

STP ***SUPPLEMENT***

**ON SOVIET-
CHINESE
RELATIONS
PEKING AND
THE USA:
A DANGEROUS
COLLABORATION
AN EYEWITNESS
REPORT ABOUT
CHINA**

4

STP

SUPPLEMENT

SOCIALISM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE



Published
bimonthly
in English,
French,
German
and Spanish

CONTENTS

FROM DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS

L. BREZHNEV.

On Soviet-Chinese relations 5

N. TIKHONOV.

The Soviet Union has never sought confrontation with the PRC 6

LE DUAN.

We favour restoration of normal relations with China 7

HISTORY AND OUR TIME

B. PYSHKOV,
B. STAROSTIN

Spiral of betrayal 9

V. ZUBAKOV.

An important landmark in the history of the CPC 26

FOREIGN POLICY

V. LOMYKIN.

PRC-USA: the results of rapprochement 31

A. KHARLAMOV.

Staking on separatists 42

A. KOZYREV.

A dangerous phenomenon 49

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

China's "lost generation" 52

S. FROLKIN.

The scourge of unemployment 61

A step of despair and protest 65

IDEOLOGY

Ideological indoctrination of the Chinese population 69

BOOK REVIEWS

K. MASLOV.

The Soviet Union and China: a brief history of relations 78

S. AGAFONOV.

The sources of the present-day course 81

OUR LIBRARY

Darkness over China 83

Abridged materials are marked with an asterisk (*).

Address of the
STP Editorial Office:
7 Bolshaya
Pochtovaya Street,
107082, Moscow,
USSR

© Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982

Editing completed May 24, 1982.



Suong Pansai, a reader from Laos, writes: "I know that in the past the relations between the USSR and China were very good. I also know that friendship and alliance between them were reaffirmed at one of the CPC congresses. Could you give some information about this congress and how come China is now against the USSR, Laos and other socialist countries?"

The reply is given in V. Zubakov's article "An Important Landmark in the History of the CPC" published in this issue.

L. I. BREZHNEV ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

The principled position of our Party and the Soviet state on the question of Soviet-Chinese relations is clearly expounded in the decisions of the 25th and 26th congresses of the CPSU. Here I would like to reiterate the following aspects.

First. Despite the fact that we have openly criticized and continue to criticize many aspects of the policy (especially foreign policy) of the Chinese leadership as not conforming to the socialist principles and norms, we have never tried to interfere in the internal life of the People's Republic of China. We have not denied and do not deny the existence of the socialist social system in China, though, surely, Peking's agreement with the policy of the imperialists on the world scene contradicts the interests of socialism.

Second. We have never supported and do not support in any form the "conception of two Chinas" and have fully recognized and still recognize the sovereignty of the PRC over the Island of Taiwan.

Third. On the part of the Soviet Union there has never been nor is there now any threat to the People's Republic of China. We did not have and do not have any territorial claims to the PRC and are prepared to continue talks at any time on the existing frontier issues with the aim of reaching mutually acceptable decisions. We are also prepared to discuss the question of possible measures for building mutual confidence in the area of the Soviet-Chinese frontier.

Fourth. We remember well the times when the Soviet Union and People's China were bound by ties of friendship and comradesly cooperation. We have never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries a normal pheno-

From L.I. Brezhnev's speech at a meeting in Tashkent devoted to the awarding of the Order of Lenin to the Uzbek SSR, March 24, 1982.

menon. We are prepared to reach accords, without any preliminary conditions, on mutually acceptable measures for improving Soviet-Chinese relations, on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, non-interference in each other's affairs and mutual benefit and, of course, not to the detriment of third countries. This applies to economic, scientific, cultural, as well as political relations—as soon as both sides are ready to take specific concrete steps in any of these spheres.

Pravda, March 25, 1982

THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER SOUGHT CONFRONTATION WITH THE PRC

*Replies given by N.A. Tikhonov,
Chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers, to questions put by the
"Asahi" Editors (Japan).*

Question: Would you please express your opinion on present Soviet-Chinese relations and their prospects?

Answer: It is generally known what Soviet-Chinese relations are like today. There is no need to remind you what they were like in the past. What they could be today and in the future and what kind of relations we in the Soviet Union would like to have has been stated more than once emphatically and with utmost clarity.

The USSR policy towards China is principled and consistent. It has been charted in the resolutions of the Party's congresses. Expressing the view of the Soviet people, L. I. Brezhnev declared at the 26th Congress of our Party that the Soviet Union has never sought, nor does it seek now, confrontation with the People's Republic of China and would like to build its relations with that country on a good-neighbourly basis.

He also stressed that the repeated proposals made over many years for normalizing relations with China remain open and that our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed.

We cannot, of course, be satisfied with the present state of

Soviet-Chinese relations. And it is not our position that is to blame. As is known, in international affairs China's leaders stubbornly follow a course of hostility towards the Soviet Union and its allies and friends. Other forces in the world are also seeking further deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. These facts cannot be ignored.

We take the view that in Soviet-Chinese relations there are no problems which could not be solved on the basis of equality and in a spirit of mutual understanding. We do not intend to divert from concrete steps in attempting to improve the relations between our countries. But this must not be a one-sided process.

Pravda, February 17, 1982

LE DUAN
General Secretary,
Central Committee,
Communist Party of
Vietnam

WE FAVOUR RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA

The people of Vietnam are fully resolved to oppose all acts of annexation and aggression contemplated by the ruling circles of China against our country. But as before we harbour the feelings of friendship and good-neighbourliness and stand for the restoration of normal relations between the two countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence, respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and settlement of controversial issues through negotiation.

We have repeatedly proposed resuming the talks unilaterally called off by China, but the Chinese side continues to reject our proposals. As before, the Chinese leaders are frantically pressing forward with their policy of expansion and great-power chauvinism. They continue to nurture the plans of drawing Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea into the sphere of China's domina-

tion, regarding the countries of Indochina as the primary target of annexation and aggression in their expansion in Southeast Asia.

At present, the Chinese leaders are colluding with the United States to further their strategic designs still more. This is the real cause of growing tension in the relations between Vietnam and China. At the same time, this collusion is a factor undermining peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The ruling circles of China must bear all responsibility for the situation their policy creates.

From Le Duan's report at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, March 27, 1982.

HISTORY AND OUR TIME

B. PYSHKOV,
B. STAROSTIN

SPIRAL OF BETRAYAL

Peking and the International Communist Movement

The Changeover to an Alliance with Imperialism

Marxists-Leninists have long demonstrated the fallacy of Maoism. The real essence of the "cultural revolution" has been laid bare in the documents of the CPSU congresses and plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, in the speeches made by the Party and Government leaders of the Soviet Union. Speaking in Gorky in 1967, L. I. Brezhnev remarked: "The decisions of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee and the political campaign now going on in China under the banner of the 'great cultural revolution' bear witness to the fact that the great-power anti-Soviet policy of Mao Zedong and his group has entered a new and dangerous phase. . . Nor can we fail to see what harm the present policy pursued by Mao Zedong and his group does to the interests of the Chinese people themselves. . . It is a great tragedy for all true Communists in China and we express our deep sympathy to

Concluded from "Supplement" No. 2 for 1982.

them... By exposing the ideology and policy of the present Peking leaders which have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, we are fighting not against the CPC and China. We are fighting for the Communist Party of China, for its return to the path of internationalism, for its solidarity with all fraternal parties on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism..."¹

A Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the "cultural revolution" was given by representatives of many communist and workers' parties. The policy of the Mao Zedong group was subjected to argumentative criticism at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1969. The communist press stressed the anti-socialist, anti-democratic and anti-constitutional character of the "cultural revolution".

Today, a decade and a half since the beginning of the "cultural revolution" and several years after Mao's death, the experiments of the "great helmsman" are admitted to be fallacious and are openly denounced in China itself. In January 1980 Deng Xiaoping stated: "The whole country was in a state of white terror and unprecedented chaos. Party organizations suffered considerable damage and the popular masses were brutally suppressed."

Hu Yaobang, the present Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, called the "cultural revolution" a "counter-revolutionary period of great destruction".

Such appraisals are not fortuitous. Life has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of the Maoist interpretation of socialism and the utter bankruptcy of the attempts to put the Maoist "model" into effect. And Peking is undertaking the reappraisal of many

important aspects of Maoist theory and practice by no means for the sake of truth. As before, this process reflects the never ending struggle for power in the "upper echelon" and in the other tiers of Chinese society.

How should we assess the current developments in China?

Let us turn to the facts.

Inside the country, as the events of the last few years have shown, the new Chinese leadership has been unable to solve major economic, social and political problems, to set right the harm done to the Chinese people and the cause of socialism.

The national economy of the People's Republic of China is in dire straits and, as the newspaper "Renmin ribao" pointed out, the country is facing the threat of a "grave financial and economic crisis". Industrial output is falling, imbalances between economic sectors are increasing and the state budget deficit is growing. The political crisis, which has been going on in China for many years now, has not been overcome and in a number of fields it is even deepening. The mass anti-Maoist movement is growing in all spheres of Chinese society. The petty-bourgeois, private-property elements are becoming more active and conditions are appearing for monopoly capital from Western countries and Japan to penetrate into the economy of the PRC.

The Communist Party is not playing the role of political nucleus of the working class and its leadership does not voice the interests of the working people. The state and cooperative ownership of the means of production which has been preserved is wholly geared to the creation of a militarist super-power and

¹ *Pravda*, January 14, 1967.

the conduct of a hegemonic policy in the international arena.

The negative features of Peking's political course are most patently shown in its actions on the international scene. We witness China's further alignment with imperialism and world reaction and the intensification of its political and ideological struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries and also against progressive newly free countries and liberation movements.

Peking is now acting more aggressively than before. This is proved by the attack of Chinese hegemonists on socialist Vietnam, the continuing armed provocations on the Vietnamese-Chinese border and the designs against other neighbouring countries. This is confirmed also by Peking's military doctrine which, as before, is based on the premise that "a future war will start soon, will be large-scale and even nuclear".

Now and again paying lip service to the denunciation of the arms race, the Chinese leadership opposes, in practice, any proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and strengthening peace. Peking mounted a slander propaganda campaign against the peace initiatives advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress.

Peking's rapprochement with imperialism, its military and political alliance with the aggressive circles of the United States, Japan and Western Europe, its economic cooperation with monopoly capital, all of which is in fact subordinated to Peking's military-political ambitions, are reaching a dangerous point. The gates are thrown open for the sale of the latest military technology by the Pentagon and its allies to China. From discussions on the "parallel" direction and "coincidence" of their strategic interests on many

questions, China and the United States have practically begun coordinating their military, political and diplomatic actions.

New Tactics

One of the consequences of Peking's turn from a pseudo-revolutionary stance to an alliance with imperialism and reaction has been deep demoralization among Maoists abroad, intensification of the crisis which had long before surfaced in their camp. Many of the pro-Maoist groups have disintegrated, some have sharply denounced China's pro-imperialist course and those still loyal to Peking are losing even the semblance of political organizations, turning into its camouflaged agents.

Against the background of the deepening crisis in the camp of Maoists abroad, the Chinese leadership has lately concentrated efforts on two directions. Firstly, it is not slackening its attempts to consolidate the ranks of its stooges abroad, to make them a docile mouthpiece of Peking's policy. Secondly, it is obviously trying to change its policy towards some communist parties and, by flirting with them, to dampen their opposition to China's pro-imperialist policy on the international scene. The Chinese leadership shows its readiness to withdraw—and is already withdrawing—its charges of revisionism against some communist parties, in return for the recognition that Peking's struggle against the USSR and the CPSU, and other socialist countries does not allegedly contradict either the interests of individual parties or the interests of the communist and national liberation movements in general.

"Renmin ribao", organ of the CPC Central Committee, for the first time in many years, has begun

publishing regular reports about the activities of some European communist parties, grouping them under one heading with reports about various pro-Peking "parties" of dissenters abroad. Behind this seemingly minor fact we can discern a new rather significant political game which Peking has begun in relation to the international communist movement, while continuing its confrontation with the overwhelming majority of communist parties and practising its "differentiated approach" to the communist movement, dividing the participating parties into "right" and "wrong" ones.

The new tactic of the Chinese leadership towards some communist parties of Western Europe has been "ripening" in Peking over the past three or four years, gaining its definite, organizational form, so to say, in 1980. In the spring of 1980 Peking "normalized" its relations with the Italian Communist Party and in November, during the visit to China of the delegation of the Communist Party of Spain, an announcement was made about "normalization" of relations between the CPC and the CPS.

