this century) Peking's leaders do not conceal that accelerated modernization of the "defences" is its sum and substance, a "strategic necessity".

Speaking about the modernization of the army Peking focuses attention upon its three crucial aspects: the equipment of the army with fundamentally new weapons and hardware, intensification of the ideological indoctrination of the officers and men in the spirit of chauvinism and anti-Sovietism, and improvement of combat and special training. The ultimate goal is to build up strong armed forces obedient to the will of the Peking leadership that could carry out its hegemonistic schemes.

Today one no longer hears in Peking that a massive home-guard is the "mainstay" in a future war,

that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger" and that victory can be won by leaning solely upon "a cog-soldier" equipped only with Mao's "ideas". Without abandoning the Maoist ideology the Chinese leaders now also state: "We must have everything our enemy has, and even what he does not yet have."

Modernization of the Army

The Chinese leadership's programme of modernizing the armed forces provides for the main effort to be centred upon the development of new types of weapons and also upon the improvement of the troops control system.

The lion's share of allocations for the army re-equipment goes to the missile forces. According to the Hongkong bulletin "Zhungbao", China has guided ballistic missiles of four types including the CSS-1 limited medium-range (1,900 km) missile carrying a nuclear warhead with a 20 kt. yield; the CSS-2 medium-range missile (2,700-4,000 km); the CSS-3 limited intercontinental missile (6,500 km) and the CSSX-4 intercontinental missile (11,000-12,800 km). Trial launchings of the latter were made in May, 1980.

Besides, China has allocated a considerable portion of its resources for the development of weapon systems that could substantially enhance the strategic offensive capabilities of the armed forces in the second half of the 1980s.

Active research is under way to develop advanced nuclear ammunition. According to Western press reports, during the tests at the Luobnuor range alone at least three nuclear devices designed for warheads have been tested in recent years. The "Zhungbao"

bulletin also reports that research efforts have been stepped up to develop neutron ammunition.

A principal avenue in the pursuit of the programme for modernizing the ground forces is the development of a new model of the Chinese tanks. Quite naturally, specialists in that country have been showing keen interest in the Western armour and more particularly the West German Leopard-2, the French AMX and the British Chieftain. China does not intend to acquire large batches of costly hardware but seeks to gain access to the manufacturing techniques of some more sophisticated elements, e.g. high-quality armour, gun stabilization systems, fire control devices, including laser sights.

As for artillery systems, they will be modernized mainly by developing self-propelled artillery. Much attention is being given to light portable anti-tank guided missiles and anti-aircraft guided missiles for infantry units.

China's aggression against Vietnam in 1979 in the opinion of foreign specialists brought to light many weak points of that country's ground forces. One of the principal drawbacks which the Chinese command has been striving to rectify is the low level of motorization of the units. Therefore, provision has been made to produce an increasing number of armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles for the infantry and troop-carrying helicopters. Simultaneously, plans are afoot to significantly increase deliveries of troop control and communications facilities. High up on the agenda are such questions as the adoption of a suitable field uniform and restoration of the system of military grades and ranks.

Modernization of the Air Force provides for the

development of new types of combat aircraft (fighters, attack planes and strategic bombers).

Aircraft armament is also being developed. The Air Force is equipped with air-to-air missiles fitted with infra-red homing heads. A new rapid-firing cannon is being developed.

Much is written in the Western press about China's interest in acquiring certain modern Western warplanes. For instance, negotiations have long been under way with Great Britain for the purchase of the Harrier vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL); the question of acquiring the Tornado multirole variable-geometry fighters, the French Mirage-2000 and Mirage-4000 aircraft and the US F-16 and A-10 planes is under consideration. However, China's offers to buy small batches of hardware do not suit Western firms and Peking has no foreign exchange to pay for large-scale hardware imports.

A central place in the modernization programme of the Chinese Navy is accorded to the development of the submarine fleet. First of all atomic attack and later missile-carrying submarines will be built.

The Chinese leadership's plans also envisage the development of air-capable fleet forces. The British "Navy Forces" journal reported that Great Britain is ready to take part in the development of aircraft-carrying ships of two classes with the displacement of 12,500 and 7,200 tons.

