



SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

**The enemies of the
socialist countries'
unity**

**A "political show"
in Peking**

**"Chinese model"
of economic
development**

SUPPLEMENT

**III
1981**

SOCIALISM:
THEORY AND
PRACTICE

Published
bimonthly

III

1981

SUPPLEMENT

CONTENTS

FROM DOCUMENTS

- Leonid BREZHNEV
We Are for Normalizing Relations with
China 5
- Fidel CASTRO
Alliance Between Imperialists and Hegemo-
nists 7

HISTORY AND OUR TIME

- B. SHIRENDYB
Peking Preachers of Great-Han Chauvinism 9
- A. MIKHAILOV
Maoists' Betrayal 18

FOREIGN POLICY

- O. BORISOV
The Socialist Countries' Unity and Its Pek-
ing Adversaries 24
- Peking Changes Tactics 33
- N. SERGEYEV
The New Mandarins' Ambitions 38

ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

- O. IVANOV
"Demaioization" or Modernization of Mao-
ism? 45
- I. ILYIN
Mock Trial 52
- V. VANIN, S. LYUDIN
Economic "Adjustment" in China: What It
Means 60

Articles published in abridged form are marked with an asterisk (*).

Address of the STP
Editorial Office:
7 Bolshaya Pochto-
vaya Street, 107082,
Moscow, USSR

BOOK REVIEWS

F. BELELYUBSKY
Education and Science in China 70

OUR LIBRARY

M. YAKOVLEV
The Treacherous Satrap 74

FROM DOCUMENTS

Leonid BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of
the CPSU Central
Committee

WE ARE FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Special mention must be made of China. The experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to.

The present Chinese leaders themselves describe what happened in the period of the so-called cultural revolution in their country as "a most cruel feudal-fascist dictatorship". We have nothing to add to this assessment.

At present changes are under way in China's internal policy. Time will show what they actually mean. It will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will manage to overcome the Maoist legacy. But, unfortunately, there are no grounds yet to speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As before, it is aimed at aggravating the international situation, and is aligned with the policy of the imperia-

Excerpt from the *Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. Delivered by L. I. Brezhnev on February 23, 1981.*

list powers. That, of course, will not bring China back to the sound road of development. Imperialists will never be friends of socialism.

The simple reason behind the readiness of the United States, Japan, and a number of NATO countries to expand their military and political ties with China is to use its hostility to the Soviet Union and the socialist community in their own, imperialist interests. That is a hazardous game.

As far as the people of China are concerned, we are deeply convinced that their true interests would be best served by a policy of peace and nothing but a policy of peace and normal relations with other countries.

If Soviet-Chinese relations are still frozen, the reason for this has nothing to do with our position. The Soviet Union has never sought, nor does it now seek any confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We follow the course set by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, and would like to build our ties with that country on a good-neighbour basis. Our proposals for normalising relations with China remain open, and our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed.

Pravda, February 24, 1981

Fidel CASTRO,
First Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Cuba, Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba.

ALLIANCE BETWEEN IMPERIALISTS AND HEGEMONISTS

Taking advantage of the nefarious position of the Chinese government and its leaders' betrayal of socialism and internationalism, US imperialism set about weaving an alliance with China and Japan, aimed against the Soviet Union.

...US imperialist policy has an ally in the government of China, whose leaders are fomenting aggression by NATO, proposing that it step up the quantity and technical development of its arms; inciting and aiding the United States in its efforts to turn Japan into a springboard for attacks against the Soviet Union; openly continuing its nuclear preparations, developing carriers for nuclear warheads and proclaiming that the USSR is the enemy to be destroyed; and trying to expand into Southeast Asia by threatening its neighbours in ASEAN and attacking Vietnam, forcing that coun-

From Fidel CASTRO's report at the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, December 18, 1980.

try to interrupt its peaceful national reconstruction and socialist construction in order to defend itself. They are also playing a similar role in Africa and Latin America, allying themselves with the most reactionary forces and making friends with the most repressive representatives of every corrupt regime.

Pravda, December 19, 1980

B. SHIRENDYB (MPR)

PEKING PREACHERS OF GREAT-HAN CHAUVINISM

Bellicose imperialist and reactionary circles motivated by the ideas of world domination have been in recent years frantically building up their military potential, producing ever new types of weapons with great destructive power, stoking up international tensions, imposing their military bases armed with nuclear warhead missiles on some independent countries, forming new aggressive blocs and unceremoniously interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

These extremist circles have been joined by the Peking instigators of a death-dealing war. In their hegemonist plans the Maoists assign an important place to the territorial aggrandizement of the PRC through the conquest of the lands of other countries, among them the MPR, the USSR and other neighbouring countries.

Ideas Borrowed from the Emperors

The expansionist cravings of Peking militarists are seen in Chu Shushon's article **Some Questions Concerning the Appraisal of Genghiz Khan** published in the newspaper *Guangming ribao* in 1979 and in Wu. Chian-wei's article **The Aggressive Policy of Tsarist Russia Towards China During the Hsinhai Revolution** published

in 1980 in the newspaper **Wenhui bao**. The former article says that the tribes which inhabited an area which is now the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic prior to the formation of a united Mongolian state in the early 13th century belonged to China and that by their conquests Genghiz Khan¹ and his descendants united China and the neighbouring peoples into a single Chinese state. Genghiz Khan and his descendants, the author claims, played a progressive role in China's history. Consequently, the newspaper says, they are national heroes. These statements by Chinese authors are not anything new and have always been expounded by the ideologists of great-Han chauvinism.

Using these myths, Mao Zedong and his followers likewise repeated that the Mongols and other peoples were in historical affinity to China, that Genghiz Khan's descendants were progressive figures who fought to unite great China, and the lands conquered by them were related to China, and so on and so forth.

These fabrications have a dual aim: to fan nationalist passions over the Genghiz Khan cult and the false conception of the "affinity" of the Chinese, Mongolian and other peoples, to allay the discontent of the Mongolian population in Maoist China on the one hand, and, on the other, to lay territorial claims to the Mongolian People's Republic and countries which were attacked and conquered by Genghiz Khan's descendants in the by-gone times of the 13th century.

The Maoists believe that the most suitable means of suppressing the struggle of the Chinese population of

¹ Genghiz Khan (real name Temuchin, born c. 1155, died in 1227)—Mongolian khan and military leader under whose supremacy an early feudal Mongolian state was formed. Undertook predatory campaigns of conquest in the neighbouring countries—*Ed.*

Mongolian origin against great-Han chauvinism is to extol Genghiz Khan's role and propagate the kinship of the Mongols and Chinese. In 1956 the government of the People's Republic of China built a temple to worship Genghiz Khan and in 1962 officially observed his 800th anniversary. According to the Chinese press, in early 1980 a meeting was held in Inner Mongolia to "commemorate the memory of Genghiz Khan, an outstanding military and political figure who played a progressive role in the development of society".

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

Chinese expansionists lay territorial claims to practically all neighbouring countries and engineer frontier provocations. To "justify" their actions they falsify history and resort to slander.



Chinese cooking.

Drawing
by N. Lisogorsky.

Krasnaya zvezda

These and other measures and statements by Chinese authors are at odds with the elementary facts of history and directly contradict the class approach to it.

Mongolian historians, like Marxist scholars of other countries, appraise any policy of conquest and, in particular, that of Genghiz Khan and his descendants from class positions. They positively assess Genghiz Khan's role in unifying Mongolian tribes into a single state but condemn his policy of conquest and the wars caused by it.

Maoists are extremely inconsistent in their approach to historical facts. Not so long ago they held forth on their devotion to Marxist-Leninist theory and now openly extol "hero emperors" and "distinguished conquerors" who grew up on "yellow-race soil". Yet, universally known historical data refute the falsifying inventions of Peking ideologists.

Some time before the third century B.C., i.e., prior to the formation of the Chin kingdom, the first unified Chinese state, the territory of China proper was much smaller than the territory of the PRC today. In those times big non-Chinese nomad tribes of Central Asia lived outside its borders—Huns, Chujangs, Turks, Hsienpis, Tobas, Kidans, Mongols and others who were totally independent of the Heavenly Empire. Relations between Chin China and these tribes were now peaceful, now extremely hostile and were at times overshadowed by great wars which often ended in the victory of nomad tribes and the establishment of their domination over China. It is not accidental that more than 2,000 years ago, during the reign of the Chin dynasty, the building of the Great Wall of China was started to protect the empire from attacks by the neighbouring big nomad tribes which shaped their destinies independently.

The cattle-breeding economy established in Mongolia by the beginning of the first millennium B.C., the slab tombs and rock paintings from the distant past unearthed in various regions of the MPR graphically testify that the original culture of the inhabitants of Mongolia has nothing in common with the culture of the population of ancient China with its totally different ethno-anthropological features.

World history, the history of the peoples of Asia, Europe, America and Africa provide numerous facts when some peoples were subjugated by foreign conquerors, or themselves fell under the power of their former vassals. But these facts give no ground whatever for categorical conclusions about some countries belonging historically to others. Only Chinese authors of the present time can arrive at such "original" judgements.

Contrary to Generally Known Facts

At the beginning of the 11th century there arose states of large Mongolian tribes, among them the Hamag Mongol Ulus state in the basin of the rivers Onon and Kerulen. In 1206 a unified Mongolian state was formed on the Onon River, and its ruler Temuchin was proclaimed Genghiz Khan. In the early 13th century the Si Sia Chinese state recognized its vassal fealty to Genghiz Khan.

Mongolian conquerors overran the whole of China in 1272 and established the Yuan dynasty which reigned for nearly 100 years. It was overthrown by the Chinese people as a hateful foreign yoke. Then Manchurian conquerors dominated over China for 267 years and over Mongolia for 220 years.

Historical facts testify irrefutably when and which of the states of Central Asia established its domination over other countries, and, if we are to follow Chu Shushon's logic, we could claim that China belonged to the neighbouring states. But this approach cannot be recognized as historically justified.

Let us turn to some examples from the history of other continents. By the close of the sixties of the first century A. D. Britain was conquered by Romans; prior to the colonization of what is now the US territory by Europeans in the 16th century it was inhabited by Indians and Eskimos, the latter coming from Northeast Asia.

From this, if we are again to follow Chu Shushon's scheme, we could "conclude" that Britain belongs to Italy or the US territory to the Eskimos.

The East African man, *Homo habilis*, who lived hundreds of years ago in the territory which now is the territory of Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia and some other countries, was an intermediate ancestor of *Sinanthropus*, *Pithecanthropus* and other early species of man. According to Chu Shushon's "concept", it turns out that since *Homo habilis* is an indirect ancestor of *Sinanthropus*, the peoples of Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia can be simply declared to be in kinship to the Chinese people.

Territorial integrity of states is determined not by falsified historical data but by principles laid down in international law. In this connection it would be appropriate to ask:

- Does Chu Shushon know the inviolable conditions for establishing boundaries between states, such as the right of nations to self-determination, equality of big and small nations, the policy of peace and cooperation between peoples?

- Does Chu Shushon happen to know also such an interstate legal document as the frontier treaty concluded between the two neighbouring states and signed on December 26, 1962 by Yu. Tsendenbal, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, and Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister of the PRC, and ratified by the supreme state organs of the MPR and PRC?