Peking is playing up as best as it can the "normalization" of relations with these parties as an "event of historic significance", as a "new stage of development", declaring the intention of the CPC to firmly uphold the "revived friendship won in battle".

A Double Game

Now let's return to the question raised at the beginning of the article. Why has Peking's attitude towards some contingents of the communist movement taken such a sharp turn, and what is the real meaning of this new zigzag? Analysis of the political

course of the present Chinese leadership shows convincingly that on major issues concerning international affairs and the world revolutionary process its position has not drawn closer to the position of the socialist countries and communist and workers' parties. On the contrary, Peking's policy is posing an ever greater danger to the cause of peace and socialism.

Peking is trying to worm its way into the international communist movement, through the "backdoor" so to say, pursuing its purely pragmatic, national-chauvinistic and pro-imperialist aims. Tracing the history of the CPC's relations with this movement, we can see that over the past 20 years the Chinese leadership has applied different tactics for the spreading of Maoism among communist parties and the undermining of their positions. But neither ideological attacks, nor total political confrontation and the implanting of pro-Maoist organizations in different countries have yielded the desired results. In the situation that has obtained the Chinese leadership, using a selective approach to individual communist parties under the "normalization of relations" banner, tried to play some communist parties off against others. This is apparently Peking's primary aim. To realize this aim, the Chinese leadership endeavours to take advantage of the position taken by some West European communist parties whose leadership lays special emphasis on the "national specifics" of the struggle for socialism, on questions of independence and autonomy, and diverges from other communist parties in its approach to particular international issues.

Secondly, seeking to pit some Communist parties against others, primarily against the CPSU, the Peking leadership is obviously trying to blunt the in-

ternationalist edge of their struggle and to impose on them its attitude to pressing international issues. On the eve of and during S. Carrillo's visit, Peking leaders most persistently preached the main slogans of their foreign policy doctrine.

Naturally, the delegations of West European communist parties expressed their disagreement, also in public, with some aspects of the Chinese policy. "We do not agree that the Soviet Union is an enemy," said E. Berlinguer, for example. The divergence of the ICP representatives from the CPC leadership was also manifested in relation to Peking's military-political rapprochement with the United States, NATO and Japan, in appraising problems of war and peace and Chinese aggression against Vietnam. Statements to the same effect were also made by S. Carrillo. But the Chinese leaders tried to let them go unnoticed and even to belittle their significance.

Thirdly, the cause and aim of Peking's new tactic is anti-Sovietism, the desire to isolate the CPSU and the Soviet Union on the international scene.

The leaders of the CPC advanced their claim of defining the rightness or wrongness of the policy of this or that party. Hu Yaobang said unambiguously that Peking would judge the "correctness of the positions" of other parties above all according to "how far they have dissociated themselves from the CPSU". It is no secret that Peking tries to win over a certain section of Left-wing forces to its side as one of the means of creating what they call the "broadest front" against the USSR and other socialist countries, i.e., carrying out a plan with which, judging by their public statements, the leaders of West European Communist parties do not agree.

Fourthly, through establishing contacts with communist parties, the Chinese leadership would like to put an end to the isolation imposed on China by Maoist policy, to raise its impaired prestige in the eyes of the Left forces the world over and the Chinese people themselves, since Peking's reactionary actions on the international scene are severely criticized by wide circles of the progressive public. Thus, China's aggression against socialist Vietnam, undertaken not without the tacit approval of American imperialism, was resolutely condemned by practically all communist, workers' and revolutionary-democratic parties, many leaders of developing countries and prominent representatives of Social Democracy, trade unions and progressive public organizations of widely differing leanings. By entering into contact with influential communist parties, Peking is trying, as it were, to obscure its policies' pro-imperialist orientation, leaving intact their reactionary, aggressive essence.

Fifthly, and lastly, we cannot discount the fact that the "normalization" of Peking's relations with some communist parties is in practice in the interests of US imperialism and is undertaken in the spirit of those principles of coordination of American-Chinese actions which lend these actions a subversive nature, threatening the cause of peace and international security.

The Lessons that should not be Forgotten

It is quite obvious, not only to Communists, but to all who can soberly view the facts how marked the pro-imperialist features of Chinese policy have lately become. And once this is so, Communists cannot help but ask themselves: in this situation, are not the steps taken in the direction of Peking aimed at catching

up with those who are sliding more and more rapidly down the slope into the arms of reactionary imperialist forces? And further: will such actions not damage the struggle for the basic aims of the communist parties, which drastically differ from the Chinese in their appraisal of crucial issues of world development, war and peace, the role of the Soviet Union, and American imperialism?

What then is left after all? If it is a question of the principles of autonomy, independence, mutual non-interference in inter-Party relations which, it now seems, even those in Peking agree with if in words, after the failure of the most blatant pressure on communist parties, then these principles, being, for that matter, a pre-condition, prerequisite and norm of any inter-Party links, cannot in themselves form any substantial basis for the community of aims and tasks of cooperation.

During the talks in Peking much was said about "mutual support and joint discussion of international questions". The question arises here: how and in what is Peking going to support West European Communists? In the struggle against monopoly capital or in the struggle for European security? Peking's stand on these questions is well known—it is diametrically opposed to the Communist one.

It is also worth noting that the "normalization" of relations with communist parties does not interfere with the pompous welcome extended by Peking to delegations of pro-Maoist dissenters, despite their openly hostile attitude to Communists, including Spanish Communists. The Chinese leadership, it seems, seeks to legalize its double dealing tactics, to develop relations simultaneously with Communists and with Maoist elements.

Sometimes, as if in justification of the development of contacts with the CPC, it is said that China and the CPC represent a considerable political force which it is impossible and unreasonable to isolate, and that it would be better to develop relations with them, despite their political course, rather than anathematize and try to excommunicate them from the movement. History convincingly shows that neither the CPSU nor other communist parties have ever anathematized the CPC, have ever sought, or seek, China's "isolation" on the international scene. On the contrary, the Soviet Union made every effort, even when the Chinese leadership adopted its anti-Soviet position, to ensure that China took its rightful place in the United Nations and could play the major role in the world, as befits a great power.

From the outset, Marxist-Leninist parties approached their differences with the CPC leadership in an attitude of goodwill towards the Chinese people and the socialist cause in China. They realized the complexity of the restructuring of social relations on socialist principles in such a vast country as China and the need of finding such solutions which would best conform to China's specific features. No one forced on Chinese Communists any ready-made formulae or called on them to copy anyone's methods of socialist construction. At the same time, Marxists-Leninists pointed out the fundamental line which separates that which works for socialism from that which essentially contradicts its principles. The Chinese people would not have been plunged into the vortex of many tragedies and economic failures, social and cultural stagnation and regression if those to whom the truth had been spoken in all honesty had heeded the voice of their friends.

The Peking leadership and none other has set itself against the international communist movement, the socialist community and other forces of peace and progress by launching all-out subversion and the next extensive propaganda campaign of lies and slander against them.

Justifying the development of contacts with the CPC it is further said that the USSR as well, for that matter, is trying to improve its relations with the USA and other imperialist powers, and that this does not interfere with the maintenance of normal inter-party ties with the CPSU. But this "argument" distorts the most obvious truths. It is one thing to improve interstate relations for the sake of strengthening peace and keeping up detente, while fully preserving the anti-imperialist leanings of the political course, and quite another thing to enter into a military-political alliance with imperialism, as Peking does.

To close one's eyes to this means, at the least, the indirect recognition of the "rightfulness" of Peking's course for creating a military-political alliance between China and American imperialism, NATO military and Japanese militarists or, in the Chinese leaders' parlance, a "broad front" against the Soviet Union.

An ambiguous position regarding Peking's present policy is detrimental to the support rendered by the international communist movement to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of newly free countries. It is known that as far as the national liberation movement and the developing countries are concerned, Peking is in fact, pursuing a policy common with imperialism. Together with the imperialist powers China participates in suppressing liberation movements, interferes in the affairs of new states, carries out subversion against progressive, revolution-

ary-democratic regimes. Such actions on the part of China have been graphically revealed in Bangladesh and Chile, Angola and Ethiopia, in the countries of Indochina and the Arab East, Nicaragua, Iran and Afghanistan.

Failure to recognize the subversive activities of the Maoists in this zone of the world means conniving with the "parallel" actions of China and American imperialism against the developing countries and the national liberation movements and with Peking's own great-power aims in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Lastly, one often hears that the establishment of ties with the CPC does not affect the ideological and political positions of communist parties and that stating the differences in views on pressing problems would help to make a positive influence on Chinese policy. However, for the time being things are somewhat different. No positive changes are observed in Peking's policy. On the contrary, it is increasingly following a negative line.

Fraternal communist parties voice their indignation at China's imperialist, anti-Soviet course and its hegemonic provocative actions on the international scene. This was reflected in the speeches of many foreign delegations' leaders made at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. Communists emphasize the dangerous character of Peking's new manoeuvres in relation to communist parties and its revived claims to leadership in the world communist movement.


The two decades of the CPC leaders' ideological and political conflicts with the Communists of the world have shown with sufficient clarity that each time these claims were spurred on by a desire to impose Peking's hegemony. And each time it turned out

that those who tried to accept and implement Peking's strategic formulae suffered rather substantial and, often, irreparable losses.

These lessons of history are not to be relegated to oblivion.

Kommunist, No. 12, 1981 *

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN



The Four Modernizations.

"Dikobraz" (CSSR)

IN BRIEF

PEKING'S RECORD

Drawing on Washington's Experience

Among the "aid" Washington renders and sells "to deal with disorder" to the most reactionary regimes (Chile, South Africa, Paraguay, South Korea, Haiti, Israel, etc.) are large consignments of police equipment and arms. Not long ago, "The New York Times" reports, China has been added to the list of recipients. It has purchased police equipment worth \$100,000. This modest deal, the paper adds, opens the way for Peking to buy much more police arms, handcuffs, rubber clubs, etc.

Speaking about the clubs, the France Presse correspondent reported from Peking that the "custodians of order" used them to disperse a several thousand strong demonstration protesting against unemployment and hard living conditions.

Training Spies

About three thousand persons of Chinese origin, mostly emigres from China, are being trained in Hongkong to be sent illegally to Indonesia, writes the Indonesian newspaper "Merdeka". Many Peking special services agents are among them. The illegal Maoist-subsidized syndicate forges documents for them—passports, identification cards, driving licences. In Indonesia, Peking spies and saboteurs will conduct subversive activities—discredit the government, propagate Maoist ideas, spread false rumours.

Aiding Colonialism

Peking boasts that it will never suffer foreign possessions on Chinese territory and first of all the British colony of Hongkong (territory—1,013 sq.km, population—5,017 million, 98 per cent of them of Chinese stock). In actual fact the Maoists not only suffer the British presence in this colony, but encourage the

development of ties with it. Through Hongkong China is conducting lively trade with the capitalist countries receiving about \$ 4,000 million annually.

According to the London "Financial Times", the PRC meets Hongkong's requirements in rice (52%), vegetables (41%), cattle (95%), gasoline (27%), kerosine (35%), industrial lubricants (69%). Every year Hongkong buys drinking water costing \$ 17 million from the PRC. A British colony, existing on Chinese bread and water.

Declining Birthrate

In most of Chinese provinces a decree was promulgated, the France Presse Agency report says, whereby families that have a second child are to be fined. As the Maoists explain, this measure will help "reduce the birth rate" in the country. However, they keep mum about where the ten per cent deducted from the miserable wages of the parents with "many children" for "extra" babies, goes.

Provocations

According to the Vietnamese VNA Agency, Chinese troops constantly stage provocations on the border with the SRV, bombing and shelling the country's frontier areas. They violate Vietnam's territorial waters and air space. There are casualties among the population. A great number of houses have been destroyed and rice crops ruined.

From the foreign press

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

Appetites of Peking hegemonomists.



"Nhan Dan"
(SRV)

By joint effort.



Drawing by
R. Karatayev,
"Komsomolskaya
pravda"

AN IMPORTANT LANDMARK IN THE HISTORY OF THE CPC

Dear Comrade Suong,

You are quite right when you say that relations between the USSR and the PRC were very good, as befits the socialist countries. Friendship with the Soviet Union figured also in the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China held in September 1956. This congress met in a momentous period. The foundations of socialism were being successfully laid in China. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries extended aid to China on an unprecedented scale for developing the economy, scaling the summits of science and technology and advancing culture. New China was advancing fast against the background of a favourable international situation ensured by the might and prestige of the entire socialist community.