An important place in the Navy modernization programme is allotted to the development of the marine landing troops. Specifically, it has been decided to expand the construction of new types of troop-landing vessels of large load-carrying capacity and also high-speed hydrofoil assault boats.

Most Western specialists are of the opinion that without putting to work the West's scientific and technical innovations China will take decades to modernize her armed forces, given the present-day state of her material and technical facilities. This is precisely why, in the words of "The New York Times", the Chinese military are avidly exploring world markets in search of weapons, sending thousands of specialists to the West European countries. Developed capitalist countries are prepared to aid the rearmament of the Chinese army in exchange for the anti-Sovietism of the Peking leadership. According to the Japanese newspaper "Mainichi" the solution of this question depends in large part on the position of the US Administration which has stated on a number of occasions that a "strong China" accords with the West's strategic interests.

Military specialists in the West are unanimous in the opinion that China will in the short term modernize its army not through large-scale imports of modern arms but mainly by acquiring separate prototypes or small batches of weaponry and hardware and also technologies in order to start armaments production inside the country. So the efforts will be centred upon the development of new tanks and related equipment, modern combat aircraft and also new types of nuclear weapons and rocketry.

* * *

As facts testify, the Peking leaders are bent upon the country's militarization with the aim of carrying out their acts of aggression against the neighbouring sovereign states, of using force for resolving international issues and meddling in the affairs of other countries.

S. FROLKIN

CHINA: THE POLICY OF "OPEN DOORS" AGAIN

From *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*

Setting out to build up the military-economic potential at any cost, Peking readily brings China into the orbit of the capitalist world.

For the Benefit of Foreign Capital

One more area of China, this time Hainan Island, has been proclaimed "open" for foreign investors. By a decision of the Peking leadership all foreign businessmen wishing to participate in the "development" of the island are granted advantageous conditions to exploit the natural resources and hire Chinese labour there. Reporting this, Peking newspaper "China Daily" writes that financial benefits for foreigners on this island in the south covering an area of 32.2 thousand square kilometres will be more "attractive" than in the so-called

"special economic zones" of the Chinese provinces Guangdong and Fujian, which were initiated in 1979.

The "open door" policy has become one of the "new" trends in China's economic orientation. Indeed, for the first time in the history of the PRC, foreigners get the right to sign long-term agreements on leasing Chinese territory, to run their own fully financed enterprises, to fix wages for Chinese workers, hire and discharge them. Moreover, to curry favour with foreign capitalists, a new type of insurance has been introduced in China that insures against "political risks". In other words, the Chinese government pledges to re-

fund any losses incurred by foreign employers in the event of strikes, revolts, sabotage and confiscation of private capitalist property by local Chinese authorities or departments. The imperialists who enslaved and plundered China at the end of the last century and in the beginning of this century could not even dream of such an advantage.

The penetration of foreign capital into the Chinese economy is evident from this figure: total investments in joint enterprises with foreign investors' capital have already topped 1.5 billion dollars. The Chinese press reports that this year Western monopolies will be again invited to Peking and offered the opportunity to participate in 100 "joint projects". And so, the course proclaimed by the Peking leadership for "the adjustment of the economy", envisaging discontinuation of many large projects and "reduction of the front of capital construction", does not apply to foreign investments. In fact, these investments are part of the "adjustment". According to the statement of Ji Chungwei, a member of the Chinese State Committee for Foreign Investments, the "open door" policy will become

the Chinese leadership's "long-term strategy" in the economy.

Press reports in China and abroad testify to Peking's far-wide plans to create a "favourable climate" for foreign capital in China by granting it various tax reliefs.

The Opposite Effect

It is evident already today that the Peking leadership's one-sided emphasis on the development of ties with the capitalist world, far from helping to solve acute economic troubles and serving its purpose, creates new economic and social problems. As admitted by the newspaper "Nanfang ribao" (Guangdong province), foreign industrialists prefer to create small processing enterprises in China which do not require sophisticated technology. Their benefit for the PRC is small. Thus, the newspaper emphasizes, a contradiction arises between these transactions for importing advanced industrial technology into the country and the actual striving of China's eagerness to use Western capitalists to invade the Chinese market with minimum outlays. This position of foreign businessmen "brakes" the flow of modern equipment to China through

the channels of "mixed enterprises", for most of them are assembly plants or establishments only serving the needs of foreign trade and tourism.