Under the Yoke of Manchurian Feudals

Another Chinese author, Wu Chiandui, claims in his article published in May 1980 in the newspaper *Wenhui bao* that in 1911, with the help of its troops and diplomats, tsarist Russia separated Outer Mongolia from China.

The main aim of the author is to prove the legality of the Maoists's claims to the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic on the pretext of the criticism of tsarism's aggression. The events which took place during the undivided sway of imperialism are presented in a false light so as to lay territorial claims to the Soviet Union.

The historical roots and socio-economic causes which led to the restoration of Mongolia's state independence in 1911 lie not in the aggression of tsarist Russia but in the cruel consequences of the centuries-old oppression and merciless exploitation of the Mongolian people by the Manchurian feudals and Chinese money-lenders.

For more than two centuries the Mongolian people were politically oppressed, had numerous feudal taxes imposed on them and were ruined by the machinations of the Chinese money-lenders. The history of the two centuries of the despotic yoke of Manchurian and Chinese feudals and exploitation is full of examples

of heroic struggle, armed resistance and risings of the Mongolian people for their national and social liberation against the oppression of foreign exploiters.

In the 17th and 18th centuries the Mongolian people rose up many times against the Manchurian feudals and Chinese officials. Large-scale armed risings of Amarsan and Chingunzhav in the middle of the 18th century were brutally suppressed by the Manchurian-Chinese troops by the order of the Peking government. The peaceful population of Mongolia, too, became victims of butchery, mass killings and open plunder. But, despite that, the Mongolian patriots continued to fight against Chinese money-lenders and Manchurian officials, seeking to restore their state independence.

The national liberation movement of the Mongolian people in 1905 and 1910-1911 led to the overthrow of Manchurian rule in Outer Mongolia. On November 18, 1911, on the occasion of the restoration of the Mongolian state, representatives from all aimaks of Outer Mongolia issued an appeal to the population of the country, which said in part: "We Mongolians have been a nation since ancient times. Now, according to the old customs, we have to establish our own national state independent of other states."

Thus, the formation of the Mongolian state in 1911 came as a result of the many years' heroic struggle of the Mongolian people, which was crowned with victory under the impact of the world revolutionary process, especially the 1905 revolution in Russia.

In those years denouncing the aggressive policy of the imperialist states and, in particular, of the governments of Russia and Japan in relation to Mongolia, Korea and China, Lenin mercilessly exposed the oppression of the working people of these countries by their

feudals and emperors. In his writings of 1912-1917 he examined the Mongolian question in the light of world politics and the most important events in the Far East, and constantly urged the working class of Russia and progressive forces of the whole world to support the state independence of Mongolia and the struggle of its people for freedom.

Continuing its national liberation and revolutionary movement of 1911-1920 against foreign oppressors and feudals at home, the Mongolian people, influenced by the Great October Revolution, accomplished the People's Revolution in 1921 which marked the beginning of the sovereign existence and socialist development of the country.

In 1981 the Mongolian people will mark the glorious 60th anniversary of the People's Revolution by signal historic achievements in all fields of the life of their sovereign socialist homeland. The Mongolian People's Republic, a UN member, a member of the united family of the socialist community countries, has gained immense international prestige throughout the world as a state consistently pursuing the policy of peace and goodneighbourliness.

Za rubezhom, No. 26, 1980 *

MAOISTS' BETRAYAL

Our reader W. León from the Republic of Cuba put the following question to the Editors of STP in connection with the publication of A. Minyaev's article "The Peking Traitors" in our Supplement No. 4, 1980: "How can you explain the fact that the Soviet government requested Mao Zedong to intensify the operations of the CPC armed forces against the Japanese army at the time (i. e. in 1941) when Mao was not yet the head of the Chinese government, for the PRC was established in 1949?" Sinologist Anatoly MIKHAILOV answers this question.

Comrade León,

First of all, let us briefly recall and survey the exceedingly complicated and peculiar military-political situation which had evolved in China by the year 1941.

In the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s the Chinese people were forced to wage a grim struggle against the Japanese militarists who had invaded China. Using the part of China's territory they had seized in the north as a springboard of aggression, the Japanese army, 300-thousand-strong and equipped with the latest arms, launched a multi-pronged offensive deep into China in the summer of 1937. On the part of Japan that was an imperialist colonial war waged to enslave China. For the Chinese people, right from the start, it was a just war of national liberation against the Japanese aggressors. In the initial years of the war

Japanese troops captured immense areas in Northern, Central and Southern China, they overran the country's major economic centres and completely blockaded China's coastal areas. These reverses resulted from the general military-economic weakness of China and the reactionary policy of China's Guomindang government headed by Chang Kaishi, which furthered and upheld the interests of the landlords and the big (comprador) bourgeoisie. Gravitating towards the Western powers it adopted a passive strategy and tactics in the anti-Japanese war.

The ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain did not take any effective measures to curb the aggressor in those trying years for the Chinese people. They confined themselves to a verbal denunciation of Japan and hypocritical expressions of "sympathy" for China. At the same time the Western powers considerably stepped up the delivery of strategic materials to Japan, actually encouraging the aggressor. They sought to satisfy the appetites of the Japanese military at the expense of China so as to later redirect the spearhead of Japanese aggression against the USSR.

In those years the Soviet Union was the one and only great power that staunchly and resolutely took actions to curb the aggressor and comprehensively aided China. Guided by the Leninist principles of its foreign policy of friendship and support for the liberation struggle of the Chinese people, the Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression pact with China and thereby delivered a telling blow to the aggressive policy of Japanese imperialism which counted upon China's international isolation. The Soviet Union also gave China direct material aid and support. In 1938-39 the Soviet Union provided China with credits and loans to the amount of 250 million US dollars to buy war mate-

rials. It was from 1937 that the Soviet Union began supplying China with arms, ammunition and other military materials in quantities. A substantial contribution to the struggle against the Japanese invader was made by the numerous Soviet military specialists (over 3,500 in 1939). Soviet volunteer pilots fought in the skies of China; over 200 of them died the death of heroes.

All this impressive economic and military aid was rendered by the Soviet Union to China at a time when our country was doing its uttermost to prepare for a rebuff of the impending military attack from the West. You undoubtedly know full well that Hitler's nazi clique which had by then usurped power in Germany proclaimed the Homeland of Lenin to be its worst enemy. Nonetheless the USSR considered the rendering of aid to the fraternal Chinese people to be its internationalist duty.

The Soviet Union's diverse moral, political, material and military support to China during the most difficult period of its resistance to the Japanese invader was crucially important to the Chinese people's liberation struggle. Mao Zedong acknowledged this when he declared in December, 1949: "From the outset of the war no imperialist government gave us aid worthy of the name. The Soviet Union alone helped us on a large scale providing manpower, material and financial resources". But you know from reading the article "The Peking Traitors" that Mao Zedong himself acted quite differently when the Soviet people faced their trying moment.

Why was it that in 1941, when the Soviet army waged heavy battles in the immediate proximity of Moscow repelling the incessant attacks of nazi invaders, the Soviet government appealed for support pre-

cisely to Mao Zedong although, as you correctly note, he did not then head the central government of China?

The point is that when militarist Japan began its war of aggression against China a civil war was already raging there. The central (Guomindang) government and the armed forces of Chang Kaishi which upheld the interests of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie were fighting the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people led by the Communist Party of China and having at their disposal the Chinese Red Army which was under communist leadership. Towards the close of 1935 the units of the Chinese Red Army had mainly concentrated on the revolutionary base in North-Western China where the Liberated Area was formed with its headquarters in Yanan (Shaanxi Province) and continued its combat operations against the Guomindang.

You will, no doubt, agree that the continuation of the civil war, while the Japanese war of aggression was engulfing the country, played into the hands of the Japanese aggressors, facilitating their actions against the Chinese people. To effectively fight the foreign invaders intending to enslave the country by force of arms unity of action by the entire people was indispensable. Immense internationalist aid was rendered to the Chinese people by the Comintern which at its 7th congress in Moscow in the summer of 1935 recommended the tactic of a united front for accomplishing the main objective: the struggle against colonial enslavement by imperialism. Upon the Comintern recommendation, in 1935-37 the CPC initiated (which Mao Zedong and his close associates opposed) the creation of a united national anti-Japanese front in the country.

Due to the unity of action achieved by the patriotic forces, resistance to the Japanese invaders intensified

appreciably; the Chinese Red Army was reorganized to form two armies—the 8th Army and the 4th Army, a new one. Both operated against the Japanese invaders in North-Western China. It is essential to note that both armies received their instructions directly from the CPC leadership. This is why the Soviet government addressed, through its representatives in Yanan, in 1941, the leadership of the CPC, in the person of Mao Zedong, with a request that combat operations against Japan be intensified, for at the time the Chinese Red Army already had the power to inflict telling blows upon the Japanese troops.

It was then that Mao discarded his mask of an adherent of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and betrayed his true nationalistic essence. Not only did he object to the fulfilment by the CPC of its internationalist duty (even though this would have been in the best interests of the Chinese peoples themselves, and of the Chinese revolution), but he also launched a bitter struggle against those CPC leaders who demanded intensification of combat operations against Japanese imperialism.

Meanwhile, the units and formations of the Japanese strategic grouping massed in Manchuria, close to the Soviet border, numbered over 700,000 men at the end of 1941, a most trying period for the Soviet Union. The Japanese militarists hoped, in the event of the defeat of the USSR in the war against Nazi Germany, to annex the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia. This obliged the Soviet Command to maintain a significant part of its forces in the Far East, thousands of kilometres away from the Soviet-German front, where not only the destiny of the Soviet Union but also the future of Europe and, ultimately, the destiny of the Chinese revolution itself were being decided.

Mao Zedong did nothing to step up combat operations by the armed forces of the CPC; he even issued the following guideline: "Ten per cent of our forces shall be used to fight Japan, twenty per cent—to fight the Guomindang, and seventy per cent—to augment our own strength". In consequence of this narrow nationalistic Maoist course the activity of the CPC forces—the 8th and the 4th people's revolutionary armies—began to steadily decline beginning with 1941.

Thus, at the time when the interests of the world proletariat, the interests of the common struggle against fascism and, finally, the interests of the Chinese people's revolution itself required sharp intensification of operations against militarist Japan, Mao and his henchmen in the CPC leadership repudiated the principles of internationalism and took up a passive, in effect traitorous, position.

Respectfully, Anatoly MIKHAILOV.

O. BORISOV

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' UNITY AND ITS PEKING ADVERSARIES

Imperialism, world reaction and other forces hostile to socialism, do all possible to undermine the unity of the socialist states, divide them and set them in opposition to each other. It is precisely with this end in view that nationalism tries to exert its pernicious influence, the imperialists and Peking gang up to pursue their subversive work.

Policy of Division

Peking's aims regarding the socialist states to try and undermine the unity of the fraternal countries, provoke frictions between them, pit them against the Soviet Union, disrupt the concerted character of their actions in the international arena and eventually subject them to its influence have not changed.

The Chinese leadership has been growing increasingly hostile towards the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, Laos and other countries. Against the peoples of Indochina it exhibits brazen hegemonism and strives to thrust its will on them by force of arms. China's armed provocations along the Vietnamese border continue unabated; Peking's rulers' subversive activities against Laos do not stop; they also furnish military and political support to the routed but not stamped out detachments of the Pol Pot gangsters in Kampuchea.