The Eighth Congress was held in the setting of the strengthening and growth of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Party, which found reflection in the new Party Rules adopted by the Congress. "The Communist Party of China," they read, "is guided by Marxism-Leninism in its activity.... The Party firmly adheres to the principle of closely combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolutionary struggle in China..." The formulation that the Party "is guided in all its activity by Mao Zedong's ideas" was removed from the programme provisions.

The Congress devoted much attention to questions of social and economic development. It came to the conclusion that the issue of the struggle between socialism and capitalism in China was settled. The Congress adopted the line for the gradual implementation of socialist transformations in town and country and set the task of raising the material and cultural standards of the people, and advancing democracy in the country and the Party.

As the Congress saw it, one of the main tasks of the Party "in the period of transition from the creation of the People's Republic of China up to the building of socialist society", was to "gradually complete the socialist reorganization of agriculture, handicraft industry and capitalist industry and trade and gradually carry out industrialization of the country." The report to the Eighth Congress delivered by Liu Shaoqi criticized departures from the general line of the Party during the transition period and denounced right and "left" deviations.

The Congress emphasized that a decisive factor in enhancing the activity of broad masses of industrial and office workers was the gradual improvement of their well-being. It noted the need for consistent application of the principle of payment according to work done.

Along with the extensive programme of socialist development in China, the Congress adopted a number of fundamental decisions in other fields of the Party's activity. It underlined the correctness of the political and organizational line pursued by the Party and pointed out the importance of the ideological and organizational development of the CPC. The Congress adopted the new CPC Rules. The foreign-policy guidelines approved by the Congress were of funda-

mental importance. Its documents stressed that the CPC "favours a foreign policy aimed at preserving world peace and promoting peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems... The Party exerts efforts to develop and cement friendship with the countries belonging to the camp of peace, democracy and socialism headed by the Soviet Union". In this connection it is not without interest to recall that, when speaking at the Eighth Congress, Mao Zedong was forced to declare: "Internationally, our victories have been won owing to the support of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism headed by the Soviet Union and the deep sympathy of the peace-loving peoples the world over."

However, as subsequent developments showed, Mao Zedong succeeded in imposing on the Party his own "general line" with its "great leap" in industry and "people's communes" in the countryside. This "line", covered up with pseudorevolutionary phrases, disrupted planned socialist construction and brought grave misfortunes to the Chinese working people: hunger, unemployment and anarchy in all spheres of Chinese society.

The leading group of the CPC headed by Mao Zedong completely discarded the decisions of the Eighth Congress on friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and communist parties and came forward with its "special platform", trying to force its diktat on the international communist movement.

Renunciation of the decisions of the Eighth CPC Congress, Mao Zedong's ill-famed "general line", a sharp switchover from friendship with the CPSU, the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties and countries to enmity with them caused an acute crisis in the

Party and the country. The Mao Zedong group mounted a fierce struggle against its political opponents, all who disagreed with "Mao's line". This struggle developed into the notorious "cultural revolution" which proved to be a deep tragedy for the Party and working people of China.

The leaders of the CPC have now declared the "cultural revolution" a "grave mistake" on the part of Mao Zedong and "the leadership of the Party's Central Committee". The Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee held at the end of June 1981 also put it on record that the Eighth Congress "passed with great success", that its decisions were correct. This might give the impression that the decisions of the Eighth Congress have been rehabilitated. But this would be a wrong impression.

The point of the matter is that the present leadership of the CPC is not at all reverting to the road indicated by the Eighth Congress. As distinct from the Eighth Congress which excluded from the Rules the provision about "Mao's ideas" as the ideological foundation of the entire activity of the Party, the Sixth Plenary Meeting endorsed the Maoist ideology as a "scientific theory which has stood a long test of history" and qualified Maoism as the "ideological treasure-trove of the CPC".

Fundamentally important is the fact that the present Chinese leadership, deliberately putting together the positive experience of the CPC, including the decisions of the Eighth Congress on questions of domestic development, and Mao Zedong's anti-Marxist conceptions, tries to pass them off as a "Chinese model of socialism". But Chinese realities show that this "model" has nothing in common either with the

course proclaimed by the Eighth Congress or the principles of scientific socialism.

It is also highly significant that the present CPC leaders are silent about the foreign-policy guidelines of the Eighth Congress, especially those emphasizing the importance of friendship with the Soviet Union. Conversely, they sing praises to Mao Zedong's anti-Marxist "theory of three worlds" on the basis of which Peking is advocating the "united international front of struggle" against the USSR and world socialism and entering into an ever closer military and political alliance with the forces of imperialism and reaction.

This is the policy China is pursuing today.

Sincerely yours,
Vladimir ZUBAKOV

V. LOMYKIN

PRC-USA: THE RESULTS OF RAPPROCHEMENT

Of late, US statesmen are more and more often speaking of the strategic importance of Sino-American relations. Former President Ford, who visited Peking in March 1981 bringing a secret message from President Reagan, declared that the White House would build up American-Chinese ties with the aim of taking joint measures against the USSR. The maiden visit paid to China by the new Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in June 1981 confirmed, as the American press reported, the firm resolve of the Reagan Administration to develop "strategic" relations with Peking.

Peking does not make any secret of the fact that it associates the development of relations with the United States with the formation of a "united front" against the USSR. There is not a single meeting of the leaders of the PRC, especially Deng Xiaoping, with American representatives that is not accompanied by calls for closer relations between the United States and China, for the "formation of a strategic structure of joint opposition" to the Soviet Union.

As a result of the Sino-American rapprochement, the situation in Asia has become noticeably more complex in recent years and dangerous tendencies towards the aggravation of the crisis in the Asian-Pacific region are evident.

A New Stage in Sino-American Relations

The Sino-American rapprochement has in the last two years entered a new stage highlighted by the active development of their military-political ties for the purpose of intensifying the struggle against the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the national liberation movement. This is manifested in "parallel" and joint actions on the world scene, especially in Asia, in the development of various forms of military cooperation—from exchange of information, including that on "defence planning", to plans of military aid to China.

With China's help Washington seeks to increase the pressure on the USSR, its allies and developing countries and aggravate international tensions. China holds an important place in the current and long-term policy of the United States. Washington views military-strategic cooperation with China as a means of further deforming the social and political system of the PRC and restoring capitalism in that country.

As for the Peking leaders, they see in the rapprochement with American imperialism broader opportunities for intensifying the confrontation between the USA and the USSR to the point of provoking a military conflict between them, for stepping up China's expansion in Southeast Asia and for using the economic potential of the West to modernize the military-industrial facilities of the PRC.

Peking's tactics for provoking a military conflict between the two socio-political systems are not anything new. At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s the Chinese leadership, in a bid for hegemony in the international communist movement, tried to impose on the Soviet Union and other socialist

countries the tactics of a "tit-for-tat" struggle and provoking military conflicts with the United States.

Blocking with American imperialism, Peking is trying to use the same "tit-for-tat" struggle tactics, but now against the Soviet Union, assuming the role of organizer of a "united" anti-Soviet front and provoking the United States to start a war against the USSR. For many years the Chinese leaders have acted from the positions of "theoreticians" expounding the inevitability of a third world war. In 1980 alone, during his meetings with foreign journalists, Deng Xiaoping on two occasions (in April and August) made statements to the effect that "sooner or later" a war would break out.


Interaction on the World Scene

In Peking's view, the European continent is the most fitting region for provoking a military clash between the two opposite systems. The following three factors are decisive for it. Firstly, Europe is precisely the centre of confrontation between the two military-political systems and it is here that the biggest headway has been achieved in promoting the policy of detente and implementing the Peace Programme put forward by the Soviet Union. Secondly, the territorial remoteness of China from Europe reduces the probability of its being drawn into the conflict. Thirdly, since the main sphere of China's expansion is Asia, Europe and the European policy of the Chinese leadership play the role of a distracting factor.

Peking has openly sided with the Pentagon and those NATO circles which headed the campaign for stoking-up tension in Europe. The Chinese leaders promptly backed the US initiative in effecting an an-

nual three per cent increases in military spending and stationing new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in accordance with the decision taken by NATO in December 1979. Peking was among the first opponents of the new Soviet proposals for taking further confidence-building steps in the military field and establishing a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles of NATO countries and the USSR and other proposals advanced at the 26th CPSU Congress (1981).

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN



Bridge-building.

*Drawing by
V. Mochalov,
"Krokodil"*

Peking has been lately stepping up propaganda and diplomatic efforts in support of the American plans for "modernizing the nuclear armaments" of the NATO countries and expanding the operating sphere of this imperialist bloc. Provoking a military conflict in Europe, Peking is in fact acting as an accomplice of the Pentagon viewing the European continent in the light of the "new nuclear strategy" as a possible theatre for military operations with the use of nuclear weapons.

The cooperation between China and the United States on the world scene has already led to the growth of expansionist, adventurist tendencies in their policy creating new "flash-points" on the planet.

A typical example in this respect is the conflict in Indochina which began with the armed aggression of China against Vietnam in February-March 1979. The aggression itself and the subsequent policy of diplomatic isolation, economic boycott and military provocations by Peking against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos have been fully supported by the United States. Moreover, Washington and Peking are acting jointly in organizing subversion against the countries of Indochina. They are at one in the United Nations Organization which they use to impose on the world community discussions on the so-called Kampuchean question. American diplomacy is actively helping Peking to knock together a "united political front" from motley reactionary groupings for interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Under the smokescreen of the talk about the "Vietnamese threat", Peking and Washington are pressing for the further aggravation of tensions in Southeast Asia. They are applying pressure to the

ASEAN countries to worsen their relations with Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos and are trying to turn ASEAN into a military bloc opposing the three Indo-chinese states.

Growing adventurism in Peking's foreign policy, repeated statements of its leaders about teaching Vietnam "another lesson" backed up with constant military provocations on the Vietnamese-Chinese frontier and Washington's support show that the "parallel" actions of China and the United States are increasingly destabilizing the situation in Southeast Asia.

Equally dangerous are these actions in the Middle East where the United States and China are vigorously and in many ways supporting the regimes of some Muslim countries waging an undeclared war against democratic Afghanistan. As the American press puts it, in the "Afghan crisis" Peking and Washington are following the road of a "rational division of labour that might be applied everywhere". The cooperation of Peking and Washington is manifested in the formation of bandit units on the territory of Pakistan, in the training of Afghan counter-revolutionaries by Chinese and American instructors. The United States is eager to turn Pakistan into an advanced post of imperialism in the Middle East, into a support base for provocative activities against Afghanistan and for exerting pressure on India.

An important aspect of collaboration between Peking and Washington on the world scene is the Chinese leaders' all-out support for the "positions of strength" policy on which US imperialism stakes. It is not accidental that already in its first official statement regarding Reagan's election, Peking expressed satisfaction with the fact that the new administration intend-

ed to achieve foreign policy aim by "relying on force" and gaining "military superiority over the USSR". The Chinese leadership welcomed Washington's intention to push up military spending considerably, to use the rapid deployment force more actively and to expand the military presence of the United States in Asia and other regions of the world. Deng Xiaoping openly urged the White House at the end of last year to build up the American presence in the Pacific.

A salient feature of the new stage in China's rapprochement with the United States is the development of various forms of military cooperation between them. According to American press reports, the two countries hold consultations and cooperate on military and intelligence questions. Under an unofficial clandestine agreement, the United States is delivering to China communications equipment and sending technical experts in exchange for intelligence information about Soviet actions gathered with the help of radio-electronic bases set up near the Soviet frontier.

The Strategy of "Reinforcing" China: Essence and Consequences

The Western conception of "strategic reinforcement" of China fully accords with the plans of the Chinese leaders who give priority to the accelerated build-up of the military-economic capability of the PRC as the main means for achieving political hegemony in the world. The Eleventh CPC Congress which met in August 1977 endorsed an ambitious course for turning China by 2000 into a "mighty modern power".

China's course of "four modernizations" with its clear-cut militarist orientation was supported in Washington, and provision of aid to China for this pur-

pose became part and parcel of the "world strategy" for all-out "opposition to the Soviet Union".

The United States and its allies, West European countries and Japan, agreed to grant Peking credits to the tune of about 30 billion dollars for the development of basic industries crucial for the build-up of China's military might. In view of the serious lag of technology in munitions industries, much emphasis was laid on the development of scientific and technical ties of the PRC with the United States and other capitalist countries, above all in such spheres as space and nuclear research, high-energy physics, electronics.