This is most graphically illustrated by "special economic zones". There are four such zones in China being developed in two South China's provinces—Guangdong and Fujian. The largest of them is the Shon-zhen zone (Guangdong province), 30 square kilometres in area. Up to now, barely three years after its establishment, many foreign investors, chiefly from Hongkong, the neighbouring English colony, have made 800 deals worth one billion dollars. The capitalists are glad of the opportunity to lease the land for a song—about 10 cents per one square metre for a 25-year term, while in Hongkong the price is ten times higher. Under foreign control small enterprises operate in Shon-zhen and hotels and even health resorts are being built for foreign tourists in areas which only recently were farmlands feeding peasants. In this and other special zones the import of raw materials and equipment and the export of finished products are free of any duties. The income tax rate for profits

ranges from 10 to 15 per cent and the rest is pocketed by foreign entrepreneurs.

There is one more aspect to China's business-investment relations with the capitalist world. Foreign employers concentrate on "developing" coastal areas, since this is more convenient for them. The infrastructure developing there is intended mainly to export the output. The exclusive development of coastal areas has a distinctly lop-sided effect. Even now, more than 30 years after the formation of the PRC, industry in China's coastal areas, according to the newspaper "Renmin ribao", produces over 45 per cent of the country's total industrial output while the interior regions still remain outside this general development. This accentuates tendencies similar to those observed in old China which led to serious territorial imbalances in the economy. This was the policy pursued by the imperialist powers in relation to China in the past.

A Justified Concern

The Chinese press writes with concern about the social consequences created by "the opening of gates for capitalism". The Guang-

dong and Fujian provincial authorities have had to take measures against the steeply mounting contraband, profiteering, corruption and drug traffic. The newspaper "Nanfang ribao" wrote that "some international syndicates are trying to turn the Guangdong province into a base for shipments of opium, heroin and morphine. Criminal elements inside the country establish contacts with people abroad, enter into contacts with them and cooperate with them for the sake of fabulous gains".

What "dividends" can China expect in future from the "open door" policy?

Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council of the PRC, speaking at the December session of the National People's Congress, listed

this course among "ten guidelines in the field of economic construction" in China.

Taking a sober view of the matter, it can be said that in view of China's general backwardness and economic weakness, the participation of Western monopolies in developing the Chinese market gives them certain economic positions that can be exploited to the full if not now, then in the near future. The alliance with the imperialist West, all sorts of attractions offered to foreign capital in the form of credits, "joint enterprises" or "special economic zones"—all this creates a threat to China's independence and leads to the expansion of the economic and political influence of the imperialist states on the PRC.

OBSERVER'S VIEWPOINT

M. YAKOVLEV

CHINA: NEW AGRARIAN POLICY

From the newspaper *Selskaya zhizn*

In the years of Maoist rule China's agriculture was in a sorry plight and characterized by poverty, small-commodity production and an extremely low level of mechanization. Nowadays the Peking leadership is trying to find a way out and is forgoing the collectivist principles of agricultural production for the sake of immediate gains.

A new form of labour organization is being increasingly introduced into the Chinese village, the so-called system of production responsibility which basically involves "the assignment of production targets to individual households". A family receives from its production team a plot of land, draught animals and farm implements, and signs a "contract" with the team undertaking to produce a

specific farm product and retains any surpluses to dispose of according to its lights. According to "*Renmin ribao*" over 90 per cent of the country's farm production teams are covered by different forms of this system.

Judging from Chinese press reports, the new agrarian policy has somewhat revived agricultural activities. At the same time it has thrown up a host of problems which the Chinese press has been debating with alarm.

The introduction of the new labour organization system accompanied with calls not to fear the enrichment of individual farmsteads is being welcomed by families with a large number of able-bodied members. The position of the poorest families especially those short

WHAT'S GOING ON IN XINJIANG

Soviet Sinologist V. ANDREYEV answers the question of an Afghan reader.

