

China Advances Along The Socialist Road

The Gang of Four Were Counter-Revolutionaries and Revolutionaries Cannot Support Them

By the Jarvis-Bergman Headquarters

Comrades,

We with the help of many comrades have formed the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters in order to wage the struggle that must be fought in the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, to reverse the counter-revolutionary line represented by the new CC report on China and the "Rectification" (read Sectification) Bulletin.

We as individuals and as a group have thought very seriously about the nature of our actions and our responsibility to our comrades, along with whom we have pledged to "put the interests of the working class and the revolution above everything else;" (Article 3, Section 1, Constitution of the RCP.) To be true to these principles as well as the principles on which our Party was founded, there is no other avenue except to lead our Party into open and determined rebellion against the line of the new CC report. We who have signed our names below readily accepted the responsibility to serve on the Central Committee of our Party; we feel very strongly that our actions are perfectly consistent with shouldering that responsibility.

It's Right To Rebel Against Reaction!

Members of the Central Committee and its Political Committee

Mickey Jarvis
Glenn Kirby
Mike McDermott
Mike Rosen
Ginny Jarvis

Members of the Central Committee

Rob Devigne
Lee Ornati
Dave Cline
Christine Boardman
Dave Clark
Nick Unger

The above comrades include:

Vice-chair of the Central Committee and its standing bodies
Chair of the East Coast Region
Vice-chair of the Mid-west Region
Chairs of the Milwaukee-Minnesota, Chicago-Gary, NY-NJ,
and Phil-Bait Districts
Head of Party work in the R C Y B
Head of Party work in the N U W O
Head of Party work in U W O C
Editor of The Steelworker

Introduction—Practice Marxism Not Revisionism; Drive
Counter-Revolution Out Of The Party Of The US Working Class

- Working class rule smashed in China.
- The Gang of Four, target of the hatred of the Chinese masses, upheld as revolutionaries by the RCP Central Committee.
- The Chinese masses, steeped in Confucianism and tired of the high road, capitulate to counter-revolution. And here at home,
- A bourgeois-revisionist headquarters, with no actual revisionists in it, unearthed and exposed. The source of the

disorientation and floundering in our Party finally eliminated.

- *Vi* of the standing bodies of the Central Committee purged. Almost *Vt* of the Central Committee cast down, removed from responsibilities, reassigned.

The new CC report has arrived, and it is a barn burner on a scale few had expected. The Chairman has already summed up that its reception in the ranks of the Party has been both enthusiastic and liberating, a real breath of fresh air. But the opposite is the case, and none can deny it.

This Party, our Party, is in the beginning stages of open, militant and determined rebellion. Rebellion about the way this line came down. And even more rebellion against the line itself, against this attempt by a few to turn this Party into its opposite and change its political color. The rebellion is widespread and deep.

- The NY-NJ District Committee, as well as the sections and branches, overwhelmingly voted to rebel. A meeting called by The Chairman from which the district leadership was barred was boycotted by over 80% of the cadre. A "gentlemen's purge" where all Party members were required to "re-up" or be considered no longer members was even more strongly boycotted.
- The New England District Committee voted to rebel against the CC bulletin and the ram job. They voted to take this paper down to all cadre along with the CC bulletin, and not to recognize any leadership changes.
- The Milwaukee District Committee and all branches voted to rebel.
- The Philadelphia-Baltimore District Committee and the majority of cadre voted to rebel.
- The majority of cadre and branches in Chicago voted to rebel.
- The National Office of the R C Y B branch [sic] voted to rebel.
- The Pittsburg District Committee voted to rebel.

- As of now, over 40% of the entire Party has been purged by the "re-up" attack.

Comrades, the rebellion is real. *Vt* of the old day to day leading body of the RCP, *Vt* of the old Political Committee, and almost *Vi* of the old Central Committee of our Party have united with many other comrades to form the "Revolutionary Workers Headquarters of the RCP" in order to: **hold up** this new line, **criticize it**, and **drive it the hell out of our Party**.

There can be no paper unity on the question of China. China is a watershed question, a fundamental question of what is revolution and what is counter-revolution. The task before all of us is to drive the line of Avakian and company out of our Party, or to drive out the line of the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters. They cannot both exist in our Party. There are two lines in our Party, and there are two Headquarters with many forces in the sharpest struggle. There can be no retreat from struggle around this question. Neither can there be a formalistic or organizational resolution in advance of a political and ideological one. Our line on China is our line on the political and ideological question of the highest importance to the international working class. The Chairman through a combination of idealism and outright deceit is trying to ignore this. But reality will assert itself, and it is doing it all through the Party.

Comrades, to rebel against reaction is justified. It is necessary. Let the rebellion spread. Let the fury of the working class against all oppression rage against the counter-revolutionary line of the new CC Report.

What Has Happened

The Chairman has said that the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters has presented the cadre with a "fait accompli" on the question of China. Nothing could be further from the truth. There has been a fait accompli. It has come from The Chairman, who is trying to organizationally (through using the form of democratic centralism against the working class) ram through this line and turn our Party into a defense group for the Gang of Four. Along with this, The Chairman has summed up that the Gang were a little slow in getting the jump on the bourgeoisie in China, and The Chairman will not make the same mistake over here.

Think about what has happened. If the gang-building campaign of The Chairman has not led us to a fait accompli, the word has no meaning.

- Bulletin 1 on China raised some questions.
- Bulletin 2 on China did not sum up the questions raised, but added three new questions and told all of us not to "draw conclusions."
- Bulletin 3 came out before most comrades had discussed Bulletin 2, did not discuss the Gang at all, and set artificial guidelines designed to create public opinion for their line.

Now, out of the blue, the CC embraces the Gang as revolutionary heroes and saints, denounces the CCP and Hua as revisionists, and condemns the masses to capitalist restoration.

Having set the comrades to struggle over points like the significance of "concentrate" and "reflect," the Chairman was setting up the Party for a coup. Our Party was to be the new home of the Gang. While The Chairman made sure that the rank and file would not draw any overall conclusions, he made sure that the CC meeting would do that and only that—both to win his point on the Gang and also to cut down the opposition to The Chairman's Gang of Four left idealist line for work in the U.S.

The manner in which this railroad job was conducted makes a mockery of the current CC's lip service to the chain of knowledge in our Party. Rather than concentrating the results of previous discussions and returning them in a higher form, each succeeding bulletin ignored the ones before it, switched, with no explanation, to a new set of issues to be discussed, and discouraged analysis of the real world. To crown it off, the CC meeting was held at a time when the overwhelming majority of branches and higher units had not completed their discussion of the third bulletin and many had not even begun. Avakian's paper was prepared weeks earlier. What clearer proof could there be that The Chair does not believe that the cadre could come up with **any** contributions to determining a line on the question of China—no analysis, no ideas, no facts, not even any questions worth considering! This is sheer petty bourgeois contempt for the rank and file communists of our Party and for the Marxist-Leninist concept of the chain of knowledge and command. It is the "genius" theory, pure and simple.

Was the Party of the U.S. working class led by The Chairman to determine truth from facts based on applying Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought to the situation in China? Was the initiative of the cadre released to make a step by step evaluation of the overall situation in China? Were the opinions and the understanding of the Party members systematized from the discussions that were held? Were the lines on the struggle in the

United States drawn out, based on the practice and theory of our Party? We have to answer NO, and in all four places.

Why did things go down this way? The answer is simple for The Chairman. No two line struggle could be permitted throughout the Party exactly because there were 2 lines. The way to deal with this is a shoot out at the top, where The Chairman would smash the other line and his position would go down as the line of the entire Party. ***By his own admission, The Chairman would have split the Party if he did not win at the CC.***

Some of the authors of this paper were in a position to put real roadblocks in the path of The Chairman and his coup. But because of our own fear of splitting the Party and our desire for unity, and because of our fear of having to take on The Chairman in a big face to face battle, we incorrectly went along with the way he wanted to conduct the struggle. We made serious errors and should criticize ourselves and be criticized for doing this. But we will be damned if we are now going to go along with the decision on China, go along with the rectification bulletin which reverses our Party's line on the U.S., and most of all go along with the fact that the very orientation of our Party is being turned around just because we made the error of going along before.

Comrades, The Chairman has presented us with a real "fait accompli." Go along with calling the Communist Party of China revisionist without investigation and without seeking truth from facts. Renounce China on the basis of a 78 page paper short on fact, without concrete analysis, absent of proof, but long on conjecture, subjectivism, idealism and metaphysics. Accept an anti-Marxist, counter-revolutionary document as the line of the Party. And if you do not, you are going against the Party and will be disciplined. We cannot and we will not accept this. The Revolutionary Workers Headquarters will stand up and fight for our Party and for the working class.

Down With The Counter-Revolutionary CC Report

What is revolution, and what is counter-revolution? What is Marxism, and what is revisionism and Trotskyism? This is the central question under debate here. This paper from the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters is a beginning defense of the building of socialism and putting down of counter-revolution in China. On this question the paper has 2 parts: one, on the overall situation in China, and the other, a criticism of The Chairman's paper "Revolutionaries Are Revolutionaries . . ." In addition, there is a

paper on the development of a left idealist line to "lead" the work in the U.S.

The 78 page treatise from the CC would be a farce if it were not proposed as the line of our Party and if it were not the leading edge in turning our Party away from uniting with and leading the struggles of the working class in this country.

The method of this report is thoroughly bourgeois. Quotes out of context. No analysis of concrete conditions. No discussion of condition, time, place. No discussion of the role of the masses, the mood of the masses, anything about the masses—except how backward, superstitious and tired they became. Outright lies, and subtle distortions. And a slew of unsupported assumptions, personal opinions and "I believes" to fill the gaps.

For the method alone, this paper must be condemned by all comrades. But the crime of The Chairman is far worse than that. The method goes with the conclusion—supporting counter-revolution, and opposing socialist revolution and socialist revolutionaries abroad and at home. The depths of counter-revolution are reached in Section 3, where The Chairman blames the masses for the "defeat" of revolution, with not one word about bad lines, errors or anything else that led to this situation. Here, alone in the paper, do we find mention of the objective situation. But here, it is to put it as obstacles to socialism. What a shameless departure from the line and method of Mao, who saw in the history of exploitation and oppression and enforced backwardness the potential for great revolutionary enthusiasm and drive. There is a historical precedent for the analysis of The Chairman on why socialism failed in China. It comes from the Progressive Labor Party, who saw in these same conditions the failure of socialism 6 years ago. And both PL and The Chair owe a debt to the founder of this school of thought, Trotsky, who told us all that socialism cannot be built in one country, let alone a backward, superstitious peasant country. Comrades, after so many years of denouncing Trotskyism, why in hell should we embrace it now to accomodate The Chair.

The Rectification Bulletin

While The Chair can come up with a 78 page broadside on China, he can only get up 10 pages on the existence of a revisionist headquarters that has existed in one form or another since before our Party was even founded. This does not, however, mean that he has no line on the situation here and how to resolve the contradic-

tions in the work we face. The problem is that he has the same smash and grab line as the Gang. First get rid of the opposition headquarters, then the work goes on. But the way to get rid of the headquarters is not through line struggle, but through an organizational coup, busting them all in one struggle.

The Chair had to call for sweeping rectification in our Party not only because he wants to consolidate his putsch with purges extending clear down to the basic levels, but because there have been real problems in the Party requiring rectification and the cadre recognize it. Increasingly the Party's chain of knowledge and command has been sabotaged by a left idealist line and the "genius" theory. The rectification the bulletin promises, the current CC cannot deliver. They are turning their backs on what the Party needs—more summing up of both line and practice, more line struggle over real issues, more motion from practice to theory and back to practice. This campaign, on the contrary, can only impede real rectification, can only institutionalize the idealist line and bureaucratic centralist methods which have fueled the problems in the first place.

The rectification bulletin is a follow-up to the coup. It aims to "rectify" our Party by consolidating The Chair's incorrect line through the entire Party. If it succeeds, our Party will be reduced to a sect, guided by a firmly entrenched left idealist line in the Center and utterly incapable of uniting with the working class and masses, bringing scientific socialism home and leading them toward revolution.

Democratic Centralism, Factionalism,
And Who Believes Line Is Decisive

In the early days of the rebellion, The Chair has repeatedly and strenuously made the main point the question of organization. This must be settled before there can be a struggle over the line. In or out, he asks us all, and then we can talk about China. On this basis he has refused to struggle over the lines in a way that reflects the actual situation and contradictions in our Party. There must be sharp 2 line struggle on all levels of the Party, including Congresses. This represents the best interest of the Party and the working class. Both lines and the headquarters that reflect them cannot both exist together in the Party, and the Party must decide on the basis of which line is the correct one. It is both correct and responsible to recognize this fact and have faith in the masses of cadre to rise to the challenge that this struggle poses for all of us.

The Chair is the principal roadblock to the struggle in our Party.

He has moved to split our Party under the banner of upholding democratic centralism and factionalism. We refuse to recognize the authority of him and his CC to kick us out of the Party or remove us from our posts. We refuse to accept that honest, responsible comrades have to re-apply to the new CC and its agents or be dropped from the membership rolls. As of this writing, the CC has thrown out over 40% of the membership of the Party in this manner. This is an outrage, and it will also not be recognized. Some people think that they own our Party! Just like our class brothers and sisters, we want no condescending saviors and will accept none either. The CC has some learning and remolding to do about what a communist is and what a communist is not.

The Revolutionary Workers Headquarters of the RCP asks all of our comrades to think about two points in relationship to the current struggle.

"Members of the Revolutionary Communist Party must:

(1) Put the interests of the working class and of the revolution above everything else;"
Constitution of the RCP, USA, Article 3, Section 1, p. 168.

"Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it."

Mao Tsetung, 1975

Comrades!

Hold Up—Criticize—Drive Out the line of counter-revolution and retreat represented by the new CC report.

The death of Mao Tsetung presented new challenges for communists around the world and in the CPC in particular. Our Party, a young but vibrant Party, was shaken by the loss. We didn't choose these conditions, but our task is to deepen our understanding of Marxism and continue to struggle. The two lines in China produced two lines in our Party. Because of the ideological, political and organizational line pushed by The Chair, he and the CC have forced a crisis in our Party. It is a crisis that the masses of Party members neither desired nor were prepared for. But it is a crisis that we must stand up to and overcome, not by making the question of principle factionalism or violations of democratic centralism or the unity of the Party, but by making the question of line, in China and right here, the point of principle. Parties waver and degenerate, but the historical mission of our class stands above all. It Is Right To Rebel Against Reactionaries!

Support The Socialist Revolution In The People's Republic Of China Led By The Communist Party With Comrade Hua Kuo-feng Its Head!

The Gang Of Four Were Counter-revolutionaries And Should Not Be Supported! They Represent In Theory And Practice A Repudiation Of Marxism-Leninism Mao Tsetung Thought!

The U.S. Working Class Needs Its Party! Fight To Keep It Out Of The Hands Of Those Who Would Destroy It!

Uphold The Interests Of Our Class Above All!

RUSH TO JUDGEMENT

The RCP and its predecessor, the RU, has a proud history and devotion to the struggle of the US working class. It has led many important individual struggles and made important theoretical contributions to the development of the ultimate revolutionary victory. It has in the past period been dealt a number of severe self-inflicted blows which the Party must vigorously rebuff. What has distinguished the RCP from the many so-called Marxist-Leninist sects? Essentially, it has been its concentration in the major battles of the working class, the oppressed peoples and their allies, and its summing up of these struggles through applying the worldwide experience of the working class, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. In the ideological battle with these sects, it has distinguished itself by demolishing the right and left dogmatism and stressed the fundamental duty of Marxist-Leninists to link up with the masses in struggle. As the Party Programme puts it: "The central task of the Revolutionary Communist Party today, as the Party of the US working class, is to build the struggle, class consciousness and revolutionary unity of the working class and develop its leadership in a broad united front against the US imperialists, in the context of a worldwide united front against imperialism aimed at the rulers of the two superpowers." (bottom p. 101, top p. 102)

And further it maintains:

"In carrying out its central task today, the Revolutionary Communist Party takes part in, learns from and brings leadership to the struggles of the working class and its allies, unites all who can be united, consistently exposes the enemy and points to the final aim of overthrowing imperialism and building socialism. To do this it bends every effort to fulfill three main objectives in these struggles: to win as much as can be won in the immediate battle

and weaken the enemy; to raise the general level of consciousness and sense of organization of the struggling masses and instill in them the revolutionary outlook of the proletariat; and to develop the most active and advanced in these struggles into communists, recruit them into the Party and train them as revolutionary leaders.

"Through this process the Party leads the masses of workers in fighting against the capitalists and in developing this into an all-around battle against the capitalist system." (Party Programme, p. 102)

Of course, there has been shortcomings and errors, and at least some of them have been summed up and corrected. We still have a long way to go, but shall we in silence reverse our correct stand? Shall we, who as the RU exposed PL as Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries follow their footsteps down the road to hell? Shall our comrades trained in toe-to-toe struggle with the bourgeoisie cave in to petty bourgeois degeneration and despair, throw up our hands and forsake the struggle? Shall we join the Trotskyite anti-China chorus, do the job of the bourgeoisie from the left, that the bourgeoisie needs to supplement its attack from the right? Our comrades are used to battle and will certainly resist and defeat this counter-revolutionary deviation.

While the battle to resist this trend away from working class concentration, towards a safe but harmful left idealism and Trotskyite interventionism has been going on for quite a while inside the Party, it has not been general knowledge among the cadre, although many cadre have resisted and protested. But it has come to a head over the China question, and as such has both concentrated a trend into a gallop, and has demanded that we make common cause with PL, WVO, Spartacists and other Trots. This rush to judgement forced on the Party by a willful and disruptive few stands to turn our honorable history around unless the cadre make it forcefully clear that they refuse to follow the Judas goat to the slaughter house. This carefully orchestrated rush to judgement developed under a barrage of pyramiding bulletins escalating the stakes at each turn.

Bulletin 1: Simply raised certain questions.

Bulletin 2: Did not sum up the questions raised in #1, discussed three other questions and said, "don't draw conclusions."

Bulletin 3: Came out before most had discussed #2, did not at all discuss the Gang of Four, except to practically make it impossible to oppose them. And then, this last CC report which enshrines the

Gang as revolutionary saints and condemns the Chinese masses to capitalist restoration.

This line, based on selected conjecture and flying in the face of a mountain of contrary evidence, needs to be reversed by the cadre if our record is to be upheld and if our future is to be fought for.

It is important to note that both the two highest standing bodies of the CC are evenly split on this matter. And on the basis of the correct stand of those who oppose the frantic head-over-heels rush to catch up with the Sparts, all opposing have been removed from their posts. This not inconsiderable purge (only the beginning) of those who proved themselves in past struggle and proved themselves anew in this battle consolidates the attempted sectification of the RCP.

The question of China is a question of principle, the question of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought vs. Trotskyism, or one should say shame-faced Trotskyism because the ridiculous stand of maintaining it only internally and orally upholding China as a socialist country is both ridiculous and nothing but a creeping escalation to fullblown betrayal. We are told to lie to the masses, and tell close forces the truth only if they promise to lie to the masses.

This dubious tactic is already a public failure and bound to be even more thorough in the immediate future.

The China question needs to be reversed, and above all the central task of the RCP has to be reaffirmed. And the three main objectives have to be reaffirmed and stuck to. Otherwise how can the RCP be maintained as the Party of the working class? This reckless disregard of the needs of our Party and of the U.S. masses will certainly be denounced by the overwhelming bulk of the cadre and this counter-revolutionary line will surely be defeated.

Written by a veteran comrade
who has been through this kind of thing before.

THE CC REPORT ON CHINA IS A
COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY DOCUMENT AND
MUST BE CRITICIZED

The report on China put out in the name of our Party by the Chair and his CC is counter-revolutionary and must be criticized and repudiated by all comrades. The line of the report is wrong-dead wrong. The Gang were not revolutionary heroes. They were counter-revolutionary traitors and enemies, and their fall is a

workers' victory. To uphold them is to replace revolution with counter-revolution in our Party. The Chinese Communist Party headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng is not a revisionist Party. China is still on the socialist road, it is still a beacon light for the working class and all oppressed people around the world. To deny this is to set our Party against the revolutionary tide of history. This must be opposed on all fronts.

The CC bulletin marks a complete break with Marxism. The wrong line was arrived at and is set out with anti-Marxist methods. It is being pushed throughout our Party with equally anti-Marxist methods of inner-Party struggle. The unity of line, method of investigation, and method of inner-Party struggle shows how fully counter-revolution has been embraced by the Chair and his CC.

Uphold the Marxist Method

Seek truth from facts. The correct line develops in opposition to the incorrect line. These Marxist principles should guide all comrades in dealing with the situation we face. The incorrect line of the CC bulletin will be held up, criticized and defeated. The correct line and truth about the situation in China will be developed and deepened in this struggle and through consciously applying Marxism to the situation in China.

This paper by the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters of the RCP represents the beginning stages of both aspects of this process. Our approach has been to examine the general features and general conditions of China to determine if revisionism has in fact triumphed. And we have used Marxism to evaluate the CC paper. From the beginning, the burden of proof was on them. They had to show that revisionism had won. In this, they have failed miserably. On that basis alone the CC bulletin must be rejected. But more can be said. Though our investigation is only at the opening stages, it shows that China is clearly still socialist, that the working class still holds power. The exact part played by each and every Chinese leader and the exact nature of each current struggle is not yet known. But enough is known to say that Hua Kuo-feng deserves the support of all comrades as a follower and developer of the correct line of Mao Tsetung.

This introductory section on the counter-revolutionary methodology of the CC paper opens the criticism of that document. It is followed by sections on the class struggle, why the CC thinks revisionism triumphed, Chou En-lai, and the 11th Party Constitu-

tion. The criticism section is followed by an entire part on the gang's counter-revolutionary role in China and an analysis of the current situation, including a discussion of agricultural modernization and the development of socialist new things. Through the active participation of many comrades across the country, and through summing up with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought, both the correct line and our understanding of the nature of the incorrect line will be deepened through struggle. Our Party will defeat the incorrect line of the CC. We will unite around proletarian revolution here and in China, and through this class struggle, move forward the cause of the working class.

Bourgeois Methods Only Serve the Bourgeoisie

The position paper offered by the Chair and accepted by his CC, called "Revolutionaries Are Revolutionaries And..." is a disgrace to Marxism and our Party. It is a qualitative leap—backwards. Comrades need only compare it to the past work of the RCP and the RU to see how shallow and empty of Marxism it is. There is precious little analysis, but instead subjectivism and egocentrism. This paper spits on the high level of polemic that our Party has struggled to develop within this country.

Why did this happen? There is only one reason. The CC paper was guided by an incorrect line. It is not true that material about China is so difficult to come by that all anyone could do is offer up superficialities. The class struggle in China, including the contending lines and roads, are not so hidden that one can only guess at them. If this was the case, why in hell was our Party forced to take a position right now? The class struggle in China, like any other process, is knowable. The RCP could have set itself the task of using Marxism to learn its laws and their actual development. Our Party, based on the science of the working class, is the best instrument to carry out this task. But the Chair and his CC would have none of it, and they still won't. This cannot stop us. The Revolutionary Workers Headquarters will not let the banner of Marxism be dropped. We have taken up this task as part of a righteous rebellion against counter-revolution and as part of fulfilling our duty to the international working class. It shall continue.

Starting at the End and Ending Where He Started

When comrades first heard about the arrest of the Gang in October, 1976, there was general and genuine confusion in our ranks.

Something momentous was happening in China, fast upon the death of Mao. But only one among us was certain as to what was happening. Only one knew the answer before the question was even fully asked. The Chair had it down from the first day. He was not entirely alone. As was to be expected, Mike Klonsky of the OL also knew it all from the start, continuing his record of consistent slavishness and opportunism. It is a bitter shame that the Chair chose to adopt his approach (regardless of the fact that their lines were opposites). But the ugly fact remains that the Chair *knew* "the truth." There was no question to investigate. Revisionism had won, capitalism would soon follow. His only task remained to prove it.

As a result of knowing the result before the investigation—apriorism pure and simple—the Chair could dispense with real Marxist analysis. He did not have to seek truth from facts. He already had truth, and the only thing he would call facts were things that helped show it. An open, deep, concrete analysis would just postpone the inevitable verdict in support of the Gang, so why bother?

Metaphysics, Idealism and a Legal Brief for the Gang

The approach of the Chair determined that the CC would adopt as the line of the RCP a 78 page paper that really doesn't teach or lead the comrades in understanding the class struggle and Marxism. The CC paper is divided into 3 main sections, and the very division itself exposes the anti-Marxist method of the Chair.

Section 1: This is supposed to prove the entire case. After it, we are told, "From all that has been said I believe it is very clear that the present rulers have betrayed Mao's line and are implementing a revisionist line. As for how to view the Four, on a certain level that should be very easy in light of what has been shown. However, I believe that it has been shown in a deeper, more thorough way, by examining the line of the Four themselves in opposition to that of the current rulers on a number of crucial questions, that the Four were carrying out a correct line and fighting for the interests of the proletariat." (CC Report, pp. 69-70)

Section 1 is the section of the paper most empty of facts, on analysis of the situation in China, however fanciful. And yet it is the one that proves the case. This is the section of lifting quotes, measuring them and throwing them away. Lifting them means taking them out of context, offering quotes without regard to time, place and conditions, and without these there is no Marxism.

Section 1 is a dozen different ways to restate the original conclusion. The Gang is always presumed correct. The quote from *Peking Review* is always presumed to be the line of a unified Party leadership. (The CC's general approach to *Peking Review* is, like the rest of their line, almost a carbon copy of PL's notorious *Road to Revolution III*: "Material incentives are reappearing as the emphasis shifts overwhelmingly in publications and propaganda to technical innovations (see any recent *Peking Review*)" This was in November, 1971.) The rest is easy. The quote from the Gang is stated to be the same as Mao, but then again, that was the starting point for this section. This section and the entire paper passively reflect the line and thought of the Gang. Nowhere is there an analysis of whether Gang thought, or Chang Chun-chiao Thought, really is the same as Mao Tsetung Thought. It is just assumed, and this assumption is used to prove itself.

Section 2: This has far more "facts" than Section 1. To the Chair, facts are things you need in arguments with people who don't agree with you, but they are not necessary to formulate your own line. Section 2 is the legal brief, cross examination, following the Section 1 opening argument. It is the debating tricks, hunt for the loopholes, and fast talk. Section 2 is where the major questions have to be decided with "I believe" and "In my opinion" not once, but literally dozens of times. Whether this is to substitute for facts or to conceal facts is immaterial. It is no wonder that one comrade commented, after reading this legal brief for the Gang, that the lawyers should plead insanity.

Section 3: This is in many ways the most disgusting of all. Here, for the first time, the full objective situation is brought into play. Here the Chinese masses make their first appearance. Only by now, they are too tired to resist revisionism and are fair game for whatever goulash Hua dishes up. Section 3 blames the objective situation and the masses for what the Chair thinks happened in China. The Trotskyism of this section will be dealt with later.

Section 4: This can be summed up in a few words. Lie to the masses, and tell the truth to our friends only if they promise to lie to the masses. It is a fitting conclusion to the entire method of the paper.

Mao Tsetung was confronted with similar arguments some 40 years ago. His response to them hits the mark today, and serves both to expose the CC bulletin and to guide communists in a correct approach.