Since 1978, Washington gradually removed barriers to the supply of military technology and material to China. At first it lifted restrictions on deliveries of "defensive weapons" and respective technology. Then it sanctioned the sale to Peking of "auxiliary military equipment" by American firms. In November 1980 the NATO Coordinating Committee on export control decided to lift restrictions on the sale to China of military technology, including offensive weapons. Lastly, in June 1981 Secretary of State A. Haig informed Chinese leaders during talks with them in Peking about the decision of the Reagan Administration to permit the sale of offensive weapons to China.

By its decision on the sale of American weapons to Peking the Reagan Administration tries to give a new impetus to the military-political cooperation with China in the hope of fortifying its anti-Soviet positions and supporting the pro-imperialist course of the Deng Xiaoping group currently jockeying for power in the Peking leadership.

Once effected, the conception of "strategic reinfor-

cement" of China would bring extremely negative consequences for security and peace in East Asia.

First, the growth of China's military might is pushing Japan onto the road of militarization, giving its influential circles interested in reviving "great Japan" a convenient pretext for nuclear arming. The militarist tendencies in Japan are fully in evidence: its military spending is rising, the "self-defence forces" are growing and plans are being speedily drafted for creating a nuclear potential.

Second, assistance given to China in implementing its programmes of military-industrial build-up creates problems for the United States itself. Washington can no longer remain confident as to the direction in which the Chinese leaders are going to use the growing might of their country. Thus, the development and testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile by Peking did not produce any enthusiasm among American military specialists who noted China's ability to deliver strikes against targets on the US territory.

Third, the implementation of the strategy of China's reinforcement is causing grave concern among all adjacent countries which, understandably, cannot leave such dangerous manoeuvres of American imperialism and Chinese hegemonism unnoticed.

Lastly, militarization is most damaging for China itself, having already led to acute aggravation of its social and economic problems. All this is ultimately enhancing the destabilizing role of China, making its foreign policy still more unpredictable, especially in Asia.

Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, No. 4, 1981

ALBANIAN NEWSPAPER ON PEKING'S POLICE

The newspaper "Zeri i popullit" published an article under the title "Zig-zags of China's Policy: Adaptations to Circumstances", which reads as follows.

If one is to judge from the public statements made recently by top-rank Chinese leaders one can get an impression that "Chinese-American relations are in a state of crisis", to quote the PRC Deputy Foreign Minister. Or, as Foreign Minister Huang Hua said, these relations "may deteriorate". Statements in Washington are made in the same vein. Thus, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig told a "New York Times" correspondent that the disagreements between the two countries are of a "serious nature".

Explaining its present attitude towards the United States Peking says that China is displeased with the US decision to sell weapons to Taiwan. Yet this decision is not anything new or unexpected in relations between Washington and Taipei or between Washington and Peking. The former US President, James Carter, officially recognized that the Unit-

ed States established diplomatic relations with China without suspending economic, cultural and even military relations with Taiwan.

This suits China as Taiwan is an important link in the American network of military bases spreading from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. China does not mind as it hopes that this network can act as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. China wants Taiwan to maintain its present status. Statements by Chinese leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and others) that Chinese-American relations allegedly depend on the US attitude to Taiwan are sheer nonsense. The Chinese "dragon" is not going to stop eating from the American trough. Washington leaders realize this only too well and are not in the least worried over such an "impediment" in the American-Chinese relations as Taiwan. Accordingly, the statements voiced in Peking and Washington are reminiscent of the scenario of "hostility" between the United States and Israel, intended to hoodwink the Arab peoples.

The Chinese are out to deceive the world community. Also they would like to extort more dividends from the Americans using the tension in Soviet-American relations.

As for the Soviet factor in the light of Chinese-American relations we can say that Moscow has more than once proposed normalization of its relations with Peking. The Soviet Union has always kept the door open for China.

China is gripped with a host of difficulties now, but the West is not over-anxious, as it used to be, to invest capital in that country. China's market cannot yield any big profit and is not stable enough. China's policy is known very well and no illusions are harboured on this score. Likewise well known are the ambitions of the "Middle Empire" passed down from former Chinese leaders.

A. KHARLAMOV

STAKING ON SEPARATISTS

Of late Peking has stepped up its military and political support of all kinds of separatist rebel groups seeking to create new "independent states". Under Peking's plans the separatists should destabilize the internal political situation in China's neighbouring countries and produce a climate conducive to Peking's interference. Peking also hopes that the separatists will seize vast territories in which puppet regimes will be installed thus providing a base for China's further expansion.

Peking has concentrated its efforts on creating such "buffer zones" at the junction of South and Southeast Asia, notably in Laos. According to the French journal "Afrique-Asie" China has schools in Yunnan province for training people from the national minorities living in Laos for subversive and terroristic work. It is intended to smuggle hundreds of spies across Burma's north-eastern mountainous regions where pro-Peking rebels have entrenched themselves in the jungle.

The "Asia-Weekly" of Hongkong reports that using its henchmen Peking is intensifying propaganda work among the national minorities in Burma so as to enlist the services of various armed separatist groups. Chinese instructors at "military schools" based in Burma train subversive groups formed from the national minorities. Arms and munitions for these anti-government factions are also supplied by China.

Indian authorities say that the current wave of terrorism in India's northeastern states is due to the increased military and political support China is giving the separatists. More and more China-trained separatists from the Naga and Mizo tribes are being smuggled into India through the northern regions of Burma. Rebel gangs armed with Chinese weapons have appeared in the Indian states of Tripura, Manipur and Meghalaya.

Another aim of Peking is to provoke splits between countries. The activities of Maoist and separatist groupings on the Indian-Bangladesh and Bangladesh-Burmese borders cause tension in relations among these states. The same can be said

of Thailand and Malaysia. Aided and abetted by Peking the bloc of Malaysian and Thai Maoists is trying to enter into collusion with the movement of Moslem separatists demanding that Thailand's southern provinces be joined to Malaysia. Separatist activities are a source of constant friction between the governments of these countries.

In the Philippines, local Maoists have mounted propaganda among some of the country's national minorities and are seeking contact with the Moslem separatist movement. In Indonesia, the separatist subversive group of North Kalimantan is acting under Maoist slogans.

The American administration approves of Peking's schemes. As testified by the US position on questions relating to the security of the South and Southeast Asian countries, collusion exists between Washington and Peking. China's southern neighbours are particularly concerned over the White House decision to supply Peking with modern weapons. They are aware that Peking has never concealed the fact that it claims territories of the states of South and Southeastern Asia and that China considers this region a sphere of its "special interests". Once it receives modern American weaponry, the Indonesian press stresses, China will present a still greater menace to the security and sovereignty of countries along its southern border, particularly so as Peking is sure to ship part of this weaponry to its "fifth columns" operating in the independent states of the region.

On the plea of "countering the Soviet and Vietnamese threat" Peking, supported by the United States, is out to destabilize the situation in the region and realize its expansionist designs.

Izvestia, February 4, 1982 *

TELL ME WHO IS YOUR FRIEND. . .

Double-Dealing Stand

China and South Korea are trade partners, and their mutual commercial turnover is steadily growing. Reports to this effect appearing in the world press have always evoked Peking's undisguised irritation and heaps of vociferous, if lame, refutations. However, of late Chinese officials have been keeping dead silent on the subject. The thing is that now they would have to refute their own statements, for it was the official Chinese press that let the cat out of the bag.

The newspaper "Guangzhou ribao" (South China) published a dispatch about the local export-import firm that had sold a large consignment of goods to South Korea. Reuters, which quoted the dispatch, added that in 1980 the volume of trade between China and South Korea amounted to \$ 600 million to reach \$ 1,000 million in 1981.

Press reports on China's growing trade with South Korea were confirmed by Hao Deqing, chairman of the Chinese people's society for international relations studies, during his talk with Shogo Ohki, a Japanese M.P., in September 1981.

Without officially recognizing the Seoul regime China established secret contacts with it back in the mid-seventies. In 1980 South Korean businessmen based in the United States and Japan visited China and an official representative of Peking went to South Korea. They discussed questions bearing on the increase of the deliveries of Chinese coal to the South Korean metallurgical complex in Pohang.

China is South Korea's major coal supplier. Coal is shipped there from Chinese ports on vessels flying the Chinese flag. The PRC also exports oil to South Korea, which she needs badly, and other commodities in return for radioelectrical articles, fertilizer, etc.

In expanding its trade and economic ties with that reactionary regime China in fact panders to Washington's mounted efforts to build up South Korea's military and economic capability. Chinese authorities have more than once declared their approval of the US military presence in the Far East, South Korea included, as well as the extension of the network of US military bases in that region.

China's double-dealing stand on the South Korean question, its perfidious policy with regard to the Korean people's struggle for a peaceful reunification of their country are a logical outcome of the hegemonistic and great-power course pursued by the Mao successors who are joining hands with imperialist reaction.

Hand in Glove with the Junta

Peking's emissary Wang Runsheng, deputy minister of foreign trade, who came to Santiago to take part in the meeting of the fourth joint Chinese-Chilean commission for economic cooperation, was accorded an exceedingly warm welcome. Wang returned this welcome in kind by showering compliments on the Pinochet regime.

Immediately after the overthrow of the lawful Allende government the Peking rulers began to aid the Pinochet clique. Ignoring world public protests the PRC leaders have been giving every assistance to these henchmen of US imperialism and world reac-

tion. It is not accidental that Wang Runsheng specially stressed the strengthening of the "bonds of indestructible friendship" and the "happy" coincidence of views of Peking and Santiago.

Apart from political and moral support, the Peking top metes out substantial economic assistance to the Chilean junta. Government and trade-industrial delegations shuttle between Peking and Santiago. In the past three years, for example, trade between Chile and the PRC has more than quadrupled and is worth \$ 140 million. China buys large quantities of Chilean copper and saltpetre and increases its deliveries of various items and arms to the junta.

To all appearances, Mao's heirs mean to follow this line in the future too. Upon signing new agreements on bilateral ties Wang Runsheng spoke about "forthcoming happy days" in relations between Peking and Santiago. According to the Chinese leaders, the economic and political situation in Chile is "quite favourable", and Pinochet is a "staunch fighter against hegemonism".

Official Peking is wont to discourse about its "loyalty" to the ideals of national liberation struggle, to the principles of solidarity and proletarian internationalism. Yet in practice the Chinese leadership has long been pursuing a policy of betrayal of the interests of the national liberation movement as is proved, among other things, by its ties with the Chilean junta.

Pretoria's Friends from Peking

The Chinese leadership intimates that it is "the best friend" of the African peoples and is prepared to give them every support in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism. But how far apart

are Peking's words and deeds! The barbarous aggression of South African racists in late August 1981 against the People's Republic of Angola brings to memory the 1975 aggression against that country. At that time Peking, without mincing words, took the same side of the barricade as the Pretoria interventionists. Both racists and Maoists actively cooperated in organizing, training and supplying the FNLA and UNITA counter-revolutionary bands with arms and money. At the same time Peking carried out subversive activity within the national liberation organizations in territories under racist rule, and aided splinter groups there. China conducts this policy to this day.

More and more reports prove irrefutably that the PRC-RSA economic cooperation is deepening—at a time when all world progressive forces are striving to enlist as many countries as possible to boycott Pretoria economically. It has been estimated that in the last two years the volume of PRC-RSA trade conducted through Hongkong firms and other intermediaries has risen tenfold and reached half a billion dollars. Peking receives from the racists pig iron, steel, coal and precious metals in exchange for wolfram, mercury and other strategically important goods. To quote the South African foreign trade association, the RSA is now the second largest market for China's indirect export on the African continent.

Further. Informed circles express little doubt today that the South African racists have the atom bomb. Information has been leaking into the world press about the supplier of the main component of this weapon. Thus, "The Washington Post" wrote that it is from China that Pretoria imports concentrated uranium for atomic bomb manufacture.

The old proverb goes, "Tell me who is your friend and I'll tell you who you are". Peking's deeds show that China's friends on the African continent are South African racists.

From the Soviet press

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

"Come in, friends".



"Daily World"
(USA)

OBSERVER'S OPINION

A. KOZYREV

A DANGEROUS PHENOMENON

According to the US press the US military department has come up with a secret report specifying the principal parameters of projected US-Chinese trade in armaments. The total volume of profit the overseas war monopolies count upon is estimated at astronomical figures: 41-63 thousand million dollars. "The New York Times" states that the contemplated programmes for modernizing the Chinese armed forces envisage, among other things, the delivery of 3,000—8,600 modern medium tanks, between 8,000 and 10,000 armoured personnel carriers, between 16,000 and 24,000 heavy-duty trucks, 6,000 air-to-air missiles, 200 modern fighter planes and ... 240 fighters-bombers.