Dear Gulam Muhammad,

Xinjiang occupying a vast area in the north-western part of China is one of the five autonomous regions where over 6 million people live—Uygurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and other national minorities. It borders on the USSR, the MPR, Afghanistan and India. The Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous region was formed as an administrative unit in order to preserve and develop the national traditions and cultures of these national minorities. However, the Peking leaders, intent on turning Xinjiang into an outpost of their expansionist policy, have been pursuing a policy prejudicial to the national interests of the millions of the indigenous population in the region.

For a long time now Peking leaders have been encouraging, and often forcing, the Hans (i.e. the Chinese) to move and settle there for good so as to help the central authorities to retain their control over the national minorities. As a result the proportion of the Hans among the Xinjiang population has increased from 6 per cent in 1949 to almost 50 per cent at the present time. The Chinese occupy virtually all the key posts in the Party and state-administrative apparatus of the autonomous region. The best lands and the more developed areas have been given to the Han

of labour has been going from bad to worse. This is leading to social differentiation in the village and is undermining the collective economies. The Chinese press reports numerous facts of collectively-owned property being arbitrarily divided.

Chinese press organs admit that many peasants believe the current policy regarding the village is dismantling collective farming. "Nanfang ribao" (Guangdong Province) wrote that they think the entire "production responsibility" system is tantamount to land redistribution among peasants and a reversal to private land use.

The peasants that have received plots of land for personal use in almost half the production teams do not want to enter into contracts by reason of transient considerations and plant crops which they find profitable to cultivate. Due to this areas sown to cereals have diminished which leads to the disruption of grain procurement plans.

The fragmentation of collectively-owned lands and encouragement of private land use have in effect retarded the mechanization of agriculture and given rise to negligent attitudes to the construction and preservation of irrigation facilities which are of primary importance for China's agriculture.

The new agrarian policy has already resulted in a sharp decline in the number of pupils at village schools. Many parents take their children from schools and make them work in the field on a par with adults. According to press reports this policy also subverts the public health services in the village.

The agrarian policy of the Peking leadership geared to advance the well-being of the well-to-do peasantry demolishes the collectivist basis of labour organization in the Chinese village and imposes a heavy burden upon the mass of the Chinese peasantry.

settlers. Due to the mass takeover of pasture lands the Chinese settlers have had their ploughlands increased. This worsens the living of the indigenous population as their main pursuit is cattle breeding.

The forcing of the entire able-bodied population of the autonomous region to take part in the construction of military facilities and undergo military training is a heavy burden upon the indigenous population. Virtually all men and women are enrolled in home-guard detachments. Moreover, a one-million-strong army is quartered in Xinjiang whose units actually perform the role of overseers over the local population as it works on the construction of military installations.

Culture is also in a sorry plight. For instance, the Arabic alphabet which was used by a majority of the Xinjiang population has been replaced by the Latin one, mosques were either closed or destroyed, tomes of classical literature burnt. A considerable proportion of the Xinjiang population are illiterate.

Naturally, this policy could not but lead to a sharp exacerbation of tensions in the region. Peking's great-power chauvinistic course caused an exodus of over 60,000 Uygurs and Kazakhs, driven to despair, to the Soviet Union in 1962. Serious disturbances erupted in February 1978 when, according to Taiwan press reports, an uprising of the local population broke out in Xinjiang. The insurgents smashed up the Maoist administrative and Party offices and seized arms depots. By decision of the CPC Central Committee of February 28, 1978 regular army units quelled the uprising ruthlessly.

But disturbances swept not only the indigenous population of Xinjiang. In 1980 there were major eruptions of discontent among young people banished

to live there permanently from Shanghai and other regions of China.

According to "The Washington Post", last year Xinjiang again witnessed an outbreak of disturbances caused by victimization of Moslems and the demands of national minorities that more religious freedoms and financial autonomy be accorded them. The indigenous population protested against the dominance of the Chinese in the Party and state-administrative apparatus. There were violent clashes between the indigenous population and the Chinese.

In August 1981 the situation deteriorated so that Deng Xiaoping, Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, was obliged to come to Xinjiang in person in order to help settle the conflict.

Growing tensions in Xinjiang caused by the chauvinistic nationality policy force Peking leaders to admit that the interests of the indigenous population of the national borderlands have been substantially ignored over the years.