As formerly, China conducts its expansion policy against the Mongolian People's Republic, exerts military, political and economic pressure on it and conducts ideological subversion. Special emphasis is being laid upon a falsification of Mongolian history.

For many years now the Chinese leadership has been playing a double-game on the Korean question. In fact, it supports the continued presence of US forces in South Korea and hypocritically echoes the calls of the Korean People's Democratic Republic that they be pulled out.

China's strategy regarding the European socialist countries is also one of duplicity.

At a press-conference in Peking, held October 7, 1979, Hua Guofeng sided in effect with the West German revenge-seekers demanding Germany's "unification" which spells annexation of the GDR by the FRG.

Now that the imperialist circles in the West are trying to exploit the events in Poland in the pursuit of their anti-socialist provocative aims, Peking propaganda misrepresents the truth of the developments there and attempts to discredit the Polish United Workers' Party's course aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country.

In its coverage of the life of socialist countries Chinese propaganda increasingly employs methods usually used by the capitalist countries' mass media. Sundry fabrications are devised about fictitious "contradictions" between the ruling parties and working masses; the nature of the relationships between the socialist states is crudely twisted.

Peking claims that it stands for the promotion of interstate relations with the socialist countries and wishes to have friendly relations with them, whereas in reality it retains, and sharpens, the anti-Soviet thrust

of its political course. In these conditions the coordination of actions by the fraternal countries in their relations with China, which in large measure neutralizes the negative effect of Peking's "differentiated" policy, is of special importance.

The Chinese leadership steps up its attempts to subvert the communist movement from within, to sow dissension in its ranks, to weaken the positions of the parties abiding by Marxism-Leninism. With this end in view, Peking restores and promotes ties with certain communist parties with which it formerly had serious differences and resumes the practice of sending delegations of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to the Congresses of certain communist parties, a practice which was interrupted at the time of the "cultural revolution".


These facts show the revival of pro-Maoist opportunism that meets Peking's interests. There is a looming threat of a common "Euro-Asian" opportunistic platform whose components are nationalism, elements of "Euro-communism" and modified Maoism.

Words and Deeds

The modification of Maoism is a salient feature of the present-day situation inside China. One its manifestation is the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi which was decided upon and approved by the plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee in February, 1980. In 1968 the decision to expel Liu Shaoqi from the CPC and discharge him from all his posts "inside and outside" the party was endorsed by the plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee following the report delivered by Zhou Enlai. Then Liu Shaoqi was named the "chief of the bourgeois headquarters", "traitor", "provocateur", and "strike-breaker".

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

Bellicose anti-Sovietism unites the American imperialists and Chinese hegemonists.



Mutual attraction.

Drawing by A. Andreyev.
Krasnaya zvezda

To all appearance, Liu Shaoqi indeed had differences with Mao Zedong on domestic and international issues even though it was precisely Liu Shaoqi who in his report to the 7th Congress of the CPC, held in 1945, substantiated the legal validity of "Sinicization of Marxism" and introduced the term "Mao Zedong thought".

It looks that Deng Xiaoping and his faction have gained weighty political successes from the campaign to rehabilitate Liu Shaoqi. But how long will their victory hold? One can predict with a high degree of accuracy that in the course of the continuing struggle

between the factions in China new "gangs" will emerge. The ejection of the "gang of four" from the Politbureau of the CPC Central Committee, the open criticism of certain upstarts brought by the "cultural revolution" and attempts to oust Hua Guofeng plainly indicate the trend.

An important place in the struggle being waged now by Deng's group to further strengthen its position within the leadership of the party, the army and government on the eve of the 12th Congress of the CPC is being attached to the trial of the group of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" with Mao's widow targeted as the main culprit.

This farce of a trial had the purpose of branding the people in the dock as the only ones guilty of the great damage inflicted upon the party by Mao Zedong's policy and of simultaneously shielding the main culprits who inflicted the hardships and tragedies on the Chinese people—Mao and Maoism, and of presenting the current Peking leaders as champions of truth and justice.

When speaking about the overall situation in the PRC one should stress that the basic problems of socio-economic development are still unresolved despite certain changes in the country's life, and the consequences of the political crisis in Chinese society are far from being overcome. China's leadership tries to modify Maoism in order to fit the needs of the "four modernizations" which have the aim of transforming the PRC into a militaristic state.

The complicated economic and political situation in the country, the struggle for power and the attempts by Peking's leaders to find a way out of the critical situation were all mirrored in the proceedings of the third session of the National People's Congress of the

fifth convocation (August 30 through September 10, 1980). Having admitted the failure of the earlier announced "four modernization" plans the session examined questions pertaining to streamlining the economy, to reforming economic management, and making a major cadre shakeup within the state leadership system. The session proclaimed a new economic policy which is oriented on the restoration and long-time functioning of economic structures widely diverse in their socio-economic nature: the state sector, the cooperative, private and state-capitalist ones.

The invigoration of private-proprietor elements, the active drawing of foreign capital into the economy, the intensification of political and social differentiation within society hold the threat of a further shift of China to the right and a closer economic linkup between China and imperialism, and a deeper pro-imperialist orientation of the country's foreign policy.

The session endorsed the cadre shakeup and more specifically the retirement of Hua Guofeng from the post of Premier of the State Council of the PRC, and the removal of seven other CPC leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, from their respective posts of Deputies to the Premier of the State Council. The newly-appointed Premier Zhao Ziyang and his Deputies are linked up politically with the right-wing pragmatist group headed by Deng Xiaoping and back up his course towards a further drawing-together with the West.

The session reflected the extreme complexity of the problems facing the country which will take much time and material expenditure to solve. At the same time it demonstrated the yawning gap between the declarations issued by the Chinese leadership and its practical deeds. While speaking about its desire to advance

the well-being of the people the Chinese leaders nonetheless gear all their economic and political decisions to the tasks of stepping up the country's militarization.

Repudiation of certain extremes of the "cultural revolution", the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi and other CPC functionaries who had fallen victim to Maoist misrule, and rejection of a number of the more absurd guidelines set by Mao merit consideration. At the same time, the new elements in Peking's line do not touch the core—its anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, its aggressive course in the international arena.

New Stage in Chinese Policy

The regulation of socio-political and economic life in China is linked up with the struggle against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The manoeuvring of the current Peking leadership has been continued on the basis of the principal postulates of Maoism and it has in no way presaged a return of the country to the path of genuine socialist development.

Soviet-Chinese relations at the present stage are still characterized by tension. On January 16, 1980 delivering a directive report to the higher cadres of the CPC Central Committee and the PRC State Council, Deng Xiaoping said in part that the struggle against the Soviet Union on a global scale "is the main goal of China in the foreign policy sphere". Another tidal wave of anti-Sovietism in Peking's policy and propaganda has been mounting in connection with the events in Afghanistan. All through 1979 and 1980 the Chinese leaders exacerbated Soviet-Chinese relations demonstrating their uninterestedness in normalizing relations between the two countries. This was attested to by the

decision of the PRC government not to renew the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Cooperation which expired on April 11, 1980. Another instance was Peking's actual refusal to accept the Soviet proposal whereby the countries could, instead of the treaty, sign a joint document on the principles of relationships between them on the basis of peaceful coexistence. This was plainly shown by the negotiations on questions of interstate relations between the two countries conducted in Moscow in the autumn of 1979. The Soviet proposal which the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* printed on April 7, 1980 that negotiations be resumed did not find a positive response in Peking.

The Chinese leaders agree with Washington on the question of the so-called "sanctions" against the Soviet Union. They put off indefinitely the next round in the Soviet-Chinese negotiations on interstate relations and even refused to send the Chinese sports team to the Olympic Games in Moscow.

China is at one with the USA in fomenting anti-Soviet hysteria. The *Renmin ribao* alone publishes hundreds of articles and other materials every month, calumniating the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies.

It is safe to say that a new stage has come in the policy of the Chinese leadership, with the main emphasis being laid upon their partnership with imperialism's aggressive circles.

This stage is bound up with the intensification of joint and parallel operations by China and the imperialist states in the international arena which they regard as within the context of their joint long-term strategy.

Peking's hegemonistic course (just as world hegemonism in general) gets an additional prop in the form of reinforcement of the regime in the PRC and an ac-

celerated development, with the aid of imperialism, of that country's economic and military capabilities including the latest weaponry.

A prominent place in these processes can be accorded to the drastic "adjustment" of Peking's home policy that further renounces socialist economic management principles and the building of a multistructural "mixed" economy, the use of "market" regulation within the economic mechanism and attraction of foreign capital. All this holds the danger of China's swing to the right and creates additional factors for Peking's coming-together with the capitalist world.

The framework of the "broadest possible" front against the USSR and its allies is being extended by the inclusion of nationalistic and opportunistic elements from the revolutionary and democratic movements.

There is an intensive "modernization" of Maoism so as to have it accord with Peking's present-day tasks and make it seem an attractive doctrine both to imperialism and right-wing opportunism.

* * *

The present situation shows that with the sharpening struggle between the socialist and capitalist world systems the role of China as a negative factor in progressive world politics is growing. Its role of an accomplice of imperialism in the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, in the struggle against detente is also being enhanced. There is a tangible danger that in the event of a further deepening of the confrontation between the two systems Peking will not "sit on a mountain and watch two tigers fighting" but will most probably side with imperialists.

The most effective means for preventing any surprises on the part of China's present leaders and for curbing Chinese expansion is the firm and principled position of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, the keen vigilance of the peoples of the fraternal countries and their constant readiness to rebuff any provocations the Chinese chauvinists make.

Partiinaya zhizn, No. 22, 1980 *

PEKING CHANGES TACTICS

The recent visits to China of representative delegations of the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties once again confirmed that Peking had altered its tactics in regard to some communist parties.

For many years the Chinese leadership attached opprobrious labels to practically all communist and workers' parties, accusing them of having become "bourgeoisified," of "revisionism," and of "compacting with imperialism." Now it has gone over to a differentiated approach to the international communist movement, dividing it into parties that, from Peking's point of view, adhere to the "correct positions" and those that share "incorrect views and positions," and is seeking to set them one against the other.

It is legitimate to ask: what does Peking expect to achieve by the tactical shift from "wrath to benevolence" vis-à-vis some communist parties? What do the communist parties whose delegations have conducted

talks in China and in general the cause of peace and socialism gain by this? In practical terms the aims and results of such trips accord primarily with the interests of the home and foreign policies of the present Chinese leadership. For "normalization" of relations with certain communist parties yields Peking political dividends.

At present some of the concepts of Mao Zedong and his role in China's history are undergoing reappraisal. The "great leap forward" has been officially disavowed and the "cultural revolution" is now described as a "period of great counter-revolutionary destruction," a period of "fascist dictatorship," and a "decade of disorder." Needless to say, the recognition by the present Chinese leadership of the bankruptcy of a number of basic aspects of the Maoist "model of socialism" is noteworthy. In effect it amounts to an admission that the appraisals of the policy pursued by Mao Zedong given long ago by the Communists of many countries, the true friends of the Chinese people, are correct. However, while conceding that Mao committed serious mistakes, the present Chinese leaders are seeking to rehabilitate the tarnished Maoist image and to lay the main blame for all past transgressions on his closest associates.