"The most ridiculous person in the world is the 'know all' who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and

proclaims himself the 'world's Number One authority'; this merely shows that he has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is the reverse—honesty and modesty." (On Practice, Selected Readings, p. 71)

"Only those who are subjective, superficial and one-sided in their approach to problems will smugly issue orders and directives the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their history and present state as a whole) and without getting to the essence of things (their nature and the internal relations between one thing and another). Such people are bound to trip and fall." ("On Practice," Selected Readings, p. 73)

What the Chair Leaves Out is Marxism

The method of the CC paper stands exposed both for what is in it, and for what is missing. There is no real analysis of the objective situation in China and how it developed. There is no discussion of the role of the masses in making history, where they stood and why on the key questions. The mass line is never mentioned. How the line of the Party was grasped by the masses, or not grasped, and how on that basis the masses changed the objective conditions, none of this is present. The advances of the 76 CC Report are thrown away by its supposed defenders. The United Front strategy is never mentioned, even though it is a cornerstone of working class rule. (Again, all of this comes up from the other side of Section 3 to blame the masses for revisionism.) After 78 pages, we are as lacking in an all-around Marxist analysis of the struggle in China as we were on page 1. Comrades here are given the same treatment the Chair gives the Chinese masses. We too, are too undeveloped (they mean and often say stupid) to figure out which line is correct in a 2 line struggle. The masses, here and there, are reduced to passive onlookers to a battle of titans at the top levels of the Party. This is the real politics of the Chair. He saw his heroes fall in China, and redoubled his efforts to stage the coup here they could not stage there. Bourgeois power politics replaces proletarian politics, both in the CC bulletin and in the CC meeting.

In its place there is only supposition and bourgeois logic. This is why comrades cannot learn from the CC paper. Mao spoke to this point very sharply: "One cannot acquire much fresh knowledge through formal logic. Naturally one can draw inferences, but the conclusion is still enshrined in the major premise. At present

some people confuse formal logic and dialectics. This is incorrect." (Speech at Hangchow, Dec. 1965, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, p. 241)

It would take a book to unravel every syllogism and twisted "If A is like B, then Hua is a revisionist" argument. One stark example serves to indict them all. "As a general characterization of Hua's speech it can be said that it is boring—which is not merely a criticism of style, but of political content and basic method. Mao's comment on the Soviet Political Economy Textbook. . . is directly relevant here: 'It lacks persuasiveness and makes dull reading. It does not start from a specific analysis of the contradictions between productive forces and productive relationship and the contradictions between the economic basis and the superstructure. . . (CC Report, p. 73) This powerful combination of the Chair and Mao could surely deduce anything. The rub is that Mao did one other thing that is even more "directly relevant here." He got the text of Hua's speech the day Hua gave it at the Tachai Conference. He read it, he approved it, and he had it distributed all across China to lead the Learn From Tachai movement. So much for the logic of the Chair. In this same Critique of Soviet Economics that the Chair refers to, recently published by Monthly Review Press, Mao talks about why it is wrong to make the major premise of an argument its conclusion and the danger of proceeding from definitions and abstractions. Chapters 33, 35, and 67 are directly relevant here. (One last point—those members of the current CC guiding the Party's propaganda work should think twice before they popularize the argument that boring means revisionist.)

Materialists Have Nothing to Fear from the Truth

The current CC and their Chair have resorted to the basest dishonesty in preparing and accepting the CC report. They cannot plead ignorance, since material showing the truth about the situation was sent to them well in advance of the CC meeting by comrades struggling for a correct line.

*They knew that Hua Kuo-feng played a significant and very positive role in the Cultural Revolution, that he led a province to unite around Mao's line in opposition to the right and the ultra-left. They knew he wrote reports about this struggle that were circulated nationwide for all to learn from. They knew he had played a similar role during the Great Leap Forward. Still, they sum him up in one distorted sentence. Again, a lawyer looking for a loophole instead of a Marxist looking for the truth.

•They knew that the workers cultural teams and many other such forms have not been abolished, and that the position of the Chinese leadership in the face of sharp class struggle is to adjust and develop them, to correct abuses and preserve the strengths. But the current CC does not stoop to analyze to actual class struggle[sic]. It is better to say that Hua forces are riding roughshod over the Socialist New Things and hope that the comrades get blind with fury at Hua. We are not blind, and our fury is at the deceit of the current CC.

•They knew that the foreign trade policy developed under Mao has not been changed, and that the class struggle over it continues to be sharp. They knew that at the recent Trade Fairs, the Party leadership said no to any major changes. Still they say that these wholesale changes are being implemented. Anything goes if it can help boost the Gang and tear down Hua.

•They knew that there were serious problems in the educational system in China. But to admit it would open the Gang's role up for questioning. So of course they refuse to admit the truth.

•They have said in private for the past year that China's foreign policy under Hua, is, if anything, a little better in its handling of the two superpowers. Now, when Peking Review 45 comes out with not one new and significant difference from the foreign policy for the past many years, they call it a marked departure from Mao, and so lay the basis for an attack on China's foreign policy without having to openly attack Mao.

The current CC will stop at nothing to uphold the Gang. They have to try and knock down real revolutionaries like Chou En-lai. If he was a revolutionary, the Gang could not have been heroes, not the way the Gang made him the main target of attack for years. So the apriorism of the CC sends them scurrying to find something Chou said or did to attack. It would have been naive to expect them to turn back when they could not find anything. Instead, they just make it up along with an entire made-up private history of Mao's relationship with Chou. To raise the Gang up to the heavens, the red flag has to be dragged in the mud.

It would have been impossible for the current CC and the Chair to uphold Marxism in the service of the Gang. Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought is a partisan science. It belongs to the working class, and only the working class can use it to change the world. The current CC repudiates the Marxist method, and the principles and line of our Party. They abandon all of this to make a home for the Gang here in the US. Our task is to stop this before the Gang moves in and settles down.

This paper by the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters starts to do this. In both the sections criticizing the CC bulletin and analyzing the situation in China, the reactionary line and method of the CC and their models, the Gang, will become clearer and more concrete. The masses in China are today enthusiastically criticizing the line of the Gang. We must do no less. The 2 line struggle and rebellion in our Party has released the initiative of comrades everywhere, who have started to carry through and deepen the criticism and repudiation of the counter-revolutionary line of the current CC.

CLASS STRUGGLE IS THE KEY LINK

"Never forget classes; never forget class struggle." "Class struggle is the key link, everything else hinges on it." These statements by Mao Tsetung reflect the historical and objective nature of socialism and give the outlook that the working class has to have to move forward. The general line of the Chinese Communist Party embodies this outlook:

"Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct socialist education. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every day so that we can retain a relatively sober understanding of this problem and have a Marxist-Leninist line."

The fundamental contradiction under socialism is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the same as under capitalism. However, there is a historic difference, in that the primary and secondary aspects of this contradiction are reversed. The proletariat is the principal aspect under socialism. It is the ruling class, and on that basis can step by step consciously transform all of society through a long period and through this move forward to communism.

This advance takes place through the three great revolutionary

movements—the class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experiment. Mao stressed that because of the class nature of socialism, the fundamental contradiction under socialism and the prime importance of proletarian rule, the class struggle is and must be grasped as the principal revolutionary movement. This will no longer be true under communism, when classes themselves cease to exist.

Mao's analysis of this problem did not end by saying what is principal. Only a pseudo-communist would smugly stop there. He said that everything else hinges on the class struggle, that the class struggle must be taken up within and guide everything in society. It runs through all the movements, and ultimately guides the development of all the contradictions in society. This is an objective fact, and communists must subjectively grasp it in order to lead the masses and move forward on all fronts—theoretical, political, and economic.

The line of the gang on the class struggle and how to grasp it and wage it was a counter-revolutionary, anti-Mao line. It resulted in abandoning the class struggle on all fronts, always of course under the banner of the class struggle. The gang metaphysically separated all the various fronts and tasks and pitted them against each other, they confused tasks and policies with principles, their view of the class struggle was idealist, and in doing all this they stood against the working class consciously ruling and transforming all of society.

The current CC upholds all of this, and would make this the guiding line and understanding of our Party. This puts them squarely against proletarian revolution in this country. The Gang's line on the class struggle is not Mao's line, it is not Marxism. It is counter-revolution dressed up in phrases about the class struggle. Adopting the line of the Gang as the line of our Party is base treachery against the working class.

The Three Directives

A wrong line on the class struggle runs through the entire line and practice of the gang. This question was brought into sharp focus in the struggle over Mao's directives, the three directives, of late 1974. And in their treatment of this struggle, the current CC stands exposed.

The three directives—calling for, in short, study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, stability and unity, and pushing the national economy forward—were issued at different

times that fall. Taken together, as they were intended to be, they serve as a programmatic outline of where China had to go in the period ahead, as a general formulation by Mao of the key tasks facing the Party and the masses. These directives did not come out of the blue, or come from a Mao detached and above the current struggles, as the current CC thinks. They are consistent with the thrust of the 10th Party Congress the year before, and were reinforced at the 4th NPC in January 1975.

Teng Hsiao-ping jumped on the three directives, raising the formulation "take the three directives as the key link," a serious error of principle which resulted in the Chinese masses being drawn away from grasping class struggle as the key link. Teng's jumping out served as a lightning rod, drawing fire from all quarters. And the many responses show how correct Mao's teachings on the necessity to watch out for a correct line covering another, incorrect line.

Mao was short and to the point. "What! 'Take the three directives as the key link'? Unity and stability do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it." Compare and contrast this with the response of the current CC, slavishly following once again the line of the gang. They "enrich" Mao's criticism and come up with a line that is the opposite pole of the stupidity of "take the three directives as the key link."

First, they say the problem is that there are too many directives to be the key link—you can't have three, you can only have one. This is meant to attack eclecticism, but only shows how idealist the current CC is. It is not a question of how many, but what is the key link. None of the directives was the key link; as Mao pointed out, the class struggle is the key link. The current CC disagrees with Mao on this.

"In fact in the three directives of Mao that came to be referred to as the 'three directives' the one on socialist construction was, as far as I can tell, limited to a general call for 'pushing the national economy forward', and was certainly not meant to be out on a par with his instructions on the class struggle, and the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combatting and preventing revisionism in particular, which was the main and decisive directive." (CC Report, pp. 33-34)

The current CC would have us believe that 'pushing the national economy forward' was not really a directive, certainly not an important directive having much to do with any of Mao's instructions on the class struggle.

No, this is not what was going on. There were three directives—and not one big directive and a couple of minor afterthoughts. "Class struggle is the key link," is not one of the three. Everything has to hinge on this—including the carrying out of the three directives. Mao spoke about the second directive, saying "unity and stability don't mean writing off class struggle." He was saying that this directive hinges on the class struggle, that the class struggle has to run through and guide this one, and the first and the third. The gang wants to say, and the current CC would parrot, that the first directive is the class struggle one. Do they think that there will not be fierce class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on the basis and the reason for unity and stability? Objectively, there certainly was, and Mao's comment cuts two ways: don't write off class struggle in the name of stability and unity, *and* fighting for stability and unity does not require that you write off class struggle. And as we can see, the gang and their friends think that it does.

Even their saying that the first directive was the "main and decisive" one is pure metaphysics. They oppose this to it being part of the three directives, which it of course was. The question is not "can the three directives be separated"? Just like the atom, they can be. The question was who was separating them and why? The gang was, and the reason was opportunism. Comrades should ask themselves, can our Party's three objectives be separated? Yes, and when they are, we have to stop it and strive to fulfill all three. Mao said that the working class and its Party has to formulate ideological tasks and policy tasks together to move forward. (See *Smashing The Gang* on this point.) Mao's point was that you needed both. The current CC ducks the main and decisive question with a lecture on atomic physics. (We anxiously await the CC criticism of Chang Chun-chiao's pamphlet for saying on page 16 "Here it should be noted that Marx divided the sentence on the dictatorship of the proletariat into three points, which are inter-related and *cannot be cut apart* (emphasis ours).") (Here is a case of outganging even the gang).

The gang separated out tasks, not once but all the time. They separated the Lin Piao-Confucius campaign from the tasks of the 10th Party Congress, they separated studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat from studying and implementing the decisions of the 4th NPC. And, of course, they separated and opposed the three directives. This separation was undialectical and anti-materialist and damaged the socialist revolution in China.

The Four Modernizations Don't Mean Writing Off
The Class Struggle Either

The defense of the Gang puts the current CC against the necessity of the modernization of socialist China. "In sum then, the Four were in favor of the four modernizations in accordance with Mao's line on revolution and production but they were against what the right deviationists tried to make the 'four modernizations' stand for. They were very aware of the danger that making a big push for the four modernizations would give the green light to 'production first' revisionist [sic] and they were very concerned that in the effort to fulfill the task of modernization the basic task—the class struggle—not be thrown overboard and that in the name of promoting production to achieve modernization the commanding role of revolution not be thrown out." (CC Report, p. 37)

That the Gang was not in favor of the four modernizations will be shown in other parts of this paper. But there is something else to note in this passage. Again, the CC plays fast and loose with tasks and tasks [sic]. They take the key link of socialism, persisting in the class struggle to step by step eliminate the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes and all the bases for their existence, and oppose this to the tasks at each stage of development of socialism. And in doing so deny that the class struggle does in fact and must consciously run through and guide such tasks as the four modernizations.

Modernization, big jumps forward in the socialist economy and the material base of socialism, these are important tasks. They are necessary. The current CC says do it if you can, but it is not very important. This amounts to turning over the field of the economy and modernization to the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will try to take the movement around modernization out of the hands of the working class. Only in that sense, are they getting a "green light." But that does not make the task any less important or necessary. Completing it is not a nice idea, as the gang and the CC put it. Precisely because it is a necessity, and because the conditions for it existed in China, the four modernizations were a real opportunity for the proletariat to strengthen its rule over the bourgeoisie by consciously transforming society.

The working class can launch a big economic push or a Cultural Revolution because it has state power. This is not automatic. It requires the conscious summing up by the Party, practicing the mass line and using Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought to grasp the necessity and turn it into freedom. And this, always involves the sharpest class struggle—to formulate the correct line,

to advance on the correct road, to keep the initiative firmly in the hands of the working class.

Without constant advances, in the base and the superstructure, socialism will fail. The gang portrays socialism as a purely defensive battle. The working class seizes power, and from then on in, it is downhill. The bourgeoisie keeps coming at you until they probably win out. And it is precisely this view that accompanies their failure to take class struggle as the key link in all spheres and lead an all round advance to constantly and consciously build socialism and restrict the three great differences and other birthmarks of capitalism. Both together, advance and defend.

The gang's line in practice was to turn over the spheres of unity and stability and the economy to the bourgeois rightists. The gang considered them bourgeois turf, full of dangers and green lights for the right. And, of course, the right was glad to accept the banner of unity and modernization. They always try to pose as the real champions of development and the well being of the masses. The 'General Program' reflects this, taking up the banner of modernization to hit at the gang and sacrificing the interest of the masses as it does.

The Class Struggle Takes Place In The Real World

The current CC is totally reversing the understanding and line of our Party. It is necessary to fight the bourgeoisie tooth and nail on every front, to concede no sphere to them. This is just as true under socialism. The gang reduces everything to a question of stand and ideology. This is the only class struggle they see. In the name of fighting the bourgeois line of "the dying out of class struggle," they offer the equally bourgeois line that the class struggle is just, or mainly, struggle over whether the class struggle is dying out or is it the key link.

All this takes place while the actual class struggle is raging on all fronts, not just in the superstructure and ideology. And the working class needs conscious leadership on all these fronts. The view of the gang and our CC is idealism—whether in a rightist form or an ultra-revolutionary leftist form. Either way it is poison for the working class.

This idealism leads the current CC to repudiate even those advances that they were part of in the past. Now they say "where a revisionist line leads and the leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses, bourgeois relations of production will actually exist, even in the collective form." (CC Report, p. 9) And

they have the nerve to call this the line of Mao.

This complete mixing up of the objective and subjective sets the current CC against Mao and our Party. We have studied this question in the past, and, agreeing with Mao's criticism of the Soviet Union and Stalin, we wrote in *Red Papers 7*:

"Though Stalin never in fact abandoned the class struggle, his lack of clarity on the precise nature of the enemy weakened the proletariat. Further, though Stalin argued forcefully (and correctly) that the law of value continues to operate under socialism, he did not draw the correct conclusion from this—that capitalist production relations must then also exist in some (often) hidden forms." (*Red Papers 7*, p. 21)

These bourgeois relations do not exist because a revisionist line leads. They exist because of the nature of socialism itself—the continued operation of the law of value, commodity production, small scale production, the force of habit. In a word, socialism is a transitional system. It is a qualitatively higher social system than capitalism, but still has many of its features and is not yet classless society.

The CC gets this wrong on both sides. Most of the time, along with the gang, they downplay the advance of socialism, negating the key importance of proletarian rule, and so give the bourgeoisie damn near equality in the fundamental contradiction, and treat the socialist economy as if it is almost identical to capitalism.

Here, they go the other way. They imply that the question of the law of value, etc., has been solved, by saying that it is the revisionist line that recreates the bourgeois relations. They get quantity and quality wrong, and the only consistency is that they make the error that serves their immediate needs and immediate arguments.

The danger of having a revisionist line in command is that it does not expose and restrict bourgeois relations of production, but gives them free rein to operate and even uses them as a motor to try and increase production (or in the case of the gang, gives them free rein by promoting anarchy and weakening the Party's leadership). The contradictions within the socialist economy itself are pushed towards capitalism when the revisionist line strengthens the secondary, weaker aspect—and if representatives of that line seize and control the superstructure, the secondary aspect will become principal and capitalist relations will be restored in full. But to say that the revisionist line creates or causes the bourgeois relations denies the dialectical relationship between thinking and being, denies that the revisionist line and ideas have roots in the material world and have an effect on the real world precisely because people use them to deal with real contradic-

tions. The CC report would have us believe that if you defeat the bourgeois line, you have defeated the bourgeois relations. No matter that the law of value, commodity production, etc., still operate. Ideas don't have to be made a material force. This is idealism as naked as any since Descartes proclaimed, "I think, therefore I am."

This same idealist confusion of quantity and quality leads the gang and their supporters in our Party to in essence date the Chinese Revolution as starting with the Cultural Revolution. They divide China's history into the 17 bad years and the 10 good years, throwing dialectics out the window, and preventing them from seeing the actual content of the class struggle in the superstructure over taking back power usurped by the bourgeoisie.

No matter how hard the gang tried, and no matter how much the current CC tries to carry on, they cannot paint Mao as an idealist to get him to line up with them.

The Gang's Line In China

The gang's idealism seriously weakened the campaign on studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and did considerable damage to the Chinese Revolution. The campaign was intended to wage the class struggle against the bourgeoisie ideologically, to raise the understanding and consciousness of the Chinese masses about the contradictions and tasks of socialism as a transitional system, to arm them against revisionism. And it was intended to stress the necessity for the conscious transformation of all of society under the leadership of the working class, to provide a higher base of understanding and enthusiasm for building socialism. This is not "theory in its own right" but the opposite, theory to serve the overall and immediate class struggle. The entire country was about to launch into a big economic push, and the whole country was coming out of the Cultural Revolution. Conscious leadership and direction were decisive. Releasing the initiative of the masses around the correct line was decisive. To separate this campaign from the tasks ahead, both general and particular, is making a hollow phrase out of "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production." And that is just what the gang did. They could only see in the four modernizations a danger, and could only see the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat campaign as a blocking of the immediate rightist forces. How narrow these idealists are, and how narrow their home-grown supporters have to be to defend them.

The leadership of the gang's idealist and metaphysical line was no idle philosophical problem. It was a matter of life and death. In one formica, furniture and plywood plant in Peking, the influence of the

gang's attacks on rules and regulations under the guise of criticizing "control, check and suppression," led to the effective, if not official disbanding of the plant's safety committee. Even when a worker was seriously injured by a machine, nothing was done. This situation was made more serious by the fact that the Party leadership of this plant had grown increasingly isolated from the actual day to day struggle. They were infrequently on the shop floor, and instead spent a great deal of time studying, discussing and arguing over the campaigns like the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, together with a sizeable contingent of workers who were full-time worker theoretical group members at full pay. Because the campaign itself, as distorted by the gang, not only ignored but attacked such tasks as developing production, even as these leaders and workers tried to take up and spread the campaign, they became more divorced from the actual situation in the plant. In this leadership vacuum, bourgeois individualist tendencies of going for self and favoring short term advantage over long term interests or quantity over quality were strengthened among the workers, and struggle, class struggle, among the workers over these issues often went unresolved or even became antagonistic. This situation around rules and safety continued to deteriorate with the result that an accident identical to the earlier one killed a worker.

The current CC would uphold the gang's line. Didn't they stress the overall? Didn't they oppose narrow self interest, production first, immediate results? No, in fact, they fed it among the masses, by robbing them of leadership in *all* aspects of the class struggle. And they made the overall into something that had no relation to the present. The situation in this factory was not turned around until the gang went down, and the masses of workers began to repudiate and criticize the line of the gang. Mao is clear on this kind of error, and he is clearly against the gang and the CC:

". . . the particularity of contradiction is still not clearly understood by many comrades, and especially the dogmatists. They do not understand that it is precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides. Nor do they understand how important is the study of the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us for guiding the course of revolutionary practice." (On Contradiction, Selected Readings, p. 91)

Mao goes on to say:

"The truth concerning general and individual character, concerning absoluteness and relativity, is the quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things; failure to understand it is tantamount to abandoning dialectics." (On Contradiction, Selected Readings, p. 109)

The Gang's Line In The U.S.

This is precisely what is happening in our Party. The methods of the gang, their metaphysics and idealism, are being upheld and propagated. Like the workers in that Peking factory, we have suffered through revolutionary sounding general calls from a divorced leadership, and been left to our own devices to determine the dialectical relationship between the general problem and the concrete conditions of the class struggle. And like them, we are beginning to see the damage this kind of leading line can do. And we too have been called pragmatists for every effort at actually making revolution.

It has not taken long for the line of the gang to lead the CC into repudiating the line and program of our Party. The current CC has begun to sum up the U.S. through gang-colored glasses. An entire section of this paper is devoted to this question, but a few comments are in order here.

Page 5 of the rectification bulletin sets up another of the devil's choices and metaphysics that this line leads to. Are you for keeping the proletariat's consciousness tense, or are you for building big battles with small forces? The gang line in the U.S. reduces the class struggle to an ideological question, and in doing so sets the CC against the mass of cadre who are trying to build the struggle against the bourgeoisie with the small forces that are around. Just like in China, this is being done under the banner of fighting rightism. But you can't fight rightism with leftist, metaphysical idealism.

The working class does have to consciously seize power, and this requires a consciousness of the class as a class for itself. This is what Marx means when he says that the "growing union of the workers" is more important than any particular gain in any battle. This is why keeping the consciousness of the proletariat tense is decisive. But how can this be done outside of the class struggle, on all fronts? Putting it any other way is an appeal to retreat from the class struggle to somewhere else and get the consciousness and tenseness there. Reducing the class struggle to the ideological struggle, separating consciousness and tenseness from the class struggle on all fronts—this is a recipe to feed rightism and spontaneity among the masses of cadres, accompanied by and guided by a leadership locked into abstraction and sectarianism. This line was soundly rejected in China, and the same must happen here.

Unity and Class Struggle

The CC tries to answer the charge that the gang was sectarian,

that they wouldn't unite with people. (Throughout this section of the bulletin, it is hard to distinguish between their views on China and their views on the U.S. The current CC paper reeks of this subjective transference, and shows how far the gang line has permeated.)

"Who should they have united with that they failed to unite with? People like Hua Kuo-feng?... To talk about 'uniting' abstracted from line is exactly to raise unity above the class struggle, and will end you up in unity with the bourgeoisie—on its terms." (CC, p. 71) (Again, it seems like they are talking about the U.S. For this is a perfect description of the line of the CC on the current struggle.)

How simple unity was for the gang. Unite with the folks who already agree with you, and the other folks are on the other side. Then the good guys move ahead. What garbage! Political unity is based on struggle. Unity, struggle, unity. That is the correct view. And that means that within unity at any point there will be differences, including basic ideological differences, both open and hidden. This cannot be made a bar to unity, or the working class can never advance and lead the entire masses in advancing. The view of the gang was in essence sectarianism—differences meant quality, period. And only if people changed could you unite with them. Mao's line is the opposite.

That is why in 1975 he told the gang, "Unite with the more than 200 members of the Central Committee." He surely knew that there were some among them who were not pure proletarians. He surely knew that there were even some plain revisionists. Still he called for unity, because the proletariat has to lead in making revolution. And there is a difference between the core and the front, among the masses and within the Party.

Unity and stability were the best basis for the proletariat to carry on struggle at that time. The gang opposed this, constantly seeking new ways to expand the attack, until the target was everybody in leadership but themselves. Now the current CC broadens it still further. The leadership was all either revisionists or cowards, and the masses were tired and backward.

The gang and the current CC treat uniting all who can be united to defeat the common enemy, and the instruction to narrow the target of attack, broaden the target of education, as fetters on their revolutionary purity. But in fact they are principles of the united front strategy, reflecting the fact that 95% of the masses are basically good, and the same holds for the cadres. The working class has to forge unity to achieve any tasks. This understanding

is key to maintaining proletarian rule, and it is even more the case in China, where the working class itself, let alone its most advanced sections, are a small fraction of the masses. The banner of revolution must be a banner of unity, or revolution is doomed. Rather than writing off the class struggle, this reflects the fact that the interests of the working class are the interests of the vast majority of the people.

The Gang Goes from Very Big To Very Small Very Fast

The current CC is faced with the task of simultaneously denying that the gang was isolated and explaining why it was. The masses rejoiced at their fall? That's easy, remember that millions in China hated the Cultural Revolution, and anyway, the bourgeoisie can organize a demo. The stuck pig squeals. The outpouring of joy in China was not organized. The demonstrations were just the tip of the iceberg. There was a mass phenomenon—spontaneous marches and parties. The masses bought up all the wine and whiskey in the major cities on their own, the better to wet their whistles for more celebrating and anti-gang chanting. They stayed out in the streets all night without being organized. They did this because they wanted to, because they were glad to see the gang go.

Why does the current CC refuse to admit that the gang was isolated and unpopular with the masses? And why, to the extent that they have to admit it, do they try to blame the masses for it? It is because of their own view of the high hard road of revolution. They think nobody will take it, that the masses don't want it. Only the super-heroes will do it, the condescending saviors. The rest have to be dragged to socialism and communism, against their will with constant encouragements like better conditions and three squares a day. In this country, the gang line leads to retreat from the day to day struggle in the name of the revolutionary goal. In China, it means trying to usurp the Party and state power to use them against the working class.

The current CC is forced to resort to a shell game to deal with this point of support for the gang. Their number one advocate is "convinced that the followers of the Four. . . number at least in the tens of millions." His faith is touching, but it is no substitute for evidence on this question. Even if his fondest dreams are true, in China this is a mere handful. It takes 45 million just to give you 5% of the people. Resistance by the masses of gang's supporters to their fall was small—significant, but small. What is the reason for

this? They were isolated from the masses. Without the masses, you cannot win.

In Chou En-lai's report to the 10th Party Congress, he stated:

"Chairman Mao teaches us that the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything. If one's line is incorrect, one's downfall is inevitable, even with the control of the central, local and army leadership. If one's line is correct, even if one has not a single soldier at first, there will be soldiers, and even if there is no political power, political power will be gained."

The current CC may think that Mao made Chou say all this. They would do better to inquire why Mao did not make the gang listen to it. For their sorry history reaffirms what Mao and Chou said. Their support was not static. The current CC would like to hide that point. The gang started out as part of the proletarian headquarters of China, which commanded the respect and allegiance of hundreds of millions—of the vast majority. Dialectics requires of us that we examine the motion of this process, its development.

Our Party has some experience in this. We have seen what happens when the force in the leadership of the masses fails to grasp the key link of the class struggle and concretely lead the struggle forward together with the masses. We have seen how an incorrect line opens the door for the bourgeoisie to counterattack and destroy temporary gains. All this, of course, takes place under capitalism, where the bourgeoisie is the principal aspect of the fundamental contradiction, where they rule.

We summed up this experience in the phrase, "you can go from very big to very small very fast." And when that happens, you have to look at the objective situation and the masses and the line of the Party. The situation in China is this phenomenon on a mass scale under socialism. The gang went from very big—part of the leadership of hundreds of millions—to very small, isolated and hated, very fast, in less than 4 years. The same hundreds of millions who supported them as a part of the collective Party leadership and of Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters (in part because of their individual contributions) wound up opposing them. This is a question of line—of the wrong line of the gang playing itself out in front of the Chinese people, and the correct line of Mao and after him, Hua, raising the pole of revolution for the masses to rally around. In rejecting the gang the masses weren't rejecting class struggle, they were waging it!