But matters remain the same despite such admissions by Chinese leaders. The construction of military facilities in Xinjiang is still going on at accelerated rates and the indigenous population is made to leave to give space to the Chinese arriving from other provinces to settle there for good, and for quartering military units. The levers of provincial government are still in the hands of the Chinese and the spontaneous outbursts by national minorities, driven to despair by Peking's anti-popular, chauvinistic policy, are ruthlessly quelled as before.

This, dear Gulam Muhammad, is what is happening in Xinjiang bordering upon your country.

THEATRE IN THE SERVICE OF MAOISM

From the magazine *Teatr*

As the most mass-based art in China the theatre plays a great role in the ideological indoctrination of the country's population. This tradition was taken up by Maoism which had for decades compelled the theatres to propagate Mao Zedong's ideas and his ventures like the "great leap" and "cultural revolution", and out-and-out anti-Sovietism.

Chinese Theatre after Mao

After the "dead season" in China (1966-1974) during which it was only allowed to stage and perform "model revolutionary plays" and rehash in every way the standard packet of "Mao Zedong's ideas", the Chinese leadership suddenly began talking about new works that would glorify the "cultural revolution" until now referred to in the country as a "black decade". The call on the theatre to rehabilitate the "cultural revolution" in effect amounted to the desire to prolong the dominance of the "ideas of Mao Zedong".

However, back in 1976 the new leadership that had succeeded Mao after his death, while continuing allegiance to the fundamental Maoist postulates such as anti-Sovietism, was compelled to openly denounce the "cultural revolution" and some of Mao's actions. Accordingly, it was demanded that the Chinese theatres maintained and even intensified the anti-Soviet line.

Thus, the play "The Vanguard Oilfields Fighters" (1976) abounds in the familiar propaganda clichés belittling the importance of Soviet experience and the USSR's economic assis-

tance for China. Suitable as it was for official Chinese propaganda, this tested model clashed with the real situation that obtained in China after the rout of the "gang of four" in 1976. Recognition by the new PRC leadership of the pernicious consequences of the Maoist experiments and the hasty searches for new ways of extricating the country from the economic chaos—all served to compromise the former propaganda models of "production" plays and tone down somewhat the economic aspect of the anti-Soviet propaganda.

Accent on Anti-Sovietism


Since 1977 the Chinese leaders' alignment with the most aggressive forces of world imperialism has been evident in the scenic art of the PRC. The play "The Light of Red Lanterns" is a case in point. Much advertised by Chinese propaganda, this play, spearheaded against the USSR and based on the deliberate falsification of historical facts, was dubbed by the PRC leadership as a model new-type production.

The play centres on an episode in the struggle of the Yihetuan (Units of Justice and Concord) secret society against the invasion of China by seven powers. Of this number (Britain, Germany, the USA, Japan, France, Italy and tsarist Russia) the authors mention only the last. The plot revolves round one minor event—Yihetuan's skirmishes with a Russian Cossack detachment. This alone shows that the authors of the play meant not so much to glorify Yihetuan's deeds in the fight against imperialist aggressors as to focus the attention on Russia and provoke a hostile attitude to Russians. In doing so they hush up many well-known historical facts testifying that the contingent of Russian troops was very much inferior to that of the other interventionist powers and that, following the seizure of Peking in August 1900, the tsarist Russia's troops were the first to leave the capital (in September) and did not take part in plundering it.

All this highlights the authors' intention to twist the facts of history and portray Russia as the chief country responsible for the dramatic events of 1899-1901, calling for revenge and inciting hatred for the Soviet Union in the Chinese people. As for the other participants in the intervention they have had their actions justified by the authors, contrary to the irrefutable facts of history. The impression is that their flirting with imperialism

and currying favour with it are for Peking leaders dearer to the heart than the historical truth.

Such "masterpieces" as "The Light of Red Lanterns" are found in galore on the Chinese stage. Take, for instance, the opera, "Oulei Yilan". The unseemly aim of its creators was, by means of operatic art, to impregnate some basic concepts of contemporary Chinese historians who are attempting to "substantiate" somehow the Maoists' absurd territorial claims made to areas in the Soviet Far East and Central Asia, and distort the history of Russian-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations. Probably, realizing that their arguments in favour of the territorial claims are unconvincing, the authors make up for this loss by issuing highly emotional bellicose cries for a crusade against the Soviet Union.