The plans of selling US arms to China have caused alarm in the Asian states bordering upon that country. The grave threat posed by China to the Asian countries is well-known. Chinese support for anti-government and separatist movements in a number of Southeast

Asian countries, the border wars unleashed in the recent past by Peking against India and Vietnam are vivid evidence of the hegemonistic ambitions of the Chinese leadership. So reads a statement released in Burma's capital by the Committee in Defence of Asia against the Chinese Menace, a public organization. Peking does not bother to conceal, note the authors of the statement, that it covets the natural riches of its neighbours.

This is eloquently attested to by a map appended to "A Brief History of Modern China" recently published in the PRC. The compilers of the map bluntly assert that Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Bhutan, all used to be part of China.

In the view of the authors of the statement, upon arming themselves to the teeth the Peking leaders will not hesitate to immediately start "regaining" the so-called "lost territories".

The world public is also concerned over the fact that in recent years China has emerged upon the "free" market as an arms merchant intent on earning foreign exchange. Trade in Chinese weapons is being briskly conducted by a go-between English firm, the Commerce International, one of the largest firms in the field. Peking offers a wide choice to prospective buyers including small arms, mortars, artillery, howitzers,

and even warplanes and tanks. There is also a wide diversity of ammunition.

The West-German "Der Spiegel" reported that among the buyers of Chinese weapons are Egypt, South Africa, Somalia and Chile's fascist junta. It is common knowledge that with Peking's active involvement the Pol Pot and Ieng Sary clique conducted its Maoist experiment in Kampuchea, a reign of heinous terror which cost the people of



Attacking Vietnam.

Photo: Chinese tanks starting their offensive

that country about 3 million lives. The Pol Pot hangmen were armed with Chinese weapons. There were at least 20,000 Chinese instructors and advisers in the country. Ever since the Kampuchean people toppled the Pol Pot terrorist pro-Peking clique, China, in league with the special services of the US and other imperialist states, has been paying and arming in Thailand the gangs of mercenaries attempting to prevent Kampuchea's rebirth.

The provision by Peking, in collusion with the USA, of arms to the gangs of counter-revolutionaries participating in the undeclared war of international reaction against Afghanistan is an outrageous international terrorist operation.

Chinese weapons are also used by anti-government groups engaging in subversive activities in India, Burma and a number of other Asian countries.

Of piratical character is China's funnelling of arms to the terrorist organizations staging acts of sabotage in Angola from the territory of South Africa.

Thus, all talk that the delivery of arms to China is a usual commercial transaction is not only groundless but also extremely dangerous. The sale of weapons by the Western imperialist circles to Peking's hegemonists is an extremely dangerous phenomenon threatening all of mankind.

*Argumenty i fakty, No. 23, 1981 **

FROM FOREIGN NEWS SOURCES:

"The Sunday Telegraph", Great Britain: Bitter rivalries have flared up between the NATO member states for the vast market which will appear with the modernization of the Chinese armed forces, 4,500,000-strong.

France-Presse, France: French Defence Minister Charles Hernu announced that China urges the French government to sell to the PRC the Mirage-2000 warplane, to be adopted by the French Air Force in 1984.

"O Estado de São Paulo", Brazil: The Chinese study the possibility of purchasing from Brazil 1,000-1,200 armoured personnel carriers, and also the "Xavante" jetfighter, the T-27 trainer turboprop plane and the "Bandeirante" reconnaissance plane.

CHINA'S "LOST GENERATION"

Based on materials from the Soviet and foreign press.

It would be wrong to say that the Chinese youth, accounting for 65 per cent of the PRC's population, suffers from lack of attention on the part of the Chinese leadership and the official press. On the contrary, in recent years, after more than a ten-year interval, the publication of youth newspapers and magazines has been resumed; the Youth League of China and the Student Federation, disbanded in the turmoil of the "cultural revolution", have renewed their activities. Young people are assigned to play no small role in implementing the "four modernizations" programme.

However, signs of anxiety are becoming more and more evident whenever the propaganda media and Chinese leaders refer to the younger generation. The main theme that runs through all press publications devoted to youth problems is the call to "overcome the crisis of confidence and regain courage".

Popular distrust of the Peking leaders' propagandist pledges to radically resolve China's vital problems grows with every passing day. If in the past the Chinese people were hypnotized by Mao's ideas, today these ideas have noticeably lost much of their glamour. The continued jostling for power, the protracted and contradictory political and ideological campaigns disorient party members and professional party workers, increase disenchantment with Maoist dogmas and provoke silent resistance to, and even open discontent

with, the CPC leadership's policy.

Frank admissions to this effect appear in the Chinese press. Pessimism, apathy and lack of confidence in the future—these are far from all the qualities attributed today by the PRC's propaganda machine to the "lost generation". The results of the public poll published by "Renmin ribao" show that a little over 50 per cent of the young Chinese still believe that the Peking leadership's hegemonistic plans are feasible. The CPC's slogans, the newspaper laments, find no response among the youth, and some young people even openly doubt the truth of "Mao Zedong's thought" and "the CPC line".

Peking sees the way out in the ideological indoctrination of the youth and the tightening of the screws. The campaign recently launched in Shanghai under the motto "Our life is sweeter than honey" appears as a mockery. Once again the young are called upon to raise high the banner of "Mao Zedong's thought", "not to fear death or privations". At the same time the solution of urgent problems confronting Chinese youth is postponed indefinitely. What is permitted today is to "display the spirit of an unrusting cog".

Eloquent Evidence Justified Concern

The mood of the Chinese youth causes considerable apprehensions among the Chinese leaders. What will happen to the country if the younger generation develops indifference to Maoism?

True, there are differences between young people in town and country, in northern and southern regions, in the east and the west of the country; dif-

ferences between the young people of the Chinese community and ethnic minorities, as well as between young people of a different background—the children of workers and peasants and those coming from the families of the intelligentsia. Yet, they possess certain traits which are characteristic of the contemporary Chinese youth in general, i.e., disillusionment, hopelessness, indifference to everything, and contempt for fostered ideals. Some young people take the “easy” life, others in despair start searching for new ideals.

... Quite recently a foreign language teacher in China asked her students to write a composition on their attitude to life. The best one had the title: “I resent Mao’s whole system.” The regular procedure

is to display the best work for all to see. The teacher was hesitant about doing this, but the student who wrote it said defiantly: “Go ahead, I’m not afraid.” Though he may not be a typical representative of contemporary Chinese youth the PRC’s rulers have good reasons for anxiety while there are people like him.

China News Analysis, Hongkong

Redundant People

The great campaign for resettling urban youth in remote parts of the country was a real tragedy for millions of young Chinese. Finding themselves in unusual surroundings and unaccustomed to hard

*Banished to rural areas as a result of the “cultural revolution” and sent to labour camps for “re-education”, millions of Chinese young men and women are barred from active social life. Their lot is unemployment or “skilled” labour to implement the “four modernizations” programme.
Photos: Slaving for “modernization”.*



peasant work, they set their minds upon going back—to their families, classes, technical schools. But they realized only too soon that they had been trapped. There was no way back. The country's economy, disrupted by Maoist experiments, was going through hard times: industrial enterprises were not working at full capacity, there was much redundant labour and acute food shortages. "Why should the towns feed extra mouths?", Peking argued. That is how "redundant people" appeared.

To become redundant in a society is a tragedy. In today's China this is a double tragedy. Finding no place for themselves in the countryside, the young people have no hope they will be more lucky in town. There are no jobs for them—unemployment has embraced today over a quarter of all the able-bodied urban population.

Izvestia, Moscow

According to official data some six million people were provided with jobs in 1980. Only half of them received employment at state enterprises. The rest were allowed to set up so-called "youth cooperative enterprises" based on manual labour. Their pay is one-fourth to one-third of the miserly wages doled out to workers at state-owned plants and factories.

L'Unita, Rome

Mass Illiteracy

There are over 150 million illiterates in China. Ninety-six per cent of school-age children enter primary schools, but only 30 per cent of them are able to finish them.

Shijie jingji daobao, Shanghai

For lack of finance many schools and students' hostels are in a pitiful state, most of them being dilapidated and unfit for use. Over 80 per cent of the windows in primary school No. 18 in Zhanjiang are without glass and there is no money to glaze them. Teachers' dwellings in Shengzhen, overcrowded as they are, look no better than pigsties.

At present, out of the 26,000 teachers of secondary and higher schools in Guangdong only 38.2 per cent have a secondary or higher education. Out of the 122,000 teachers of incomplete secondary and second-stage primary schools only 12.3 per cent have a specialized or higher education, and out of the 308,000 primary school teachers a mere 18.4 per cent have a specialized secondary education.

After a ten-year period of chaos (as the "cultural revolution" is referred to in the Chinese press—Ed.) the teachers' position has greatly deteriorated. In some localities they are openly despised. There are cases of assaults upon teachers. Their wages are miserly.

To somehow provide the subsistence minimum for themselves and their families they have to combine teaching with doing unskilled work at plants and shops. In Zhanjiang the head masters of some primary and secondary schools have had to let part of the school premises out as boarding houses. Others open canteens in the classrooms of primary schools, and teachers take turns in cooking, cleaning and washing dishes.

Nanfang ribao, Guangzhou

Growth of Crime

The crime growth as a result of increasing unemployment and the revival of private enterprise, which is being encouraged by the authorities, has its impact

on all aspects of China's social and economic life.

Individual and group robbery, burglary, cases of rape, murder are becoming a common phenomenon. In big cities young hooligans organized in gangs start violent fights, even in broad daylight. There are cases of car-stealing, and pick-pocketing without number. A "black market" economy is thriving in Canton and Shanghai. In the country's southern regions, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan smuggling and trade in narcotics are widespread.

The authorities are trying to explain the growth of crime by the baneful influence of the "gang of four". True, violence, whose cult was officially encouraged in the late 60s, left a deep imprint on the Chinese youth. However, it is rather in the present than in the past that one must look for causes behind the growth of crime in China. It is clear that a great many jobless young people, just fresh from school or back from the countryside where they had been sent in millions in recent years, naturally become recruits to the growing ranks of criminals in the large urban centres. The young unemployed easily yield to the temptation to provide for themselves by criminal means, since they have no other means of subsistence.

Le Monde, Paris

Police Repressions

The Chinese leadership is alarmed by the growth of disillusionment and cynicism in the country, particularly among young people. A special police circular allows them to use firearms, handcuffs, truncheons and other police equipment without restriction. Deng Xiaoping, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, has permitted to impose martial law in Chinese

provinces and towns to "suppress any manifestations of discontent". Accordingly, local authorities can introduce a curfew whenever they choose and summon troops "to help maintain order" and initiate reprisals.

Troops were called out to suppress unrest in the Qinghai Province in the north-west of China, where thousands of young people expelled from towns demanded that they be sent back home.

The Daily Telegraph, London

Illusory Plums and Real Discontent

In ancient times the cunning ruler Caocao set out with his army to seize new lands. The sun was scorching hot and the troops were parched with thirst and dying from fatigue. Then Caocao assured all that somewhere ahead, beyond the black desert, was a plum grove. These words made the soldiers' mouths water and they forgot their thirst. This fable is recalled by young Chinese when they reflect on the Peking leaders' calls to "become a shock force" in realizing their hegemonistic plans, with a promise of nothing but illusory plums as a reward.

Pravda, Moscow

Foreign residents in Peking came across a copy of a leaflet duplicated on the rotary press and signed by a group calling itself "The Union for the Study of the Democratic Revolution in China". "Mao left our people a legacy of abject poverty, fear and back-breaking toil," the authors say. "The present Chinese leaders have insulted the people by declaring that Mao's merits by far outweigh his mistakes."

Calling the "great helmsman" a "feudal dictator" and asserting that most people consider him a "plot-

ter", the authors demand that all Mao's crimes be made public. "To achieve his political ambitions Mao sacrificed the future of the younger generation. Today's leaders are trying to do the same. This is a dangerous game," the leaflet reads.

Agence France-Presse from Peking

* * *

The above evidence shows that the problem of the Chinese youth who, through the fault of the Peking leaders, can find no place in society, is today one of the most pressing problems in China. The economic, political and spiritual crisis which has gripped China, has hit the country's younger generation particularly hard. The unemployment level among young Chinese is the highest in the country. As a result of Mao's criminal experiments the majority of them find themselves without a profession, instruction or work.

Due to the fierce political struggle for power, the nationwide crisis and Peking's increased flirting with imperialist and reactionary forces, young Chinese feel they are a "lost generation", deprived of ideals and confidence in the future. In this situation some of them are going over to more active opposition against the present regime.