Our Party is faced with the same task under our conditions. We

have to throw out the wrong line, and uphold the class struggle on all fronts against the bourgeoisie. Grasping class struggle as the key link requires us to rebel. The current CC can follow the gang to hell, but they must not be allowed to drag our Party there with them.

WHY SOCIALISM FAILS TO EXCITE THE CHAIR,
Or—Pulling the Ice Pick Out of Trotsky's Head

Part III of the new CC report written by the Chairman and enthusiastically endorsed by the current CC, is a particularly disgusting and counter-revolutionary piece of bourgeois propaganda in the guise of a "Marxist" analysis. In this section, the Chair has literally pulled the ice pick out of Trotsky's head, making it crystal clear to most how seriously the line of our Party is being turned over.

In Part III, the Chair and the new CC set for themselves an impossible task: to prove something that has not happened.

The Chairman thinks that revisionism has triumphed in China and that capitalist restoration is near. But when it comes time to lay down the proof and stop picking at this and that, the Chair's idea and the development of actual events in the real world pass like ships in the night.

Setting aside for one second the question of what these opportunist armchair correct-liners do know, we would have to agree with a part of the Chair's statement. That is, he sets the task of determining why the revisionists triumphed as a *future task* requiring a "great deal of attention and study." Certainly there is not a word in the first 69 pages of the paper (where this quote appears) on the question of *why* and as we will see, none after. To any honest Marxist this fact would be a real cause for pause and alarm. But not for our opportunists, the key question of the objective situation *and* an analysis of the political lines that were developed and put forward that led to the triumph of revisionism are not essential to determining *why* socialism failed. Again, the reason for this is simple, there are none because it never happened. But to be sure, this will be no obstacle for the Chair or anyone else. All he has to do is to depart from Marxism and the Marxist method and say the "reason" for the triumph of revisionism is because:

"On the one hand, the victories of the proletariat in those struggles led to great advances in socialist revolution and socialist construction. On the other hand, the more there were advances, the deeper the socialist revolution went, the more it dug away at the soil engendering the bourgeoisie, and the more it called forth desperate resistance from the bourgeoisie. Along

with this, as noted before, at each stage in this process, some people get 'stuck,' including especially, as Mao pointed out, those who have become high officials and want to protect the interests of high officials, as against the interests of the masses." (CC Report, pp. 126-127)

So in this particular spiral in the development of socialism, the proletariat fought hard (on the one hand), but the bourgeoisie fought harder—the people get tired and despite the correct lines of the Gang and Mao, the revisionists win out.

To our correct-liners, their guys went down, and *this* and not line is decisive. As to why their guys lost since they were 100% Marxists and can't be blamed, then the reason must lie somewhere else. The chair says. . . "certain things which contributed to this [why the revisionists triumphed—ed.] can be indicated now."

The things that can be indicated now are covered in the CC report under four general points: the general reasons why the revisionists triumphed, the particular reasons why they triumphed, some thoughts on the last great line struggles, and finally an exhortation to the cadre not to lose faith, because socialism will triumph somewhere, some day.

General Reasons Why Revisionism Is Alleged to Have Won

According to the Chair, there are 5 general reasons that indicate why the revisionists triumphed in China:

- 1) ". . . the persistence of commodity relations, the three major differences (mental/manual, town/countryside, worker/peasant), of bourgeois right as well as other powerful remnants left over from previous society in the material and ideological sphere."
- 2) "in a country like China, a backward country economically, where it is first necessary to go through the democratic stage and then make the immediate transition to socialism, the problems of making that transition and continuing to overcome spontaneous tendencies are enormous . . ."
- 3) ". . . there is a whole deep rooted Confucian tradition in China, which along with the still backward conditions economically means that many people are still strongly weighed down by the old spiritual fetters—superstition, etc., as well as the tendency to meekly follow those in authority."
- 4) "and there is still the legacy of colonialism and the colonial mentality. . . which promote the idea that what is foreign is better."
- 5) "At the same time there is a tendency to nationalism, which has a strong material base in the still largely peasant character of the country..." (All quotes from CC Report, pp. 122-3)

There are two points that must be made about the Chair's "general reasons." The first reason that socialism failed is that socialism is socialism, and not communism. All he has done is list some features of socialism. And the second reason, points 2 thru 5, is that China and its people are backward. They get the full brunt of blame for the failure.

Socialism is a transitional social system. It has many birthmarks of the old society, and is not yet a communist, classless society. All the problems the Chair puts forward have existed since the day of liberation. In fact, all of them were stronger then than they are now. They are problems that every socialist country faces to one degree or another, certainly every backward country that advances to socialism. To list them without any discussion of how socialism dealt with them and what turns around [sic] is to say that the conditions of socialism and "human nature" together give rise to the fall of socialism.

The list of points is used to slander the Chinese people. Here we have a masterpiece of true eclecticism. "Legacy of colonial mentality," "spiritual fetters," "nationalism," "spontaneous tendencies." This is not Marxism. How much? To what degree did these things take hold of the Chinese people? What was their motion, were they increasing or decreasing over the past 28 years? What turned them around? How did these things come out? Why—or what—were the lines that turned them loose? There is nothing of this in the section.

Once more the Chairman plays us for fools. Perhaps after 70 pages he thought our guard would be down. But point 4 says the Chinese have the idea that "foreign is better." And point 5 says that the Chinese are nationalists, which is bound to make them think "Chinese is better." Just throwing out a list of factors cannot substitute for even an initial analysis.

Mao addressed all of these points many times in the course of the Chinese Revolution. He said that we live in "the historic epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism are going to their doom and world socialism and people's democracy are marching to victory." He further pointed out that "imperialism has pushed the great masses of people throughout the world into the historical epoch of the great struggle to abolish imperialism."

The line of communists until now has been that the revolutionary storm center of the world resided in the "weakest links"—in precisely those countries where the Chair's list applies. The history of the past 60 years bears this out. Now, the very materialist basis of the revolutionary anti-imperialist struggles as part of the socialist revolutionary movement is being discarded to build support for the Gang.

And together with this, the 5 points are together a strong repudiation of Mao's line on building socialism in a backward country; a country with a large peasantry, poor economy, superstitions, nationalism (even Mao gets hit with this one)—these are the general characteristics of the vast majority of the world's peoples and countries. And this is what Mao said about it:

"In addition to the leadership of the Party, a decisive factor is our population of 600 million. More people mean a greater ferment of ideas, more enthusiasm and more energy. Never before have the masses of the people been so inspired, so militant and so daring as at the present. The former exploiting classes have been completely swamped in the boundless ocean of the working people and must change, even if unwillingly. Undoubtedly there are people who will never change, who would prefer to keep their thinking ossified down to the Day of Judgment, but that does not matter very much. All decadent ideology and other incongruous parts of the superstructure are crumbling as the days go by. To clear away the rubbish completely will still take some time, but there is no doubt of their inevitable and total collapse. Apart from their other characteristics, the outstanding thing about China's 600 million people is that they are 'poor and blank.' This may seem a bad thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written, the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted." ("Introducing A Cooperative," 1958, *Selected Readings*, p. 499-500)

Poor, backward, even blank. Are these conditions good or bad for revolution and socialism? Mao said they provided a good basis to advance to socialism and communism if there was a Party that integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of the Chinese revolution. There were and still are two roads ahead for China and all poor countries like it. The capitalist road of spontaneity and smash and grabism, of short cuts and neo-colonial bondage, arid, the socialist road of consciously transforming these backward conditions through struggle of revolutionary drive and all-round development with the initiative in one's own hands. The correct line and leadership of the Party is decisive in deciding which road is taken. The Chair does not agree. For him, the conditions lead to taking the capitalist road, even when and in spite of taking the correct line. The Chair disagrees, for him in spite of a correct line and a Party these conditions provided the basis for the rise of revisionism and the fall of socialism.

Particular Reasons Why Revisionism Is Alleged to Have Triumphed

The Chair follows the general attack on Mao and socialism with a list of particular reasons for the supposed triumph of revisionism.

- 1) "Mao's death, an event long awaited by the reactionary forces as the signal to make their big move."
- 2) Another is the devastating earthquakes.
- 3) "the deaths of several long-time Chinese leaders besides Mao, all in the space of a couple of years, and several within one year (which role these different people played in the most recent struggle is not the point here—the point is that such deaths were bound to cause uncertainty and anxiety among the Chinese people about the situation in the country and this is magnified by the superstitious traditions referred to above, one of which links earthquakes with the end of an Emperor's reign, etc.)"
- 4) "... there was undoubtedly a section of the Chinese masses, and a larger percentage of cadres, intellectuals etc.—though certainly not all and not the most class conscious—who were tired of it all and wanted an end to it."
- 5) "... the fact that to a certain degree 'the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, which sustained them in their state of tension. . . was weakened in recent years. In short, some of them tired of the struggle."
- 6) In addition there is very real threat of imperialist, especially Soviet, aggression against China and the international situation as a whole. . . . And in recent years, with the growing danger of an attack on China by the Soviets in particular, and with the necessity to make certain agreements and compromises with reactionary and imperialist governments, with the whole 'opening to the West,' and all the bourgeois influences that inevitably accompany this, there was bound to be a powerful 'pull' away from taking the socialist road. . . . And the cultural and ideological corrosion that is bound to accompany increased contact with bourgeois countries certainly had no small effect on the Chinese masses."

(All of this from CC, pp. 124-126)

The striking thing about these particular reasons is that they are the same as the general reasons with slightly more detail. Again, no line is offered as to how these factors played their

negative roles. What we learn over and over is that people get tired of the struggle for socialism. But how is it that the Chinese people did not get tired in the darkest days of the anti-Japanese War, or in the Civil War. Or the Great Leap, or the Cultural Revolution. How is it that they were full of enthusiasm just a short while ago? What changed? Not a word is offered to answer this question. The eclecticism of the previous section is re-doubled. How many got tired? How much were people corroded? How big was the loss of enthusiasm? And how did these continuing secondary aspects become primary? Again, not a word. The particular reasons boiled down to the Chair's view that only Mao could keep China red. When he died, the floodgates opened. Heroes make history, pure and simple.

The particulars are more slanders and more exposures of the Gang. The earthquake caused more than "tremendous damage and dislocation." They caused a sharp two-line struggle between Hua and the Gang. The Gang did not cause the earthquakes, but they sure used them to smash and grab. And the current CC upholds them and blames the Chinese masses. No sooner did the earthquakes hit than the Gang published an article entitled "When the Earth Turns it Signifies the Advent of A New Earth." Here in the guise of fighting Confucianism, they reminded whole new Chinese generations of an old superstition that was dying out. They pushed backwardness in the guise of attacking it, and raised the question of succession in the bargain. This is the same method of a pornographer saying that people think of women as sex objects.

Point 6 in particular re-writes the line of our Party. It is a wholesale reversal of verdicts in a short space. China's foreign policy is portrayed as a necessary but tragic compromise with the imperialists and reactionary governments. The "opening to the West" is presented as coming out of weakness. This is not the line of Mao or of our Party. The generally correct foreign policy of China in the 1970s has won real victories, not only for China but for the entire working class worldwide and for all oppressed peoples. Would the CC throw away the International United Front Against Imperialism Aimed At the Rulers of the 2 Superpowers in order to support the Gang? It appears so. This foreign policy put China more firmly at the core of this front by breaking the imperialists encirclement and blockade. This came from strength, not weakness.

In Point 6 the slander on the people of China continues: who the hell is supposed to believe that the pull of the good life in the West was a "powerful force" and "had no small effect" on the Chinese

masses. How big was the effect? How corroded were the people? As much as 90% of the Chinese masses have never even seen a Westerner. The reports of every single visitor to China right through today go directly against the idealism and wishful thinking of the Chair. They all report on the high class consciousness of the people they meet. Far from lusting after our appliances and blue jeans, the Chinese suffer sincerely and deeply over our having to live under capitalist exploitation and oppression. Compare this to reports from the USSR or Cuba, including those in Red Papers 7. Working class rule makes a difference.

The Chair has finally discovered that China is a poor country. After 70 pages of downplaying the big need for economic development, mechanization and modernization, he puts economic backwardness as a big reason for why revisionism triumphed. Not only that but it makes the Chinese masses easy prey for revisionist and bourgeois Western lures.

On page 31 he hits the other side with the same idealism and arrogance. "I remember that after an acquaintance returned from a trip to China he was asked by a worker how it was, and he replied, 'It was like going through a time machine.' The worker, on the basis of bourgeois spontaneity and prejudices said, 'Yeah, they're still a long ways behind us, so it's really like going back in time.' 'No', the acquaintance replied, 'it's like going forward.'"

Opposing the economic backwardness to the socialist system, leads the Chair to blame Americans for seeing China is poor, blames the "opening to the West" for finally letting the Chinese see it, and then blames them for seeing it. Only the Chair can see the truth, that it all leads to revisionism.

The Chair sets out to show how revisionism has triumphed, and as we said before this is a very difficult task, especially if your method is seeking truth from facts. What we have seen from his presentation of the general and particular (read peculiar) reasons why the Gang lost is that *even though* the Gang had a correct line, the forces of capitalism were just too strong for them.

In Red Papers 7, when the RCP analyzed the restoration of capitalism, it was decisive to go into the line errors Stalin made that contributed to the rise of revisionism and the bourgeoisie. Without this, people would not be fully armed to understand how this reversal happened. But this is not possible here. The Chair himself says: "But with the Four it cannot be shown that their stand deviated from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought and that they created public opinion for an opportunist line that they were attempting to carry out. The public opinion they created

was for a correct line." (CC, p. 21)

This is the big contradiction the Chair finds himself caught in. The Gang was correct, they were the revolutionaries, but they lost. They were defeated by Hua, so Hua must be a counter-revolutionary revisionist. So how then could Hua get on top—how could he and the rest of the revisionists triumph?

The only way, if you prescribe to the opportunism of the Chair, is because of the conditions of socialism. Socialism is a transition between capitalism and communism, the masses have backward aspects to their consciousness, the imperialists exist worldwide, under socialism some leaders turn color and betray the revolution. It is not enough just to put these aspects forward, to support the Chair you have to distort them, to raise them from the secondary role (and often relatively small secondary at that) they play when the working class is in power into problems far bigger than they really are. This is why the CC report treats such questions of getting tired, superstition, and nationalism totally out of context and with no discussion of the struggle and the effect of Mao and other revolutionaries striving to root them out in the course of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To support the Gang, who were counter-revolutionaries, you have to turn reality on its head. You have to turn the advance of the working class in fighting the class enemy and building socialism into its opposite. You have to take the leadership that Mao gave to the revolutionary struggle and say when asked if he failed, "yes and no" and really mean "yes" but be afraid to say it. All this is a despicable insult to our class and to the science of our class.

And when the Chair has laid out his reasons, after he has been ruthless in his science, then he lays a heavy rap on all the comrades to tell them not to lose heart and to understand that socialism will win out in the end. But what is this enthusiasm based on? Mao says that the masses of people have "inexhaustible enthusiasm for socialism." But the Chair reminds us that this was before they got too superstitious and tired. Mao says "the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." And that "if you have a correct line, you will win soldiers." But now we learn from the Chair that even if you have a 100% correct line not only will you not win soldiers, but you will lose them.

Trotskyism Is Still Counter-Revolution

While the Chair is caught up in the contradictions of his posi-

tion, and therefore can't identify any line errors giving rise to revisionism, he none the less puts forward a line as to why revisionism did triumph.

The message is clear. The objective conditions were not ripe for socialism, but they were ripe for capitalism and revisionism. Poor backward countries have too many strikes against them. The material and cultural base for socialism is too low. The forces for capitalism are too strong. The working class is too small and weak, and the peasantry too large. The surrounding world is too hostile, and every effort to deal with them contaminates you. The leadership is too corruptible, and the Party cannot deal with these contradictions. Nationalism sooner or later drives out internationalism in peasant countries. And there is nothing that the subjective forces, the revolutionary communists, can do about it. Not even Mao could stem the tide of capitalism, and when he died, it was all over.

This analysis is not new. It is simple and classical Trotskyism applied to China. Listen to what Trotsky said, on page 280 of *Permanent Revolution*: "The world division of labor, the dependence of Soviet industry upon foreign technology, the dependence of the productive forces of the advanced countries of Europe upon Asiatic raw materials, etc., etc., make the construction of an independent socialist society in any single country of the world impossible." And in *Preface to 'The Year 1905'* he observed, "The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

Trotsky never finished one of these analyses without telling all his followers not to feel bad. He always said that there would be revolution and socialism some day, even as he attacked it each and every day.

Our Party has always stood with Comrade Stalin in his attacks on Trotsky and Trotskyism. We have always waged a determined battle against its followers in the US. We said of them in the Programme of the RCP, and we must uphold today that:

"Historically these Trotskyites have alternated between 'left' and right opportunism—between 'revolutionary' slogan-shouting to oppose the actual stage of struggle, and outright tailing after the bourgeoisie. But in essence they have always been right-wing servants of the reactionary classes. They attach themselves as parasites to the revolutionary movement to promote their organizations at the expense of the masses. They act all-wise and

try to lord it over the workers, but the working class in every country has learned to deal with them in the same manner as it deals with their imperialist masters." (Party Programme, p. 92)

Trotskyism says that you can't build socialism in a backward country. It says the masses, especially the peasants, will not go along. And that the workers are too few and will tire quickly. It says the Party cannot lead, that the ideological and political line do not decide everything. In short, it says the same damn thing that the Chair and his CC are now saying about China.

The current CC paper opens with the statement that " 'And the attitude and approach every Party takes in understanding and evaluating the events in China will have much to do with determining whether or not that Party remains a Marxist-Leninist Party or degenerates into one kind of opportunism or another.' " (CC, p. 2)

The line of the Central Committee of our Party on China is a counter-revolutionary, Trotskyite line. This must serve as an alarm, a call to drive this line out of our Party before it takes hold and leads it down the path of counter-revolution and betrayal of the working class.

CHOU EN-LAI WAS A REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST

The role of Chou En-lai is a central one in the arguments put forward by the current CC. In order to try and bestow the revolutionary mantle of Mao on the counter-revolutionary gang, they have to bend every effort to attack and discredit the reputation of Chou.

More than 5 full pages is devoted to this underhanded effort, starting with page 80 of the report. The treatment of Chou En-lai is one of the most glaring examples of the *apriori* and subjective method of the entire paper, and far from discrediting Chou, fully discredits the author.

The paper never ceases to whine about reversing verdicts. In the section on Chou En-lai, we are presented with a revisionist reversal of the correct verdict and line of the RCP, and a total abandonment of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought.

The old CC of the RCP responded to the death of Chou with a sum-up of his life and role in the Chinese Revolution. Our Party said then, in January of 1976, that all communists should learn from Chou En-lai:

To be a revolutionary Communist all of one's life. To maintain one's bearings in the face of difficulties and set-

backs. To aim high and persevere in step-by-step struggle according to changing conditions. To be firm in principle and good at uniting with others. To stand, ever, with the surging masses; to learn and to lead. To be conscientious in preparation and bold in execution. To uphold the Red Flag against all enemies within and without.

But this correct summation of Chou does not fit in with the purposes of the current CC. In fact, it stands as a real roadblock that they must attempt to deal with.

What are they trying to prove? First, that the gang and Chou were on opposite sides. The gang went after Chou from at least 1972, and the CC says that this was correct. If the gang were revolutionary heroes, then they must have gone after Chou because he was not a revolutionary, and if they went after him hard, he must have been a revisionist. This is their formalistic, twisted logic. And to demonstrate this, they try to show that Mao and Chou were on "opposite sides" during this period.

The paper says that "In response to this [the task of cleaning up the Lin Piao mess—J-B], I believe Mao and Chou En-lai had significant differences, though like all contradictions these differences went through a process of development, which ended up with Mao and Chou in fundamental opposition to each other."

What pseudo-Marxism. All contradictions develop. But all contradictions do not develop with people winding up on opposite sides. Mao and Chou worked together for some 45 years, and their differences did not "develop" in the straight line way that the CC paper offers. This view of how line struggle takes place runs through the entire paper, and runs through the entire way that the current CC conducted the China struggle in our Party.

What happened to Mao and Chou to put them on "opposite sides?" All the bulletin can do is repeat the point, each time with more emphasis. "And it seems very clear to me that by the time of Chou's death . . . Mao and Chou had come into clear and sharp conflict." "But beyond that, it is *obvious* that Mao and Chou were on opposite sides for some time before Chou's death, if we stop and think about how things developed over that period." ". . . everything points to the *obvious* fact that Mao and Chou En-lai were basically not in unity but on opposite sides for several years and increasingly so in the period right before Chou's death." All this on one page (p. 86) and they emphasize the *obvious* lest we try to really look at the situation. And finally, on page 91, we are told when Chou En-lai went bad. "Chou En-lai in particular did go along with the Cultural Revolution after Mao struggled with

him at the start, and during the early stages of it—up to the time of the Lin Piao affair—he played a good and very important role, overall. But, after the Lin Piao affair, Chou's role turned into its opposite."

The paper lays out its view not only of the issues around which there were differences between Mao and Chou, but also decides where each stands. But what we are really given is a re-writing of history to give Mao the gang's line.

"In substance, Chou felt the only thing to do was to bring back many people who had been knocked down during the Cultural Revolution and were bound to be strong opponents of Lin Piao, while Mao, agreeing probably to bring back some, did not want to go as far with this as Chou did. And besides just bringing back people, Chou wanted to push policies that would reverse the momentum of the Cultural Revolution and the continuation of the revolution. In substance, he wanted to put stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward as the main things." (p. 81)

And Mao?

"With some of this, I believe, Mao agreed, because he agreed that it was a necessity in the short run. But not all of it, even in the short run, let alone the long run. In short, Mao did not agree that everything should be subordinated to stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward—and specifically not that *correct* verdicts of the Cultural Revolution should basically be reversed." (p. 81)

And furthermore, "Chou thought Teng was basically good but had made some mistakes; Mao, I am convinced, did not trust Teng and recognized that upon returning to office Teng was likely to resume his old ways." And this right after we have been told that "I believe that Mao and Chou agreed that it was necessary to bring back Teng at this time—his return began in 1972, very shortly after Lin Piao crashed." (p. 81)

This is not a comparison between the lines of Chou and the lines [sic] of Mao. It is nothing but a single assumption, that Mao was closer and closer to the gang as time went on, stated and restated with "I believe" and "probably" to substitute for concrete analysis. And the assumption is not true.

Did Chou En-lai and Mao have differences over these points, key questions of how to build and develop socialism, including how to push the economy forward, on what basis to stabilize and unite,

cadre policy and the direction of political campaigns? It is inconceivable to say that they did not, even often sharp ones. But there is not one shred of evidence to support the characterizations offered by the CC of what these differences were, and none at all to support a conclusion that they wound up on "opposite sides." This is only the wishful thinking of the current CC, aping the futile four year struggle of the gang to set Mao against Chou and knock down Chou.

But even more underhanded is the attempt to imply that Mao and the gang were in fundamental unity. On the very points mentioned, it was with the gang that Mao had very sharp differences. On the necessity of stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward, it was the gang who in fact stood in the way of these correct thrusts by metaphysically opposing them to "revolution" and "class struggle." Mao said "stability and unity don't mean writing off class struggle." Not that stability and unity can wait until we finish the class struggle. The policy of liberating cadre knocked down in the Cultural Revolution was Mao's policy, and it did not begin with the question of the Lin Piao affair, though that speeded up the process through the new necessity. This policy was a concrete application of Mao's view of how contradictions are resolved. And now we are even being told that the foreign policy of Mao and Chou over the past period was not really Mao's. A crack for worms to crawl in, so that soon they can attack the Chinese foreign policy and say that they are not attacking Mao. They can say what they like, but the truth is the opposite.

The paper of the CC advises us that the correct method to judge these questions is to compare and contrast the different lines. Even if they will not allow this to take place over China, it must be done.

Where are the incorrect lines from Chou En-lai that we are supposed to compare with the lines of Mao or the gang? Where is the statement from Chou that shows he is violating Mao Tsetung Thought, that he is standing against the Cultural Revolution? Where is Chou's revisionism?

There is none. Not one quote, or even a fragment. Not even a statement taken out of context like we find through the rest of the paper. The current CC does not even pause for a moment about not having found any bad lines from Chou. No, they plunge ahead to explain away all the good things he said.

The paper quotes Chou often, especially his reports to the 10th Party Congress and 4th National People's Congress. But both of these reports put out the correct line on the situation in China and

the tasks coming out of this situation. Both represent Marxism, and both are Mao's line. The only explanation we are offered is that Chou was secretly against them and that Mao made him say all these good things. And the facts on this are clear. Chou agreed with the line of the 10th Party Congress and the 4th NPC, and the gang consistently went against it.

Raising the spectre of Lin Piao is a vain attempt to cloud the issue through innuendo and bourgeois analogy. The CC says ". . . look at Lin Piao's report to the 9th Congress, and now we can look back and see with whom and what Chou was increasingly aligned after Lin fell. . . (p.81) Yes, let's look. Lin Piao was forced to change his revisionist draft of the report to the 9th Congress and accept the Party's line that he did not agree with. And Lin Piao smuggled in as much of his garbage as he could get away with, such as the genius theory. Lin Piao had many rotten lines which have been thoroughly exposed and criticized by the Chinese people.

Chou's reports to the Party and Peoples Congresses have no such garbage smuggled in. The 10th Congress is a Marxist work, whose basic thrust has been confirmed by the events following it and by Mao's issuing of the 3 (yes 3) directives in response to the situation coming out of it and in preparation for the 4th NPC of January 1975. His line was correct, it was Mao's line, and the gang were the ones who diverted from it. It will not be long before the current CC finds themselves forced to repudiate the reports to both the 10th and 4th Congresses.

The paper tells us to check out how Mao forced Chou to put going against the tide into his report. If this is true, then Mao forced Chou to deal a heavy blow against the metaphysics of the gang and the current CC. What did Chou, (and Mao if you will "for who else would both want to and have the ability to get this into the 10th Congress documents?"—what a subjective view of line struggle again) really have to say about going against the tide?

"Chairman Mao has constantly taught us: It is imperative to note that one tendency covers another. The opposition to Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism which advocated 'all alliance, no struggle' covered Wang Ming's 'left' opportunism which advocated 'all struggle, no alliance.' The rectification of Wang Ming's 'Left' deviation covered Wang Ming's Right deviation. The struggle against Liu Shao-chi's revisionism covered Lin Piao's revisionism. There were many instances in the past where one tendency covered another and when a tide came, the majority went along with it, while only a few withstood it.

Today, in both international and domestic struggles, tendencies may still occur similar to those of the past, namely, when there was an alliance with the bourgeoisie, necessary struggles were forgotten and when there was a split with the bourgeoisie, the possibility of an alliance under given conditions was forgotten. It is required of us to do our best to discern and rectify such tendencies in time. And when a wrong tendency surges towards us like a rising tide, we must not fear isolation and must dare to go against the tide and brave it through. Chairman Mao states, 'Going against the tide is a Marxist-Leninist principle.' In daring to go against the tide and adhere to the correct line in the ten struggles between the two lines within the Party, Chairman Mao is our example and teacher. Every one of our comrades should learn well from Chairman Mao and hold to this principle."

This was said in the 10th Congress Report. It is not just a point of Marxism in general, but directly related to the situation in China then, a thrust that is missing in the CC bulletin. The bulletin reduces this to a simplistic tactic, saying "It is clear that the tide that was gaining momentum then was that represented by people like Teng Hsiao-ping—and ultimately Chou En-lai—who were bound to gain from the whole campaign to clean up right after the Lin Piao affair (criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work)." And later we are told that Mao warned against ". . . the right, the right, the right again. . ." How easy it all is to the current CC idealists.