The Chinese theatre continues the Maoist chauvinistic and hegemonistic course in culture.

Photo: A scene from the ballet glorifying victory over "Soviet revisionists".

"Masterpieces" of Slanderous Propaganda

Another unsavoury function imposed on China's theatre is to discredit in the eyes of the Chinese people the policy of peace being pursued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and twist the meaning of the internationalist assistance the USSR gives to the world national liberation movement.

A sample of such slanderous propaganda is the much advertised play "On the Other Shore" by Du Xiuan, produced at the Shanghai drama theatre for the 30th anniversary of the PRC in 1979. The scene is laid in Africa, but one finds it hard to see what is really happening in present-day Africa. The authors purposely keep silence about African peoples' struggle against foreign monopolies, against racism and apartheid. Nor do they raise the natural question: what are the aims and ideals upheld by the peoples of the continent in this struggle. The main characters, the Africans, remain in fact, in the background.

The state of affairs on the African continent is presented in such a way as to mislead audiences concerning the events really taking place in Africa. The author of this propaganda work intimates that there are no racist regimes "on the other shore", that the imperialists do not interfere in the affairs of African countries and peoples, do not obstruct the national liberation movement, and do not support reactionary regimes. For obvious reasons the author does not mention the intensive aid China has been and is giving to the armed bands fighting against the People's Republic of Angola.

Du Xiuan peremptorily asserts that the X country is the principal enemy of the African peoples engaged in national liberation struggles. It is clear from the crude allusions that the Soviet Union is meant. For want of concrete facts and "evidence" against the X country the author, following the familiar track, resorts to seditious slanderous allegations. He goes to the lengths of absurdity calling "self-interested" the tremendous help the USSR renders to countries struggling for independence and effecting democratic transformations.

Apparently being aware that the Soviet Union's consistent struggle for detente is largely contributing to its international prestige, Du Xiuan tries to whitewash the PRC leadership's militarist course. Echoing the Maoist conception about the inevitability of a third world war he cynically dismisses as "nonsense" the Soviet Union's warning that "a spark can cause a third world war and mankind's extinction".

China's rulers praise works of this sort, showering awards on their authors and encouraging favourable press comments. However, these "masterpieces" are not very popular with spectators. The absence of interest in such "hack plays" as Du Xiuan's is evident by the lack of theatre audiences.

IRONICAL REMARKS

THAT SUBVERSIVE CARMEN



Bizet's "Carmen" was recently staged in China for the first time, more than a century after it had been composed. Until then it was banned there. A specially invited French production team led by conductor Périssou spent a whole year coaching Chinese singers and musicians. The opera finally opened in January and was then repeated five times. Only party and government functionaries were ad-

mitted. After that the opera was again banned. The West German magazine "Der Spiegel" says there were two reasons for the ban. Firstly, José becomes a deserter on account of Carmen, and this fact may lead to the weakening of discipline in the Chinese army. Secondly, there is too much love in the opera, and that is contrary to the principles of "loyalty to the leadership" and "Maoist ideology."

WHY THE INTELLIGENTSIA IS PASSIVE IN CHINA

From the newspaper *Izvestia*

Measures are being taken in China today to assess the results of the policy pursued by the present Peking leadership with regard to the intelligentsia. A special decision of the CPC Central Committee on such a "survey" has not been published, but its contents have been reported upon by the press.

It is clear from the press statements that the Chinese leadership is worried by the fact that, despite the adjustments it made in the Maoist policy towards the intelligentsia and, in particular, the "rehabilitation" of this social stratum victimized during the "cultural revolution", the improve-

ment of living and working conditions for some categories of the intelligentsia, restitution of scientific ranks, etc., the general position of the intelligentsia has not improved to any significant degree. The press reports that the executive personnel of "many organizations and departments" do not pay proper attention to the intelligentsia. More than that, they "do not trust it, do not rely on it and even ignore it". In this connection the press carries calls "to protect the intelligentsia politically", to overcome "indiscriminate distrust of all intellectuals".