Are not certain quarters in Peking trying to invoke the prestige of some communist parties and the "normalization" of relations with them to justify their hegemonistic, chauvinistic policy and at the same time to score "points" in the factional struggle for power they are engaged in? Clearly, endorsement of the present Chinese leaders' policy by diverse political forces abroad, including some leaders of communist parties, provides the Chinese leadership with an important trump card.

What Peking is out to achieve through the "normalization" of relations with some communist parties, stands out in even bolder relief against the background of its foreign policy. This policy is aimed at torpedoing detente and whipping up militarism, at military and political alignment with imperialism and reaction in general against the Soviet Union, other socialist and progressive states, and the liberation movements. The Peking leaders are expatiating on the key slogans of their foreign policy doctrine of the inevitability of war. Qualifying detente as "bluff", the Chinese leaders are incessantly urging the US hawks, the NATO brass and the Japanese militarists to join with China in a "united front" for a head-on struggle against the Soviet Union. These and similar absurd theses the Peking leaders incessantly press on all delegations visiting China.

Noteworthy too is that "normalization" of relations with communist parties does not prevent Peking from extending a full-dress welcome to delegations of pro-Maoist splinter groups despite their die-hard enmity towards the Communists, the Italian and Spanish Communists included. It seems that the Chinese leadership is seeking to legitimize its two-faced tactics and to maintain ties at once with the Communists and the pro-Maoist splitters operating in the same countries.

It is perfectly clear that Peking is out to make use of "normalization" of relations with some communist parties in order to emasculate the struggle waged by the Communists of its internationalist content, to isolate the CPSU and the USSR in the international arena. Also it would like to capitalize on the prestige of the communist parties in order to restore its own lost prestige in the eyes of the democratic forces of the world and the Chinese people themselves, and at the same

time to build on the other side of the political barricade a military-political alliance with imperialism aimed precisely against these forces. Hence many Communists ask: in the given circumstances are not overtures to Peking moves in the footsteps of those who are increasingly sliding down into the embraces of the reactionary, imperialist quarters, and does this not damage the struggle for the fundamental aims of the Communist parties, does this not weaken the internationalist support they render to the struggle of the peoples for national and social liberation?

One more point. The newspaper *Renmin ribao* wrote: "We must . . . have a great sense of responsibility for the world communist movement." We shall leave aside the question of who gave the CPC such a sweeping right to assume responsibility for the activities of the more than 90 communist and workers' parties. How Peking understands this "responsibility" and what the present Chinese leadership's main criterion is in assessing the activities of the communist parties can be seen from Hu Yaobang's statement that the correctness of the positions of other parties should be judged "primarily by the extent to which they have dissociated themselves from the CPSU."

But the CPSU is a party whose policy is in full accord with the common interests of the international communist movement, a party that is consistently guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. In demanding "dissociation" from the CPSU, the Peking leadership is actually seeking to divert the communist parties away from the Marxist-Leninist principles, to introduce changes in the positions of the international communist movement that would suit its own purposes.

The two decades of the CPC leaders' ideological con-

troversy with the world's Communists have clearly shown that underlying such demands there has invariably been the striving to impose Peking hegemony on the international communist movement, to substitute Maoist concepts for the vital principles of Marxism-Leninism. The invalidity of these concepts as applied to Chinese conditions has now been generally recognized. On the other hand, experience has shown that those in other countries who, recognizing Peking's "responsibility" for the world communist movement, have sought to give effect to its strategic postulates, have themselves suffered grave and often irreparable political damage. These lessons of history should not be forgotten.

It is perfectly clear that Peking is trying to disunite the communist parties, to split and weaken the communist movement. This is a policy that plays into the hands of the anti-communist strategy of imperialism and reaction.

The CPSU has always stood for broadening contacts, deepening ties and developing all-round cooperation between fraternal parties in the name of the unity of the international communist movement. This unity can only be built on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, creatively developed and applied in conformity with the concrete conditions of the various countries, on the basis of proletarian internationalism, a common struggle for peace, for the triumph of communism.

Novoye vremya, No. 51, 1980 *

N. SERGEYEV

THE NEW MANDARINS' AMBITIONS (China's policy in Africa)

China's policy with regard to the African states is yet another example of the recently formed collusion between Peking and imperialism. In Africa Peking backs the forces opposing progressive social change in the continent and follows in the wake of the geo-strategy of Washington and its allies. China, in part, approves and supports in every way the pro-Western Sadat regime and provides arms and armaments for various reactionary groupings.

In recent years Peking has greatly extended its ties with Pretoria, including trade, crudely violating the UN embargo and rendering sizeable economic aid to the apartheid regime. According to press reports, the total trade turnover between the two countries reached some 300 million dollars in 1979.

Peking imports strategic raw materials from Pretoria, such as tin, copper, nickel. Chinese export to the Republic of South Africa has also grown: more and more Chinese goods are on sale in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth. Police uniforms and munitions and prison equipment account for more than 20 per cent of Chinese exports.

Several months ago in Windhoek, the administrative centre in Namibia, secret talks took place between the

delegations of China and representatives of the RSA occupation army in Namibia. They discussed the possible resale of Western arms to Pretoria by China. Such a prospect could not but gladden the hearts of racialists since it would provide another loophole for them to gain access to Western arsenals through the services of "champions of social justice" from Peking.

Peking actively continues to assist UNITA and FNLA bandit formations working hand in glove with Pretoria and organizing provocations against independent Angola. With the Chinese leaders' blessing terrorists from these groupings conduct subversive operations and destroy economic projects. Terrorists are recruited to suppress the Namibian people's liberation struggle since China is interested in perpetuating the RSA domination in Namibia. The terrorists' military bases receive large shipments of armaments from Peking: mortars, machine-guns, small arms. In the special camps where mercenaries are being trained military instructors from China "work" side by side with their "colleagues" from Israel, Chile and the USA. And no matter how hard they try to refute the fact their protégé gave them away all the same: J. Savimbi, leader of the counter-revolutionary UNITA grouping, during an interview bluntly stated that the PRC is their chief supplier of arms and finances.

The China-RSA collusion is aimed primarily at suppressing the national liberation movements in Southern Africa which accords with the interests of today's neo-colonialism.

In an attempt to camouflage their extensive ties with the RSA, Peking launched a loud propaganda campaign to advertise its so-called aid to independent Africa. Some Chinese leaders toured the continent holding forth on the benefits of their economic presence in

the region. As a result of economic assistance to young states in developing their economies they named the China-built TAZARA railway line that linked the Zambian copper belt with Dar-es-Salaam, a seaport in Tanzania. But TAZARA stands idle, because the equipment supplied by China within the framework of aid is mostly out of order and the locomotives are so obsolete that any transport museum would be happy to have them. At the same time neither Tanzania nor Zambia can make the TAZARA railway operative: the Chinese spares are too costly and the railroad brings nothing but losses amounting to tens of millions of dollars.


In fact, TAZARA is becoming an obstacle to the development of the infrastructure in Eastern Africa. The thing is that Peking's assistance to Africa is nothing

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

American-Chinese partnership is a dangerous trend in world politics threatening all mankind, including the American and Chinese peoples.

A dangerous stunt.

Drawing by
Yu. Cherepanov.



Pravda

but hot air. The Chinese aid far from helping to resolve the main economic problems of these countries, makes them particularly acute.

Having flooded the African market with poor quality, cheap commodities China hinders the development of local industries. The Maoists' methods are nothing new; Western colonialists used them for two centuries and today the new mandarins from Peking have put them in focus again. Keeping the African states backward, withholding industries from them, helps the Peking leadership to promote its great-power ambitions: to turn the Third World countries into obedient servants bowing to their orders. Peking widely uses bribes and corruption as a means of subversion in fighting the governments not to its liking, and charitably hands out arms for fanning conflicts and splitting African unity.

The Maoists' ties with the reactionary RSA regime and the Chinese policy in Africa in general are the logical outcome of their betrayal of the cause of the liberation struggle.

Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, December 25, 1980

A PRO-IMPERIALIST COURSE

KAMPALA. The pro-imperialist course of the Peking leadership is glaringly revealed by China's actions on the African continent, writes the Ugandan newspaper *The Star*. Not so long ago, it points out, Maoist propaganda characterized the USA as a superpower. Today "theoreticians" in Peking concentrate their efforts against the Soviet Union, calling on the African states to counter it and to bloc in a "united front" with the USA.

This "front", the article says, has demonstrated itself in practice during the armed aggression ventured against Angola when Peking and Washington acted in unison as real accomplices in this venture.

Seeking to knock together a pro-imperialist anti-Soviet bloc in Africa, the Chinese leadership and the American Administration actively draw pro-Western regimes into it and help them to build up their military potential. An example of these actions is the military support given to Egypt. It is noteworthy that Peking showed its satisfaction over the agreement between the White House and the present leadership of Somalia on American military bases on the territory of this African state, as well as its agreement with other actions of Washington envisaging "strong USA military presence" in Africa.

The Chinese leadership openly approved the pro-imperialist idea of forming "inter-African security forces" that are to perform police functions on the continent, the article emphasizes.

PEKING "FASHION-CLOTHES MAKERS"

Wedding dresses with the trade-mark "Made in China" are not likely to evoke enthusiasm among British brides, the British journal *The Economist* concedes, but their cost is sure to suit their parents. A small Lancashire firm Veronica Moss offers these Chinese items to British customers for a mere song. It is the first experience of joint business, but a very important one for Peking, for it hopes to gain a foothold on the British market. China draws more than 30 per cent of its export receipts from the sales of textiles and textile products and half of this output goes to the Common Market countries.

With the money earned in Western Europe the PRC authorities cut their "clothes" in their own manner: their latest fashion is "arm to the teeth". So Peking businessmen strive to sell more of their cotton even at a cheap price.

And one more thing. At one time, when addressing textile workers, Yao Wenyuan, a member of the "gang of four", said: renouncing the revolution for the sake of material benefit, you "sew a wedding suit for capitalism". It appears that the present-day rulers of China are eager to keep up with the fashion and, at the same time, make profit.

BACK TO... RICKSHAWS

The Peking newspaper *Guangming ribao* proposed bringing back to the streets of the Empire under the Heavens bicycle vehicles driven by the brawn of man. In other words, it proposes returning to the time of man-propelled vehicles. To avoid giving the readers the impression that the proposal comes from the Peking authorities, the newspaper made it appear that it comes from the grass roots.

In short, it published a letter from a certain Ma Cejiu who threw light on the way public transport can be modernized.

In the view of this new-fangled reformer, urban public transport existing today in China cannot meet "the diverse needs of the broad masses." Buses and trolley-buses, he claims, are overcrowded and create a lot of inconveniences—in them, you

cannot take a sick person to a hospital, luggage to a railway station or make a trip with children. A taxi is too costly for the majority of the Chinese and they cannot afford it anyway. So, he suggests, let those who do not want to rough it in a bus or cannot afford a taxi resort to the services of... man-propelled vehicles.

And he provides a solid economic foundation for his case in support of restoring the profession of rickshaw-man. Man-pedalled vehicles will reduce the load on public transport and provide employment for the jobless whose number exceeds 20 million today.