The truth is far more complex and very different. The 10th Congress begins to lay out the task of pushing the economy forward, and strengthening the Party. The stress on economic development and unity is growing, not against Mao's line, but as Mao's line. And the struggle to deepen the defeat, ideologically and politically, of the Lin Piao headquarters and its effect on the masses is continuing. All this means that there must indeed be a caution to watch out for right-errors and bourgeois rightists. But at the very same time, the Party center is launching campaigns against the right—Lin Piao-Confucius, and shortly thereafter the campaign around the study of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This struggle certainly could cover and did cover a "left" tendency. The strategic guidance given by Chou at the 10th Congress leading up to the smashing of the gang, "to discern and rectify such tendencies in time" was both correct and prophetic, much to the dismay of the gang and their supporters who tried to sneak into power behind "opposing" the right.

All of the quotations from Chou do not discredit him, but do in fact deal blows to the gang. So the paper has to come up with another method to smear Chou. The Chou section stands out as a model of subjectivity in a subjective paper.

"I believe." "Mao, probably agreeing." "With some of this, I believe, Mao agreed." "But not all of it." "Here, I believe, are the seeds." "I believe." "I am convinced." "I am convinced." "It is obvious." "It seems very clear to me." "I believe it is indisputably clear." "This is probably true and the reason I think so is." "Clearly in my opinion." "But I don't think so."

All of this is from just 3 of the Chou pages. Phrases like this are the heart and soul of the entire Chou argument. It is obvious and clear that the CC "believes" all this trash. This is what the struggle is all about. Unlike them, communists demand proof.

Still further the CC is forced to retreat. How could Mao and Chou have been in basic unity? If they were, the gang would have gone down and the struggle would have been very different. This reduces class struggle to simple power politics at the very top. Nowhere is there a serious discussion of class forces and the conditions, including the mood and understanding of the masses, that shape the necessity and freedom of the proletariat. Nowhere is there an analysis of the actual contradictions that different class forces were lining up around.

A brief look at the Cultural Revolution or the struggle in China at any period shows that things never develop or go down in this simplistic and easy a manner, precisely because many contradictions are at work and conditions have to be created, within the Party and among the masses, for ideological and political and organizational struggle. In fact this simplistic and idealist notion of the class struggle and the 2 line struggle has led the current CC to seek a scapegoat within the Party rather than engaging in the far more difficult and principled task of answering the actual questions and contradictions we confront. And so they tried to deal with the question of China, all questions within the US and the supposed "revisionist headquarters" in one organizational coup. This is the opposite of Mao's line, methods of struggle and outlook, which enabled the Chinese Party to successfully wage 11 major line struggles without degenerating into either revisionism or Trotskyism.

Once more rewriting history is used to say that the Lin Piao-Confucius Campaign was led by Mao and aimed at Chou. The truth is quite otherwise. The gang distorted the Lin Piao-Confucius campaign to try and aim it at Chou and their veteran cadres and at the

masses. They did this through innuendo, and they did this through adding such contradictions among the people as "going through the back door" to the struggle against class enemies Lin Piao and Confucius. The gang may have wanted to aim at Chou, but what they did aim at Mao and the CCP [sic]. Mao told them to stop it, to stop weakening the campaign. The gang separated the conduct of the Lin Piao-Confucius campaign from the tasks of the 10th Congress. This was another attack on Mao and the Party. Far from supporting them, Mao replied "Metaphysics is rampant" and directed the gang to criticize themselves before the Party center. The current CC says that the gang's line was Mao's line. Mao and the Chinese CC said it was not.

Much has been made of the nature of Chou En-lai's funeral services. They took place in the context of sharp struggle over the question of succession, over who would take over the post of Premier of the State Council and inherit at least much of the mantle of Chou. The question of blocking the bourgeois rightists from using the death of Chou En-lai to advance their position was a real one confronting Mao, and must be taken into account in evaluating the form of the services.

Other facts are known and must be considered. Mao did in fact visit Chou in the hospital before his death, not once but several times, even to the point of spending entire days and nights by the bedside of his old comrade. This even though Mao himself was quite sick and weak at the time. The current CC might want to believe that he went there to struggle with Chou to "get up off his line." But this only shows how far from human reality they have traveled.

The funeral services at the center were not the only ones in China. The entire Chinese people mourned Chou as a revolutionary leader and hero. This was an *obvious* fact. This was not just because the Chinese are backward and Confucian and anti-Mao, but just the opposite. The outpouring of grief at the death of Chou was a reflection of the masses' commitment and determination to continue on the road to socialism.

This situation caused the gang to jump out. Right after Chou's death, the gang-controlled press played down reports about memorial meetings and played up advances on the ideological front in the struggle in education. This setting the two in opposition to each other served to weaken the ideological campaigns of the Party.

The right was trying to use the masses' feelings for Chou to divert and hide from criticism of the right deviationist wind. The

gang response to this was to step up the attacks on Chou, and by implication the masses who mourned him. They set themselves above the masses as condescending saviours protecting China from the right. This of course created many new hiding places for the rightists in the anger of the masses for the gang.

This situation led the anti-right deviationist wind campaign and anti-Teng efforts of the Party to flounder from the start. The right was an unceasing obstacle and the gang led their resistance with pseudo-revolutionary phrase-mongering and increasingly open attacks on Chou. Right before the April day of mourning, the gang openly attacked Chou in the Shanghai press for several days running, prompting the masses in Shanghai to poster an entire Peking bound train in protest. The gang was helping set the conditions for serious disturbances on the day of mourning.

The situation reached a critical point with the Tien An Men incident. The anti-socialist right was out in full force, emboldened by the mass outrage at the gang's attacks on Chou. They tried to hide among the masses and set them against socialism and the Party. The response of the gang was to take advantage of the need to suppress counter-revolutionaries to press their own case, again at least by implication calling mourning for Chou a backward action by the masses. This again strengthened the right and seriously weakened the efforts of the Party to conduct struggle against the right. Rather than leading the struggle against the right, as the current CC would have us believe, the gang was an obstacle, a real fetter on the Party and the masses.

The gang tried to paint Chou as a revisionist before and after his death to show the masses that they were the only real followers of Mao. Instead, they showed the masses that they were against Mao and the Party. Now, two years later, the current CC does the same, setting themselves against the line of Mao, the CCP and the Chinese people.

The portrait of line struggle that comes out clearest in the Chou section of the bulletin is idealist and recreates the genius theory that Lin Piao failed to put over. Chou and all other Chinese leaders are painted reluctant revolutionaries who sooner or later go bad unless Mao personally stops them.

"Chou En-lai in particular did go along with the Cultural Revolution after Mao struggled with him at the start." Chou "wavered" on the Great Leap. Mao tried to get Chou to "get up off his line."

Mao is portrayed not as a Marxist-Leninist but as someone who has it all together then has to get all the other waverers to line up

behind him. The paragraph in parentheses on the bottom on page 91, where the Chairman finally tells all about the hard times of being a Chairman is a masterpiece of a distorted ego and a subjective idealist line.

Condescending saviors and geniuses do not make revolution. The current CC has thrown away analysis of class forces, thrown away the concepts of advanced, intermediate and backward. They have abandoned the method of dialectics with its interpenetration and relations between things. The paper has not one word on how the line develops in constant struggle, on the mass line within the Party and among the masses, on the movement from confusion to clarity and from one-sidedness to all-sidedness. All this is missing. You get the impression that they think Mao didn't need it, so why should they. That is how they interpret Mao's statement that often he was in a minority, even a minority of one. This is a rank attack on Mao and Mao Tsetung Thought, and represents a consolidation of opportunism in our Party.

What are the facts. The paper distorts the role of Chou in the Cultural Revolution to further this view of line struggle. Chou first plays a leading role in the Cultural Revolution just 20 days after the publication of Yao Wen-yuan's "signal" article. He gets it published in Peking, the very headquarters of Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen. And this was even before the Cultural Revolution had even become one. This same distortion of lines and role extends to Hua Kuo-feng, who did not disappear late in 1966 as the bulletin suggests, but in fact played a leading role in his province in consolidating the Cultural Revolution against attacks from the Right and ultra "left." His reports on the struggle there were circulated by the Central Committee throughout the country.

And as for Yeh Chien-ying hating the Cultural Revolution, all we have to do is read the very next sentence of the *Peking Review* article quoted, *PR* 43, 1977 to see how the CC has tampered with the facts. The report quotes Yeh as saying "The third comparatively major setback (in the Party's history) took place immediately after settling accounts with Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line." Yeh said that, and in the very next sentence he said, "Our Party suffered from sabotage by a bunch of anti-Marxist swindlers—Lin Piao and the 'gang of four.' This resulted in the greatest damage and the most harmful influence in the history of our Party. Wielding that portion of power they had usurped, they wantonly tampered with Marxism, sabotaged the Great Cultural Revolution and deceived many of our comrades." This is not hatred for the Cultural Revolution after [it] knocked down Liu

Shao-chi at all, but saying what is true, that it did not end there and in fact other counter-revolutionary headquarters jumped out, caused damage and had to be dealt with.

All of these facts are and were readily available to the CC. They were presented to them. But they are ignored. Why? There is only one explanation. The facts don't fit the conclusion, so the facts have to go. This is not the Marxist method, and it should not be the method of the RCP.

Comrade Chou En-lai died on January 8, 1976. The current CC says that by that time it was obvious that he was not a revolutionary but a revisionist. They say it is obvious that the Lin Piao-Confucius campaign had been directed at Chou. They say that it is obvious that Teng and other rightists were supported by Chou and riding high. They say that it is obvious that Chou was heading one camp and Mao heading another. None of these charges are new. The bourgeois press was filled with them all through 1974 and 1975. They saw China as a shaky alliance between the "moderates" and the "radicals." It was all obvious to veteran China-watchers stationed in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

But the RCP did not stoop to follow the bourgeoisie in January of 1976. We made an analysis of the situation in China, and we made it based on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. On that basis we put forward the truth and organized meetings of workers around the country to do so and draw out lessons about socialism and revolution.

The RCP then said about Chou En-lai, in the January 15th, 1976 issue of *Revolution*:

"Yet today, even as they are forced to make reference to Chou, they try to present him as a 'moderate' or a 'pragmatist' as if his accomplishments were due to the fact that he was not really a communist when, in fact, the opposite is the truth."

Who is the "they" that distorted the life of Chou. It was the bourgeoisie, then and now. The article goes on to say:

"What the bourgeoisie slanders as 'pragmatism' is precisely the step by step application of Marxism-Leninism to advancing the cause of the working class in China and throughout the world. For Chou and all communists, 'Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action,' a tool in the hands of the oppressed to make revolution and build a new world."

This verdict on Chou En-lai and on Marxism-Leninism, is cor-

rect. It must be upheld. The CC report must be overthrown.

Uphold the 11th Party Constitution

A glaring example of how far off the idealism, metaphysics and apriorism of the current CC will take you is in their analysis of the Constitution that was adopted at the 11th Party Congress in August of 1977.

There are many changes between the 11th Constitution and the one adopted by the 10th Congress some 4 years earlier. On the basis of these changes, with nary a word about the conditions of the class struggle that gave rise to them, the current CC has decided that this new Constitution is "fascist."

The 11th Constitution comes out of the struggle against the gang. That is their only point of reference, and that is what they don't like about it. Calling it a "fascist" and dictatorial Constitution is nothing but a vain effort to add weight to their case. Their method shows how far into rank emotionalism they are willing to sink in this effort. After these very same forces have vacillated and postponed a scientific discussion of fascism within our Party starting even before the Founding Congress, they seize on the word to apply it in a backward and even socialist country. Cut the crap and deal with reality before it is too late.

The goals and method of the current paper prevent it from dealing in a materialist manner with the current Constitution, including the changes. First they offer a long section on "overthrow" vs "eliminate." The 10th Constitution says that the basic program is "the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over capitalism." The 11th Constitution says that the basic program "for the entire historical period of socialism is to persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, eliminate the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes step by step and bring about the triumph of socialism over capitalism."

The formulation of the 10th Congress reflects the general tasks of establishing socialism, and the formulation at the 11th Congress reflects the tasks of continuing the revolution under the conditions of socialism. Compare this with the Constitution of the RCP:

"The basic program of the Revolutionary Communist Party is the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of

the dictatorship of the proletariat in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over capitalism. The ultimate aim of the Party is the realization of communism.

"In order to accomplish this historical mission the working class, led by its Party, must establish under its leadership the broadest united front, uniting all who can be united against the main enemy, and must carry the struggle through to the complete elimination of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes." *Programme and Constitution*, p. 167.

We are offered as an argument that "overthrow" means "bottom up" struggle and "eliminate step by step" means "top down" struggle. This is nonsense. The appeal to the cadre to sign up for "top down" or "bottom up" is nothing more than an anti-communist appeal. Is the dictatorship of the proletariat top down? Is the leading role of a Communist Party top down? This argument has been offered before, by petty bourgeois revolutionaries in the 60's as a reason not to move towards Marxism-Leninism and the working class. The Cultural Revolution with its mass character and rebellion against reactionary authority made Marxism acceptable to large numbers of petty bourgeois revolutionaries. But these same forces summed up the Cultural Revolution without regard to condition, time and place, and many within our Party, as well as in China, have raised the forms and methods of the Cultural Revolution as an idealist "best" method of carrying on the class struggle. In any and all circumstances. They have in a word, gotten stuck. Not that there is no such thing as "top down and dictatorial" methods. We have only to look at the way the current CC is trying to conduct the struggle over China to see it.

The argument that the 11th Constitution denies the necessity for another Cultural Revolution is equally laughable. Who would not agree that "China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a political revolution carried out under socialism by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent the restoration of capitalism." And who would not agree that "Political revolutions of this nature will be carried out many times in the future." This is the line of Mao Tsetung. And it is the line of the current Chinese leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng. The quotes are from the 11th Constitution, coming just 2 pages after the statement on the step by step elimination of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes. Again, would the current CC cut the crap.

Well, they say, maybe overthrow and eliminate are not the

point. The real proof that the 11th Constitution is "fascist" is:

"... the fact that in the tasks of the primary organizations of the Party, the Constitution is specifically changed from the 10th Party Congress to *take out* ' . . . wage an active ideological struggle so as to keep Party life vigorous,' which is replaced with the instruction to report the opinions and demands of the masses to higher Party organizations and to be concerned about the masses' political, economic and cultural life. . . This is dialectically related to other changes in the Constitution, such as instituting 'commissions for inspecting discipline' at various levels of the Party, re-instituting one-year probationary requirements for new members—something previously dropped from the Constitution as a result of the Cultural Revolution—and the direct tying of going against the tide to upholding the 'three do's and don'ts' which really means that the last two are the basis for defining the first—that is, anyone who goes against the tide is splitting and conspiring and is therefore a revisionist."

This is another eclectic mixture of fact and fancy, petty bourgeois hysteria over discipline with idealist abstracting of the Cultural Revolution, all to prevent a real analysis of the 11th Constitution and thereby hopefully win support for the gang. The current CC will do anything before a concrete analysis of concrete conditions, because after one, they will have to abandon their position.

The 11th Constitution did drop the section on "wage an active ideological struggle so as to keep Party life vigorous." The fact of the situation in China was that ideological struggle in particular was distorted by the gang, especially through their running of the major ideological campaigns like Lin Piao-Confucius and study the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and through their control of ideological education. But active ideological struggle is important to the life of the Party. And it is primarily because of the damage done in this sphere by the gang that the conditions were created that allowed elements within the Party to force the removal of that phrase from the new Constitution. The revolutionaries within the Party on all levels are waging struggle to keep it in the Party.

The new Constitution contains a greater stress on inner-Party democracy than even the 10th Constitution did. "Promote inner-Party democracy." "The whole Party must prevent Party members, especially leading Party cadres, from exploiting their privileges, and wage a resolute struggle against bourgeois ideology and the bourgeois style of work." "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides

everything." "The Party persists in combating revisionism, and dogmatism and empiricism." The Party "must give full scope to inner-Party democracy and encourage the initiative and creativeness of all Party members and Party organizations at all levels, and combat bureaucracy, commandism and warlordism." "It is absolutely impermissible for anyone to suppress criticism or retaliate. Those guilty of doing so should be investigated and punished."

All of these formulations are either new to the 11th Constitution or are strengthened over the 10th Constitution. All of these clearly come out of sharp class struggle within the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party, and it is precisely by following the class struggle in China that we will be able to sort things out.

And even the thing that is substituted for "wage an active ideological struggle. . ." is derided as reporting the masses opinions up, or in other words spying and finking. Reporting up is no substitution for ideological struggle, but neither is it a thing to deride. It is absolutely indispensable to the practicing of the mass line, and for the chain of knowledge to function based on dialectical materialism rather than idealism. Only the idealist, genius theory of the current CC prevents them from seeing this. Our Party has stressed this point many times as a basic point of Marxism and a basic point for the functioning of the Party and the Party branches.

The question of the discipline, probation and the like can only be viewed through examining the class struggle, not by linking things metaphysically to a missing phrase.

The 10th Party Congress called for strengthening the Party. This was a key task for moving socialist revolution and socialist construction forward, coming out of the Cultural Revolution and consolidating its gains. But what was the result. There was a crash admissions program led by the gang, with 7 million new members entering, 20% of the Party, in less than 4 years. Fully one half of the Party Membership is now new, joining since the Cultural Revolution. The gang pushed ahead with educating Party members, especially new ones, in metaphysics. They pushed going against the tide means blindly rebelling against authority. They pushed don't produce for the incorrect line. All this was criticized and repudiated by the Central Committee as early as 1974, but it happened and had its effect none the less. The situation in China was changed over the years, and a materialist analyzes this and brings his thinking and actions into conformity and reality.

So where the 10th Congress dropped the probationary period

because of the Cultural Revolution the way that Liu Shao-chi tried to make the Party a base for revisionism and reversion, (Lin Piao had and used a different base primarily), reinstating a probationary period at the 11th Constitution can enable the Party to strengthen its leading role and train a new generation of successors, train them in Marxism, not revisionism.

The current CC is afraid that the rightists will use this probationary period to keep out proletarian fighters. But this is nothing more than fear of the actual class struggle that comes down in every sphere of life. The rightists and revisionists will try to use probation to their advantage. And there will be struggle over it. How can this be an argument against taking necessary steps to enable the proletariat to strengthen its Party. This is nothing but a call for an idealist purity, for something that only the working class can use and that the bourgeoisie cannot. There is no such thing, and to look for one is to retreat from the class struggle.

The argument over discipline is the same. "Commissions for inspecting discipline" precisely grew out of the recent class struggle, especially the struggle against the gang and their constant eroding of the leading role of the Party and the Party leadership. They were set up to "strengthen Party members education in discipline, be responsible for checking up on the observance of discipline by Party members and Party cadres and struggle against all breaches of discipline." The actual imposition of discipline remains in the units on all levels, as do all the rights of Party members to disagree, reserve their opinion, and appeal.

The Party in China had in fact, admitted by all, been hit by factionalism, disruption and sabotage of Party unity, forming of gangs on many levels. This requires attention to discipline. And this is an area of class struggle. The discipline commissions are necessary tools for the Party, and both classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, will try to grab this tool and use it against the other. (A comparison with the current struggle in our Party is enlightening. The current CC is trying to grab onto the rules of democratic centralism to use them against the cadres and the working class overall. And this is in fact and right now, an area of sharp class struggle.)

The current CC says that all of this is nothing but a document calling for "absolute obedience to higher levels and unquestioning compliance with orders." We have all seen one recently, the "Rectification Bulletin" and can compare it with the 11th Constitution.

The 11th Constitution provides a real basis for the continuation

of the class struggle in China on favorable terms for the proletariat. All of the changes, and the entire document are to be used by the proletariat to help strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, and advance the socialist revolution and socialist construction. And that is the basis on which communists should uphold it.

Raising the 10th Constitution in an idealist manner to oppose the 11th Constitution is nothing but opportunism. There is no basis for such a document to stay the same after intense class struggle. The 11th Constitution comes out of the struggle against the gang and their counter-revolutionary headquarters. For it to stay the same as the 10th would be for the Chinese leadership to lie to the Chinese people about the current situation. They did not do so.

Any attempt to flee from the class struggle around the 11th Constitution would be dangerous, either here or in China. The proletariat in China will not stand by idly while the bourgeoisie tries to use the Constitution against them. We will not stand by idly while the current CC tries to use it to support the gang. Their only argument is that anyone who would want to put the gang down must have been fascist, so off they go in a futile search for fascist evidence. All they could find was petty bourgeois hysteria and two pages of anti-Marxist and even anti-communist arguments.

(All quotes from the current CC paper are from pp. 18-19. All quotes from the 11th Constitution are from *Documents of the 11th Congress*, pp. 121-142.)

SMASHING THE GANG OF FOUR WAS A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE WORKING CLASS AND SOCIALISM

The line on China adopted at the recent Central Committee meeting of our Party is dead wrong, opportunist and must be smashed. If this position is consolidated, it will place our Party, the Party of the U.S. working class, in opposition to the actual development of the worldwide proletarian revolution. The crushing of the Gang of Four was a necessary step and a great victory for socialism in China. Far from representing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, the Gang had become new bourgeois elements who would have led China down the road to capitalist restoration, had they succeeded in seizing power.

Both their line and practice made this clear. Ignoring the actual tasks which the development of the revolution had placed before the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, they pur-

sued a policy of divorcing class struggle from those tasks. In particular, this took the form of making the overthrow of bourgeois elements in the Party a prerequisite for taking up anything else. In doing this their philosophic outlook was idealist in that they made the main battle over ideas in men's minds that were but a reflection of the material world, rather than uniting all who can be united against the main enemy to resolve the actual contradictions that face the proletariat to move society forward. By doing this they reversed the correct relationship between thinking and being, made thinking always the primary aspect and then drew out the class struggle as a battle between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary ideas divorced from the actual state of the class struggle, time, place and conditions. For the Gang their idealism developed in a left political form: that they were the revolutionaries, the sole repositories of the correct line. But increasing their super revolutionary cover became nothing but a hammer to pound down any opposition to them and to their drive for more and more power. This "left" idealist and metaphysical line led to sabotage of socialist construction, splitting the Communist Party, strengthening the very capitalist tendencies and rightist forces the Gang claimed to oppose—in short, to undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat. Holding fast to this line, the Gang could only end up as they did, capitalist roaders whose increasing isolation from the leadership of the Party and the masses alike left them only one path to try and win victory for their incorrect line—a coup attempt.

It was because the Gang of Four had come to be an objective fetter on the development of socialism and, in fact, the gravest danger to the working class dictatorship in China, that the Central Committee headed by Hua Kuo Feng had to crush them. This bold and timely victory is the reason that China remains a socialist country today and can continue along the difficult road of working to build communism. Both socialist China and the Chinese Communist Party and its Central Committee deserve the support of all Marxist-Leninists, and their gratitude.

At the same time, it will not do to pretend, as careerists like the OL do, that there is no more class struggle in China. It is raging right now between real class forces in every field over what road the revolution will take. Waging and consolidating the battle against the Gang has made necessary not only aiming the blow away from the right, but close unity with rightist and revisionist forces in the Party. (In much the same way, Mao during the Cultural Revolution had to unite with Lin Piao, "against my will,"

to be able to build the mass movement and defeat Liu Shao-chi & Co.) With their freedom increased by this alliance and by such factors as the tarnish the Gang put on the weapons of Mao Tsetung Thought and the Cultural Revolution, these forces are testing and seeking to expand their strength.

Reports coming out of China, including articles in *Peking Review*, show both that the different forces making up the current leadership are making compromises to maintain their alliance (the report to the 11th Party Congress itself is a good example) and that a sharp two line struggle is going on (over cadre participating in manual labor, agricultural mechanization, socialist new things, and many other issues). This situation obviously calls for close attention and careful evaluation on the part of revolutionaries outside China. On the other hand, to use the present twists and turns of the class struggle to justify support for the Gang, who are to blame for many of the difficult conditions in China today, and not supporting the proletarian line in the current leadership, is nothing but opportunism.

A Matter of Principle

What line we take on China is a question of principle. As Mao pointed out, "Who are our friends? Who are our enemies? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution." The socialist countries are beacon lights of our class, the international working class. China helps communists everywhere understand and explain to the advanced and the masses the great leap in human history represented by socialism. The complex class struggle to preserve and build socialism, and will also make the road easier to travel in the socialist revolution in this country, [sic] Proletarian internationalism requires we do what we can to defend socialist China from its enemies, especially those in our own country. Principally this means the ruling class, but it includes as well those who wave the red flag as they echo the capitalists' slanders of China to the masses!

Secondly, the adoption of this line means the betrayal and degeneration of the ideology, policies and organization of our own Party. Support for the Gang of Four means replacing Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought with what their followers hailed as "Chang Chun-chiao Thought": Trotskyite-style left idealism, contempt for the masses and sectarianism. This is already a clear trend not only in the documents upholding the Four, but in other areas of our Party's work. This trend must be smashed along with

the pro-Gang line that nurtures it.

For these reasons the entire Party must reject the 3 propositions made by Avakian in his paper:

(1) That China has gone revisionist and is fully on the road to capitalist restoration. This is untrue and upholding this as the truth, based especially on the "reasons" developed in Avakian's paper is the height of irresponsibility. In particular at this time where the class struggle between the bourgeoisie in China [sic] is very sharp, to say all the leaders represent opposite poles of the same stupidity is traitorous. (2) That the Gang were revolutionaries and should be supported. Since 1974 the Gang pushed an opportunist line, that undermined the unity of the Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, caused the broad masses to doubt the leadership of the Communist Party, and objectively gave a big opening to the right. The Gang developed into capitalist roaders and pushed a counter-revolutionary line. It was a victory for the proletariat in China and throughout the world when they met their political deaths. (3) That the political thought of the Gang is consistent with and a development of Mao Tsetung Thought, that the Gang of Four was really a gang of five and that the Gang, with whatever errors they had made, fought for and represented the line of Mao as applied to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. This is utterly false and ridiculous and flies in the face of the content of the contribution of Mao to the world proletariat. In our own Party Gang of Four thought is being substituted for Mao Tsetung Thought as well as Marxism-Leninism and must be held up—criticized and driven out.

The Gang Was The Bourgeoisie in The Party

The Gang of Four by the time of their fall, had become capitalist roaders, representatives and commanders of bourgeois elements inside the Communist Party and in Chinese society as a whole, deadly enemies of the proletariat. They unleashed tremendous forces for the restoration of capitalism and proved unable to lead the masses in combatting either such forces or other bourgeois enemies. Precisely because they claimed to be the leading members of the proletarian headquarters, while they had become by seeking capitalists on the capitalist road, [sic] leaving the masses of the people without a genuine proletarian headquarters. In a complicated period of class struggle the Gang went their own way once more, stabbing the people in the back all the while struggling to keep the mantle of the left. For these reasons the Gang

had put themselves directly and immediately in the path of the revolution with their attempted coup. Their coup, far from the act of proletarian heroism that some would have us take inspiration from, was a direct continuation of their theoretical, political and organizational line as it had developed over several years. Out of desperation not valor, out of the desire to have a grab and not to serve the interest of the people, their coup fortunately had no chance at success but represented the last gasp of a small clique of counter-revolutionary scum.

The Gang were bourgeois elements because, irrespective of their motives (which were piss poor and will be dealt with as well), their line would have put China onto the capitalist road and to the extent they succeeded in implementing it, it would have caused certain civil war and certain capitalist restoration if their ideological and political line held sway. Their line and policies caused splits and factions among the working class that led to disunity and great disruption in the industries. In agriculture their left line led back to private farming and the promotion of degenerates and bad eggs.

The Gang not only unleashed forces for capitalist restoration, they represented and were themselves capitalist roaders. Like the poverty pimps in the U.S. they seized on and rigidified for their own gain and power base positions from the period of the Cultural Revolution, that is in the mass organizations, the trade unions, the women's federation and the people's militia. In the same way they turned many of the socialist new things into positions of patronage and graft. As they became more isolated from the masses of the people, the only forces they could rely on became more and more the bad eggs in society, and who because of their political line the Gang was forced to unite with and promote.

The Gang of Four for sure are not the only bourgeois elements in society, nor will all capitalist roaders take the same "left" in form and right in essence form that they did—as pointed out above, the principal danger in China at this point is from "traditional" Liu Shao-chi style revisionism.