The Chinese press draws


attention to the passivity of the intelligentsia itself. Intellectual workers employed in the sphere of science, education, the economy, literature and art "are far from displaying all their potentialities", the press reports. The Chinese intelligentsia, not for a moment forgetting the endless political campaigns of the recent past and being confronted today with the current drive against "bourgeois liberalization" and other "deviations", is cautious towards the measures and guidelines of the present leadership. In this connection it is admitted that the survey "has revealed numerous problems waiting solution for a long period of time". Thus, despite the assurances of Peking propaganda that most of the cases unjustly taken

in the past against representatives of the intelligentsia have been reconsidered, it has become known that "472 cases bearing a political character" have not yet been dealt with.

Flirting with the intelligentsia and trying to set it at ease, the Chinese leadership calls for "an end to all forms of blocking" the policy of enlisting the services of the intelligentsia and drawing it, especially the scientific and technical community, into "active implementation of the modernization of the country".

Judging by the admissions of the Chinese press, the attempts to win the trust of the intelligentsia by the already familiar method of organizing one more campaign have not yielded the desired effect.

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN



The Maoists' repressive measures against the artistic intellectuals breed in them feelings of passivity and uncertainty.

— From which direction does the wind blow!

"CULTURAL REVOLUTION": EYEWITNESS REPORT

From the journal *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*

In his book "Four Years of Chaos"¹ A. Bazilbayev describes the "cultural revolution" in the Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous region (XUAR). The book is based on a wealth of factual material and personal observations of the author who hails from Xinjiang and witnessed the events in question at first hand.

The first chapter tells of the start of the "cultural revolution" in Xinjiang. The author notes that as far as the time-limits were concerned, in that region this campaign somewhat lagged behind that in China's central provinces. One may say that it proceeded on the strength of the already accumulated "experience" and according to plan. In keeping with the Maoist thesis: "Strike at the head, and the rest will fall apart by itself", the first blow was struck at the intelligentsia and advanced workers.

A "working group" consisting mainly of the Han students of Xinjiang University in Urumqi initiated the drive for spotting "class enemies", "struggle against the black lines" and "poisonous herbs". The lat-

¹ A. Bazilbayev. *Four Years of Chaos. On the So-Called "Cultural Revolution" in Xinjiang*. Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan Publishers, 1978, 144 pp. (in Russian).

ter, for instance, included the best samples of folk art and works by eminent Uygur writers and poets.

Four hundred Peking hungweibings who arrived in Xinjiang in early September 1966 were instructed to open "fire at the headquarters", that is, the XUAR Party Committee. The crude actions of the Peking emissaries evoked the resolute protest of the Xinjiang population.

In the second chapter the author looks at the drive "for establishing revolutionary ties" sponsored by Zhou Enlai, and its effects. In the course of this drive the hungweibings crisscrossed the country, met CPC leaders, and "exchanged experience" gained from "firing at the headquarters". As a member of one such delegation Bazilbayev toured many Chinese towns and cities. On the basis of his impressions he paints the picture of the economic dislocation and the hard and beggarly life of the population of this vast country. He adds that during his long missions he encountered only despondent and disillusioned people.

However, the Maoists' excesses perpetrated in the national regions could be compared to nothing else, he says. In Xinjiang he saw a great many trains carrying Chinese settlers who were to "fortify the border". When on their way back these trains were loaded with grain, meat and dairy products, wool, leather, fruit and other agricultural products, in addition to industrial raw materials such as oil, precious and non-ferrous metals, wood, etc. The author concludes that the drive for "establishing revolutionary ties" brought Xinjiang's economy to the brink of catastrophe. Raw materials were not delivered in time, factories and plants were at a standstill because the transport facilities were controlled by the hungweibings.

The "cultural revolution" spawned new and new "left-wing groupings" forever engaged in fierce grappling.

By the end of 1966 the clashes between the Xinjiang hungweibing factions had come to a head. "Ideological" controversy developed into sanguine battles. This is dealt with in the chapter entitled "The January Revolution and Armed Struggle". The author points out that the involvement of district military units could not stabilize the situation in Xinjiang where in February 1967 a large-scale campaign to "seize power" began in the party committees at enterprises and offices. During all this time the hungweibings in their internal strife had wide recourse to arms, marauding and plunder.

As a result of chaos and mass disorder industries stood idle. The population was in dire straits. The non-Han nationalities living in Xinjiang stepped up their resistance to the great-Han jingoistic policy and ideology.