IN BRIEF

GRIM HUMOUR

The labour reform camp in Shanxi Province in no way differs from the many other camps in China. Here too people who do not suit the regime are kept without trial. Here too people are maltreated, third-degreed and beaten up. And what grim humour the authorities must have possessed to give this camp the poetic name of "Lotus Blossom."

OBSERVER'S OPINION

S. FROLKIN

THE SCOURGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Mounting unemployment in China acquires threatening proportions. The press explains the problem by a too fast population growth: each year at least 5-7 million people in towns and cities join the labour market. Although general official statistics on the immense army of the jobless are not published by Peking, Western specialists believe there are now between 26 and 30 million people out of work.

The current Chinese leadership undoubtedly realizes the gravity of this situation. They impute it to the rule of the "gang of four" in the years of the "cultural revolution". At that time schools and higher educational establishments were closed, and some 60 million young men and women were forcibly deported to rural areas. Since 1976 roughly half the deportees have returned to towns and cities, and many of them with families. This has also aggravated the employment problem.

And yet, the drastically higher level of unemployment is accounted for by the

recent closure of enterprises and the curtailment of capital construction, especially in the heavy industry sectors under the so-called "regulation of the economy" scheme. This new orientation in economic development has resulted in a sharp reduction of jobs and deprives millions of people of the means of subsistence. The trend continues.

The Chinese press does not lack publications whose authors come up with sundry half-measures for the "dissipation" of unemployment. Specifically, some of them propose opening co-operative enterprises in the towns or "collective and individual enterprises" as they are termed in China, with funds the jobless themselves collect. This relieves the state from taking care of the unemployed.

According to the "Renmin ribao" currently over 10 million people in China, mainly young people, earn their livelihood in the retail trade or in the services sphere. Some of them have set up on their own account

such "collective enterprises" as snack-bars, sewing shops, hardware repair shops, workmen's associations making souvenirs and other items, workshops for repairing bicycles, domestic appliances, etc. Such enterprises do not guarantee steady earnings and their employees do not have a right to social security and insurance; they are even paid 3-4 times less than personnel at state-run enterprises. Such a "collective enterprise" paying a tax to the state can go bankrupt any time and the employees find themselves out of work again.

Therefore, many jobless people prefer waiting for years, doing casual work to keep body and soul together or are supported by their parents, in the hope of getting any job at a state enterprise or institution. However as stated in a joint decision adopted by the CPC Central Committee and the PRC State Council in 1980, "the solution of the employment problem is a protracted and complicated process" and people should get rid of the "bad habit", still persisting in some cities, of waiting for jobs at state enterprises.

Thus, chronic unemployment is scourge in China. Even according to official statistics there are over

300,000 unemployed in Peking.

A particularly trying situation has developed in Shanghai, one of the country's largest cities, where there are over 500,000 people out of work. In 1980-1981 demands for work culminated in a veritable revolt. The demonstrations involved tens of thousands of people, mainly the young, many of whom were arrested and then exiled from the city by an administrative injunction. There are over 400,000 jobless in the city of Wuhan. The army of the unemployed has been growing in Nanjing, Guangzhou and other cities. There are many demobilized servicemen among the unemployed in Wuhan.

Redundant labour begins to increasingly affect the socio-economic situation in the country, particularly as far as the young people are concerned. A growing number of jobless youth succumb to the temptation of "earning" their livelihood by breaking the law since they see no other way out. According to the Chinese press, the state security department in the city of Nanjing estimated that in the first half of 1981 three-quarters of all crimes were committed by unemployed youth.



Popular discontent with the adventurist course of Mao's successors is growing.

Photo: Jobless young people demonstrating in Shanghai.

Chinese newspapers more and more often raise the question of maximally increasing the number of workplaces at state enterprises even though this would adversely affect labour productivity and plant retooling. All this clashes with a new orientation of the country's economic development under the "regulation of the economy" scheme which envisages the closure of tens

of thousands of "unprofitable" enterprises in order to raise production efficiency.

Provision of millions of the unemployed with jobs will mean, to put it bluntly, their incorporation into the immense labour army which is still characterized by a low level of education and proficiency. Thus, this will result in an increasing proportion of the wages fund being spent to remunerate

the labour of supernumerary personnel.

Obviously, at the present time China lacks an integral, scientifically sound economic strategy. The Peking leadership is therefore forced to represent the emergency measures, also being implemented to mitigate the employment problem, as some sort of a "new economic policy", the curtailment of production and capital construction—as an improvement of

proportions; and the revival of non-socialist forms of property as an enhancement of planned regulation. Still, the supreme goal of the political and economic dictatorship in China is the maximum extraction of surplus product for the sake of militarization and hegemonism. In the final count, this is damaging the interests of the broad sections of the population.

Trud, December 13, 1981 *

A STEP OF DESPAIR AND PROTEST

The policy of China's Maoist leaders is causing mounting discontent among broad population strata. Mass actions by the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia protesting against the order of things that has obtained over the past decades occur up and down the country. The situation forces growing numbers of Chinese to risk their lives and leave the country.

Chinese people flee China from want, social deprivation and from political repression by the authorities. Many leave having lost faith in what Mao Zedong and his team had for years dinned into their minds, in what Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of present-day China are trying to impress on them today.

Through Barbed Wire

The real numbers of refugees are not known. However, even fragmentary information coming from various regions bordering upon the PRC is tell-tale enough. Thousands of Tibetans have taken refuge in India. Recently, India guided by humanitarian considerations agreed to admit another 1,500 Tibetans who had taken refuge in Bhutan. Their flow has been continuing unabated for several years now. The cause of this is the Maoist line on the national question. In Tibet, just as in other regions inhabited by national minorities, the Peking leadership pursue a Sinicization policy by force of arms. Tibet is regarded by them as a strategic springboard against the neighbouring states, as a site for intensive military preparations. It is not accidental that discontent of the local population is a common occurrence here. "We were grieved by what we saw in Tibet, particularly by the hard conditions of life," said the members of a delegation of representatives of the Dalai-lama, the spiritual leader of the Tibetans, that visited this vast area last summer at the invitation of Peking. Significantly, notwithstanding all efforts by Chinese authorities to create an impression of well-being and

peace in these parts, a demonstration of local residents protesting against the policy of the central government took place in Lhasa during the visit. The exodus of Chinese via the Guangdong Province to Hongkong has acquired an even greater scope. In their quest for a better lot (unsuccessful, so far), at the risk of losing their lives, they pick their way into this British colony giving wide berth to the heavily-armed patrols ranging the sea and land. They also have to force their way through a barbed-wire entanglement 15 feet high running all along the border. According to information released by British authorities, up to 500,000 persons are annually trying to cross the border from the Guangdong Province to Hongkong. Half the number are arrested by Chinese authorities and a part are repatriated by the authorities of the British colony. For all that almost 150,000 manage to remain there. "The big leap forward and the 'cultural revolution' have reduced us to poverty. We trusted Deng when he promised to improve our status by implementing the 'four modernizations'. We are bitterly disappointed now", says a former member of a commune in the Shaoguan Lin Dehuai region.

But the accounts by the Chinese that left their country and asked for political asylum in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are perhaps the most revealing. They spoke to Vietnamese and foreign journalists in Hanoi and told them about their tragic lives. These people were five, out of several hundred, who found freedom in Vietnam after being victimized in the "post-Maoist epoch"...

After the Intoxication of the "Cultural Revolution" Wore Off

"Life in my native district is very hard, particularly for peasants. Eighty per cent of their produce is requisitioned by the authorities. Almost all families can only afford one bowl of rice a day and even eat tubers of wild plants. Hungry children begging in doorways is a common sight. Only old people work here now because under Mao and Deng youth is involved in the endless struggle for power", says Mu Sunhe, aged 38, member of the CPC since 1963, from the Lijiang district in the Yunnan Province.

Mu says that his youth coincided with the period of the "cultural revolution", and blinded by "Mao thought", the graduate of the Institute of Physical Culture in Yunnan he became an activist in the "zaofan" movement.

After the frenzy of the "cultural revolution" gradually wore off the awakening came. Now he realizes that he was duped and used as a pawn in another stage of the struggle for power. The same fate befell his friends.

Mu Sunhe had close personal connection with the leadership of the area. In 1975 his friends from among the military told him about the so-called B-5 Plan which consisted of "three points for action" against the SRV whose policy did not suit Peking. Point One envisaged support for the Pol Pot regime in staging aggression on the south-western borders of Vietnam. This was to serve as an indirect warning. Point Two provided for the use of huaqiao, ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, for carrying out a Maoist "revolution" there. In the event of failure of these actions Point Three provided for a direct attack upon Vietnam by Chinese troops...

Wang Chaoxiang served in the Chinese army between 1963 and 1969. Later he joined the Yanshan police department and witnessed numerous crimes perpetrated by the authorities.

"The memories of the Yipinglang incident torment me day and night", he says. "On January 27, 1968 thousands of workers started joint action to secure an improvement in the conditions of their life. The authorities ordered the army to quell the uprising. The 18th and the 14th army corps were sent in to seal off the Liufeng district. We opened artillery fire upon concentrations of protesters a number of times and urged them to surrender. Hundreds of shells were fired upon Yipinglang. Hundreds of people were killed and wounded, and extensive material damage was done. On the next day my unit received commendations for the operation. Neither I nor many of my friends could conceal our indignation."

While serving in the police Wang Chaoxiang saw with increasing clarity that the Chinese authorities used them as a weapon to suppress opposition. The police in the Yanshan district arrested, under false pretexts, many Party cadre workers, rank-and-file Party members, including many Party veterans.

In that situation Wang Chaoxiang joined an opposition organization led by Wang Renhua, a personnel department chief in the Yanshan district. The organization had roughly 200 members. They wrote dazibao urging people to resist the authorities' repressive policy and protested against compulsory "contributions" exacted for the war against Vietnam. Opposition was active in several districts of the Yunnan Province. Numerous activists were arrested and sent to "re-education camps". Expecting arrest, Wang Chaoxiang fled to Vietnam.

Under False Pretexs

He Gang aged 28, worked in the Tongmen commune, the district of Fushu in the Guangxi Province. "In the days of the 'cultural revolution' we were ranked with the so-called 'high class' people because my family owned a plot of land. In August, 1966 hungweibings took my mother and two brothers, together with fifteen other peasants, to the local football field, tied them to wooden poles and bludgeoned to death".

The leaders of the commune imposed arbitrary and very heavy taxes upon everything my plot could yield. Families that kept cattle, pigs, poultry or cultivated bananas were publicly censured.

The situation became worse in February 1979 after China's attempted invasion of Vietnam. The army requisitioned food. Workers were sent to build fortifications. Many people openly condemned the Peking authorities who under the spurious pretext of having to counter "Vietnamese aggression" began mobilizing people en masse and plundering public property.

Returning from the front after delivering supplies there, members of the Tongmen commune declared angrily: "This is nonsense! Our soldiers have penetrated tens of kilometres into Vietnam. They kill and plunder. And our leaders talk about Vietnam's hegemonism. Because of all this many people fled to the mountains".

"The Maoist cultural revolution only inflicted suffering upon the Chinese people. Discontent is running high among the population. Being cruelly deceived, people no longer take the promises of the current leaders on trust", says Mu Sunhe, quoted earlier. "I realized that the Communist Party of China must seek a new way, must restore friendship with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. I am not alone. There are many sober-minded people in China, true revolutionaries. But to save my life I had to leave my country and seek political asylum in Vietnam".

More Chinese are leaving China...

From Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi;
Agence France-Presse, Paris;
Patriot, Delhi;
China News Analysis, Hongkong

IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION OF THE CHINESE POPULATION

From the Soviet and foreign press

The world public closely follows the processes unfolding in China. The country's leadership while repudiating the more odious facets of Maoism seek to retain its substance. As attested by the documents of the Sixth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee held in June, 1981, the economic and political setbacks of the Maoist course, and the crisis phenomena that plague the state and the Party, forced the Peking leaders to admit that Mao Zedong had made many errors which inflicted great distress and suffering upon the Chinese people. At the same time the meeting's decisions stress that "Mao Zedong thought" is a "spiritual treasure-trove", the "fount of the Party's ideas" which will "guide CPC activities in the future too". In order to play down Mao Zedong's errors and the consequences they had for China, it is claimed that Mao's merits greatly outweigh his demerits.