Of course, the newspaper writes in conclusion, a small motor could be attached to the bicycle but then, it argues, this motor will inconvenience those who use the rickshaw service, it will aggravate the noise problem and pollute the environment.

By all appearances, the new generation of Chinese rickshaws who are already plying the streets of Shanghai will have to drive their vehicles by one muscle power.

ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

O. IVANOV

"DEMAOIZATION" OR MODERNIZATION OF MAOISM?

The current economic, social and ideological changes in China's domestic life, as well as the new reshuffles in the Peking leadership, are widely discussed in the world. Sharp controversies regarding the prospects of and the overall trend in the country's socio-economic development are raging in China itself.

Loss of the Socialist Perspective

The internal policy of the Chinese leadership is characterized by the continuing economic, social and ideological manoeuvres in attempts to stabilize the situation in the country by any means, reduce social tensions and remedy the glaring deficiencies in the national economy. Obviously, the "Maoist model of social development" once hailed as "the summit of Marxism-Leninism", has ended in a complete fiasco.

The great advances made by the PRC in the first decade of its existence are evidence that the path the country decided upon then was the right one assuring steady progress in every sphere of social life. The repudiation of scientific socialism by the Maoists, the revision of the original CPC line of fraternal cooperation with the CPSU and the international communist movement brought stagnation and regression to the country's

development and jeopardized the socialist gains of China's working people.

Meanwhile, in order to "streamline" and "modernize" the economy and cope with the challenging socio-political problems Peking's leaders now stake upon the restoration of a number of earlier forms of production organization which were destroyed in the course of the "cultural revolution" and simultaneously quickly introduce economic management methods alien to socialist society.

This situation marked by "looseness" in China's social structure, the break from the socialist community and the ousting of the proletariat from the process of directing social development by the resurgent petty-

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

Peking propaganda carries out ideological conditioning of the population on the basis of Maoist dogmas.



Peking fakir.

Drawing by V. Chakiridis.
Novoye vremya

bourgeois element with their private proprietorship mentality, and the country's penetration by monopoly capital from the West intensifies the danger of further erosion of the socialist components forming the base of Chinese society and the loss of the socialist perspective as a whole. This tendency may cause China to draw still further into the orbit of Western political and economic influence and strengthen the pro-imperialist orientation of Peking's policy.

The economic measures and reforms being implemented in the country are part of the anti-socialist, anti-popular domestic policy pursued by the Chinese ruling clique and oriented first and foremost, on increasing the military-industrial potential. While explaining the slow-down in the country's production growth rates as being due to the policy of the "big leap forward" and the "people's communes", or blaming it on the "cultural revolution", Peking propaganda keeps deliberately silent about the negative influence of the country's accelerated militarization dictated by the desire of the ruling elite to attain their great-power hegemonistic goals.

Instability and Contradictions

The changes occurring in the country in the spheres of policy and ideology are largely of a demagogical character. Statements on the need to promote "unity and stability, democracy and legality" are used as a coverup for buttressing the position of the ruling elite which still relies on the army and the punitive repressive apparatus.

The current rulers of China fully retain such fundamental principles of Maoism as nationalism, great-power chauvinism, hegemonism, territorial claims, mili-

tarism and so have adapted "Mao's thought" to suit the requirements of the "four modernizations" programme. The restructuring processes are extremely painful as the power struggles within Peking's ruling elite still continue unabated. Various factions in the Chinese leadership are all in agreement that China faces the crucial task of overcoming its general backwardness but there are divided opinions as to the specific ways of coping with it and the extent of the reforms projected in the economy and the ideological-political sphere. Also in question are the permissible framework and limits of cooperation with the West including how far to adopt capitalist economic management methods, while the needs of working people are ignored.

It is not surprising that social tensions continue in the country. The Peking regime, while prettifying the facade of its edifice and demagogically declaring "democratization", still employs punitive measures to put down spontaneous anti-Maoist actions.

The third session of the National People's Congress held between August 30 and September 10 reflected the fact that the country's cardinal problems were still unsettled and revealed contradictions over the ways of solving them. It examined the major questions facing the economy and matters associated with streamlining the state's political structure. A number of major reshuffles in the PRC leadership were also made. The session approved the new orientation given to Peking's economic policy which envisages the restoration and further coexistence of diverse socio-economic structures. With the contraction of the sphere of centralized state planning and financing and the accentuation of the methods of market regulation of the economy, extensive possibilities open up for further strengthening

the petty-bourgeois elements with the resultant growth of capitalist tendencies in the country's economy and social structure. The doors are thrown wide open to admit foreign capital into the country; the process of "erosion" of state and cooperative ownership is in full swing and every encouragement is given to "free enterprise". Such reforms make inevitable further intensification of the social differentiation of Chinese society and facilitate the foreign monopolies invasion of the national economy.

The situation in the country remains unstable and contradictory. The policy of invigorating "free enterprise" and attracting foreign investment is fraught with new social upheavals. The colossal deficit, considerable disproportions in the development of economic sectors, inflation, mass-scale unemployment, acute shortages of skilled personnel, red tape blighting every department of the administrative and economic management mechanism corrode away every sphere of the life of society. The development policies as regards the working people pursued by the leadership do not rectify these drawbacks, rather, the aim is to safeguard the interests of the ruling groups. On the plea of "decentralization" of Party and state power and "rejuvenation" of the state apparatus Deng Xiaoping's grouping has managed to roll back the upstarts brought to the fore by the "cultural revolution" and also the influential functionaries who could have exerted a restraining influence upon Deng and his entourage that would stop further convergence with the West.

New Stage

It is often asserted in the West that the current changes in China spell a "radical return to socialism".

But the untenability of the allegations that certain innovations in the PRC all-but accord with the interests of world socialism is all too evident. For all the changes taking place in China the working class is still deprived of its leadership position in society. The Chinese leaders do not conceal that they are not going to reconsider the basic principles of their anti-popular policy. The present regime still has the familiar old features. The only new factor is the growing importance of the state apparatus whereas the role of the Maoist party is declining. The military, retaining their positions in the higher bodies of government, influence the process of decision-making and implementation mostly indirectly, from behind the scenes, so to speak.

China's current leadership has no social support either among the working class or the intelligentsia. Moreover, the policy of the Chinese leaders increasingly clashes with the interests of the class which is expected to be the social mainstay of the regime—the peasantry. China's leaders no longer rely on the rural poor and the lower sections of the middle peasants and are beginning to repudiate certain egalitarian guidelines they used to follow. Thereby they are turning the mass of the peasantry consisting of large families with many dependents against them. As this is so social tensions in the country are not likely to abate and the current regime is treading shaky ground.

The domestic political situation is also compounded by key factional wrangles in the Peking upper crust such as the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi and the trial of the "gang of four". The mounting power struggle among the Peking leaders warrants the conclusion that Maoism cannot serve as firm foundation for either Party unity or state unity.

From the analysis of China's domestic and foreign

policies, and its ideological doctrine, a justified conclusion is that the anti-socialist hegemonistic course of the Chinese leadership is passing through a new stage in its evolution. The pro-imperialist course of the Chinese leadership has acquired the nature of a direct partnership with imperialism. It visualizes a sweeping military-political collaboration with the USA, Japan and other capitalist states on an anti-Soviet basis. Peking's hegemonism receives a strong boost from the forced development of the country's economic and military capability with the aid of imperialism. At present the Chinese leaders are trying to create the "widest possible front" against the USSR and the socialist community as a whole. What they call "modernization" of Maoism is the process of imparting certain "flexibility" elements to it but leaving its basic features intact.

For all that, it should still be kept in mind that the socialist elements of the economic base created during the revolution are still alive. There is no equating Peking's military-bureaucratic regime with the Chinese people. They are victims of Maoist policy. The awakening will come sooner or later and they will make their choice.

Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, No. 12,
1980 *

MOCK TRIAL

The new Chinese leadership, which succeeded Mao Zedong, repeatedly declared its intention to institute court proceedings against the "gang of four" and other surviving leaders of the "cultural revolution" for more than three years. After numerous postponements a "special court", set up expressly for examining the cases of the "counter-revolutionary groupings of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing", began its sessions in Peking on November 20, 1980. This trial is the biggest and most sensational of all trials in the history of the PRC. Among the ten accused were nine former members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, including Mao Zedong's widow Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Mao Zedong's former secretary and editor of his "works", and Wang Hungwen, former Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

The Character of the Charges

The indictment formulated by a special prosecuting body at the Supreme Procurator's Office of China listed 16 persons among the main criminals. But six of them are no longer among the living. In accordance with the Chinese legislation, deceased persons are not arraigned before court.

It followed from the indictment that the criminals were charged with persecution of party and state leaders, numerous cadre workers, an attempted overthrow of state power, an attempt on the life of Mao Zedong and preparation of an armed mutiny in Shanghai. It pointed out that the main crimes were committed during the "cultural revolution", that over 727,000 people became its victims of whom over 34,000 were "driven to death". But these figures are understated. As

Deng Xiaoping himself admitted, the number of victims of the "cultural revolution" amounted to 100 million.

From the very outset the "special court" in Peking was forced into the Procrustean bed of a scheme worked out at meetings of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. It was decided to attribute to the account of the "ten" all the crimes and excesses of the "cultural revolution" and simultaneously prevent direct criticism of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai as well as some living leaders who suffered during the "cultural

The prosecutor, judges, lawyers and security men all have the face of Deng Xiaoping. In this way the cartoonist of the Hong-Kong journal "Far Eastern Economic Review" accentuated the role of Deng's faction in organizing and conducting the trial in Peking. He also predicted that the verdict would be passed unanimously and was proved right.



revolution" but gained higher posts owing to it. Great pains were taken to keep the foundation of the Maoist regime intact as far as possible, for on it reposes the power of the present leaders too.

It was therefore continuously stressed that the trial was not political but a criminal one. This is why the charges against the defendants were introduced as crimes "punishable by ordinary criminal law". To keep the trial within definite limits, its participants were supposed to keep strictly to the plan of the stage-managers and not depart from the approved text.

It is, perhaps, possible to agree with the definition of the Chinese press that the trial of the "ten" is a "historical trial". For it was the first time that a big heap of Maoism's dirty linen was washed in public. It was the first time the Peking leaders had dared raise the curtain and reveal the methods employed in the unceasing power struggle.

At the Trial and Round It

The world press has not without grounds called this noisy trial a "big political show". The proceedings against the two so-called "counter-revolutionary groupings" of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing have been a new example of gross falsification of the facts of the recent period of Chinese history carried out for the sake of the interests of the persons who are at the helm in China today.

The desire was clearly evident to blame the failures and setbacks of the last two decades, particularly the period of the "cultural revolution" and all abuses of law and arbitrariness rampant in China at that time, on the so-called "gang of four" and Lin Biao and his supporters and at the same time to clear Mao Zedong of guilt in every possible way as well as those who

appeared in the role of judges and are in power today.