In the last chapter, "Great-Han Chauvinism Exposed", Bazilbayev cites numerous instances demonstrating the Maoists' chauvinistic policy towards Xinjiang's indigenous population. He arrives at the conclusion that for all the different titles given to the political campaigns that had swept Xinjiang since the PRC's inception they shared one feature, namely: they hit mainly the non-Han peoples.

The book under review gives a clear and full idea of the rightless status of the non-Han nationalities in the Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous region and the real substance of the great-Han nationalities policy pursued by the Maoists, both in the past and at present.

O. TOLSTYKH

THE GREAT HELMSMAN'S LEGACY

From the *Ogonyok* magazine



for every inhabitant of our planet.

Mao Zedong left behind a monstrous jumble of sundry philosophical ideas and teachings but what he feared most of all was his own exposure, even if posthumous.

He also left behind a country, an immense country with a billion-strong population and the proud name of the People's Republic of China.

The book "China: Walls and People" is a narration about the present day of that country, and the life of the peoples inhabiting it. The book is solidly documented. Some of the documents are particularly telling because the

On Mao Zedong's personal instructions a total of three billion quotation books were published in many languages of the world, almost one

Gao Lingwei, Nikolai Solntsev. *China: Walls and People*. Moscow, Planeta Publishers, 1981.



*So
far,
wooden
weapons...*

Chinese themselves commented upon them. They include photos, excerpts from letters, periodicals and the semi-legal dazibao, official slogans, and utterances by the country's political leaders.

We see a crowded Peking street, workers and uniformed soldiers, service caps and ordinary caps, with and without stars, but not a single smiling face. This is a photo-accusation of Maoism which still remains China's official ideology, Maoism which has deprived the Chinese people of the joy of life and reduced them

to one "right"—thoughtless obedience. And everyone knows *only* too well what happens to those who disobey.

The photographs and comments selected by the authors of the book spotlight many aspects of public life in China after Mao's death. One of them is the hypocritical play at freedom of speech. In a number of specially allotted places people are allowed to paste "newspapers of big hieroglyphs" on walls, named the dazibao, in which "criticism is permitted". Deng Xiaoping said: "If the masses want to say

something they should be given the possibility to do so." But he omitted to say that those who "want to say something" have their pictures taken by security agents. So, the lists of the "recalcitrant" have been growing. An accurate and terrifying calculation...

The book "China: Walls and People" was written by a Soviet and a Chinese journalist.

Many, very many Chinese patriots, and one of them is the co-author of the book, are not indifferent to the destiny of their people, to the grim lot that has befallen a whole generation of young people in China. What can they, who were numbed by Maoist propaganda, give mankind and their children?

Children... Everywhere they are tended



*A hundred
million
suffer
malnutrition.*

and cared for by the grown-ups. In China concern is also shown for them. But this is a peculiar kind of concern. Chinese children are taught to kill. "Children of the whole world play at war," note the authors of the book. "Chinese children play only at war."

Children always need an example to emulate. And Chinese children do have such an example. This is an exemplary soldier Wang, hero of the numerous comic strips. Indefatigably does he smite the enemies, especially those "from the North". He knows no fear or hesitation and reports on all suspects to the proper authorities. Hundreds of thousands and millions of small followers of Wang in combat formations are trained to use bayonets and rifle butts and to report on suspects. It is hard to imagine anything

more unnatural than the face of a seven-year old boy contorted with rage. What will the future bring him? What will he be denied tomorrow if today he is robbed of childhood?

"China: Walls and People" is a book about the great tragedy of the Chinese people. The abundant factual material collected by the authors conveys the oppressive atmosphere of ignorance and social deprivation reigning in China.

Many people associated Mao's death with the hope that a whole epoch in the life of that country, an epoch of dogmatism and cruelty, would come to an end. Many Chinese thought that since the situation couldn't be worse, it would get better. But this has never happened...

A. SOKOLOV

The Soviet monthly digest SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE and supplements to this journal are digests of the political and theoretical press featuring the vital problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the practice of socialist and communist construction, the peoples' struggle for peace, democracy and socialism, and worldwide ideological struggle.

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