They did not grasp the nature or demands of the whole period of socialism at all. They did not understand or apply Mao's theory of the continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat or the Marxist-Leninist approach of resolving different contradictions with different methods. Instead, as some veteran cadres became stuck in the stage of the new democratic revolution and were unable to make the leap to socialism, the Gang got stuck in the social relations of upheaval and rebellion which characteriz-

ed the Cultural Revolution and were unable to advance with the revolution. This became crystal clear during the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius which got going in early 1974 and in the Study the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Campaign the next year. Before looking at these, however, it is necessary to lay out some background on determining key tasks in the period of socialism and on the situation in China as the first of these campaigns began.

A Few Points On The Socialist Period

In the period of socialism at every point and around every question the proletariat and its allies are faced with the emergence of contradictions whose existence reflect the two classes and whose resolution reflects the 2 lines and the 2 roads. In socialism 2 roads present themselves to the working class and its allies. Only one road will lead forward toward the proletariat's final goal; the other, no matter what guise it takes, leads back to exploitation and capitalism.

In the historical period of socialism classes and class struggle exist and as Mao always stressed—class struggle is the key link, everything hinges on it. In socialism the proletariat is constantly battling to strengthen its dictatorship over the old exploiters, restrict the soil from which the bourgeoisie emerges and eliminate the bourgeoisie step by step. The bourgeois elements for their part attempt to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat, create the ideological and political conditions from which they can enrich themselves, seize control of parts, gain influence in others, usurp party and state leadership and establish their dictatorship and gain control of society.

This class struggle fought out in the period of socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat is a battle on three general fronts. As Mao puts forward in his criticism of the Soviet textbook, "A thoroughgoing socialist revolution must advance along the 3 fronts of politics, economics and ideology." (Page 48 M.R.)

This is the first point that we must grasp firmly to evaluate the practice and lines of the Gang of Four. How did they grasp the principle that class struggle is the key link, that everything hinges on it and how did they take up the battle against the bourgeoisie on the three fronts: the economic, the ideological and political, i.e. on this front how did they deal with the task of strengthening and consolidating the D of the P.

The second major point that we must grasp to evaluate the line

and policy of the Gang is how they analyzed the key task and the relationship between this task and other tasks confronting the proletariat. Lenin in "Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" written just before May Day in 1918, had the following to say on this general point:

"The real interest of the epoch of great leaps lies in the fact that the abundance of fragments of the old, which sometimes accumulate more rapidly than the rudiments (not always immediately discernible) of the new, calls for the ability to discern what is most important in the line or chain of development. History knows moments when the most important thing for the success of the revolution is to heap up as large a quantity of the fragments as possible, i.e., to blow up as many of the old institutions as possible; moments arise when enough has been blown up and the next task is to perform the 'prosaic' (for the petty bourgeois revolutionary, the 'boring') task of cleaning away the fragments; moments arise when the careful nursing of the rudiments of the new system, which are growing amidst the wreckage on a soil which as yet has been badly cleared of rubble, is the most important thing.

"It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a Communist in general. You must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which you must grasp with all your might in order to hold the chain and prepare firmly for the transition to the next link. " (Lenin, *Collected Works*, V. 27, pp. 273-4)

The point made here, and it is a crucial one, is that in the course of the revolution a concrete analysis must be made to determine the key task, no matter how "boring," and that on the basis of this, the people have to be united to grasp the main task.

Finally, that based on grasping the key task(s) at any particular time and the key link of class struggle, the Party must pay attention to the proper method of work. Mao again in his criticism of the Soviet textbook quotes Lenin in saying:

"On page 375 is a quotation from Lenin. It is aptly spoken and can be used in defense of our work method. Lenin said: 'The level of consciousness of the inhabitants and their attempts to realize this or that kind of program will certainly be reflected in the salient points of stepping onto the road of socialism.' Our putting politics in command was precisely to raise the level of consciousness of the inhabitants and our Great Leap Forward was precisely an attempt to realize this or that kind of program."

The correct method that Mao is stressing here is in taking up any task to pay attention to the ideological and policy tasks. Both reflect and raise questions about the other and both must be grasped in order to move forward correctly. The Gang, however, was the master of not grasping this correct work method. For example, in the period of the 3 directives they separated the primary ideological task of study, the theory of the D of the P, from the policy task of move the national economy forward. As opposed to this the *Tachai the Red Banner* book and the whole experience in Tachai is an example of paying attention to and uniting the ideological and policy tasks. In this way the correct Marxist method is adopted and implemented.

The work of all communists in any struggle must take into consideration the handling of the ideological and policy tasks. This must go on to *develop* the actual struggle against the enemy and in order to *sum* the development of the struggle up. In analyzing the current line struggle in China and in particular the lines and practice of the Gang, the question of how *they* handled these tasks in the course of the work they were responsible for is a key political question.

To sum up there are three fundamental political questions that we must grasp and apply to the line and practice of the Gang in order to make a Marxist-Leninist evaluation.

(1) Class struggle is the key link, everything hinges on it and class struggle and this principle must be grasped in order to fight the bourgeoisie on all three fronts.

(2) At any one time, many tasks present themselves to the proletariat, among these tasks there is one, that is key, that must be identified and grasped to move all the contradictions forward.

(3) That the correct Marxist method is at any time to determine the key ideological and policy tasks so that concrete plans for the taking up of both can be made. \

The Situation And The Tasks At The Point Of The Tenth Party Congress, 1973

The Gang of Four proved unable or unwilling to grasp the tasks confronting the Chinese revolution after the fall of the Lin Piao clique. The line and policies they put forward did not represent a socialist road for China, and could only steer it onto the capitalist road.

What *was* the situation in China? What were the tasks? China was just emerging from the furnace of the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution (GPCR) a great historic upheaval which had left no part of China untouched. Initiated and led by Mao the GPCR was a struggle from the bottom up aimed at overthrowing the bourgeoisie where it had stolen power, criticizing capitalism and the capitalist road and replacing leaders who had degenerated with fresh proletarian revolutionaries. The GPCR was a world historical event for the fight of the working class and the advance in the period of socialism, it was an answer in both theory and practice to the problem raised by the experience of the USSR how to prevent the restoration of capitalism.

The task of the GPCR was to criticize and overthrow those in authority who were on the capitalist road, but this task was not the overall goal of the struggle. Mao in a speech to an Albanian military delegation described it like this: "To struggle against power holders who take the capitalist road is the main task but it is by no means the goal. The goal is to solve the problem of world outlook; it is a question of eradicating the roots of revisionism." Mao in saying this is very consistent with his prior statement on the importance of paying attention to the question of ideological and policy tasks. And based on handling these tasks well the GPCR won victories in mobilizing the broad masses of the people to seize power from the bourgeoisie, to knock out the bourgeois headquarters of Liu Shao-chi and then Lin Piao, and in raising the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, which found expression in a whole range of changes in society.

The Cultural Revolution could not, however, win final victory in its task or fully accomplish its goal. Both will require continuous struggle, including more cultural revolutions, and cannot be achieved until the dawn of communist society. At the same time, as an outburst of intense rebellion, the GPCR could not continue indefinitely without turning into its opposite—anarchy and attacks on the masses—as events like the "100 Days War" at Tsinghua University showed.

To consolidate the gains of the GPCR and to keep the revolution advancing on the socialist road, the stage of intense ideological struggle from the bottom up had to be summed up, the advance consolidated and the whole Party and people united behind the task of making a leap into the new period—the period of the tasks set forward at the 10th Party Congress, the 4th NPC and Mao's three directives. The GPCR was in response to the bourgeoisie jumping out in the period of the Great Leap Forward, a period where economic construction was given stress, the bourgeoisie had been pushed back, and the consciousness of the

people raised. The task of socialist construction had not fallen away during the GPCR, but there was a two line struggle over how this construction would go on, on the capitalist or the socialist road. In fact, the GPCR led to a rapid growth of production from 1967 to a tapering off in 1971-72. This leveling off further called for creating conditions for a new leap.

Only under such conditions could in-depth mass political education help the masses scientifically sum up the lessons of the GPCR—and replace such phenomena as the Lin Piao-sponsored substitution of Red Book memorization for political study. Only under such conditions could new things, born in the Cultural Revolution, be developed and tested in practice to determine which were genuinely socialist. Only under such conditions could the well-shaken up and revolutionized Party reassert its role as the leading force in all sections of Chinese life and reestablish its authority among the masses. Only under such conditions could the rate of economic development be stepped up. Only under such conditions could new forms of struggle with capitalist tendencies and with capitalist roaders, be developed out of the summation of the Cultural Revolution. Only under such conditions could China play its role as an organizing center for forces in the world opposed to the two superpowers.

The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party set about to establish such conditions. In the aftermath of the Lin Piao shock, massive transfers of top PLA officers helped weed out Lin's clique and subordinate the Army to the Party. With Mao's approval a great number of cadres who had been knocked down in the Cultural Revolution were liberated, in most cases after having made self-criticisms for real errors, to strengthen the Party and state apparatus. Among them was Teng Hsiao-ping. This large social force and the fact that Lin Piao's crimes tended to cast a shadow on the Cultural Revolution with which he had closely associated himself, meant that the danger of right deviations was very real.

But at the 10th Party Congress, held in August of 1973, the Party leadership made it clear that they felt the situation did not call for a revival of the Cultural Revolution. The Congress was designed as a transition out of the period of the Cultural Revolution. Chou En-lai gave the main report to the Congress. He showed the leadership had not forgotten the danger of capitalist restoration, calling on the delegates and the Party as a whole to "continue to do a good job of criticizing Lin Piao and rectifying the style of work," to study Marxism-Leninism and to "pay attention to the

revolution in the superstructure," emphasizing the importance of differentiating between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions.

He also pointed to two other main tasks in his speech, both of which addressed the question of the country entering a period of greater stability—not reverting to the status quo before the Cultural Revolution, but consolidating forward out of it. One dealt with the need to strengthen both the Party's leadership in all sectors of Chinese society and its training of revolutionary successors. Chou also called for building up the economy, saying "ours is still a poor and developing country."

Taken together, the tasks which Chou En-lai laid out in his speech, studying Marxism-Leninism and combatting revisionism, strengthening the Party's leading role and developing the economy, made up a program. In it are summarized the view of the Chinese leadership of the situation and the direction in which they intended to move.

The Lin Piao-Confucius Campaign Begins

The Lin Piao-Confucius Campaign started in the fall of 1973 and became a national study campaign by January of 1974. The campaign took Lin Piao's advocacy of Confucian ideas like the theory of "genius" and "restoring the rites," restoring the old society as a starting point. Based on this, the campaign was developed to lay bare the ideological roots of Lin Piao's treachery and to hit at feudal, capitalistic and revisionist outlooks with the goal of arming the masses against future attempts at restoration. As such it was a timely blow to hinder a rightist wind from blowing up as has been pointed out above.

In preparing to lead the Party forward in these tasks, Mao assigned a key role in the proletarian headquarters to the Gang of Four. For example, Wang Hung-wen was elevated to the position of second Vice Chairman and when the Gang started a new theoretical journal, *Study and Criticism* in Shanghai, it bore its title in Mao's distinctive calligraphy.

But with the beginning of the campaign the back stabbing began: the Gang straight away betrayed Mao's trust and the interest of the working class. In the campaign the Gang used their control of the media to distort the campaign in three big ways: (1) they separated the campaign from the other tasks set out in the 10th Party Congress, (2) they added "going in the back door" to the targets of the campaign to aim the arrow down at the people

and (3) they used the campaign to attempt to launch a new or the same Cultural Revolution. In doing this they set up a pattern that would flow through all their "work": that is, in each campaign the Gang would become increasingly more isolated from the masses of the people and Mao Tsetung and the forces on the right would grow.

Although the 10th Party Congress documents and the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius were supposed to be studied together and the tasks set forward taken up as fronts in the class struggle, the Gang separated the Lin Piao campaign off from the other tasks. As will be pointed out later Wang Hung-wen criticized himself for separating these tasks off in the campaign, but a look at any of the Gang material in this period clearly shows how the Gang downplayed the task of the 10th Party Congress and blew up their distorted view of the content of the campaign.

In late January the Gang tried to tack a third target (in addition to Lin and Confucius) on to the campaign, that is "going in the back door." The actual practice of "going in the back door" is a widespread system of exchange among the people based on past favors or friendship. It refers to a whole host of transactions, from getting scarce goods, more food, admitted to a good hospital, auto transport, or school admission or even military posts. By attacking the practice of the "back door" the Gang argued by analogy at Chou's (and Mao's) policy of bringing back cadre who had gone down in the GPCR and who had been liberated, and at the same time they raised a real contradiction in the socialist society "the back door" which is non-antagonistic on a par with the Lin Piao contradiction which is certainly antagonistic. When Mao read a report on this, he was furious and wrote on it, "Metaphysics, one-sidedness, is rampant. To bring in criticism of going by the back door during the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius would weaken the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius." (Chang-fa No. 24, 1976 in *Issues and Studies* Sept. 1977, pp. 89-91).

But the Gang didn't mend their ways. They dropped "going in the back door" but raised the same point by criticizing Confucius' wish to "call to office those who have fallen into obscurity." Again through the use of historical analogy they shifted their emphasis more and more toward a campaign of slander with Chou En-lai as the main target (in the form of Confucius, the "duke of Chou" and a whole array of villainous prime ministers). Despite the obvious fact that this was not Mao's line the Gang even went further to continue to attack in a one sided way the bringing back of liberated

cadres.

The Gang criticized Lin and Confucius for wishing to "call to office those who have fallen into obscurity," whether Lin made this error is doubtful, but even if he did, the target of attack was not Lin but Chou (and Mao) for bringing back many liberated cadre.

They did great damage to an important ideological and political campaign among the masses—and why? Because they used it to put forward their arrogant left-idealist line: our faction, though a minority, has better, more historically advanced ideas. The majority of Party leaders, led by Chou En-lai, want to restore capitalism. The masses can be saved from the threat of restoration, only if we are Mao's (the Emperor's) successors.

The Bid For A New Cultural Revolution

Along with the line they were putting out in the Criticize Lin Piao-Criticize Confucius campaign, the Gang had a plan of action. It, too, became clear fairly quickly. The erroneous and short-lived "going by the back door" slogan was initiated at two quickly called mass rallies in Peking. Newspaper articles began featuring slogans the Red Guards had popularized, like "without destruction, there can be no construction." There was a wave of attacks on Western music, denouncing those who brought it to China as "class enemies." An article written under Chiang Ching's guidance and published under the name Chu Lan explicitly compared itself with "On the New Historical Play 'Hai Jui Dismissed from Office' " article by Yao Wen Yuan, which triggered the Cultural Revolution [*Peking Review*, #11, 1974). As the Gang's Lin Piao and Confucius articles increasingly targeted Chou, daily newspapers under Gang control like *Renmin Ribao* escalated to calls for "revolutionary violence," "revolutionary rebellion," and "attacking reactionaries." Wall posters appeared in Peking attacking Party leaders like Hua Kuo-feng and Wu Teh, for "repressing rebels."

Although the masses did not rally to this orchestrated effort to kick off a new cultural revolution, grasping that it was not in their interests, factional "fighting teams" were formed around the Gang's line and a wave of factional battles broke out in hundreds of factories throughout the country. This caused the disruption of production not only in plants immediately effected, but by a ripple effect, in those they supplied and so on. Compounded by troubles on the railroads, the disruption in China's industry was greater

than it had been since the late '60s.

Two points must be made about this attempt by the Gang to whip up a new cultural revolution. First, it flowed out of a very wrong analysis of the situation. No evidence exists that Chou En-lai was bent on restoring capitalism in China and plenty does that the thrust of the tasks laid out at the 10th Party Congress was one which would move the revolution ahead on the socialist road.

Second, it showed the Gang's thoroughgoing idealism—they did not consider either whether the material conditions for such an upheaval existed or what its results would be in the real world.

Speaking at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Mao said that "Ghosts and monsters will jump out every 7 or 8 years." Yet in the same period he said "We can have Cultural Revolutions only three times a century..." The important point here is not the particular time estimates, but the implication that every time bourgeois forces jump out under socialism, it won't be possible or correct to have a full blown cultural revolution. They must be knocked down, and different forms have to be developed to deal with the situation, whether it be purge, education movement, rectification campaign or some new form. But the Gang is ready to have ten consecutive cultural revolutions (or one long continuous one), regardless of the effects on the masses of people and on the maintenance of the proletarian dictatorship itself.

The effects of the line and practice of the Gang were the exact opposite of what the Lin Piao and Confucius campaign were aimed to bring about. The tasks laid out at the 10th Party Congress were not only purposefully ignored by the Gang, but sabotaged. The study campaign itself was metaphysically separated from other tasks, and it distorted both history and the criticism of Lin Piao to push an erroneous line. Instead of strengthening the Party, it promoted factionalism and disunity in the Party and society as a whole, instead of developing the economy seriously undermined it.

The Gang was not, however, able to run this line out unchallenged. There was sharp class struggle within the Criticize Lin Piao-Criticize Confucius campaign. The Party center also put articles in the press, taking particular advantage of holidays like May Day, articles which upheld the original line and aims of the campaign, linking it with study of the 10th Congress and stressing the 3 do's and the 3 don'ts, a theme which seldom appeared in the articles the Gang was responsible for. In many areas where the correct line won out and the campaign was taken up in a correct way, it did deepen political understanding among the masses, mobilize them to defend the fruits of the Cultural Revolution from attacks

from the right and make big strides against feudal remnants, like the Confucian line of women's inferiority. It also showed the battle lines that were being drawn in the Party.

This correct trend in the campaign was greatly strengthened after July by a document in the internal bulletin of the Central Committee, *Chang-fa*. This summed up things so far, leveled criticism both at the Gang-promoted anarchy and resistance to the campaign from the right and called for rectification of the campaign. In dealing with problems in production, this document criticizes two calls the Gang would use again and again during the next two years, "rebellious against leadership is going against the tide," and "don't produce for the incorrect line."

The main form the *right* errors took was many leading cadres refusing to take up the campaign and especially to bare their heads to criticism from the masses. Instead cadres even fled their posts and where they stayed would not take up leadership tasks, fearful of criticism. (*Issues and Studies*, January, 1975). Here one further effect of the Gang's incorrect line and practice can be seen—letting the right off the hook. Their distortions of the campaign and raising it to the level of antagonism could only feed hesitancy to take it up and provide excuses for those who really wanted to sabotage it. Hua's later criticism of "soft, lax and lazy" was directed at this kind of problem.

The question of Mao's line on all this has been left until last on purpose. The main thing is to investigate the Gang's line and practice in its own right and see how they stood with relation to the actual situation and tasks of the time. But Mao's views, while not inherently correct just because they're his, certainly warrant our attention and study. And Mao made it very clear where he stood with regard to the Gang of Four.

After Mao's criticism of the Gang's metaphysics, an even sharper development took place. In late February, *Issues and Studies*, in which many of the Gang's articles first saw light of day, was pulled off the newsstands. When it reappeared, it no longer carried the title in Mao's handwriting! There are only two ways to explain this—either Mao disapproved of what the Gang had been doing, or they disapproved of what he had been doing. The next month he made Chiang Ching move out of his house, telling her, "It's better if we don't see each other. You haven't done many of the things I talked to you about over the years. What's the use of seeing each other more often? The works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are there, my works are there, but you simply refuse to study." (*Peking Review* #3, 1977, p. 28)

Even these steps did not pull the Gang up short, and at a politburo meeting in July, Mao for the first of many times openly criticized them for acting as a Gang of Four.

Not only Mao's criticisms, but the open manner in which he made them, indicated the depths of his disagreement with the Gang. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, a great social upheaval in which the main task was to expose and overthrow Party people in power taking the capitalist road, Mao expressed serious reservations about Lin Piao in a private letter to Chiang Ching. But, he continued, to open fire on Lin and similar forces would destroy the united front needed to smash the capitalist roaders: "At present what I have just said cannot be made public (because) at the moment all the left speaks the same language. If one divulged what I have just written, it is like pouring cold water on them, and thus helping the right wing." (Han Suyin, *Wind in the Tower*, p. 279). In 1974, however, Mao was actively working to pour cold water on the Gang in the Party Center, and in the case of *Study and Criticism*, right out in public.

The Three Directives And The Fourth National People's Congress

With the publication of the 3 directives at the end of 1974, the past practice of the Gang came under attack, on the basis of emphasizing the three general tasks for the period. Again as was the case in the Lin Piao campaign the Gang made the same errors and in practice defined themselves in opposition to the line of Mao and the interests of the people.

The first of the 3 directives which came out in the fall of 1974 was a statement by Mao "to push the national economy forward." In saying this is Mao stressing just that people should work harder at their posts? No, what Mao is saying, and he is being consistent with his line in the 10th Party Congress and the 4th NPC, is that a *leap* in the economy needs to be made. Also this directive was a sharp blow against the Gang-caused severe disruptions in the economy resulting from the factionalism of the Lin Piao and Confucius campaign.

The second directive first appeared around December 14th on wall posters that said: "Eight years have passed since the GPCR started. It is preferable to have stability now. The whole Party and whole army should unite." This call is directly aimed at the Gang for their disruptive and factional activities. Mao clearly does not put stability and unity above the class struggle as the right would have it, but the main thrust of the directive is clear and consistent

with the tasks being developed for the general period.

The third directive came right after two significant events. The first and most important was after Mao and Chou had reviewed the preparations and speeches planned for the 4th NPC. Mao spent a sleepless night as the present leadership has told us and came out with the directive on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mao said: "Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to get this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This should be made known to the whole nation." Mao then followed this quote with three other points on the same subject. More to come on this campaign a little later.

The thrust of the 3 directives is both clear and consistent with Mao's line for the period and both in ideological and political tasks that face the working class. Despite the ravings of the Gang, the 3 directives uphold what Chou put forward at the 10th Party Congress and raise it to a new level. The three directives represented concrete direction as to how to consolidate the gains of the Cultural Revolution to enable the Party to lead the broad masses down the socialist and not the capitalist road of economic development and modernization of industry and agriculture.

The development of the actual contradictions in the class struggle demanded the resolution of the struggle in the Cultural Revolution over the 2 lines and the 2 classes on the basis of which actual way or road production and economic construction and other tasks would take place on.

Why did Mao say that 8 years have passed, it is preferable to have stability now; the whole Party and the whole army should get united? Was this just a general call for unity or had Mao gone soft in his old age and capitulated over to the bourgeoisie. Neither is the case, the call is a big deal and rather than getting soft Mao in his three directives is preparing the basis for the working class to struggle against the bourgeoisie in new conditions and in the face of new contradictions. Independent of anyone's will the CR had gone on for 8 years and the people want to move forward, to develop a plan for the economy to overcome some of the backwardness of the country. The question at hand is not whether this should be done, the question is what kind of politics are going to be in command.

To separate off the actual task of modernization and economic construction from the class struggle will not end class struggle, but will only insure that the capitalist roaders hold sway and that the proletarian headquarters will be further isolated from the

masses. If this continued the three major contradictions would bloom full flower and the basis of the rule of the working class the D of the P would be undermined. This is why Mao held a sleepless night, he recognized that the task of building stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward would unleash the right who would wage class struggle all over the place against the proletariat. At the same time Mao was also worried about the continued factionalism and disruptions in the cities caused by the Gang and their followers. In the face of all this the cardinal political question is the strengthening of the form of its rule of the working class—the D of the P. With the theoretical campaign on the D of the P Mao wanted to draw the attention of the masses to just this question.

Mao, as some would have us believe, put forward the D of the P campaign because this is where the sharp class struggle would be found, as opposed to the carrying out of the other directives. This is nonsense, no one will deny that there will be sharp struggle in this campaign, but when Mao says that class struggle is the key link, everything hinges on it, he means *everything*, every question in every front of struggle against the bourgeoisie. The D of the P campaign would be an important arena of class struggle, but so would the implementation of the other directives.

Although the Gang was to leap on Mao's new quotations about the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is evident that they are aimed at the Gang as well as the right. "Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism," points exactly to the dangers inherent in the Gang's line and activities, as the previous year had shown. (For that matter, the emphasis on the need to read Marxist-Leninist works surely included Chiang Ching—as Mao had pointed out in March.)

1975 began auspiciously with the 4th National People's Congress, attended mainly by delegates who had not been at the 3rd in 1964. Many had come forward in the Cultural Revolution and many were liberated cadres. As at the 10th Party Congress, Chou En-lai made the main report, on the work of the government. He summed up the favorable developments on the national [sic] and since the previous People's Congress, he laid out a number of tasks. First he put forward the class struggle on the ideological front, calling for deepening the movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and the cadre and masses to study and "arm themselves with the basic theories of Marxism." Calls followed for strengthening the revolutionary committees, distinguishing between contradictions among the people and with the enemy and strengthen

the great unity of the masses of people. The task of developing the national economy was laid out in somewhat more detail than the others: "The first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial economy in 15 years, that is, before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world." Chou then talked about the political principles which guide the development of the economy and stressed the importance of revolution in the superstructure and paying attention to class struggle "while tackling economic tasks." He closed this point with a call for a basic policy of self-reliance, "while making external assistance subsidiary," quoting Mao.

The 4th National People's Congress, like the directives from Mao, which preceded it, laid out a path for the Chinese Revolution in the period to come. The fact that both called for unity, stability and particular attention to be paid to economic development did not negate the class struggle. These tasks were necessary for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, as Chou implied, were the terms around which two roads would present themselves and the two line struggle break out. The ideological and political tasks of arming the masses to struggle against revisionism and restoration were also necessary and aimed at making sure the proletarian line won and the socialist road was followed as the different tasks were implemented.

The Campaign to Study the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

A month after the 4th NPC, the campaign to study the theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat began. This was to be taken up in connection with the study of the documents from the National People's Congress. This campaign marked a qualitative step in the Gang's degeneration into a roadblock in the socialist road of China's development. Their basic approach to the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius campaign was repeated—the same stand, the same line, the same method, even if altered somewhat to fit the situation. If it could be considered a serious error, perhaps of overenthusiasm or ignorance, the year before, now it moved toward becoming an antagonistic contradiction.

In response to criticism by Mao and other Party leaders directed at the incorrect approach around criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, Wang Hung-wen had written a self-criticism the

previous year which said in part, "In the early stages of the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, I divided the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius with the implementation of policies decided at the Tenth Congress," (*Chang-fa* #24, 1976, in *Issues and Studies*, Sept. 1977, p. 92). But the first thing the Gang did in this new campaign was to try and split it off from the study of the documents of the 4th NPC! In fact, here was a general effort to black the NPC out of the media altogether. *Peking Review*, for example, ran an article greeting the event, and four short pieces in #5, then silence for months.

Once again the study of theory was separated metaphysically from the other tasks of the Chinese Revolution. In practice it was upheld as the *real* form of class struggle and, therefore, as the only real task of the moment, completely negating the others—and dialectics. Where were the articles showing how at certain periods, including the immediate one, stability and unity are necessary for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and, far from requiring writing off the class struggle, create the best conditions for it? Where were the articles on how the drive to build a modern socialist China would strengthen the proletarian dictatorship and provide both opportunities to restrict right [sic], as small production in the countryside fell for example, and new problems along these lines to be resolved, like the vast numbers of new skilled technicians China will need before the end of the century?

What the Chinese people got instead were more distortions, as the Gang looked for handles to push their line. The same thing they were doing to historical materialism around Confucianism and Legalism, their articles in this new campaign did to Marxist-Leninist theory and classics. The method was to select quotes, often out of context, and articles, and write "explanations" of them, twisted to reinforce the Gang's positions. In particular, they would metaphysically separate one point or one aspect from an article, reducing dialectics, the motion of the unity and struggle of opposites, to their own static metaphysics. Comrades should contrast their article on "studying Lenin's *A Great Beginning*" with the original work, which deals with many important questions on building socialism and communism. In it Lenin dealt with such questions as nurturing "shoots of communism" in the precise context of the situation and tasks of the Russian Revolution. But the Gang's piece, one of their better ones, at that, omits Lenin's emphasis on the importance of raising labor productivity in building communism; omits his call for trying hundreds of new methods to vanquish the remnants of capitalism and his criterion for deter-

mining real communist shoots from false ones—results in practice; and omits his call for fewer pompous phases and more plain, everyday hard work on behalf of society as a whole. It's not surprising they didn't like this last point, since it could have been easily updated to "less Gang and more Tachai and Taching."