But historical facts are stubborn things. Was it not on the instructions of Mao himself that the "four" acted? We may recall how in 1966 Mao Zedong together with Jiang Qing and their supporters reviewed multi-million-strong parades of hungweibings in Peking. Was it not Mao who declared conceitedly: "I started the fire of the cultural revolution!" Was it not him who issued the call "Open fire on the headquarters" upon which hungweibings rushed out to smash Party committees? It may also be remembered that some of those who today hold the reins of power in China also participated in these and other actions of the "cultural revolution" attributed now to the "counter-revolutionary group-

"The Gang of Five" is a laconic caption to a cartoon in the "International Herald Tribune" (an American daily published in Paris). Indeed, apart from the "Gang of Four", Mao Zedong, the chief instigator of the "cultural revolution" and other pogrom political campaigns, was also in the dock. Maoism proved to be the main culprit, contrary to the intentions of the organizers of the trial.



ings".

Indicative too was the atmosphere at the trial: fist waving, threats against the defendants and mocking questions became a characteristic feature of the "trial of the century". Jiang Qing defended herself tooth and nail. Zhang Chunqiao, former Political Bureau member, "was as silent as a deaf and dumb", as the Chinese newspapers put it. As for Wang Hungwen, Chen Boda and some other defendants, these morally and physically broken people were ready to plead guilty to anything.

Unlike the "repentant" defendants, the widow of the "great helmsman" not only spoke in her defence but also launched a counter-offensive. She affirmed that she acted according to the direct instructions of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and pointed to the complicity of some present leaders, Hua Guofeng in the first place, in the mass reprisals of the "cultural revolution" period.

One circumstance of no minor importance is worthy of note here. The indictment mentions numerous "crimes" of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their supporters, first of all those which were connected with the "cultural revolution". But, interesting enough, all charges were related exclusively to China's internal problems and nothing was said about foreign policy, which revealed most starkly the great-power and chauvinist essence of the Chinese foreign-policy during the "cultural revolution". In particular, there was a notable intensification of hostility on the part of Peking towards the socialist countries. The Chinese leadership showed itself to be an outspoken enemy of the peaceful coexistence policy. Peking undertook a whole series of actions aimed at extending the "cultural revolution" to the territory of other countries, including the develop-

ing states. This was an instance of gross interference in the internal affairs of other states and barefaced flouting of the fundamental principles of peaceful co-existence.

But at the trial they preferred to keep silent about all this. An attempt was not even made to shift the responsibility for China's external actions on to the same "gang of four", Lin Biao and their supporters. Why? It is not difficult to give the answer. The judges cannot indeed sit in judgement upon themselves. For in this matter everything is the same as before: propaganda of a new world war, aggravation of international tension, further "drift" towards imperialism and reaction.

The manoeuvres performed during the trial in Peking were reflected in the Chinese press. The newspaper **Renmin ribao** came out with an article of a "special observer" in which, while explaining the purpose of the court trial over the "counter-revolutionary groupings of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing", it admitted that "in the last period of his life, especially during the 'great cultural revolution' launched on his initiative and directed by him" Mao Zedong committed mistakes which "brought misfortunes to the Party and the people". Characterizing the "cultural revolution" as "a period of ten-year turmoil", the newspaper of the CPC Central Committee also points out that other leaders of the Party too "committed mistakes of different degree". However, it went on to stress, those were "merely mistakes and not crimes".

The appearance of this and similar articles in the open press can be seen as a proof that the organizers of the trial failed to camouflage the political character of the trial, which they tried to do from the very beginning.

The trial was concluded on New Year's eve and nearly a month later, on January 25, the verdict was announced. Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's widow, and Zhang Chunqiao, former Political Bureau member, were sentenced to capital punishment, with the execution of the sentence suspended for two years. Wang Hungwen, former Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, was sentenced to life imprisonment and Yao Wenyuan, former Political Bureau member, to 20 years' imprisonment. The other defendants were sentenced to various prison terms from 16 to 18 years.

The Struggle for Power

The organizers of the trial failed to honour the compromise reached prior to its opening: not to use the trial in the struggle of groupings, in the hidden squabbles that are not abating in the Peking leadership.

In the course of the trial there were distinct echoes of the former and current clashes in the struggle for power in the top echelon of the Chinese leadership. The list of present leaders against whom Jiang Qing and others allegedly conspired has been broadened. The most often quoted "victim of slanders and intrigues" was Deng Xiaoping.

The trial revealed a rather unseemly picture of the mores reigning in the Chinese ruling upper crust, the methods of struggle for power: the spying on one another, lawlessness, arbitrariness and violence, intrigues, slanders and incriminating reports. It came to light that after his arrest Peng Dehuai was interrogated under torture 100 times and had all his ribs broken. Tapes were played in the court hall with recordings of Jiang Qing's telephone conversations ten years back and Lin Biao's talk with his accomplices in a car,

etc.

The attempts of the organizers of the trial to pass it off as a sign of "restoration of the rule of law" in the country look rather awkward, considering if only the fact that more than a half of those in the dock were jailed for nearly 10 years without trial and investigation. Neither the indictment nor the judges attempted to make an all-round examination of really criminal acts, reveal their real causes and draw lessons for the future.

The Chinese press published materials about the trial designed to create the impression that the population demanded the purges and trial of those who were involved in the activity of the "ten" in the localities. However, as foreign correspondents report from Peking, the response to the published material was not as it was made out to be. A *New York Times* correspondent writes that, although many Chinese recognize that the "cultural revolution" was a terrible misfortune for the country and they really hate the "four", the trial aroused scepticism and indifference among them. He quotes the words of one Peking office employee who told him: "We all know that this is not a trial but a struggle for power. If Jiang Qing had gained the upper hand, then Deng Xiaoping would be in the dock".

It is becoming increasingly clear that the organizers of the mock trial in Peking intend to use it as a diversion under the cover of which they could deal summarily with their political opponents.

But no matter how the Peking leaders may cut and contrive in connection with the trial and whatever tactical advantages may be sought by its main inspirers and organizers, it was in fact Mao himself who was imperceptibly in the dock.

I. ILYIN From the Soviet press

V. VANIN, S. LYUDIN

ECONOMIC "ADJUSTMENT" IN CHINA: WHAT IT MEANS

The Maoist political course has immeasurably damaged the interests and revolutionary gains of the Chinese working people in all spheres of social endeavour, including the national economy. Disregard of the general laws of socialist construction, overemphasis on the development of the military industry, orientation of economic activity to suit great-power ambitions—all has worked havoc with the economy, adding to the country's plight.


Heavy Legacy of the "Cultural Revolution"

"The cultural revolution", and the zigzags of the political struggle in the last years of Mao Zedong's life have led, to quote the newspaper *Renmin ribao*, to "anarchy or semi-anarchy in production". Within 1974-1976 the country failed to meet the planned targets in the production of industrial items to the sum of 100,000 million yuan (one yuan—about 66 cents), of steel—28 million tons, and the revenue was short by 40,000 million yuan (in 1978 the budget revenue was 112,000 million yuan). When Mao Zedong died in 1976 the economy, according to Chinese news media, was on the verge of catastrophe.

In an attempt to pull the country out of the crisis the new Chinese leadership took emergency action to check the production slump, put things right at enterprises and overcome disorganization in economic management. It was announced that "the efforts will be con-

IN A SATIRICAL VEIN

Trying to save the economy of the country from utter ruin, Peking's leadership broadly opens the doors to foreign monopolies and comes begging the capitalists for loans and credits.



Peking arc.
Drawing by V. Ginukov.

Krokodil

centrated on the so-called modernization so as to make China "a mighty power" as quickly as possible and turn it into "a leading country in the world in the level of economic development". On the whole, economic strategy served the great-power course and the top-priority augmentation of the military-industrial potential of the PRC, all clearly bearing a hegemonic character.

The March, 1978 session of the National People's Congress (NPC), the first to be held after Mao Zedong's death, endorsed the Basic Provisions of the Ten-Year Economic Development Plan of the PRC for 1976-1985, which envisaged an accelerated advancement of the economy. The increased output of major industrial items was to surpass that achieved throughout the entire history of the PRC, while the volume of state capital investment was to reach the aggregate indicators for 1950-1977. Incidentally, guidelines and assignments that would raise the people's material welfare were lacking from the programme—an indication that China's military-economic might was to be attained at the expense of the people. A no minor role was attached to foreign capital investments.

Subsequent developments, however, showed that those ambitious directives were incompatible with the economic and techno-scientific potentialities of China. The attempts to "whip up" the economy to suit the far-reaching political designs of the Peking leaders without the cardinal solution of problems resulting from the Maoist economic course, worsened the socio-economic situation in the country and intensified still further the disproportions in the national economy.

Inter-branch imbalances, for example, constantly increased. Between 1966 and 1978 the share of heavy industry in the capital construction allocations was

more than 55 per cent, of agriculture about 10 per cent and light industry less than five per cent. Despite the huge appropriations for heavy industry the fuel-power and raw material complexes were chronically lagging behind. Up to 30 per cent of the industrial production facilities were idle because of a shortage of electricity.

Agriculture and light industry were in dire straits, being geared, as it were, to the needs of the military-industrial complex. Receiving some five per cent of the budget outlays light industry contributed 29 per cent of the revenue and about a third of the value of the gross product in industry and agriculture. In 1978, 10 per cent of the state capital was invested in agriculture, which yielded nearly 40 per cent of Peking's income, the bulk of which was spent on military purposes. Such a depletion of agricultural investments sapped the production forces in this sphere, poorly developed as it is. Consequently, labour productivity here fell by almost a quarter compared to 1957.

New Manoeuvres

Faced with the aggravated social contradictions and economic disproportions the Chinese leaders were compelled to admit that "there is no developing the national economy in a planned, balanced way and at high rates." Accordingly, adjustments were introduced in China's economic policy. The decisions adopted at the second NPC session of June, 1979 meant renunciation of the ten-year plan, and transition to the "adjustment" of the national economy within a period of three years (1979-1981). Later it was announced that this period should be extended until at least 1983. To all appearances, it was a forced measure, taken to surmount the crisis afflicting China's economy. The line for "adjust-

ment" meant that Peking failed in its policy to achieve intensive economic development through another "leap", and once more proved that it was impossible to resolve the country's outstanding problems on the strength of the Maoist doctrine.

The difficulties and disproportions resulted in the drastic fall in the economic growth rates, which, in the heavy industries were in 1980 half those of 1978. It was officially admitted that the country was threatened with "a serious financial and economic crisis".

The state of affairs in agriculture did not show any marked change for the better either. Declarations about the need to plan the economic development according to the formula "agriculture-light industry-heavy industry", which took account of the prime significance of the agricultural sector, were not supported by scientifically substantiated practical measures. The directive of the CPC Central Committee regarding a 10 per cent reduction of prices of industrial products to meet agriculture's requirements in 1979-1981 still remains on paper.

"Adjustment" of the economy has not substantially bettered the life of the Chinese working people. The population's essential requirements for food and consumer goods have not been satisfied. The thirtieth anniversary of the PRC was celebrated in a peculiar way: the prices of the basic food products were raised: of meat and fish by an average of 33 per cent, eggs—32 per cent, as well as of milk, poultry, vegetables, etc.

Seeking to justify the policy of restraining a rise in living standards the Peking leaders claim that it is caused by the dearth of financial and material resources, again invoking the catch-phrase, "Bear hardships

and privations with clenched teeth, work to advance modernization at a rapid pace."