The current Chinese leaders preserve the petty-bourgeois nationalistic essence of Maoism and regard it as the foundation of the ideology and policy of the Party and the state. At the same time they make attempts to build an ideological and political platform of "Sinicized Marxism" which could be used in their struggle for world hegemony, simultaneously discarding a number of tenets of Mao's theory which they were compelled to publicly acknowledge as erroneous.

Clinging to Positions of Anti-Sovietism and Hegemonism

Having made anti-Sovietism a principal direction of their propaganda campaigns designed to stupefy the masses, Maoist ideologists take advantage of the fact that there are no sources of objective information in the country. Hence, they juggle and twist the facts concerning the domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

Almost daily, Chinese newspapers swamp their readers with lies and fabrications denigrating the aid the Soviet Union renders to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to counter and thwart the acts of sabotage and subversion being carried out by imperialism and reaction. One would in vain seek in the pages of the Peking press any information on the Chinese-US-Pakistani collusion in arming and training the Afghan rebels. US war preparations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area are presented to the Chinese people as "legitimate measures" designed to counter "Soviet expansion". The PRC propaganda agencies, the Xinhua News Agency and the "Renmin ribao" newspaper in particular, day after day back up the projected deployment of US cruise missiles in Western Europe and President Reagan's decision to launch full-scale production of neutron weapons. Inflating the myth on the "threat from the north" and drumming up the atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria in the country the ruling clique thereby tries to justify its military-political collusion with imperialism.

Using anti-Sovietism to mislead the masses the top men in Peking want to divert public attention from the failures in their domestic and foreign policies. The anti-Soviet activities of Mao's heirs are a propaganda

cover designed to conceal their subversive plans with regard to the socialist countries. Peking's mass media distort the essence of the events in Poland and try to discredit the PUWP course aimed at settling the country's problems. Full of hatred for socialist Vietnam, resentful of the growing unity between the SRV, Laos and Kampuchea, and their friendship with the USSR, the Peking leaders go all out to sully the People's Republic of Kampuchea and justify their crimes against the Vietnamese people.

At the same time Mao's heirs and their propaganda machinery make futile attempts to depict official Peking as a champion of peace and justice. Hu Yaobang, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, hypocritically declared in one of his speeches that China "does not strive for hegemony or threaten anyone with armed force". Peking's leaders have not changed their aggressive views on the role of military power as a decisive foreign policy instrument, but they do talk less now about the "inevitability" and "desirability" of a new world war. The Maoists rather emphasize the possibility of "postponing and even preventing" it, which is allegedly conditional upon the establishment of a broad anti-Soviet alliance. These "peace" gestures are no more than a tranquillizer supposed to deceive the world progressive public and the working people of the PRC and disguise the aggressive and hegemonic character of Peking's foreign policy.

Moral Pressure Apparatus

A far-flung network of Party, state and public institutions and organizations, whose activities are directed and coordinated by the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, has the aim of

ideologically "orientating" the people. From an early age every Chinese is subjected to the propaganda of Mao's great-power chauvinistic ideas. Already in kindergartens Chinese children are told about "Great China", its territory and population "largest in the world", etc., etc. Later the Chinese are involved in the activity of Maoist youth organizations and get "ideological and moral education" there. Restored in the 1970s, the Maoist trade unions, women's and youth organizations, and creative unions under the supervision of Party committees, have become an obedient tool in the hands of the Peking ruling clique intent on completely subjecting the masses to its influence. The ideological, moral and psychological climate needed for this is being induced in society by Maoist literature and art, the press, radio and TV services.

According to the "China" reference book, issued in the PRC in the late seventies, the country had over 250 central and local newspapers with a combined circulation of about 11,000 million copies. In 1980 according to the Xinhua News Agency, their total circulation already exceeded 14,000 million copies.

Radio is assigned a special place in the ideological indoctrination of the Chinese population. This is understandable because the number of illiterates and semi-literates is fairly large and the language of printed matter is rather involved, full of allusions and hints. In these conditions, radio is the foremost information source, particularly in the village. The number of radio-broadcasting stations has been growing to reach 106. For example, national radio stations broadcast a total of 90 hours a day on five channels. According to Chinese sources the network of 484 radio and relay stations makes it possible for 94 per cent of all agricultural teams to receive radio broadcasts.

Seventy per cent of all peasant households are provided with a wired radio system.

Television is not yet widespread in China. Yet there are 38 TV stations in the administrative centres of the provinces and autonomous regions (except Tibet) and in some of the major cities.

Such traditional forms of ideological indoctrination of the Chinese people as collective readings and discussion of newspaper materials and collective listening to radio broadcasts have been used for a long time now.

The Army is a Special Concern

The officers and men of the Chinese army are today charged with the tasks of executing the hegemonic and expansionist plans of the country's leadership, and of staging provocations on the borders with neighbouring countries. However, in the armed forces of China there are still quite a few followers of the smashed "gang of four" inasmuch as veterans and junior officers belong to the generation brought up on the ideas of the notorious "cultural revolution". Service in the army is not considered a prestigious occupation, especially after the failure of China's aggression against socialist Vietnam and suppression of recent disturbances in the country by the army.

Peking's leaders take hasty measures to totally bring the army under their influence. First of all, they do everything in their power to increase their ideological impact on the men and officers. To this end, Deng Xiaoping who assumed the duties of Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee directed the political orientation bodies in the military districts and army formations to intensify ideolo-

gical work in the army in order to "assure the acceptance of the Party's absolute leadership by the military units".

Special attention is accorded in the Chinese army to the ideological indoctrination of the personnel. Along with combat and psychological training, it is part and parcel of the overall training of the Chinese officers and men. It imbues all types of training and is designed to affect in a suitable way the consciousness of the Chinese servicemen. The Maoist military doctrine whereby "every generation of the Chinese must have its own war" furnishes a "theoretical grounding" of the "need" for a thorough and incessant brainwashing of the Chinese servicemen. Hence, the Chinese people must prepare morally, physically and psychologically for an inevitable world war.

The content of indoctrination is determined by the Maoist ideology and the ensuing practice of "bending the minds of the army personnel, specified, depending on the situation, in a number of decisions and decrees of the CPC Central Committee and the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee promulgated over recent years.

Great-power chauvinism, nationalism and Sino-centrism upon which special emphasis is laid in the ideological indoctrination serve to foster in Chinese soldiers such feelings as spurious patriotism and national arrogance. Psychological stereotypes, "superiority complexes", bound up with national specifics, e.g. "the Great Chinese Wall complex" (hatred of anything that is not Chinese) and "the Middle Kingdom complex" (all that is Chinese is the best in the world) are inculcated in order to impress upon the servicemen the conviction of national exclusiveness.

The brainwashing of the army personnel is of a distinctly militaristic character and is conducted under the slogan: "Have no fear of privation, have no fear of death".

The Peking leadership go to any length, and use all possible means and forms in order to shape the mentality of servicemen and facilitate the pursuit of its hegemonistic, great-power, anti-Soviet policy.

Crisis

The atmosphere reigning in China, the measures implemented by the Peking leadership incapable of resolving cardinal vital problems, deeply affect the moods and attitudes of the Chinese people. Apathy is rife amid almost all population strata; the people are steadily losing their confidence in Mao Zedong and his dogmas; the prestige and authority of the Party and government leaders are on the wane. Even the Chinese press is obliged to admit that "the Party's prestige is not high, as a fact".

The upheavals the country has been suffering because of the erroneous domestic and foreign policies have eventuated in a serious ideological and political crisis of society and enhanced nihilistic attitudes to the official guidelines and slogans. This is why the Peking leaders orient the propaganda bodies on mobilizing the people for overcoming the crisis situation.

In order to dupe the people and reduce them to mindless executors of their orders and directives the Chinese leaders seek more "sophisticated" forms and methods for shaping the mentality of the people and use new stratagems in this field.

Chinese propaganda on the one hand, tries to embellish Maoism disguised as Marxism-Leninism, and

on the other, to blend Maoist nationalist doctrines with century-old great-Han chauvinism and hegemonism. Its main aim is to create a new stereotype of Chinese personality wholly devoted to Mao's ideas.

However, the ideological and political confusion and vacillation, caused by the manoeuvres around Maoism attest not only to the bankruptcy of the political course being pursued at home and abroad but also to the low effectiveness of the propaganda apparatus. It is not an overstatement that Mao's heirs have not succeeded in establishing their control over the domestic situation which is still very tense.



*They still believe.
Photo: Thousands of young Chinese cheering their leaders.
Whither will they be led?*

Noteworthy is the fact that the acknowledgement of the crisis of Maoism can serve to arouse moods and sentiments in defence of genuine socialism. Outbreaks of discontent occur sometimes in universities, especially at Peking University. According to foreign press, demonstrations and petitions against the government are no longer a rare phenomenon there. Such sentiments become more and more widespread, and show the lack of stability in the country.

* * *

Developments in China show the futility of the attempts being made by the current Peking rulers to arrest the erosion of Maoist values. Life again forcibly confirms correctness of the conclusion made by the 26th Congress of the CPSU that the experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to.

IN BRIEF

VICTIMS OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

The Japanese newspaper "Yomiuri" reports that during the ten years of the "cultural revolution" about 20 million people were killed in China as a result of armed struggle, repression and acts of violence committed by the Hungweibings. All told, the "cultural revolution" affected about 600 million Chinese in varying degrees. The newspaper claims that this infor-

mation was obtained from an inquiry conducted in the country on instructions from the CPC Central Committee.

The newspaper "Yomiuri" points out that armed clashes between different groupings at the time of the "cultural revolution" acquired the character of civil war, with the sides employing various types of arms including tanks.

K. MASLOV

THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA: A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELATIONS

Relations between the Soviet Union and China, their past, present and possible prospects of their development, especially in view of the repeated zigzags in China's policies which sharply contrast with the consistent and principled policy of the Soviet Union, are attracting the attention of political and public circles throughout the world. The history of Russian-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations is traced in a short essay by the Soviet Orientalists Raisa Mirovitskaya and Yuri Semyonov, entitled "The Soviet Union and China. A Brief History of Relations".*

Sino-Soviet relations, and their history and present-day status, are given a distorted interpretation in many books that have lately appeared in the West. Authors write of ever-lasting enmity between the two states.

Meanwhile the entire history of Russian-Chinese relations spanning over 300 years attests to the mutual desire of the two countries to pursue peaceful, good-neighbourly and mutually beneficial ties. The authors note that when these relations rested on fundamental national interests, both sides benefited. But when narrow class interests of the ruling circles of tsarist Russia and Imperial China predominated, or when Chinese-Russian good-neighbourly relations became an object of Western colonial powers' intrigues, it was again both sides that lost.

Russia's policy towards China, unlike that pursued by Western powers was one of friendship and good-neighbourliness. Russia did not support the Western powers in their "Opium Wars" unleashed by Great Britain in order to penetrate into

* R. Mirovitskaya, Yu. Semyonov. The Soviet Union and China. A Brief History of Relations, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981 (Published in English, Arabic, Spanish, French and Japanese).

the Chinese market, nor did it approve of their aggressive designs.

At a time when the "civilized" countries of the West plied their "yellow slave trade" by selling the Chinese workforce or coolies, Russia showed its strong opposition by passing appropriate laws against such slave trade.

Britain, the United States and other Western powers smuggled tens of thousands of boxes of opium into China, poisoning the body and soul of her people. In exchange for narcotics, they pumped out silver and other precious commodities from that semi-colonial country making a fabulous profit. In contrast, Russia banned the import of opium by a special imperial decree in 1841 and did what it could to stop contraband traffic in narcotics.

At the turn of the century when the imperialist powers clashed over China, seeking to divide it into spheres of influence, tsarist Russia, having secured the consent of the Ching government, concentrated its attention on the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. The building of the railway was important for all countries of the Far East. When it opened (the railway was completed in 1903) it had first-class rolling stock manufactured in Russia, and in Europe and the United States. It gave rise to new towns and villages, industrial and commercial centres and enterprises such as coal-mines, iron smelting plants, timber processing mills, etc. It became the most important transportation artery in Manchuria and attracted migrants and technical personnel from China's interior, as well as engineers and skilled workers from Russia.

Immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution (1917), the Soviet government headed by Lenin rejected the imperialist policy of tsarist Russia towards the countries of the East and abrogated all unequal treaties with them. In particular, the Soviet government renounced the special rights and privileges that Russia had in China, such as extraterritorial rights, consular jurisdiction, economic concessions. The Soviet government restored China's sovereignty over the strip of land on which the Chinese Eastern Railway lay. Later, in 1952 the Soviet government transferred the right to run the railway and all the facilities to the PRC government.