In March and April, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao published their articles "On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique" and "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie." The publication and wide distribution of these signed pieces was aimed at establishing the Gang as the theoreticians and leaders of the campaign. In keeping with their clique's general thrust, the questions of promoting stability and unity and developing the national economy are ignored, as if they have no relationship to the dictatorship of the proletariat or were not tasks of the moment. (Chang Chun-chiao does tip his hat—once—to the need "to build China into a modern socialist country by the end of the century.")

Although these are major theoretical works on the question of the bourgeoisie in the Party, neither mentions the scientific summation made by Mao in the Cultural Revolution that the main enemy is Party persons in power taking the capitalist road. Yet it is precisely this formulation that best describes the commanders of the bourgeois elements inside and outside the Party and enables the masses to identify and struggle against them and to deliver their blows with both force and accuracy.

Yao Wen-yuan also sounded the theme that, "At present, the main danger is empiricism," a Mao quote from the 1959 struggle against Pen Teh-huai. This phrase became a catchword for attacks on veteran cadres, including Chou En-lai, who were said to raise their long experience (in making revolution) to oppose Marxist-Leninist theory. Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao also began pushing the danger of empiricism in speeches and articles. Like the "going by the back door" business the year before, this drew an angry response from Mao. On April 23, he refused to approve a New China News Agency (NCNA) report calling for opposition to empiricism, directing, "It seems the formulation should be oppose revisionism which includes empiricism and dogmatism. Both revise Marxism-Leninism. Don't just mention the one while omitting the other. Not many people in our Party really know Marxism-Leninism. Some think they know, but in fact know very little about it. They consider themselves always in the right and are ready at all times to lecture others." This blast was first and foremost a comment on the situation in China—contrary to the

Gang's line, the right danger, represented by empiricism, was not so overwhelming as to justify making it the exclusive target at this point. It also pointed out that the Gang's theoretical pretenses were shallow and self-serving. Further, Mao commented "Those who criticize empiricism are themselves empiricists." This was certainly true of the way the Gang regarded their experience in the Cultural Revolution as universally applicable in the different conditions prevailing at the time. This time the Gang did not even go through the motions of self-criticism. To the contrary, when the head of NCNA wanted to spread Mao's instruction on the rejected article inside the agency, Yao Wen-yuan ordered him to keep it to himself!

The Gang also took up in this period the difficult question of restricting bourgeois right in socialist society. In many ways they treated the concept as a portable spearhead which could be aimed at first one, then another section of the masses to condemn them as hotbeds of restoration: "red experts" (Chang Chun-chiao's article), peasants (numerous articles on spontaneous capitalist tendencies in the countryside), highly paid and skilled workers ("Worker Aristocrats Are Termites Inside the Workers Movement"). This last may have been aimed particularly at Taching, where pay rates are well above the Chinese average, although this point has never been emphasized by Mao or the Party in calling for Learning from Taching in Industry. Overall, after being forced to tone down "empiricism as the main danger," the Gang was never able to focus their efforts within the campaign until the right deviationist wind blew up late in the year.

The movement to study the dictatorship of the proletariat deepened and consolidated the erroneous tendencies displayed the year before. The Gang's line was idealist in the extreme—it separated the studying of theory from society as a whole and dealt with it primarily as an ideological question. This is contrary to taking the class struggle as the key link and to the Marxist-Leninist understanding that "a thoroughgoing socialist revolution must advance along the three fronts of politics, economics and ideology." (Mao Tsetung, *A Critique of Soviet Economics*, Monthly Review, p. 48) The emphasis on this task and the attempted burial of others which dealt primarily with the political or economic fronts meant that this idealist approach to study also became, by default, the main political (and economic) task the Gang was putting forward openly. There was still, however another task the Gang saw although their articles only hinted at it, particularly the continuing Legalist and Confucius articles. This

was the overthrow of any Party leaders, first of all Chou En-lai, who stood between them and their goal—control of the commanding heights of the Party and then of Chinese society as a whole. This view that they and only they could keep the Chinese Revolution red, by force of their superior ideas, was consistent with their overall idealism, although it also represented the most despicable form of careerism.

Hang Chow

Once again, the Gang's line had a sharp reflection in practice which made it easier to judge. Although disruptions were not as widespread as they had been in 1974, in some places the situation had deteriorated. Most serious of all was Chekiang Province and its capital Hangchow. The lives of many hundreds of workers had been lost in faction fighting there. Production had collapsed in many plants due to fighting, strikes and absenteeism, and the national rail transport system, of which Chekiang is an important hub, had been severely disrupted. Behind the fighting and much of the rest of the trouble was a close sidekick of Wang Hung-wen named Weng Sen-ho. An activist in the Cultural Revolution, Weng was vice-chairman of the Chekiang track unions and a member of the standing committee of the Province's revolutionary committee, but only an alternate on the Provincial Party Committee.

Weng ran out the Gang's line without most of their refinements and cover, saying for example, that criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius was "flogging dead tigers" and "not worthwhile" and that the point was to attack a "living tiger," namely Chou En-lai. The factional set-up he established indicates something about the social base the Gang was trying to cultivate. He drew in Party members who were cadres in non-Party organizations, the trade unionism, women's associations, revolutionary committees, and so on, and by pitting these organizations against the Party committees enhanced their importance and power. Promotions and official posts were used to reward and consolidate his followers. He appealed to young people by playing on their revolutionary spirit and desire to change the world with slogans like "going against the tide," and he established a factional armed force, a "militia headquarters," and made sure its core was tough lumpen elements who would do his bidding.

Weng Sen-ho followed the policy, which the Gang would use even more extensively in 1976, of creating large scale disruption as a basis for extending control and seizing power. With the militia as

enforcers he set out to paralyze Party committees, which strengthened the position of mass organizations under his influence. In the plants he used dual tactics to disrupt production. Economism was stirred up and wage demands aimed at the local Party Committee. At the same time, workers who rejected this and the factional fighting and continued to work were criticized for holding the theory of productive forces and denounced as belonging to Command 8315—work 8 hours a day, eat 3 meals a day and get paid on the 15th.

Over the first half of 1975, discussion of the Party Center returned repeatedly to the worsening situation in Chekiang. The Politburo heard reports on the Hangchow situation from Ten Chiling, the province's first Party secretary, Teng Hsiao-ping, Wang Hung-wen and Chi Ten-kuei. Chi's case is particularly interesting. Previously he had tended to line up with the Gang on a number of issues, but his investigation of Hangchow as early as January 1975 led him to blame the Gang's line and followers for the situation. It took the Party Center some time to even begin to restore order. In the spring, after a personal investigation visit to Hangchow, Mao condemned Wen and said he should not be allowed on any three in one organ. In June, the head of the militia, the head of the Hangchow Revolutionary Committee, and a military commander were purged and an entire division of the First Army sent in from outside. In July, the Central Committee and the State Council issued a resolution which supported the provincial Party leadership, demanded the dissolution of all factions and demanded a big list of crimes committed by counter-revolutionaries "who plot to seize the leadership power." Even these steps only stabilized the situation in Hangchow somewhat and the Gang continued their interference until they fell. At the Hangchow Iron and Steel Works, for example, output for 1974, 1975 and 1976 combined was lower than what had been in '73 alone.

The Gang Gets Rescued By the Wind—Temporarily

The Gang's line was in contradiction with the line of Mao Tsetung and the Party Center, was in contradiction with the course of action the objective situation required. Because they persisted in their errors, they were weakening the Party, undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat and causing havoc. The Gang was increasingly isolated from the masses of people to whom they had nothing to offer but exhortations to study their articles, one-sided praise for everything related to the Cultural Revolution,

severely limited cultural fare and evident contempt for people's desire for a better life. The Gang was increasingly isolated from the rest of the leadership of the Party. Even other "leftists" and those who had come forward in the Cultural Revolution could not unite with their incorrect line and destructive practice. Nor could they go along with the Gang in essentially giving over the very important questions of stability and unity and developing the national economy to the right which would pose as sole upholders of these goals among the masses.

Criticism of the Gang in the Center had become general and intense. On May 3, Mao stepped up the attack at a Politburo meeting. He named all those present against factionalism, [sic] repeating again the three do's and don'ts, "Practice Marxism and not revisionism, unite and don't split, be open and above-board and don't intrigue and conspire." Then he turned his attention specifically to the Gang: "Don't function as a Gang of Four. Don't do it anymore. Why do you keep doing it? Why don't you unite with the more than 200 members of the Party Central Committee? It is no good to keep a small circle of a few. It has always been no good to do so." Once again this is not just a case of Mao chiding the Gang for sectarianism or inept tactics. It is a political criticism which indicates that the Gang lacks clarity on the need for proletarian dictatorship. Mao has always followed the policy of maintaining a united front inside the Party as well as in society as a whole—uniting the maximum possible forces to tackle the main task and oppose the main enemy at any given point. Had Mao not always been willing and able to unite with people who disagreed with him or did not have his grasp of the situation, he never would have been able to lead the revolution through the twists and turns that faced it. The approach of the Gang he was criticizing was exactly the opposite—refusing to mobilize all positive factors for struggle. Calling on them to unite with the more than 200 CC members was a basic criticism of the Gang's line that the commanding heights of Chinese society were in the hands of the class enemy.

After this meeting Mao opened up the Gang to general criticism by the Politburo, various forces took this up in various ways. Among them were Mao himself. During the summer he called for a major adjustment to be made on the cultural front, criticizing the fascist constraints Chiang Ching had kept on her area of work. In particular he defended the film *Pioneers*, about the building of the Taching oil fields, from her unprincipled censorship. (See Hua's report to the 11th Party Congress). Wang Tung-

hsing, for instance, speaking to high level cadres at a conference in Canton, raked the Gang's line, strategy, and tactics over the coals as revisionist. Among the charges he made were trying to establish a second center and putting forward the theory of political parties alternating in power (promoting the mass organizations over the Party), confusing contradictions among the people and with the enemy, promoting anarchism, and practicing capitalism [sic] to class enemies at home and abroad.

The criticism of the Gang was led and spearheaded, however, by Teng Hsiao-ping, who was by this time the leading active figure on the Politburo. This set up the stage for developments at the end of 1975 and in early 1976, when contradictions sharpened up and opportunists began jumping out left and right. At the same time in the course of this class struggle, the road forward for the Chinese Revolution became clearer and a new leadership core began to develop with Hua Kuo-fung at the core.

When Teng moved to take on the Gang of Four, he wound up giving himself a new lease on life. Unlike the Gang, Teng recognized the importance of the tasks of promoting stability and unity and developing the national economy, and saw them and their line as the main obstacle to doing so. He was ready to engage in class struggle against the Gang, but in doing so showed that he downplayed the importance of class struggle in socialist society as a whole. This came out most clearly in "On the General Program of Work for the Whole Party and the Whole Nation," completed under Teng's personal direction in October. This was a big broadside against the Gang, who are compared to Lin Piao and accused them of waving the red flag to oppose the red flag, and promoting bourgeois factionalism. "Rebellion" and "going against the tide," must be subjected to class analysis—who is rebelling against whom, what tide is being resisted, and deeds not words must be the main criteria in judging people. There is a lengthy criticism of the practice of counterposing revolution to production and labeling economic construction the "theory of productive forces." The "General Program" focused sharply on a number of the ways in which the Gang was hampering the development of the Chinese revolution.

On the other hand, it is in no way a correct, or adequate General Program which could be used to guide the work of the CP and the Chinese people over the next 25 years *and* it contained serious errors of principle, revisionist errors. The most important of these is the tendency to negate the class struggle which was symbolized by the formulation "Take the 3 directives as the key link." The docu-

ment basically takes the position that the only danger of capitalist restoration will come from those who are "left in form, right in essence," and conspiratorial like the Gang and from capitalist roaders of the Liu Shao-chi type. The question of studying the dictatorship of the proletariat was not dealt with as a campaign to increase the consciousness of the masses and address the problems of building socialism and keeping China red but merely as an excuse to wail on the Gang. The "General Program" lacked clarity on the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, it treated the tasks of stability and unity and developing the economy basically as goals in themselves not as necessary tasks for strengthening the proletarian dictatorship and advancing toward communism. This, too, leaves the door wide open for revisionism.

Teng's activities were not limited to the drawing up of anti-Gang documents. He set up to resolve serious problems which were impediments to carrying out the program for modernization laid out at the 4th National Party Congress. His approach to the problems, however, reflected the same outlook as the "General Program." In taking up shortcomings in fields like science and technology or education, his concern was primarily that things function better than they had been, without concern for questions like remolding the outlook of intellectuals and avoiding the reproduction of bourgeois social relations (see, for example, Teng's comments on science, reprinted at the end of Chi Hsin, *The Case of the Gang of Four*).

Thus Teng, in his attack on the Gang finally succeeded in bringing their political line into sync with the real world. He had stirred up a right deviationist wind, which posed a danger of capitalist restoration and had to be opposed. Talk about opposite poles of the same stupidity! The Gang and Teng each pointed to the other as the justification for their line!

Chairman Mao became extremely concerned at Teng's failure to uphold the Marxist-Leninist line. He criticized the line of the General Program in the famous remark, "What! Take the three directives as the key link? Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle. Class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it." He also criticized Teng for failing to grasp class struggle and retaining his "black cat, white cat" pragmatism and posing the danger of restoration. In summing up he said, "With the socialist revolution, they themselves come under fire. At the time of the cooperative transformation of agriculture there were people in the Party who opposed it, and when it comes to criticiz-

ing bourgeois right they resent it. You are making the socialist revolution and yet don't know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—those in power taking the capitalist road." There was no question that Mao was calling for struggle against Teng and the right deviationist wind. In this struggle, which developed in 1976, the Gang once again proved incapable of leading China down the socialist road and new forces came forward which did have that ability.

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR CHINA

Hua Kuo-feng Comes To The Fore

Even as the right deviationist winds were warming up, the first major practical step toward implementing the 4th NPC was being carried out. This was the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, held in September and October, led by Hua Kuo-feng. Hua was a member of a new generation of leaders who had come forward during the period of the socialist revolution (although his Party work began in 1946). He rendered valuable services to the Revolution at key points in its development. As a local cadre in Hunan, he not only pushed forward agricultural communization and the Great Leap Forward, but provided Mao with important summations of this for use in the struggle against Peng Teh-huai's revisionist line. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution he played a leading role in the province and his report on the successful struggle against one of the best organized "ultra left" rebel groups, Sheng Wei Hieu (PL's favorite) was distributed nationally. He was called to Peking to take much of the responsibility for investigating the case of Lin Piao and brought into national leadership by Chairman Mao, who knew him from when he had responsibility for Shaoshan, Mao's Hunan birthplace. Hua was elected a member of the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress and after the 4th NPC served as Vice-Premier and in the key post of Minister of Security.

The Tachai Conference, which lasted a month, set forward a revolutionary plan for the transformation of Chinese agriculture. As laid out by Hua Kuo-feng in his speech in summation, the major call of the conference was to transform, in several waves, all the rural counties of China into Tachai type counties, characterized by good Party leadership, class struggle, to stay on the socialist road, and all around economic development. In this context, the goal of the basic mechanization of agriculture by 1980 was put forward.

The movement to build Tachai type counties on this basis would weaken the force of small production, develop and show the superiority of more public forms of ownership like the people's communes and narrow the three great differences. At this conference, the Gang's line also had a representative. Chiang Ching called Hua's report "revisionist," and made her own speech. From what we can tell she didn't mention the question of agricultural development and mechanization but dealt largely with her own and incorrect interpretation of the novel, *Water Margin*.

Mao's response to the conference was very clear. He immediately approved Hua's report for distribution, dismissed Chiang Ching's speech as "wide of the mark" and forbade its circulation in any form. Despite the Gang's employment of their typical media blackout tactics, the movement to implement the conference decision began to be implemented across the country, with Party workteams totalling 1.6 million people mobilized to go into the rural areas and get things rolling.

The situation took another leap with the death of Chou En-lai on January 6, 1976. Chairman Mao had spent several days and nights with his old comrade on his death bed. Amidst widespread mourning among the masses, Teng Hsiao-ping delivered the Party center's memorial speech and was clearly hoping to drape himself in the mantle of the dead leader, many of whose tasks he had assumed since 1974. The Gang meanwhile treated Chou as an enemy, earning the bitter hatred of the masses. News of the mourning for Chou was perfunctory and on inside pages of the papers, while the lead articles featured the struggle against the right deviations on the educational front.

After his speech, the criticism of Teng on the Politburo increased, and he stopped appearing in public or the media. The Gang cherished hopes of replacing him, but Mao chose Hua Kuo-feng to serve as Acting Premier. When the decision was announced February 3, Chang Chun-chiao bitterly predicted Hua's rapid downfall.

Hua, however, began handling his leading responsibilities well. In late February, Hua delivered a report endorsed by the Politburo and approved by Mao to a leadership meeting (and to which the later famous statement, act in line with past principles referred) and in it called for narrowing the target to Teng to get maximum clarity in the struggle. This was hardly the approach the Gang was taking. Using Mao's remarks on Teng as a jumping off point, they were actively broadening the scope of the struggle, by targeting the bourgeoisie's agents inside the CP, "those bourgeois

democrats who were reluctant to go forward and pass the test of socialism," (Chuang Lan, *Study and Criticism*, May 14, 1976, in "The Struggle Against the Revisionist Line"). This simultaneously presented a one-sided picture of where the social base of the capitalist roaders lies, and misdirected fire at a whole layer of veteran Party fighters. It was accompanied again, by the call for the Cultural Revolution (see the same article), which was not the line of Mao or the Party Center. The Gang even disagreed with Mao over how Teng's case should be treated, with Chiang Ching complaining to a meeting she was called[sic] to run the Gang's line, "In China there is an international capitalist agent named Teng Hsiao-ping. It might be correct to call him a traitor. Nevertheless, our Chairman has been protecting him. What I have said is my personal opinion." (Chang-fa #24, 1976, *Issues and Studies*, Oct. 1977, p. 92)

The Tien An Men incident in April is a nodal point in the development of the class struggle. The masses took advantage of the spring festival to honor Chou En-lai and protest the suppression of his memory. Counter-revolutionaries also took advantage of the situation, as the anti Mao poem "To hell with Chin Hsi-huai" publicized at the time showed. But the method of dealing with the situation, the removal of all the memorial wreaths, was sure to provoke an antagonistic response among sections of the people. It did and a protest flared up and was suppressed.

The incident showed that for many people, Teng had, in fact, inherited Chou's mantle. The Gang had only reinforced this by their backhanded attacks on Chou in similar terms to the criticisms of Teng. Likewise, by publishing and denouncing the poisonous weeds without seriously acknowledging the importance of the tasks of promoting stability and unity and developing the national economy, they deserted the banner of "concern for the well-being of the masses" in the hands of Teng, further tightening his identification with Chou who had been famous for his concern for the masses.

Because of this, the incident forced quick action on the question of Teng so the campaign against the right deviationist wind would not be turned into its opposite. The Politburo met and removed Teng from all his positions and announced that the contradiction with him had become antagonistic. There was clearly line struggle over this point as the statement also said that Teng would retain his Party membership while people saw how he acted. (Where Mao stood in this discussion is unclear, the only evidence, besides his opposition to Teng during the GPCR, is the fact that as soon as he

died Chiang Ching put forward at a meeting of the center he demanded that Teng be expelled.)

Mao's stand on another question is not in doubt and that is the matter of succession. After Teng was removed from his posts, the Gang was passed over. Hua Kuo-feng was confirmed as Premier and First Vice Chairman of the CCP. Mao seconded this on April meeting with Hua [sic] and writing him out three messages "Take your time, do not be anxious," "Act according to past principles," and "With you in charge, I am at ease." This was a most important vote of confidence in Hua and those he was working with closely in the center, like Yeh Chieu-Ying and Wang Tung-Hsing.

Any argument that Mao supported the Gang of Four must explain not only the consistent differences of line and principle between them and Hua over the preceding two years, but his firm rejection of them as potential successors. While Mao did not want to see them broken out of the Party leadership at this point, he could not rely on them to uphold Marxism-Leninism and move China ahead. Instead he chose Hua Kuo-feng. Any theory which suggests some undetailed "necessity," perhaps in the form of threats from military commanders, forced Mao to choose a man he knew or suspected to be a capitalist roader as a successor with his death rapidly approaching, is arguing that Mao had lost either his bearings or his revolutionary will. There is no evidence to suggest either is true.

The Gang Goes For Broke

After this point, the next six months in China were a big political battlefield. The Gang shifted the gears of their dictatorship of the proletariat articles. The main target now was Hua and he could not be attacked as a veteran communist who had gotten stuck at the stage of a new democratic revolution. Instead, the Gang turned out articles like the Kang Li piece, distributed in an earlier bulletin, which argued for the first time, that the bourgeoisie in the Party is primarily made up of "newly engendered bourgeois elements." Their opportunist efforts on the theoretical front were a reflection of the difficult situation in which they found themselves. Isolated, bypassed by history, their hopes of achieving supreme power beginning to vanish, the Gang took the position that, as one of their followers put it in a government forum on planning, "Do genuine Marxists hold the leadership of the state apparatus in their grip? My answer is no." (Chang-fa, #24, 1976, *Issues and Studies*, October 1977, p. 99.) Since Mao was

not about to replace these "non-Marxists" with the Gang and their supporters, the Gang decided they would have to go for broke.

During the summer they stirred up factionalism and interfered with production and transport on a scale even broader than in 1974. "Fighting groups" were formed and established networks between cities and provinces. Their idea was to create conditions of turmoil both to discredit the Party leadership and to gain opportunities to establish their supporters in power. Slogans like "Don't produce for the incorrect line" and "Confucians produce, legalists rebel" were circulated. Whole plants turned out working for months at a time[sic] and workers showed up only on pay day.

Hua fought to keep the economy functioning and to keep the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping on the track. In the midst of this battle, he was confronted with a massive national disaster, the Tangshan earthquake, which killed 600,000 people, destroyed whole industrial centers and forced evacuations of apartment buildings in large cities as distant as Peking. Hua quickly mobilized the whole country to provide relief to the stricken area, and visited it himself to provide leadership and inspiration. The Gang for their part played a most despicable role, saying that people were using "anti quake and relief work to suppress revolution and brush aside the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping," and making light of the disaster. They even went so far as to play on superstitions regarding earthquakes the Chinese government had been working for over 26 years to eradicate—with considerable success. *Study and Criticism* #9 published in September 14, carried an article which praised a leader of the Taiping Rebellion who said an earthquake was a sign from heaven that his cause would be victorious for his "sparkling revolutionary optimism." The article was entitled "When the Earth Turns, It Actually Signifies the Advent of New Earth!" From distorting history and twisting Marxist theory to peddling feudal mysticism to support their cause—this was the route the Gang had travelled!

Hua Smashes The Gang

The final act in the drama began with the death of Mao Tsetung, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, on September 9, 1976. It is a story which can be told briefly, for the actions of the people involved flow out of their political lines as they had developed over a long period of time.

From the start the Gang moved toward a seizure of power. Among their supporters they prepared opinion for their coup with

talk ominously asserting the power of revisionism at the Center, and issued calls to prepare for struggle. To circumvent the Central Committee and its general office, run by Wang Tung-hsin, they sent out orders that all Party organs should report directly to Wang Hung-wen. They acted to get from Chairman Mao when he was dead what he would not give them alive, his official support.

Chiang Ching tried repeatedly to lay claim to the files of Mao's documents and materials to make herself the source of his posthumous writings, but she was stopped by Hua Kuo-feng and Wang Tung-hsin, who forbade anyone to take any of Mao's documents from where they were stored. Even without the documents, the Gang tried to pass themselves off as the executors of Mao's great theoretical heritage, as the true Marxist-Leninists by palming off on the Chinese people a phoney bequest—"Act according to the principles laid down." Publicized throughout the media, this was a distortion of Mao's words to Hua, "Act according to past principles," designed to mystify things and make it appear that there existed some special principles which were not public knowledge at the time. This was the same theme as their lauding of the legalists, over two years before—proclaiming themselves condescending saviours with special knowledge who will look out for the interests of the masses.

Hua, meanwhile, undertook to lead the nation through this most difficult period, working collectively as much as possible with the rest of the Politburo. He refused to be buffaloeed by the Gang, either into turning over Mao's files to Chiang Ching or into going along with "Act according to the principles laid down." He timely instructed that this false formulation should not be used.

Hua's competence, decisiveness and grasp of the situation left the Gang no choice. They had to move fast because conditions could only get less favorable for them. On October 4, their writing group, Liang Hsiao, published an article which basically called for rebellion against Hua, proclaiming, "Any revisionist chieftain who dares to alter 'the principles laid down' by Chairman Mao will not come to a good end." Simultaneously with this, they initiated attempts at "power seizures" in a number of localities, armed and mobilized the Shanghai militia and put their followers there and elsewhere on red alert and tried to order military units under their command or influence into the Peking area.

On October 6, based on information about these activities and after consultation with other Party leaders, Hua had the four arrested. Within the next few days he broke up their strongholds like the propaganda centers and the Shanghai Municipal Party leader-

ship, without having to resort to fighting. There was only sporadic attempts at an uprising by the Gang's followers and for the masses of the Chinese people, who had learned to hate the four deeply, from their own experience, there was jubilation.

For Hua Kuo-feng, there remained the job he has been working to tackle ever since: not only undoing the harm done by the Gang, but helping the masses sum up the experience so that their understanding of the class struggle under socialism, and the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat is deepened and their enthusiasm for the tasks ahead is given free rein.

The Current Situation

What has the smashing of the Gang of Four meant for the class struggle in China today? First and foremost, it means the class struggle is still taking place under socialism, which is to say on the working class' turf, with its forces occupying the commanding heights. This would hardly have been the case had the Gang usurped state power and established a bourgeois dictatorship, or, more likely, plunged the country into bloody civil war in their attempt. The continued existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the single most important factor determining how the struggle in China is going on now and will take place in the future. At the same time, within this overall favorable situation, the Chinese proletariat today faces certain difficult conditions in the class struggle resulting directly from the degeneration into capitalist roaders and bourgeois elements of the Gang of Four. Again, however, the fall of the Gang has removed a major roadblock to transformation of adverse conditions by the masses and the great majority of Communist Party members and leaders who genuinely want to make revolution. No longer are they being undercut and stabbed in the back at every turn by enemies claiming to be the leading force in the proletarian camp, and the only real upholders of Mao Tsetung Thought and the cultural revolution.

Hua Kuo-feng and the forces close to him, including Chen Yung-kuei, Chen Hsi-lien, Ni Chih-fu, Wang Tung-hsin, Li Teh-sheng, Chi Teng-kuei, and Wu Teh, all leading members of the Party who have long been associated with the "left"—make up and are working to strengthen the proletarian headquarters. They are in a position which requires both unity and struggle with rightist and revisionist forces in the Party leadership. (Nor does everyone in the Party leadership fall either 100% in the proletarian head-

quarters or 100% set himself against it; this is never the case and it certainly is not at present.) The right is currently very powerful, strengthened in no small degree by the aims of the Gang, as pointed out before. The anarchism and economic disruption they spawned in the name of rebellion, "don't produce for the incorrect line," "going against the tide" and "fighting the theory of productive forces," has spontaneously helped discredit the idea of "class struggle" itself, which they so distorted. Their undialectical and anti-materialist approach to the socialist new things they posed as defenders of, caused some of those things to stagnate and turn into their opposites (more on this later in the paper). And by refusing to uphold the tasks of promoting stability and unity in the country and the Party and pushing the national economy forward, and attacking those who did for revisionism (including Hua Kuo-feng, Chen Yung-kuei, and countless revolutionaries among the Party's ranks, as well as Teng and others with his line), they built the prestige of the right as those who were truly concerned with building socialism and insuring the well being of the masses. Even without the Gang's "help," tasks like those of the present period have always provided certain opportunities for the right to jump out with lines and programs which do negate grasping the class struggle in the name of accomplishing other tasks.