The PRC holds the 125th place in the world as far as per capita incomes are concerned, and is the third in the overall volume of military expenditures. The concentration of efforts and means to cater for military needs narrows the possibilities of the Chinese economy, limited as they are.

"The Economic Reform"

The Maoist principles and methods of economic management coupled with the political campaigns have disorganized and deformed the planning and management system, which, in the initial years of the PRC's existence was developed along socialist principles. A disconcerting confession was made at the third session of the NPC (August-September 1980) to the effect that since the first five-year plan (1953-1957), the only one to have been fulfilled, in the PRC "other full-fledged plans have not been drafted" and planning efforts "were all but paralyzed" for a lengthy period of time.

The Chinese leadership has started to implement a reform aimed at restructuring economic management and "building a new economic mechanism". It embraces more than 6,500 state enterprises producing about a half of the country's industrial output and yielding approximately two-thirds of the profits from industry. At the working meeting of the CPC Central Committee held in December 1980 a decision was taken to slow down the implementation of the reform and the need was emphasized to carry on with the "adjustment". At the same time the slogan calling for the implementation of the reform was not abandoned.

Party and state documents set the task "to combine the planned economy with the market economy". In 1979 about 10 per cent of the gross industrial output was sold on the free market. It is stressed that "a commodity economy of a new type" is being shaped in the course of the reform.

Reforms affecting the development of the economic basis of Chinese society are under way in China. This trend of the reform in fact mirrors the concept and practice of the country's development using "the mixed economy". A multiplicity of forms of economic guidance and a multistructural character of the economy, the long-time coexistence, as is emphasized in the press, of different including "half-socialist and non-socialist" structures, are regarded in Peking as the most expedient way of developing China's economy.

The line is being encouraged for a broad-scale development of the petty-economic system in towns and creation of small privately-owned enterprises in the sphere of trade, services, public catering, transport and manufacture of consumer and some other goods.

The public and cooperative sectors in the towns and countryside are still considered to be the main economic pillar of the regime contributing to the centralized accumulation of funds. Meanwhile proposals are made more and more often "to reorganize state and collective property into the property belonging to individual enterprises". Moreover, it is accompanied by attacks on the state form of ownership, and demands to replace it with some "new forms of socialist ownership". Consequently, some state-owned enterprises have been turned into collectively-owned.

To revive and develop the state-capitalist sector the capital of the Chinese bourgeoisie and foreign capital is being attracted, among other things for participation

in joint-stock enterprises directly in the sphere of production.

The economic autonomy of the production teams formed in villages has been extended. In a number of regions "unprofitable communes" are being dissolved, the production teams are being divided into smaller units and the collectively-used land, implements and cattle distributed among "labour units" and peasant households. The area under personal plots of land has been doubled to reach 15 per cent of the land in use.

There are calls to borrow the bourgeois management methods, "to study and copy state-monopoly capitalism". It is not accidental that assessing the current process of reorganization of the economic mechanism the **New York Times** concludes that Peking is trying to transplant into Chinese soil some classical methods of capitalism.

Where are Mao's Successors Leading the Country to?

Some exigent "adjustments", which take a more realistic view of the economic progress requirements, can help bring the country out of the crisis state. The main idea of the "adjustment", however, is not so much to make good the gross blunders committed in the past and search for new ways of stimulating economic activity as to buttress the great-power nationalist thrust in economic policy as the complex process of economic reconstruction proceeds and restore the mechanism assuring the intensified growth of China's military-economic potential. Hence the profoundly contradictory nature of the economic course.

The state of the economy reflects the obvious inconsistency of the leadership's slogans and guidelines. Having abandoned the ten-year plan as totally un-

realistic Peking was also forced to readjust the plan and budget for 1981 approved by the NPC session in September 1980.

The twist in economic policy confronts the Chinese people with the urgent problem of the socio-economic orientation of the country's development. The line for narrowing the sphere of state planning, decentralization of administration of state enterprises and reliance on a multistructural economy are fraught with fatal consequences for the revolutionary accomplishments of the Chinese people.

In 1979, China's state budget had a deficit of over 17,000 million yuan, increasing the inflationary tendencies and deteriorating the country's financial position. In 1980 and 1981 the state budget deficit is expected to be 8,000 and 5,000 million yuan respectively. Thus, in the three years of "adjustment" the state expenditure will be about 30,000 million yuan in excess of the revenue.

The amorphousness of China's social structure, the rupture with the socialist community, the actual ousting of the working class from guiding social development, activation of petty-bourgeoisie and proprietors are conducive to the appearance of capitalist tendencies and rebirth of the "capitalist phoenix" from the ashes of "barracks communism" and the incipient petty-commodity production.

The same purpose is served by the restoration of the state-capitalist system using the means of the Chinese national bourgeoisie as well as imperialist monopoly capital.

Indicative are the attempts now being made to conceptualize the theory of a certain "Chinese model" of socialism. What do the Peking theoreticians propose in place of the epochal experience of real socialism and

how do they visualize the further socio-economic development of the PRC? They minced no words on this score at one of the Peking conferences. A report published by the newspaper *Guangming ribao* pointed out: "We believe we must follow the Chinese path of socialist modernization, but what this Chinese path is like is not clear. We say we are building socialism under China's conditions, but what is meant by the Chinese conditions is not clear either. In a word, the situation our country has found herself in is not clear. . . We are groping in the dark also in cardinal questions such as what is Marxism and revisionism, socialism and capitalism."

It may appear that the Chinese theoreticians have lost their way in broad daylight. In reality, however, under the pretext of taking account of the Chinese specificity—and there is no denying it—a concept is being postulated which is further estranging the PRC from cooperation with the socialist countries. Moreover, the notions of "socialism" and "the socialist way of development" are interpreted in such a way as to justify the ignoring of the general laws of socialist construction.

Judging by the measures now being carried out in China and the theories propagated, the so-called "Chinese model" of economic development increasingly represents a combination of elements of capitalism and socialism, a "mixed-type", multistructural and "market" economy, and broad cooperation with monopoly capital all linked with the pro-imperialist foreign policy course and the struggle against socialist countries.

Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye, No. 11, 1980 *

BOOK REVIEWS

● SPECIALLY FOR STP ● SPECIALLY FOR STP ●

F. BELELYUBSKY

EDUCATION AND SCIENCE IN CHINA

In recent years the gap between China's scientific and technical capability and the global social progress statistics has sharply widened. A team of staff-members of the Institute of the Far East under the USSR Academy of Sciences have written a monograph entitled *Policy in the Field of Science and Education in the PRC*. The authors analyzed the causes of stagnation phenomena in Chinese literature. They studied the consequences of state regulation of the activities of educational establishments and scientific research organizations over the thirty years the People's Republic of China has been in existence. The authors tried to determine to what extent the establishment and activities of the "school-higher education-science" complex corresponded to the real needs of Chinese society.

After the victory of the people's revolution in 1949 debates and discourses began on the forms and methods of training skilled manpower and specialists as before the revolution the country had no centralized nationwide educational system. Much of the debate centred on the regular Soviet practice of training specialists. The book presents a detailed picture of the struggle between various ideological trends around the identification of the goals, content and principles of organization of education. The Communists who mastered the principles of scientific socialism and the progressive intelligentsia stood for an integrated organization of education and science, based on the acknowledgement of their international nature. The Maoists sought to divorce Chinese culture from world culture.

A. Antipovsky, N. Borevskaya, N. Franchuk. Policy in the Field of Science and Education in the PRC. Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1980.

They thought that through this isolation the national identity of Chinese culture would fully manifest itself.

Under the impact of these ideological starting positions two principal conceptions of education evolved in China in the early and middle fifties. One of them recognized the objective need for a unified countrywide system of education oriented on top-priority development. It was a course towards training personnel taking due account of the country's current and future requirements. The other one sought to adapt the organization and content of education to suit the requirements of the agrarian economy and small-commodity production which would inevitably result in substandard education. This Maoist course, in fact "reproduced" backwardness.

The authors came to the conclusion that the nationalistic faction within the CPC headed by Mao Zedong had exerted a negative influence on the development of education and science. They described the ideological platform of this group as reactionary social utopia. The egalitarian slogans of "barracks-type" communism were applied not only in the sphere of the distribution of material benefits but also in the sphere of culture. This gave rise to the accelerated programme of eliminating distinctions between town and country and between manual and mental labour. In their *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels recommended such measures only for the more advanced countries. But Maoist theoreticians, in a total disregard for the laws of historical development, declared that China was already a socialist state advancing towards communism.

China is a backward society where agriculture still retains archaic forms and mass culture medieval features. Under such conditions to force the elimination of distinctions between town and country and between manual and mental labour can only mean perpetuation of backwardness. This could not be otherwise, for under the programme, the techno-economic and cultural level of urban communities was reduced to the level of rural communities, and the value of mental work was equated with that of manual labour.

Indeed, mental labour as a form of social division of labour emerged at the time of the formation of classes. Mao Zedong and his orthodox followers considered this a factor breeding social inequality and a constant source of its reproduction. Allegedly, mental labour engendered the class of exploiters and oppressors. Knowledge was branded private property "usurped" and used by the intelligentsia exclusively for

its material enrichment and careerism. Intellectuals were declared to be "the spiritual aristocracy" and "bourgeoisie". Mao Zedong called for the propagation of the idea whereby many scientific discoveries in the world were allegedly made mainly by illiterates and half-literate persons.

The "eradication" of mental work presupposed first of all the dismantling of the social institutions where intellectual work predominated, i. e. educational and scientific establishments. As noted in the preface to the book, the Maoist-proposed set of measures for "re-educating" the intelligentsia had the aim of eliminating it as a social group engaged in cultural and intellectual pursuits. All Maoist undertakings designed to "re-educate" intellectuals and student youth invariably culminated in their banishment to villages. The Maoists' anti-urbanism and anti-intellectualism are inseparably bound together.

Beginning with the "great leap" the policy of Mao's group in the field of education and science aimed at disorganizing the functioning of the "school-higher school-science" social complex laid in the fifties. This caused the disruption of their external links with social production and deformed the internal organization of labour. The general and higher schools and research institutes were deprived of state funds and reduced to "self-sufficiency". The whole school and higher education system fell apart under the Maoist blows. The system of post-graduate courses as a method of scientific personnel training was dismantled. The centralized management of research and educational work was disrupted. The scope of fundamental and theoretical research gradually diminished. The rabid isolationism in culture galvanized by nationalistic braggadocio reflected autarchic processes in China's economy in the sixties and early seventies. It contributed to the regress of Chinese science. Such are the salient features of the course aimed at deliberately lowering the cultural level of the nation.

The aftereffects of the anti-socialist activities of the Mao Zedong group in the sphere of science and education retarded China's overall social development.

The following statistics illustrate the imbalances caused by the Maoist policy. Between 1966 and 1976, China was short of four million certified specialists (the number of graduates in 1965 is taken as the starting point). Considering future losses, the figure is even larger. In the mid-seventies the country's student enrolment was to reach 3.5-4 million if the applicants were admitted to the higher schools at the same rate as in the early years of the People's Republic of China; in fact,

however, the 1979 student enrolment was a mere 850,000. Consequently, the gap between the social demand for specialists and the actual student enrolment increased by a further 2.5-3 million persons towards the close of the seventies.