The authors note that in a short survey it is difficult to give a detailed account of the tremendous and selfless assistance which the Soviet Union extended to China. Genuine fraternal internationalist assistance to the Chinese people was recognized

by the leaders of the Communist Party of China, and particularly by Mao Zedong who said that the Soviet Union was the only country in the world which supported the liberation struggle of the Chinese people.

A treaty of non-aggression between the USSR and China, signed on August 21, 1937, strengthened the position of China's patriotic forces fighting against Japan. The Soviet Union sent hundreds of volunteers to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders. An important part in the defence of China's air space was played by Soviet pilots.

After the defeat of Japanese militarism in the Second World War to which the Soviet armed forces made the decisive contribution the Kuomintang supported by US imperialism rushed into a major clash with the Communist Party. And again the Soviet Union came to the assistance of the Chinese revolution. Using its international authority and political and military weight, particularly during the initial period of the Civil War, when the CPC suffered setbacks, the Soviet Union thwarted the US attempts at direct intervention in China's internal affairs. The victory of the Chinese revolution would have been won at a much greater sacrifice had it not been for the support of the Soviet Union.

The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949 and already on February 14, 1950 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. That was a decisive contribution to strengthening China's position in the world. Soviet assistance prevented direct military intervention in China by the United States. In the first difficult years for the republic the Soviet Union also took direct military action to cool the imperialists' aggressive intentions. In 1949-1950 large Soviet airforce units, at the request of the Chinese government, covered the air space over Shanghai, a large industrial centre in East China, against American and Chiang Kaishekite air raids. In 1950, the Soviet Union, also at the request of the government of China, sent crack airforce divisions to Manchuria for the defence of industrial centres in Northeast China against enemy air raids.

As for Soviet assistance in the restoration and development of China's national economy ruined by decades of war, it had no parallel in history, the authors note. Overall, hundreds of major industrial enterprises, shops and projects equipped with

the latest machinery were built in China with Soviet assistance. The Soviet Union trained staff for every industrial project that it helped build in China, i.e. practically the entire technical personnel from among Chinese nationals, from the director and chief engineer to shop and section managers.

The Chinese leaders' switch to the policy of enmity towards the Soviet Union in the late fifties and early sixties was attended by an artificial exacerbation by Peking of the situation on the Chinese-Soviet border, by laying territorial claims to the Soviet Union and attempting to seize certain sectors of Soviet territory. The Soviet Union displayed exceptional self-restraint and patience faced with the attempts of the Chinese side to "manufacture" the so-called territorial issue between the USSR and the PRC and call into question the existing border.

Meanwhile, the history of Soviet-Chinese relations shows, the writers note in conclusion, that there are no objective reasons for alienation, much less for confrontation, of the two countries. On the contrary, there are all the necessary conditions for restoring good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China, conditions which stem from the vital long-term interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

APN

S. AGAFONOV

THE SOURCES OF THE PRESENT-DAY COURSE

The unceasing factional struggles going on between various groups in China today are accompanied by heated discussions on questions of the history of the CPC, the role and place of various leaders of the Party and the state in different periods. Attention is focused on the personality of Mao Zedong and his ideological and political legacy. While introducing corrections into Maoism, adapting its eclectic provisions to the requirements of their pragmatic policy, Peking leaders are doing their utmost to whitewash the "great helmsman", extol his virtues and minimize his responsibility for the crimes committed against Chinese people.

Current events in the PRC offer a good opportunity for delving into the history of the Chinese revolution to re-establish the truth on a series of crucial questions, including the place of Mao Zedong and other leaders of China, the historical role of those Chinese internationalists and patriots who became victims of Guomindang reaction and the Maoists. In this relation exceptionally topical is O. Borisov's book "From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950s (Concerning the Discussion on Mao Zedong in the PRC)."¹ The book throws light on the ominous role of Mao and his clique as they usurped power and shaped a great-power anti-Soviet course which is now more and more closely merging with imperialism's policies.

The choice of the chronological boundaries by the author is not accidental either. The 1950s hold a special place in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations. In the first decade after the triumph of the people's revolution and the proclamation of the PRC, the creative forces of the Chinese people were revealed in full measure. Relying on the all-round and unselfish aid of the Soviet Union, they started building the new life. The successes scored by the country led the Maoists to the conclusion that the time came when they could materialize their international ambitions. It was in those years that Mao Zedong and his group exacerbated disagreements with the CPSU and the world communist movement. Mao Zedong paved the way for a policy of rabid anti-Sovietism. The book based on rich factual material, eyewitness accounts and personal impressions of the author, shows the true visage of Mao Zedong, the anti-Marxist trend of his "ideas", the methods of intrigue he resorted to suppress dissidence inside the Party and the state and to affirm the cult of his own personality. The author criticizes, from consistent and principled positions, the Maoists' attempts to relegate to oblivion the role and importance of the aid provided by the Soviet Union and the CPSU in the formation and development of the young republic, and to falsify the history of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The author also describes the present situation in China.

¹ O. Borisov. From the History of the Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950s (Concerning the Discussion on Mao Zedong in the PRC), Moscow, Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya Publishers, 1981 (in Russian).

DARKNESS OVER CHINA

(An eyewitness report about China)

Ivan Bondar, a worker on a collective farm near the border in Primorye Territory (Soviet Far East), was returning home after work in a farm vehicle. Something went wrong with the engine and as he could not drive it farther he decided to walk. However, he did not reach home and a search was started. They applied to the Chinese border guards—a man is lost, could he by chance have crossed the border? The answer was that no one had violated the border. On the sixteenth day of the searches Bondar was considered missing.

... More than seven years went by. Then one day Chinese border guards came to one frontier post in Primorye Territory. They brought a man with them and said, "He's yours — take him..." The man they brought was Ivan Bondar.

So what happened? Where had this Soviet citizen been all these seven years?

Ivan Bondar tells his story.

That night I strayed from the road. Only in the morning did I see smoke over trees and was happy to see it. I walked closer, looked and saw a Chinese village. I felt ill at ease as I had crossed the border.

Never mind, I thought, find the local authorities, tell them what has happened and they will take me to our border guards. In 1945 I was in China freeing the country from Japanese invaders. Then, they greeted us as brothers—with red flags, smiles and handsha-

kes. Quite a number of our lads died on Chinese soil. When they know about my participation in their liberation they cannot help but believe me.

But it all came out differently. As soon as I was seen in the village they ran up to me, bent my hands behind my back and tied them with telephone wire. I did not resist. On being taken to an office, I said, "What are you doing? I helped to free your country, tell the Soviet border guards I lost my way..." But they pushed me into a car, blindfolded me and, accompanied by five guards with rifles, I was driven for about ten hours to some town. There I was put in a room with a barred window and the questioning began. The first thing I did was to write a request for them to hand me over to the Soviet border guards or inform our consul. They took it. Day after day the questioning continued.

At first I did not understand what they wanted from me. They asked me about life in my country. I told them all the truth. This treatment went on for over a year. Then they tried to make me write a sort of statement about life in the Soviet Union in such a manner that it would help in the fight against "Soviet revisionists". This condition was stressed several times. I sat and wrote 171 pages about the achievements of socialism in the USSR.

They read my statement about three days, then took me to the town of Mudanjiang and put me in a little house surrounded by a high fence.

Twelve guards and five chiefs—the whole establishment just for me... They said that I was a Soviet spy.

Thus, month followed month. Every day I asked, "Why do you hold me?" The answer was, "For you to think things over properly." What thoughts could I

have? Of course about home, about the family. So as not to be too miserable I began to work in the garden, took the shears from the old gardener and cut hedges. Then I laid a path with broken bricks. My guards liked this, they were soldiers of peasant stock. One old man especially liked me. He invited me on the first of May to his small room. Then it all went wrong. A man in civil clothes burst into the room, began to shout and hit me with his fists. I began to defend myself. The guards ran to aid up, unmercifully beat me, tied my hands. Two days after the provocation, people from Harbin came with some paper, they brought my sentence sealed four times. There was no trial or investigation of course. They read the sentence in Chinese and a translator explained that from now I would be imprisoned. I asked, "What for?" They answered, "You know why." They threw me into a car and off I went to prison.

That prison was the most horrible thing I experienced in all my life. Everything in it was designed to humiliate the prisoners. At first they brought food to my single cell that even a pig wouldn't eat. I did not eat for nine days and wrote to the chief warder that if the food did not improve I would die from hunger. Disturbed by this they brought me some rice instead of bran.

Next to my cell was the interrogation room. All the time heart-rending cries came from there. Perhaps they specially put me next to this torture cell to intimidate me. I was not allowed out of the cell for a walk and was given only propaganda articles to read. True I was given paper and pencil to write a statement if I 'thought better of it'.

I spent more than three years in that prison. My legs were swollen from cold and immobility. I began

doing exercises,—they beat me. The warder shouted, "Stop it", but I decided to continue even if they kill me. In the morning I again began to do knees-bend exercises and rub myself with water. They beat me again but still I continued and they left me alone. I was taken to the bath house only in the fifth year of my forced stay in China. I dread to think how lice crawled over me in their thousands.

However, even such treatment was considered privileged compared with that given to the Chinese prisoners. I suppose such procedures were only meted out in the Middle Ages. Prisoners were chained in shackles. When they were being taken for a walk the clank of metal resounded in the corridor. Near my cell exhausted prisoners were forced to carry chunks of metal weighing several poods (one pood = 16.38 kg.). They always walked bent double. A terrible picture — humiliated, bent people silently dragging themselves along one after another. For the slightest misdemeanour they were cruelly beaten. The shackles were unlocked twice a day when food was brought to the cells.

During this time the magazines "China" and "China Reconstructs" occasionally brought to me were full of evil slander against the Soviet Union. Once I could not contain myself and wrote refutations to the provocative booklet "Is the USSR a Socialist Country?" Apparently, my message reached somebody because on the next day the Maoists heaped still one more humiliation on me: they took me to the yard and made me walk bent double up and down it. Meanwhile they "explained" the "real content" of that slanderous book. Really, the argument was conducted on the principle, "Might is right. . ."

The years went by. Sometimes I despaired and thought I would never see my homeland again. It was clear to me that the Chinese officials hid the fact of my imprisonment from the Soviet authorities. Only on the fourth year when they allowed me to walk a little and when the food became better did the translator whisper to me, "This is the first step towards home."

One day they took me out of the prison clothes and dressed me in a blue double-breasted jacket, the one the Chinese dignitaries wear, and took me to the town of Shenyang. Forty kilometres from this town was an isolation hospital. There I met some Soviet people who, just like me, through some misunderstanding found themselves in China. Four of them could not stand the horrors of the torture-chambers, were out of their minds, and were kept separate. Some time later our group was invited to tour the country. We journeyed twenty three days. Disguised guards accompanied us everywhere. We were shown enterprises and agricultural communes—those which all foreigners are allowed to see. Indeed, ordinary Chinese are very hard-working people. We saw a canal 900 kilometres long, dug without modern machines, only with spades and wheelbarrows, and a bridge across the Yangzi River. Involuntarily the thought came to me: how many things the Chinese people could have accomplished if it had not been for those mad leaps, the "cultural revolution", this militarist intoxication, if the Peking leaders had not broken the good relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries!

The ordinary Chinese live a poor, terrible life. In the villages—they have decrepit houses. In the towns there are crowds of poorly dressed people. Wrist watches, bicycles are considered a luxury. A television can only be bought by the whole village commune.

One thing was typical: on meeting workers at enterprises and the toilers in agriculture we never noticed any ill-will towards us Soviet people.

After the journey throughout the country we again arrived at Shenyang. For three months more we were under lock and key. Again "talks" were conducted and "explanations" made that the Soviet Union was allegedly to blame for the disruption of relations with China. Once I could not endure it any longer. "Let us clear this out", I said. "Our soldiers freed China from the Japanese invaders. Many were killed here. And you do not even permit their relatives to visit the graves."

At last came the day when I was ordered to prepare to leave. They took me to the border and exhorted me for the last time.

"When you are home tell only the truth about China." "Alright", I answered, "I will tell people the truth and only the truth."

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ № 4 К ЖУРНАЛУ
«СОЦИАЛИЗМ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА»

№ 7, 1982 г.

на английском языке

0-35

The Soviet monthly SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE and supplements to this magazine are digests of the political and theoretical press featuring the vital problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the practice of socialist and communist construction, the peoples' struggle for peace, democracy and socialism, and worldwide ideological struggle.

**All inquiries should be addressed to:
SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
7 Bolshaya Pochtovaya Street,
107082, Moscow, USSR
or to the Information Department of the
Soviet Embassy**