But contrary to the Gang's line, these tasks do not belong to the right. Just like the ideological tasks to which they are tied in the real world by a thousand threads, the political and economic tasks of building socialism belong to the masses of the people and to the genuine Marxist-Leninists who can best accomplish them and who seek to accomplish them precisely in order to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and to move toward communist society. The two models, Tachai in agriculture and Taching in industry, show concretely how such tasks can be tackled in a revolutionary way, how the masses can put politics in command and develop socialist consciousness precisely in the process of carrying out the kind of "prosaic," "boring" tasks Lenin referred to in the quote from *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* above. In doing so, moreover, they are laying the *material base* for further advances in the social relations and in socialist consciousness by breaking down small production, by cutting away at the three great differences, etc.

In the course of taking up the actual tasks of building socialism, two roads continually present themselves. This is all the more true when the right is strong and "black cat, white cat" pragmatism is an influential tendency, even if it is not necessarily

advocated openly. The two roads can be perceived arising around numerous issues in China today. A few examples follow which are mainly taken from such readily available bourgeois publications as the *New York Times*, *The Weekly Manchester Guardian*, and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. (All such sources must be taken with a considerable dose of salt, naturally, and confirmation sought from other, including Chinese sources; many are issues over which struggle has taken place many times in the past—although in studying them, it is important to remember that the context of current struggles can't be judged by this alone.) One Chinese publication is reported as carrying articles on the importance of implementing the plan to build Tachai type counties and mechanize agriculture while an editorial in another emphasizes higher immediate productivity on the communes at the expense of side-line industry and farmland capital construction projects. Articles appear referring to the Gang (and Lin Piao) as "left in form, right in essence," while others refer to them exclusively as "ultra-rightist." Some articles and speeches argue for rapid military modernization to prepare for war, while others emphasize this can be accomplished only on the basis of strengthening agriculture and industry as a whole. And so on.

Such struggles over particulars reflect and at the same time come to clarify and deepen the general struggle between two lines. This is going to be more true with the campaign to criticize the Gang of Four now focusing on the theoretical plane. (*PR* #1, 1978, p. 10) Already a sharp conflict can be seen between Hua Kuo-feng's emphasis in his speeches and writings on upholding the class struggle as the principal aspect in the contradiction with the struggle for production under socialism and a number of articles in the Chinese press arguing, in different guises, the opposite (and revisionist) view, that production should, and does, take precedence over class struggle. Note for example, Hua's use at the 11th Party Congress of Mao's quote, "Stability and unity don't mean writing off the class struggle," which is a pointed reference to the 1976 struggle against the right deviationist wind.

An additional point to which the bourgeois media pays a good deal of attention in Kremlinological speculation on leadership, portraying everything as a "power struggle at the top." This is the same approach, it should be remembered, they used in dealing with the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, there is a point here. People do hold lines and represent tendencies and developments in the Party and State apparatus—who holds what positions—are important. For instance, the Ministry of Propaganda, which was the

Gang's big stronghold for so long, and Liu Shao-chi before them, is now dominated by the right, although many "compromise" and left articles find their way into print. (See, for instance, the fine material on Taching in Sept. 1977 *China Reconstructs*.) Hua, for his part, has succeeded in placing leftists with whom he has worked in the past in charge of a number of key provincial Party committees, and so on.

Nor is this question limited to one of particular individuals and posts. There are important struggles over policy questions involved. Take liberated cadres—who should be brought back, how fast should they be given major posts, are the criticisms of them raised in the Cultural Revolution correct, or should they be ignored outright? The liberated cadres are not a homogeneous group; although most were overthrown in the struggle against Liu Shao-chi, some fell for ultra-leftism, and some in the battle against Lin Biao. The other side of this is the question of those associated with the Gang of Four. Some of the main leaders attacked in the campaign against the right deviationist wind in 1976 have tended to demand harsh treatment, while Hua, who was himself targeted by the Gang, and others have argued strongly for narrowing the target and not pushing aside any of those taken in by the Gang who can be won by education. It is also clear that for Hua and those around him, while questions of cadre policy and assignment are important, they are not decisive. Their main orientation is toward mobilizing the masses around the proletarian line. This is manifested particularly in their emphasis on the building mass study and action campaigns, like those around learning from Tachai and Taching, which aim at revolutionizing consciousness and practice.

These, then are the outlines of the class struggle in China now—two roads arising continuously as the Party and the masses undertake the tasks before them in every sphere, a powerful right, and increasing line struggle within the united front in the Party's leadership. There will be plenty of setbacks as well as victories as the class struggle develops, and its development will not follow a straight line or be easy to discern. Eventually, a bourgeois headquarters will consolidate around a revisionist line and jump out in opposition to the proletarian headquarters and there will be a new test of strength between the two classes. In every such sharp class struggle—and there will be many more in the long period of building socialism—the danger of restoration becomes very sharp, but every victory by the proletariat creates new conditions which make it that much harder to drag China back down the road to hell.

In evaluating what is happening in China, now and in the future, both the objective situation and the lines being put forward must be taken into consideration. Mao prophetically pointed out that after his death the right would use certain of his words to try and turn China back and the left would use others of his words to combat and overthrow them.

Despite all the damage the Gang did, the masses of the Chinese people still retain their basic enthusiasm for socialism and the great majority of Communist Party members and cadres want to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The defeat of these opportunists has kept the socialist road open. The Chinese working class and masses have a great deal of experience in waging the class struggle under socialism. They are hard to fool—look how little success the Gang of Four actually had—and whatever the real difficulties which confront them, we are confident they will continue to struggle to grasp the proletarian line and through their practice make it a mighty force for changing the world.

Two Particulars

To provide a deeper understanding of the Gang's counter-revolutionary line and practice and to flesh out the picture of the situation and tasks facing Hua, the Communist Party and the masses of people, the next section of this paper will focus on two particular questions—agricultural mechanization and socialist new things.

These were not chosen at random. Right now millions of Chinese peasants are mobilized in a vast mass campaign to create conditions for and carry out the basic mechanization of agriculture over the next few years. This undertaking will thrust Chinese farming from the general level of U.S. agriculture at the turn of the century to its level in the 1940's. Furthermore, the question of mechanization may appear to be solely one of economic development, but a closer look shows that it is in fact a political question as well, a dividing line as to whether China will continue to advance on the socialist road or not. Socialist new things are an important aspect of the forward motion of socialist society. Many have been the subject of re-evaluation and struggle since the fall of the Gang and this has become the source of glee in the bourgeois media and concern, controversy and opportunist slander among the ranks of communists and other friends of China.

At the same time, these are only two among many subjects

which have to be investigated in depth—bourgeois right, foreign trade, the *Water Margin* campaign and dozens more must be better understood if we are to draw out all the lessons of the class struggle in China and deepen our grasp of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. Even the points on agricultural mechanization and socialist new things, like the general analysis that opened this paper, are far from definitive. In each case, however, a concrete and scientific analysis of the information that is available leads irrevocably to the conclusion that the smashing of the Gang was an absolute necessity for the preservation of socialism in China. The deeper the investigation, the clearer this becomes.

Learn From Tachai Or Down With Tachai—2 Different Roads

In the fall of 1975, the Party leadership initiated a National Conference to Learn From Tachai. It marked the beginning of open struggle between Hua and the Gang, with Hua upholding and developing the revolutionary line of Mao against the direct opposition of the Gang.

Hua delivered the major speech at the Tachai Conference, summing up the importance of learning from Tachai in agriculture. His speech is reprinted in a pamphlet, "Let The Whole Party Mobilize For A Vast Effort To Develop Agriculture And Build Tachai-Type Counties Throughout The Country." Comrades should read all three speeches in this pamphlet for a deeper understanding of the struggle in agriculture.

Hua's speech on the learn from Tachai movement upheld Tachai as a red banner on the agricultural front. Hua laid out the task of building Tachai type counties, of carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in agriculture. He touches on the need for ideological education, the leading role of the Party, combatting the bourgeoisie inside and outside the Party. The speech deals with raising the level of ownership, and the key importance of farmland capital construction and mechanization. Learning from Tachai means learning to walk on two legs down the socialist road, putting proletarian politics in command. Hua lays out the role of leadership bodies on various levels to the movement to learn from Tachai. And he gives 6 criteria for becoming Tachai-type counties, clearly laying out the fighting tasks ahead. These criteria are remarkably similar to those laid out by Mao some 11 years earlier to serve as a yardstick for judging success in the Socialist Education Movement.

The entire conference and Hua's speech upholds and promotes

Tachai as a red banner. This in itself was a victory, a consolidation around a line and a plan to transform society along the socialist road. Because of this, the other two speeches, which concretely laid out the Tachai experience in grasping revolution and promoting production were able to become part of a mass movement. Coming out of the conference was a revolutionary call to action to all the peasants from the Party. It unleashed an enthusiastic response. Within 24 hours of the end of the conference, Mao approved Hua's speech for nationwide distribution. Work teams were set up to go all over China to spur the mass movement. The number of cadres assigned to these work teams was a staggering 1.6 million.

Based on this, the movement to learn from Tachai grew, though not without opponents. The conference took place at a time when the right was beginning to whip up the right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts, and they did not support any mass movement to revolutionize the peasantry and mechanize agriculture. And the self proclaimed "left," the Gang, was actively working to sabotage the movement before it could pick up steam.

Hua has remained a champion of the banner of Tachai, continuing with the second Tachai Conference, where Chen Yung-Kuei also gave a major speech which was distributed, and the publication in 1977 of "Tachai The Red Banner" which upholds and deepens the experience of Tachai. Learning from Tachai remains a focal point in the struggle to mobilize the masses around Mao's line and a sharp weapon to oppose the right. (More on the current situation later.)

The unity of the masses around Learning From Tachai is deep. The writers of the two other speeches in the Hua pamphlet are often set against Hua in an effort to deride the movement. Kuo Feng-lien is an ardent supporter and ally of Hua in this battle. Wang Chin-tzu is a provincial secretary in Shansi. Reports of the split among them are only wishful thinking.

Two Line Struggle on Mechanization of Agriculture

The Gang's line on the question of mechanization of agriculture was a counter-revolutionary line. Where it was implemented, it severely weakened socialism and encouraged capitalism. Where it was propagated, it stood directly opposed to the line of Mao which was continued by Hua. It was an actual fetter on the development of China along the socialist road that had to be smashed for that advancement to continue.

Struggles around agriculture and mechanization are key in

China. Over 80% of the people are peasants. Conditions for the peasantry are far poorer than in the cities. All three great differences—mental/manual, town/country, worker/peasant—are centered in great part on this question. And while there have been great advances in China over the past 28 years, the mass of agriculture is still not mechanized, and the peasantry spends the vast majority of its time on basic and difficult production. The worker-peasant alliance is the foundation of proletarian rule in China. Without it, the working class cannot play its leading role in the struggle to consciously transform all of society.

In 1957, Mao spoke on the importance of mechanization. "Gradual implementation of agricultural mechanization. . . can greatly raise labor productivity, progressively solve the problem of linking the development of agriculture with the development of industry, and *progressively consolidate the worker-peasant alliance.*" (emphasis added)

By 1962, Mao said "Our worker-peasant alliance has already passed through two stages. The first was based on the land revolution, the second on the cooperative movement... At the present time our worker-peasant alliance has to take the next step and establish itself on the basis of mechanization." And furthermore, "When state ownership and mechanization are integrated we will be able to begin truly to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance, and the differences between workers and peasants will surely be eliminated step by step." (Mao, *A Critique of Soviet Economics*, p. 46, 47.)

Mechanization of agriculture was then a key to developing socialism, not just for the boost in agricultural production, but also for the political rule of the working class, for the development of side line industries and the proportional development of society, for the principle of self reliance, preparedness for war and preparedness for natural disasters.

As early as 1970, Chen Yung-Kwei, the leader of Tachai, spoke of the opposition of the right and the "ultras" to mechanization. The right regarded mechanization as an ordinary measure to save labor and increase production, failing to see the political significance of it to the worker-peasant alliance. And the "ultras" "seem to stress revolutionization, but actually they neither understand revolutionization nor want mechanization." In 1971, Yao Wen-yuan opposed the publication of an article on mechanization of agriculture by a provincial secretary named Hua Kuo-feng.

The struggle over mechanization was of the first importance in China, and reached a high pitch in 1975 that has carried through to

today. The conditions were present coming out of the Cultural Revolution for a leap in this area, and the question of which road to take came to the fore.

The Gang Attacks Tachai

The gang did not wait for the conference to attack it. They had already played down the buildup for this historic conference in the media under their control. Once the conference started, they tried to take it over. Chiang Ching spoke at the opening of the conference. She gave the assembled delegates a lecture on the novel *Water Margin*, using the opportunity to attack the conference and by implication Hua. Her media was geared up to give her speech a big spread. *Hsinhua* reported that she made an important speech. But the text did not appear, and the speech was not mentioned after that.

The gang had run up against a very powerful and angry opponent, Mao Tsetung. When he heard about her speech he could not conceal his disgust. "Shit! Wide of the mark." He gave specific instructions—don't print the text, don't play the tapes, don't distribute the speech.

Prevented from playing up Chiang Ching, the gang responded by playing down the conference and movement to learn from Tachai. Reports shrank, and at the conclusion of the conference Hua's speech was buried in the middle of *Renmin Ribao*. *Hsinhua* did write some articles about the conference, but generally they ignored it, and they even started a short series about agriculture without even a mention of the Learn From Tachai movement that was taking root throughout the country.

Instead, the gang searched around for some other model to put up against Tachai, some commune they had control over, or a village where everyone wrote poetry. All this was just so much sabotage of a major effort of the Party under the leadership of Mao.

The Gang's Line for Weakening the Worker-Peasant Alliance

The gang and their line worked at weakening the worker-peasant alliance from three different directions. First, they opposed and stood in the way of the Tachai movement. Second, their policies in the cities weakened it, and third, their agricultural policies weakened it. All added up to a serious undermining and threat to proletarian rule in China.

The gang-led disruptions in the cities were not without effect in the countryside. For all their talk about restricting bourgeois right and the three great differences, their policies magnified them. The peasantry, and especially in the collective form of organization, depend on the cities for agricultural implements, supplies, fertilizer, etc. as well as consumer goods. And they are faced with strict "laws" of production, like the necessity of planting during the planting season.

The peasantry was frequently unable to obtain these needed goods because of disruptions in basic industry and transport that the gang pushed with such calls as don't produce for the incorrect line. Workers on strike in China receive full pay, while peasants get paid only on the basis of what they produce. Disruption in production that cut agricultural production therefore magnify the differences between workers and peasants and town and country whether they are done in the name of "revolution" or not. That is why there has to be an overall view and plan for the economy. Spontaneity means nothing less than capitalism. The results of the most serious disruptions was to break down the collective economy and push the peasants to private small scale farming in order to survive. The black market also flourishes in these conditions. This is capitalism, and is pointed out in Hua's Tachai speech. The gang attacked him for "going after foxes while wolves are in power." The truth is that the gang were the wolves who turned loose the foxes.

The gang had relatively little influence in the countryside, it mostly centered around the bigger cities like Peking and Shanghai and Hangchow. In these areas, they took Mao's line of taking grain as the foundation of agriculture and get prepared for war and used them to destroy Mao's line of planned proportional development of the economy.

Grain as the key link reflects the overall need of the masses and the economy. The peasantry must strive to fulfill the state plan in grain, and supply the state with the required amount, in order to ensure proportional development, and therefore other crops must be planned for with this in mind.

In the areas the gang controlled, they threw the overall plan out the window and metaphysically raised grain to oppose it. They converted vegetable growing communes around major cities and turned them into grain producers. But this was done without regard to where the vegetables were to be used. They were for the workers in the nearby cities, a small example of local self reliance. The quantity and quality of vegetables dropped off, with resulting

resentment by the workers at the peasantry, and with new fertile soil for black market vegetables. Of course the most advanced did not blame the peasants or the plan, but rather blamed the bad communists who were messing things up—the gang and their henchmen.

Mechanization of agriculture was never an actual part of the gang's efforts in agriculture. They focused instead in developing the economy by "restricting bourgeois right." And in doing so they showed how a correct Marxist concept can become a weapon against the masses when used to promote an incorrect line.

The gang launched a movement to restrict bourgeois right in the countryside by attacking rural fairs and open markets. These exist throughout China, and are legal and generally even state regulated. Through them, the peasants supplement their income by trading the produce from the remaining private plots. And these fairs and markets also serve to enable communes, brigades and work teams to make small adjustments to fill needs not accounted for in the overall plan, like a draft animal or a tool.

These markets certainly contain soil for capitalism to grow and for capitalist ideology to expand. But this is very secondary, both in relation to total agricultural production and distribution and to their positive roles.

The gang attacked, without any investigation of conditions, any practice of the mass line, and without using the method of persuasion and education to deal with contradictions among the people. Under the signboard of restricting bourgeois right, they simply closed down the fairs and markets in at least two provinces.

In Chekiang, the Hangchow disturbances and riots had dealt heavy blows to the worker-peasant alliance. Distribution of goods to the countryside was heavily curtailed, with the resulting push to private plot farming. This process was speeded up when the gang's supporter in the area, the infamous Wen Sen-ho, closed down the local market by force. In one prefecture, Wanchow, the cumulative effect of the gang's leadership was the almost total breakdown of the communes and redivision of land among the peasants for private farming.

In Liaoning Province, the home base of Mao Yuan-hsin, Mao's nephew and a close ally of the gang, the local rural fairs were closed down under his leadership. This was done under the signboard of restricting bourgeois right and capitalism. The result here was not as serious as in Chekiang. The communes did not break down, but a flourishing black market did spring up. Bourgeois right was not restricted, and instead a new strata of very rich speculators was

created through the leadership of the line of Mao Yuan-hsin and the gang.

These are not simply "rash advances" by well meaning revolutionaries. These were cases of socialist relations degenerating and actual capitalist relations openly growing. The gang followers would not pull back and say that the conditions were not ripe. They lashed out at the masses again, this time blaming them for being too backward to restrict bourgeois right.

This three pronged attack on the worker-peasant alliance—from the cities, in the countryside, and in opposing Tachai and the Party's line for developing agriculture—placed the gang in direct opposition to Mao and the Chinese masses. They had become a real fetter on the development of the socialist revolution that had to be smashed. But smashing the gang is no guarantee of smooth sailing ahead for mechanization and revolution in agriculture or in any other sphere. In fact, agriculture remains a key focus for the class struggle in China today as it has been for the past 28 years and more.

The Struggle To Learn From Tachai Continues Under Hua

"Only socialism can save China." This was Mao Tsetung's statement on which road was the road forward. And for agriculture, Mao said, "the fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization." Mechanization of agriculture is a key step along this road. This will provide the basis for still further leaps in socialist ownership, consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance, and restricting the three great differences. But these gains will only be realized by putting ideological and political work based on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought in command. This is the fundamental lesson of Tachai.

Now that the gang is gone, the struggle over mechanization is still raging. Capitalist roaders of all stripes, either those like the gang or those like Liu Shao-chi all oppose the mass movement to mechanize agriculture.

The Right is all for the four modernizations on paper, but not in an all round, proportional way to build socialism stronger. They historically stress heavy industry over agriculture, because it is the most profitable sector of the economy. On a capitalist basis, mechanization of agriculture is hardly profitable on a nationwide scale. On this basis, it could wait until industry has moved much further ahead. And in fact this has been proposed time and again, both in the history of the Soviet Union and in China right up until

today.

But as Hua points out, "We should see to it that the mechanization of agriculture will more effectively push forward and guarantee the modernization of industry, national defense and science and technology so as to greatly strengthen the material base of our great socialist motherland. . ." (Let the Whole Party Mobilize, p. 3)

The gang opposed mechanization and the Tachai movement as a key point of their counter-revolutionary line. Smashing them maintained working class rule in China, and laid the basis for further struggle.

The debate over agriculture is relatively open. Different articles in different publications put the stress on different sides of the question, and so the lines become clear. The right is stressing grain production and fulfilling and exceeding the plan. The revolutionaries under Hua, and including Chen Yung-kuei, are stressing the need for both immediate production while providing the peasantry with sufficient time to energetically take up farm land capital construction and mechanization.

Hua put forward in his May Day speech this year that "Under socialism, too, the growth of the productive forces is bound to expose flaws in the economic and political systems and rouse people to make changes."

Hua continued by stressing the importance of learning from Tachai: "Chairman Mao long ago pointed out: 'The social and technical transformation of the rural areas will proceed simultaneously.' The growth of agricultural cooperatives into people's communes opened a broad road for mechanizing farming. Agriculture is of vital importance in our country's economic construction. The development of our agriculture calls for carrying out the mass movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture and popularize Tachai-type counties throughout the country, for carrying out education in the Party's basic line among the peasant masses, for criticizing revisionism and capitalism in a big way and for persisting in the socialist road while energetically to mechanize farm work. The present three-level system of ownership of the means of production in the people's commune, with ownership by the production team as the basic form, will in the future gradually be raised to fully collective ownership by the people's commune and eventually ownership by the whole people. This is a process of constant transformation in the superstructure and in the relations of production, a process of achieving farm mechanization and industrializing the communes and the country, and a process of con-

stantly raising the level of mechanization and industrialization." (*Peking Review* No. 19, 1977, p. 24, 25)

Hua Kuo-feng is carrying out Mao's line in agriculture, understanding the conditions and continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, waging class struggle to build socialism. This is shown in his opposition to the gang and in his leadership of the Tachai movement and persevering in the task of socialist mechanization together with the masses against all enemies and obstacles.

Socialist New Things

During the past several years a major focal point of the sharpening struggle in China has been over the direction of the socialist new things. In recent months the bourgeois press, now joined by Avakian, has proclaimed that the socialist new things which arose during the Cultural Revolution have been essentially eliminated and that the bourgeoisie completely holds sway in these areas, reversing every correct verdict, while bending every effort to institute "capitalist" new things in their place. But those who wildly make these charges of reversal only peer through bourgeois tinted glasses, substituting the facts with their fantasies and desires. Presently, in China there is sharp struggle over the direction and adjustment of several of these new things. Much of this two line struggle is centered on how to rectify the damage the Gang heaped on these new things, while claiming to be their upholder. Already enough is known to characterize some of the main points of struggle in China over the current and future status of socialist new things. This struggle helps to clarify the nature of these new things. The first new things arose almost 60 years ago.

Lenin referred to socialist new things as "shoots of communism." They are developments within socialist society which show the road ahead and which, themselves, are a step down that road. Their origin is of particular importance. Socialist new things arise out of mass surges of enthusiasm for socialism to both build and defend it against the class enemy. They are based on a heightened level of ideological and political consciousness among the masses who, coming to grips with the actual problems immediately confronting socialism, are struggling to transform those conditions, a new shoot may be born. These shoots potentially represent a particular qualitative leap forward in social relations.

Arising from mass surges of enthusiasm, these new things

serve as a source for future enthusiasm. Although they are not the only source of enthusiasm, socialism itself is the main source of mass enthusiasm, for example, by wiping out unemployment and inflation, by step by step eliminating national oppression and women's oppression, by providing a decent standard of living for 900 million people who were the world's poorest, etc.

In *A Great Beginning*, Lenin summed up the spontaneous development of "communist Saturdays," "subbotniks," as "communist shoots." This referred to the achievements of the Moscow-Kagan railroad workers who voluntarily worked on Saturdays. Guided by their own class consciousness and enthusiasm they took the initiative to work and increase the social productivity of their own labor in order to build socialism without any regard to pay. In this article Lenin described another "communist shoot," the development of free public child care which freed women to enter the labor force to fully participate in the building of socialism.

Such things, of course, have also developed in China. At one time, the development of the mutual aid teams and then later, the people's communes were socialist new things in agriculture; they were leaps forward in man's social organization which in a concentrated way pointed the road forward. And of course there was sharp struggle over them. A handful of capitalist roaders jumped out to oppose and destroy these things. Some came straight out as rightists and others decked themselves out as super revolutionaries. Some of the masses resisted them because of conservative attitudes and habits. Others among the masses wanted to abandon them because of early difficulties. In spite of the bourgeois opposition and the difficulties in the work, the overwhelming majority of the peasants were won to them in the course of building and adjusting these new things. Eventually, they became integral parts of socialist agriculture and socialist society as a whole, and ceased to be identified as new things.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—itself a great leap forward for socialism in China—a great number of socialist new things were initiated, nourished, and developed, such as: the mass movements to study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought, genuine cadre participation in manual labor, the formation of contingents of theoreticians from workers and peasants, sending educated youth to the countryside, the creation and popularization of revolutionary model operas, May 7th Cadre Schools, the strengthening of the Party's centralized leadership, revolutionary committees, three-in-one combinations, barefoot

doctors, educational reforms, mass participation in scientific and technical renovations, etc. (This list is taken from a list of socialist new things published in *Hongqi* 12, 1974. At the time the Gang was in control of this publication. The list they present is far from complete. Any number of new things were not included, for example, the worker-peasant villages, pioneered at Taching, an important concrete development in reducing the differences between workers and peasants.)

Socialist New Things: Objects of Fierce Class Struggle

The initiation and development of socialist new things are often targets of fierce class struggle. Lenin lays this point out clearly back in 1919. "When the new has just been born the old always remains stronger than it for some time; this is always the case in nature and in social life. Jeering at the feebleness of the young shoots of the new order, cheap scepticism of the intellectuals and the like—these are, essentially, methods of bourgeois class struggle against the proletariat. . ." (*A Great Beginning*, Vol. 29, p. 425)

Those attempting to hold back the further genuine revolutionizing of social relations, often make the weakness and fragility of the socialist new things a major focus of their attacks. The history of socialist China verifies Lenin's summation. From the early days of agricultural cooperation, through the Great Leap Forward, through the Cultural Revolution, and through the present day, those who oppose continuing the revolution often target the socialist new things for jeering attack. Some of this resistance arises from the conservative thinking of the more backward masses, while the organized attacks on the new things are a method of political struggle of rightists who step out onto the capitalist road. In recent years the rightists once again stepped up their attacks on the socialist new things in an attempt, as Mao stated, "reversing correct verdicts." But their efforts were greatly aided by another kind of error that Lenin referred to as well, an error which the Gang of Four turned into a reactionary principle.

Lenin, in criticizing cadre who were freely calling their enterprises "communes," wrongly representing them as shoots of communism, identifies the serious consequences of this error:

"Any kind of enterprise started by Communists or with their participation is very often at once declared to be a 'commune,' it being not infrequently forgotten that this *very honorable title* must be *won* by prolonged and persistent effort, by *practical*

achievement in genuine communist development.

"... Let the title be simpler—and incidentally, the defects and shortcomings of the *initial* stages of the new organizational work will not be blamed on the 'communes,' but (as in all fairness, they should be), on *bad* Communists. It would be a good thing to eliminate the word 'commune' from common use, to prohibit every Tom, Dick and Harry from grabbing at it, or to *allow this title to be borne only* by genuine communes, which have really demonstrated in practice (and have proved by the unanimous recognition of the whole of the population) that they are capable of organizing their work in a communist manner." (*A Great Beginning*, p. 431)

The Gang of Four were bad communists. They cloaked themselves in the banner of the Cultural Revolution and posed as the staunchest defenders of the socialist new things. Those "things" under their leadership and control (in such fields as culture, education, etc.) were stifled and rigidified. Hard work was replaced by hot air. They opposed adjustments necessary to aid the growth of these socialist new things, and to meet the needs of the class struggle; they rejected proposals and failed to implement instructions. All of this under the pretense of upholding the socialist new things, and claiming that all proposed changes were "revisionist" attacks that had to be repelled. The Gang's bad leadership crushed and misdirected the masses enthusiasm for socialism, draining the lifeblood out of these genuine socialist new things, as a result they stagnated.