The process of restoration of the "school-higher school-science" social complex which began in 1977-1980 did not result in the proper correlation of links between its various cycles in conformity with the demands of China's economic and social development. The links restored so far are oriented towards the level of development of productive forces which the country achieved in the mid-sixties. The principle of the regular, "priority" development of education is still largely ignored but voices in its defence are being raised in the Chinese press.

High hopes are pinned on the recruitment of gifted youth into higher schools. However, the questions of democratizing the system of education and of furnishing real conditions for raising the cultural standards of the nation as a whole are as yet unresolved. The state of affairs is particularly unsatisfactory at the elementary stage of education. Calls are made to use scientists and technical specialists from among those who returned to China from abroad and also to send young men and women en masse to study in capitalist countries (figures of ten to twenty thousand are quoted). All these measures implemented under the slogan of "reliance upon the gifted" show the limited character of the proposed programme.

The Maoist education programme betrays an affinity with certain bourgeois trends of pedagogical theory and practice (in particular with those which reduce the purpose of education to the function of catering to the needs of the economy and politics). Attempts to reduce education to an adjunct of the economy result in the further reproduction of backwardness, raising of people with extremely narrow mental horizons, conservation of archaic forms of ideology and shrinkage of the perspectives of social progress.

The Maoists' policy in the sphere of science and education clashes with social and cultural needs of the Chinese people and hinders the satisfaction of their material and moral requirements. The bankruptcy of the Maoist course in the field of education is a highly instructive lesson, first of all for the developing countries. The dismal failure of projects of creating a "new" culture convincingly demonstrates the groundlessness of Maoist demagoguery.

M. YAKOVLEV

THE TREACHEROUS SATRAP

Mikhail Yakovlev's book "17 Years in China" has come out at the Politizdat Publishing House. The author writes about his work in China as a TASS correspondent, and analyzes recent and current developments. Here is an abridged version of the closing chapter which describes the part played by Zhou Enlai, the former Premier of the PRC's State Council.

Zhou Enlai, an ambitious, power-seeking, treacherous, cunning and sophisticated politician, would not allow any person to stand between him and Mao Zedong. He always strove for second place next to Mao. He never suggested any projects and theories. He was an efficient executive of Mao Zedong's will, designs and plans regardless of their merits or demerits for the state and the Party. He never bothered about theorizing. He was an executor but one mindful of himself, of securing his position in the ruling hierarchy. And the only possible way to achieve this was to remove his rivals.

Rivals Disposed of

Zhou Enlai had a hand in the slurring of Gao Gang who was once considered a prospective premier, in

which case Zhou Enlai would have had to be content with the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Later Zhou Enlai was pushed out by Liu Shaoqi, PRC's Chairman, Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, the second most powerful man in the country. Moreover, Zhou Enlai was also thwarted by Peng Zhen, Mao's favourite. Both Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi were the first of the top Peking leaders to fall victim to the "cultural revolution."

Zhou Enlai heaped accusations of "treason" and "betrayal" upon many Chinese leaders. For instance, he called "traitors" Peng Dehuai and Qu Qubo, a prominent leader of the Chinese Communist Party and an internationalist who was killed by Chang Kaishi's thugs in the Guomindang dungeons.

In September, 1966, I saw a wall newspaper with an account of Zhou Enlai's speech of August 30, 1966, when he addressed the "revolutionaries" of China's Academy of Sciences and accused Qu Qubo of "treachery." On May 6, 1967, the first issue of the **Tao Qu Zhanbao** newspaper published by the "mass organizations" of the Peking Law School and the Peking City Court was circulated. It carried a selection of slanderous utterances made by Zhou Enlai and other materials against Qu Qubo. Why did Qu Qubo become an object of slander?

In order to present Mao Zedong as the sole founder of the CPC, as an "indisputable authority" in the Party's history, and exalt his personality Mao and his henchmen began destroying everything that evidenced their usurpation of power in the Party and the state. They even rewrote the history of the CPC. They slandered many organizers of the CPC, among them Li Dazhao, the first Chinese Marxist and founder of the CPC. Mao Zedong was pictured as the sole founder and

leader of the CPC. In so doing Mao and his group used their favourite method of drawing historical parallels.

In the early period of the "cultural revolution" they blackened the deeds of Li Xiucheng (1824-1864), a leader of the Taiping uprising. From 1860 to 1864 he fought the combined forces of Chinese and Manchurian reaction and the European and American interventionists. In 1864 he led the defence of Nanjing, and after its fall was captured and executed. The Chinese people held him in high esteem. Before his death Li Xiucheng wrote an autobiography, a very important document referring to the history of the Taiping uprising.

In 1963, Ci Binyu, a "young historian," as Zhou Enlai called him, wrote a series of articles purporting to prove that Li Xiucheng was "a traitor, who after capture gave in to his enemies", as shown by his autobiography written before his death. Later Ci Binyu "discovered" that before his death Qu Qubo had also written some "unnecessary words" saying to the enemies that he was "sorry." It transpired that Chang Kaishists inserted the "unnecessary words" to discredit the staunch Communist. Qu Qubo had once criticized Mao's right-wing deviationist tendencies and mistakes. On the basis of the faked data supplied by the Chang Kaishists and Ci Binyu, Zhou Enlai falsely accused Qu Qubo of betrayal.

The above mentioned wall newspaper and **Tao Qu Zhanbao** quoted Zhou Enlai as saying: "During the last months of his life Qu Qubo wrote the 'unnecessary words', did not behave himself properly, and turned traitor at the end of his life. I made a report at the Politbureau. This report has not yet been published. If the hungweibings found out about it they would destroy the monument in the Babaoshan cemetery..."

Qu Qubo, who comes from an intellectual-bureaucratic family, like Li Xiucheng, turned traitor at the last period of his life. We must learn from a young historian, comrade Ci Binyu. . ."

Incited by Zhou Enlai the hungweibings defiled the memory of Qu Qubo, one of the finest sons of the Chinese people. They opened his grave, smashed the gravestone, and painted slanderous and abusing words all around. They abused the memory of the man who met his death singing the **Internationale**.

The Daughter Sacrificed

Zhou Enlai had never once disavowed his utterances. Moreover he repeated his allegations again and again accusing this or that figure in the CPC of treachery by the analogy with Qu Qubo.

Some authors have been trying to present Zhou Enlai as a "champion" of the victims of the "cultural revolution" and Chinese intellectuals. The present Chinese leaders are portraying him like this. In fact, in many cases Zhou Enlai acted "more left" than the Cultural Revolution Group at the CPC Central Committee. Zhou Enlai connived at the persecution of his comrades and associates with whom he had worked for years. During the "cultural revolution" almost all the members of the State Council (government) including deputy premiers, ministers and deputy ministers were defamed. The hungweibings and zaofans tortured Peng Dehuai, He Luna, Tao Zhu to death. Physical and moral tortures caused the early death of Luo Ruiqing, Chen Yi and many others. More, Zhou Enlai did not stir a finger to do anything to defend his adopted daughter Sun Weishi, a theatrical worker. On October 15, 1978, **Renmin ribao** told the story of her death

during the "cultural revolution." The newspaper carried a photograph showing Zhou Enlai, his wife Deng Yichao and Sun Weishi. I'll tell you this story. It will give you a clearer idea about the atmosphere in China at the time and about its rulers.

Sun Weishi was the daughter of Sun Bingwen executed by the Guomindang men in Shanghai in 1927. Sun Bingwen was Zhu De's and Zhou Enlai's associate. It was then that Zhou and Deng adopted the girl. In 1938 Sun Weishi, at the age of 17, joined the Communist Party of China. In Yanan she was a student at the Anti-Japanese academy, the party school and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. In 1939 she was sent to the Soviet Union to study and in 1946 returned to China. She took part in carrying out the land reform in the liberated regions and worked as a cultural organizer. In 1949-1950 she headed the group of interpreters of the Chinese delegation led by Mao Zedong that visited the Soviet Union. From 1950 to 1966 she was an active theatrical worker.

She was persecuted from the very beginning of the "cultural revolution." On March 1, 1968, Sun Weishi was arrested, handcuffed and imprisoned as a "spy of Soviet revisionism", though, as **Renmin ribao** would note later, there was no ground for this accusation. They cruelly tortured her to force a "confession". On October 14, 1968, at the age of 47, Sun Weishi died as a result of torture and ill treatment. She was handcuffed and her body mutilated with beatings. And only then, according to the newspaper, did Zhou Enlai demand an inquiry to be held into the circumstances of Sun Weishi's death.

It is difficult to tell the truth from fiction in the story. **Renmin ribao** pointed the finger at Lin Biao and the "gang of four", particularly at Jiang Qing.

Now a few words about Lin Biao. During the "cultural revolution" Zhou Enlai was pushed back to play third or even fourth fiddle. But he realized how the "cultural revolution" might end. Working at Mao Zedong's elbow for years he knew well his methods and even his frame of mind. He knew Mao's tactic to stab an opponent in the back, and himself made use of it. From experience Zhou Enlai also knew they would be looking for a scapegoat when the "cultural revolution" was over. He bided his time. In 1971 he was aware of real danger as Lin Biao was gaining more power. In this power struggle his long-standing experience in fighting rivals, his political cunning and intrigues, his temporary alliance with the "leftist" remnants of the Cultural Revolution Group at the CPC Central Committee who also feared the ascendancy of Lin Biao and, consequently, of the military, and, last but not least, Mao Zedong's support, helped Zhou Enlai once again get rid of those who stood in his way.

Following the removal of Lin Biao and his supporters it was necessary to fill the gap in the leadership and make at least the impression that the situation "is coming back to normal." These tasks were set before the Tenth CPC Congress which was held behind the closed doors in August 24-28, 1973, in Peking.

The gaps, naturally, were filled. Purges were carried out in connection with the "Lin Biao case" in the army and in civilian offices. These measures, however, did not change the nature of the Chinese leadership, formed, in fact, before the Congress. Nor did they end the conflicts and feuds within it.

While agreeing to Lin Biao's removal, Mao Zedong

at the same time stopped Zhou Enlai from climbing to second place in the Party and in the state. He, a no less sophisticated politician and intriguer, always kept Zhou Enlai at arm's length, without making him "the closest associate." He knew the cunning nature of his "shadow" which Zhou Enlai had always been. After the ousting of Lin Biao and the influential military a group of the leftists came to the foreground and the so-called "provincials" close to it. Hua Guofeng was transferred to Peking and appointed Vice-Premier and Minister of Public Security—as a tribute for his services in the "cultural revolution".

Thus, in fact, three factions were formed in the Peking leadership after the Tenth Congress: the old-timers rallying around Zhou Enlai, the leftists led by Jiang Qing, and the "provincials" among whom Hua Guofeng later became prominent. Time would show when Mao Zedong would claim new sacrifices. The rivalry between these factions was intensifying.

*Zhurnal*ist, No. 1, 1981 *

The Soviet monthly **SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE** and supplements to this magazine are digests of the political and theoretical press featuring the vital problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the practice of socialist and communist construction, the peoples' struggle for peace, democracy and socialism, and worldwide ideological struggle.

All inquiries should be addressed to:
SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
7 Bolshaya Pochtovaya Street,
107082, Moscow, USSR
or to the Information Department of the Soviet
Embassy