The Gang's role as bad communists, becomes immediately apparent by examining Chiang Ching's leadership in culture. The revolutionizing of culture was a central part of the GPCR and represented a tremendous advance for the working class in exercising all round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in this sphere of the superstructure. In particular, the development of proletarian model operas was a major step forward in driving out decadent bourgeois culture that glorifies rulers, exploiting classes, etc. However, the rigid development of these model operas—under the signboard of not tampering with socialist new things—completely stagnated the development of revolutionary culture in China. In a 9-year period, a grand total of 8 model operas were developed to serve China's 800 million people. Literature, movies, poetry, etc. stagnated. The film "Pioneers" under the supervision of Chiang Ching Art was essentially suppressed.

In July, 1975, recognizing the deteriorating situation in culture, Mao called for an "adjustment" in policy, while criticizing

Chiang Ching. Mao was not very pleased with this self-proclaimed "great" communist. "Model operas alone are not enough. What is worse, one comes under fire for the slightest fault. No longer are 100 flowers blossoming. Others are not allowed to offer any opinion, that's not good." "People are afraid to write articles or produce plays. There is nothing in the way of novels and poetry." He added, "There should be some adjustments in the Party's policy on literature and art, and the performing arts should gradually enlarge their repertoires in a year or in 2 or in 3 years." "Enliven the atmosphere in a year or 2, if it takes 3, 4 or even 5 years, that will be all right too." And of course there's the famous criticism of her suppression of *Pioneers*: "There is nothing seriously wrong with this film. I suggest it be approved for release. We shouldn't demand perfection. And to bring as many as 10 charges against it is really going too far. This hampers the readjustment of the Party's policy on literature and art."

Mao's criticisms of Chiang Ching clearly indicate how her bad leadership had become a major fetter in cultural work. In the first statement of criticism Mao is hitting at the failure of cultural work to accomplish its basic political task to serve the workers, peasants and soldiers. Even though quality is important, it is dialectically related to quantity: quality cannot be developed in a vacuum. Also, how many times can 800 million people sit through 8 operas, as the main form of socialist culture, before they get bored and disgusted?

What is worse, in the hands of Chiang Ching revolutionary model operas, a socialist new thing, were transformed into the absolute measuring stick and used to bludgeon down initiative and the masses' enthusiasm for socialist culture. This method of work was a sure guarantee that 100 flowers couldn't blossom. Chiang Ching was an extremely bad communist or, more correctly, an extremely good fascist. She had faithfully violated all of Mao's instructions on developing cultural new things, as she continued right along proclaiming herself to be the arch-defender of socialist new things. While rightists at this point could only aspire to reverse correct verdicts, Chiang Ching was doing so on a daily basis, by negating all the guidelines necessary for advancing the new things and at the same time claiming to uphold them. Mao instructed Chiang Ching to readjust the policy on culture and put some life back into it before culture once again degenerated into its former "mummy-like" character as he, during the last couple years of his life, called on the Gang to alter their general direction.

They failed to heed Mao's advice. The Gang's bad leadership

provided the right with a mountain of ammunition to launch an attack. As the right deviationist wind began to blow, the Gang stepped up their counter-revolutionary activity, portraying themselves as the defenders of socialism against the right. Trying to cover themselves by the opposite pole of the same stupidity, they laid plans, until the only way to deal with their counter-revolution was to smash the Gang down.

Chiang Ching's leadership in culture provides a general indication of the kind of damage the Gang inflicted on the socialist new things under their control. As a result a number of these new things require major adjustments to get them moving again in the correct direction. Already there has been sharp struggle within the present leadership in evaluating and developing policy for making adjustments. And possibly depending on the viability of these "shoots" in relation to the necessary political tasks, it could be correct to let some die. On the other hand, given the intensity of struggle, it is conceivable that the right could kill off some viable socialist new things. Through a number of methods they could employ to choke the life out of these new things, such as, continuing the Gang's method of rigidifying, which prevents them to grow and causes them to degenerate, or gut the heart out of them while preserving the name, or finally just straight up abolishing them. Currently, there are possibilities for the right and not actualities. The methods of destruction and the methods for advance look similar, and basically the only way to make a distinction requires an analysis of concrete conditions.

Most socialist new things are actively being supported and promoted by the present leadership. These include, among others, sending educated youth to the countryside, three-in-one combinations, revolutionary committees, barefoot doctors, mass campaigns to study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought and the formation of worker-peasant theoretical groups, strengthening Party leadership, May 7th Cadre Schools, etc. But even though these socialist things are being supported, it is important to grasp class struggle runs through everything, which always implies the possibility that these things could be reversed. Also by recognizing class struggle through everything it is clear that there can be no external static socialist new things. They must continually be adjusted in the heat of the class struggle and must advance with society which means they will inevitably be negated to a higher level.

Currently, a major struggle over educational reforms produced a program for next year. The development of this struggle will be

dealt with in the next section. A major struggle has been emerging over the direction of scientific and technical work; a national science conference has been announced for this spring. The developments in the struggle over the direction of science and technology, will be thoroughly presented in the future. Also, quite recently a struggle has developed over genuine cadre participation in manual labor.

In December, Hua Kuo-feng and a group of leading supporters went to the countryside to participate in genuine manual labor. They worked on the construction of a reservoir. By doing, Hua made a clear statement in supporting genuine manual labor for cadres. He was also providing standard to judge cadre and unleashed the initiative of the masses to struggle with cadre to fulfill these responsibilities. Genuine participation of cadre in manual labor has been, historically, a sharp point of struggle within the Party. The growing intensity of this struggle is reflected in the fact that reports of Hua's participation in manual labor appeared in the press, only after an unexplained delay. Hua clearly stands for upholding this socialist new thing, and while there has not been public opposition, there is resistance nonetheless.

The Question of Education

The best publicized struggle over socialist new things in today's China has been that concerning what the 1974 *Hongqi* official list called, "the reform in education," which actually included a number of socialist new things. Both the controversy and the information it has made available make this a good subject to look at in detail. In trying to evaluate what is going on, it is necessary to investigate the history, the damage done by the Four and the line struggle now, and to apply a yardstick Lenin suggested, "practical success in prolonged efforts," to determine what actually serves the interests of the working class and where adjustments are required.

Education was the first mass battlefield during the Cultural Revolution. Under Liu Shao-chi, capitalist roaders had increasingly tightened their grip on the educational system. Politics was divorced from education, and book knowledge held superior to manual labor—before the GPCR only one middle school in all Peking had a policy of part-time productive labor for its students. Teaching methods and course content were not designed to arm students to change the world. Higher education tended to

reproduce capitalist class relations by turning out experts and intellectuals with bourgeois and feudal values and by "objective" admissions criteria which favored the children of cadres, the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie and kept the working class and peasantry greatly underrepresented.

The masses of students rose up to criticize and overturn the leadership taking this road and repudiate their line and methods, and in doing so closed down the schools for several years. Mao was generally very enthusiastic about the revolution on the educational front and in his directive of May 7, 1966 provided a general orientation for it: "While their (students) main task is to study, they should in addition to their studies learn other things, that is, industrial work, farming and military affairs. They should also criticize the bourgeoisie. The period of schooling should be shortened, education should be revolutionized, and the domination of our schools by bourgeois intellectuals should by no means be allowed to continue." (*PekingReview* 47, 1967, p. 9). As time passed and classes continued to remain in limbo while many campuses experienced small civil wars between Red Guard factions, workers' propaganda teams were sent into the campuses to restore order and help reorganize and provide working class leadership to education. The lessons of this period could be summed up in a comment Mao had made in the late '50s, "Education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor."

The struggle over how to consolidate the advances of the Cultural Revolution in education and how to make the educational system strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat ("serve proletarian politics") has been going on since at least 1971. It has been so intense because the problems have been very great. Year after year visitors and articles have reported that university enrollment remained well below the pre-Cultural Revolution level and many graduates and advanced technical training facilities had never reopened. Wuhan University, for instance, had 5,000 students in 1965. Today it is finally moving to rectify the criminal decadent luxury of having only 3,000 enrolled and a 1 to 3 teacher to student ratio! Severe problems existed in the quality of education as well. Since the fall of the Gang this can be quantified to some extent. Shanghai recently gave college graduates in science working in local scientific and technical departments a *middle school* test in their specialities—68% failed basic math, 70% physics and 76% chemistry! (*The Economist*, December 31, 1977, p. 29-30)

Mao was extremely concerned about the state of China's education, in 1974 telling a meeting of liberated cadres, "Education

needs to be revolutionized, pedagogy needs to be reformed; but that doesn't equal to abandonment of professors, quality and quantity of pedagogy, and going to universities without examinations, but a change of methods. Henceforth, it will be necessary to continuously elevate the quality and quantity of teaching, to include theory, practice, politics and administrative functionings." He also pointed out, "If education can't catch up, there will be no scientists in the coming years." (*Issues and Studies*, February, 1975, p. 92)

As the struggle over this problem developed, the Gang took their characteristic stand of upholding "socialist new things" to oppose socialism. Chang Chun-chiao's famous remark, "Bring up exploiters and intellectual aristocrats with bourgeois consciousness and culture or bring up workers with consciousness but no culture: what do you want? I'd rather have workers without culture than exploiters and intellectual aristocrats with culture." (*Peking Review* 8, 1977, p. 11) was not some abstract debating point. It was his answer to the problem that the universities were turning out workers without culture (a term which refers to learning and education in general, not poetry appreciation). As such it was no answer at all, only bluster in defense of the status quo, Gang control over much of the educational system. This went right along with the Gang's general line, which in education came out as the position that colleges should only teach the "specialty of struggling against capitalist roaders." (*Peking Review* 46, 1977). This was the same division of "class struggle" from the many tasks of revolution and socialism they pushed everywhere. It narrowed and distorted Mao's point about education *servicing* politics, went against the May 7 directives' call that students' "main task is study" and flew in the face of the objective need of socialist China for ever greater numbers of educated and trained people. What it did do was try and stake out the schools as areas for training (to the extent they controlled the selection of students by "political criteria") and recruiting Gang supporters and as centers from which to disseminate the "theory" they covered their line with.

Although the Gang's semi-anarchist line was the main one crippling the education system, the right posed a serious danger, too. Mao's remarks (quoted above) were clearly aimed mainly at the need for rectification in education but they also cautioned against negating revolution in the process. Advocates of the bourgeois line on education did jump up as the right deviationist wind began blowing up in the second half of 1975. Taking advantage of the dif-

ficult situation and the Gang's perversion of many of the gains of the GPCR, they proposed "reforming" education back to its pre-cultural revolution state. Mao's response was to turn a couple of letters to him to this effect over to the students at Tsinghua to kick off debate on the questions they raised. Instead of a real debate on what had to be done in the educational field, Gang backers who were dominant at Tsinghua and other schools set up an orchestrated campaign which defended the existing situation in education and soon shifted into an equally distorted version of the anti-right deviationist wind campaign. The result was that stagnation continued and problems deepened until the Gang's fall.

Current Problems in Education

China's need for a functioning, expanding and socialist educational system is critical. Right now, there is a great shortage of every kind of trained scientist, expert and technician. There are two critically needed steel mills at Wuhan, imported with Mao's approval, which are way behind construction schedule because the engineers and other trained personnel required just aren't there. And the demand will grow as China undertakes the big push to complete the four modernizations and other tasks. Taking the long view, the need is even greater—as China approaches 100% literacy, the goal for the minimum level of education everyone reaches must be raised and as that level is approached, raised again. This is key to eliminating the differences between mental and manual labor, which can only be done by raising the cultural level and capabilities of the masses as a whole.

The wreckage the Gang leaves behind in the educational field is massive. Much of it consists of "socialist new things," some of which proved bogus in practice, and more often, real "sprouts" which became petrified under the Gang's metaphysics and were turning into fetters on the development of socialism.

An example of this is the question of textbooks. Most of those used before the Cultural Revolution were permeated through and through with bourgeois ideology and methodology and when the GPCR broke out they were dumped. Instead, teachers were encouraged to compile their own, revolutionized teaching material, working with their students and workers or peasants attached to the leadership of their institutions. At the time, this was an excellent development. But the gang *kept* textbook production more or less at the local level ever since. Instead of taking the initial advance to a higher level by summing up and consolidating the most

advanced experiences and texts and using the collectively acquired knowledge to produce good national or regional texts, which could serve as the main leg or perhaps a strong secondary one, they turned this advance into its opposite. Elevating local produced texts to a principle removed the most effective way to maintain national standards in education. Many locally produced texts students and teachers had to rely on could not help but be inadequate or downright bad, reflecting problems their authors had, the lack of models, and the general breakdown of the chain of knowledge on this question.

The potential for a similar problem developing arose in the case of the workers assigned to revolutionary committees in the schools. In many instances, the same workers have been doing this for ten years now, without ever having returned to their jobs. As some lose their ties with their class brothers and sisters, the danger of degeneration becomes severe. Proletarian guidance can over time turn into "class stand" bogarting, and maneuvering to keep a relatively privileged job. (The Gang tried to foster this situation and recruit these new-born "hacks" to their cause.) At Peking University it has been summed up that the most valuable contributions in recent years have been made by campus workers who have continued on their jobs while taking part in guiding the school.

There is sure to be plenty of struggle around how to sum up the overall role of the representatives of the worker propaganda teams and how to move ahead. The very idea of special forms of working class leadership in the schools will be opposed by conscious rightists, by academic overlords and some whose positions will be enhanced if they're dropped. But others, in the schools, in the Party, and in the class, will fight and devise the best ways of making that idea a material force.

Is the Verdict on Education Being Reversed?

One of the issues the Gang sowed the most confusion about was tests. Like textbooks, these had tended to have a particular character before the Cultural Revolution—bourgeois. They were frequent and used by the teachers to punish and cow their students, and as pointed out before, tended to re-produce capitalist class relations in school admissions. Like textbooks, they were dumped in the GPCR and like textbooks the Gang tried to keep it that way. Tests in general are not inherently bourgeois in character. They are extremely useful as a means for evaluating

how much a student has learned, how well a teacher has taught, where a graduate should be placed to make best use of his or her capabilities or to further develop them, etc. In the absence of tests as an objective gauge of such things, the use of "political line" as the single decisive criterion encouraged abuses both by individuals trying to "go by the back door" and on a broad scope by opportunists like the Gang. The Gang's anti-test line had wide effects. Two Canadian teachers recently returned from working at Canton Foreign Languages Institute report that when a final test to evaluate graduating seniors was proposed this spring many of the students rebelled because they had not taken an exam since junior middle school—before the Cultural Revolution. (The struggle was resolved by setting up a similar test a month and a half in advance to help students detect and work on their weak points.) The Gang desperately fought off moves to resume testing. Their most successful tactic was the promotion of a petty opportunist named Chang Tieh-sheng. When he did poorly on a just established college entrance exam in 1973, Chang appended a whiney note to it about how he was a hardworking production team leader and all the other communes had chosen "bookworms" and careerists to take the test, so the test wasn't fair and please let him go to college anyway. The Gang prettified this incident—editing Chang's note and claiming he turned it in with a blank test—and splashed him all over the national media as a model of rebelling against the incorrect line of using exams in college enrollment. Chang took to his new role like a hog to slops and became a key mouthpiece for the Gang. (For more on Chang Tieh-Sheng see *Peking Review* 8, 1977). Meanwhile, the wide publicity given his model led not only to a new wave of anti-test sentiment but to many middle school students summing up that there was no point to studying because they could always bogart their way into college.

With the Gang gone (and "Blank Test" Chang with them) the current leadership opened general college entrance exams this fall to the great majority of the country's young adults as part of a general move to step up enrollment and recruit the most qualified candidates, including some directly from middle school, without the recent standard minimum of 2 years in a plant, commune or army unit. This was a sweeping move to rectify the overall stagnation the educational system had been in for so long. While it would be wrong to attempt all-around evaluation of this without more information on the test and on the general situation in education than is available now, a few points can and must be made. Use of tests as one standard for choosing who goes to college is not wrong

but desirable, although it must be in conjunction with taking into account such questions as whether candidates "have given a good account of themselves politically" and "are determined to study for the revolution," standards required for taking this fall's exam. At the same time, there are dangers in the resumption of entrance tests which must be recognized and adjusted for—first and foremost that of reverting to the pre-GPCR situation with those from "higher" class backgrounds squeezing out workers and peasants. Class struggle over the 2 roads and the 2 lines on this question is sure to continue as "efforts will be continued to improve and perfect the proletarian enrollment system on the basis of summing up the experience, both positive and negative in enrolling college students." (*Peking Review* 46, 1977)

Even though cleaning up after the Gang and rectifying the situation in education are monumental tasks, a number of the most important socialist new things in education from the period of the Cultural Revolution are being made an integral part of this process. Perhaps the most important is the combining of productive labor with study, a principle which is now universally applied from elementary schools on up. At the university level such labor, without pay, takes up about 20% of a student's school time, either regularly at a nearby plant or commune, or in long "vacation" stretches at a commune or both.

Another is political education, which includes not only a minimum of a half day a week of study and discussion of Marxist-Leninist theory but the integration of politics into every field of study whether it be the subject matter in foreign language classes or science classes taking up "open door" research projects to aid local plants, communes or municipalities.

In addition, other forms of educational institutions developed both before and during the Cultural Revolution to provide education for workers and peasants, such as the Kiangsi Communist Labor University (see *Peking Review* 33, 1977) and the part-time schools attached to factories, are being maintained and their enrollment increased. Still other forms are being developed and expanded, like correspondence courses in various technical skills for people in the countryside.

The Future of Socialist New Things

In education and in every field, the class struggle continues over socialist new things, going on in open and hidden forms with the proletarian forces attempting to defend them, to adjust them

and to incorporate them fully into socialist society. But especially at this time it is wrong to fall into the Gang of Four's static view that the question is just one of defending those which grew up during the Cultural Revolution.

The enthusiasm of the masses for socialism brings forward new things all the time. (Various reports, for instance, suggest that Tachai has moved to commune level accounting, a big step closer to transforming agriculture from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people. This is a splendid thing even if at present it would be incorrect to announce it and in doing so change the content of the slogan Learn From Tachai to a call for a rash advance for which the material and ideological conditions have not yet been prepared on a broad enough scale.) With mass movements stirring and big tasks to be tackled in China in the coming period, socialist new things will be born in great numbers.

"... We must carefully study the feeble new shoots, we must devote the greatest attention to them, do everything to promote their growth and 'nurture' them. Some of them will inevitably perish. We cannot vouch that precisely the 'communist subbotniks' will play a particularly important role. But that is not the point. The point is to foster each and every shoot of the new; and life will select the most viable. If the Japanese scientist, in order to help mankind vanquish syphilis, had the patience to test six hundred and five preparations before he developed a six hundred and sixth which met definite requirements, than those who want to solve a more difficult problem, namely, to vanquish capitalism, must have the perseverance to try hundreds and thousands of new methods, means and weapons of struggle in order to elaborate the most suitable of them." ("A Great Beginning," Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 235)

CONCLUSION

To sum up:

- The Gang of Four was a cancer in the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Revolution, a tumor which had grown and become malignant through stages. Because their activities undermined the dictatorship of the proletariat, because their plans would directly lead to the restoration of capitalism, and because they had begun as part of Mao Tsetung's proletarian headquarters, as they turned into their opposites, subverted and usurped that headquarters, the Gang had come to pose the greatest and most immediate danger to the survival of socialism.

This cancer was removed by the decisive and timely action of the Party Center headed by Hua Kuo-feng, forestalling the crisis which would have arisen from a reactionary coup attempt planned by these capitalist roaders and bourgeois elements.

- The Gang's general line posed an idealist view of "Class struggle" against the actual tasks of moving the Chinese revolution ahead in the spheres of ideology, politics and economics. They had "gotten stuck" in and seized upon particular social relations which characterized the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when they were flying high. This line manifested itself principally in calls for the constant overthrow of capitalist roaders, real and imagined, and their replacement by genuine revolutionaries, meaning themselves and their followers. This they made a prerequisite for doing anything else. In seizing hold of the real task of fighting to overthrow Party people in power taking the capitalist road in order to advance their own ends, the Gang divorced it from the actual class struggle. This task is neither the extent of the class struggle, nor is it at all times the main form that the class struggle takes. As the masses and the party take up the tasks of building socialism, the struggle between the two roads, the two lines and the two classes develops and must be consciously tackled at each juncture, using different methods to resolve different contradictions under different conditions. If the various tasks faced by the revolution are not taken up it does not stop the struggle, it merely insures that it takes place on terrain more favorable to the bourgeoisie.

- The Gang's line was at the service of a very definite goal—getting themselves into power. They demonstrated this by their repeated and futile demands that Mao place them in charge and by their consistent refusal to unite with others in the top leadership of the Party. Instead, always widening the target of attack, they aimed at those who stood in their way, like Chou En-lai. These were not tactical slip-ups but errors in principle flowing from a growing "smash and grab" style opportunism, errors which weakened both the proletariat's dictatorship and the Party it needs to maintain its rule. They also showed their colors as would be "New Mandarins" in their lust for privilege as well as power, engaging in degenerate "hobbies" and squandering the collective wealth produced by the laboring masses.

- The Gang got farther from the correct line and more isolated from the masses and the Party leadership as they failed to carry out, and in fact actively sabotaged the ideological, political and economic tasks of the period. They divorced class struggle from

these tasks, distorting to serve their own purposes the task of studying theory to raise the socialist consciousness of the masses and arm them to fight against revisionism and restoration, thus negating the other tasks. Stability in the country and unity in Army and Party were called for precisely because they provided the most favorable terrain for the proletariat and its allies to *wage* the class struggle; in general and around immediate particulars. Among these were making the transition to a new generation of leadership, moving forward on the basis of consolidating the gains of the Cultural Revolution, among them many socialist new things; the need to spur the national economy forward; the need to further develop in practice Mao's revolutionary line on foreign affairs, etc.

The liberation and unleashing of the productive forces is an indispensable and fundamental part of the process by which the working class emancipates itself and all mankind. Big strides in developing the national economy were necessary for many reasons—to strengthen the economic base of socialism and provide the material base without which certain advances in the relations of production, including the strengthening of socialist ownership and the continuing restriction of bourgeois right, cannot be made; to deal big blows to the three great differences; to put the country in a better position to deal with war and natural disaster; to keep the masses enthusiasm for socialism high by constantly improving their conditions of labor and standard of living; to provide the world's people with a living example of the superiority of socialism; and through increasing foreign trade give China a bigger role in world political affairs.

Tasks like this call for acute class struggle, for the two roads will present themselves again and again in the course of the battle to implement them. The Gang, however, tried to stand reality on its head and push the idea that to carry out these tasks *was* to take the capitalist road, as they did with their attacks on learning from Tachai and the plan for agricultural mechanization.

Even when changes in the objective situation brought the Gang's line closer to expressing the tasks of the moment (somewhat as a broken clock still tells the right time twice a day), as happened when the right deviationist wind blew up late in 1975, the Gang failed to provide the masses with correct leadership. Instead they contrived to broaden the scope of attack, to sow theoretical confusion, to split the Party and to push themselves forward by any means possible. Their attacks wound up strengthening the rightists, who were downright eager to wear the

"hat" of advocating stability and unity and building a modern and powerful socialist country.

- The Gang's degeneration, and dishonesty, created all sorts of other favorable soil for capitalist tendencies and restoration. They were the Chinese version of the petty bourgeois "left" communists of 1918 at whom Lenin's remark, "As for those who look at the victory over the capitalists in the way the petty proprietors look at it—they grabbed, let me have a go, too"—indeed every one is the source of a new generation of bourgeois," [*Report On The Immediate Tasks Of the Soviet Government*] was aimed. In other words, in their efforts to exploit the revolution these "revolutionary leaders" pushed a semi-anarchist line which unleashed the forces of petty capitalism.

The Gang's various methods of advancing their cause demonstrate how richly they merit the description "smash and grabbers": forming fighting groups and promoting factional fighting, stirring up economism, interfering with production, raising contradictions among the people to the level of antagonisms, all to create a situation in which they and their followers could "have a go, too," and particularly extend their web of political control.

Their "contributions" to important political campaigns hurt the masses' ability to grasp Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. The Legalist/Confucianist articles which made a mockery of historical materialism and those on studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat (including ones from the period of the anti-right deviationist wind movement) with their target of the month approach—now red experts, now peasants, now higher paid workers, now bourgeois democrats, now new-born bourgeois elements, and so forth—both showed that the Gang's "theory" was based on expediency and opportunism.

They consciously built up a base among certain sections of the people and pitted them against the Party and the masses. Revolutionary sounding slogans, including many with reactionary content—"Confucianists produce, legalists rebel," "Don't produce for the incorrect line," "Rebelling against leadership is going against the tide," and the like—were used to win supporters. (Even advanced workers can sometimes be lured by appeals to their revolutionary aspirations away from the real struggle into this kind of trap—like dual unionism in the US.) They used plenty of sugar-coated bullets to corrupt their followers too: official posts; long-term, full-time, full-pay reassignments of workers, peasants and youth sent down to the countryside from manual labor to study

and cultural groups under their direction; college admissions based on political line, that is upholding the line of the Gang. In doing so they stifled many socialist new things by turning them into "capital" and using them to breed loyal "poverty pimps." And the Gang's overall approach attracted others of their stripe—the Weng Sen-ho's and the "Blank Paper" Chang's who served them as lieutenants.

- The logic of the Gang's line and method led them invariably to organize a coup attempt. Their incorrect line, far from winning a large conscious following, had earned them the hostility of the masses of people and isolated them from the active revolutionary forces in the leadership of the Communist Party. Mao himself, to whose coattails they tried to cling even as they more and more opposed his line, repeatedly poured the cold water of criticism on them. When they came under heavy attack from the Summer of 1975 on, he did not speak out boldly in support of them, as he had of the left during the Cultural Revolution every time it came under fire. Instead, he let the struggle develop, taking a hand only in initiating and in tempering the campaign against the right deviationist wind. Bitterly disappointed by both the Gang and Teng Hsiao-ping and fully aware that his death was near, Mao chose Hua Kuo-geng, a leader of the anti-Gang left forces on the Politburo, to serve as acting-Premier, then as First Vice-Chairman and Premier, and worked actively to build public opinion in support of Hua.

With no other route remaining to the power they craved and claimed they alone could be trusted to exercise on behalf of the masses, the Gang stepped up their disruption of society and the economy and prepared for an armed coup. Desperate, they were upping the ante to the limit in a last effort to force on the masses and the Party members and cadres the same bogus choice they had offered all along: it's us or restoration.

In fact, the two options were the same. Had they not been forestalled, the Gang's coup might well have pushed China into a bloody civil war, with such results as the spontaneous eruption of capitalist tendencies and relations in many places, the fragmenting of the central government into separate kingdoms, widespread combat, destruction and famine—in short a tailor-made situation for capitalist restoration, or Soviet invasion to "restore order." Even granting for a moment the most unlikely prospect of a successful Gang seizure of power, their line and the training they had given their supporters would have led them soon enough to turn on one another, cannibal fashion, in continual

"class struggle against capitalist roaders," consolidating in the meantime the restoration of capitalism and accelerating the disintegration of the country. Who can deny that the Gang had become full blown capitalist roaders, bourgeois elements hell bent on destroying socialism.

- In sparing socialist China and the international working class the very real setback a coup attempt would have meant at the absolute minimum, by nipping it in the bud, Hua Kuo-feng showed that he deserved the faith that Mao had placed in him. He greatly reinforced the respect from the masses that he had earned from the time he led the first Learn From Tachai conference and through his handling of such problems as the Tangshan earthquake after he became Mao's chosen successor.

The necessity of smashing the Gang and the immediate threat of capitalist restoration they posed and of consolidating the victory over them required Hua and the proletarian headquarters in the Party he leads to conclude a common front with rightist and revisionist forces. Their strength in the first place was in no small part a legacy of the Gang's idealist and sectarian line which had made the rightist positions seem rational, credible and deserving of sympathy. This same poisonous line had to an extent discredited the very idea of class struggle under socialism and to a great extent confused people as to what it means to wage it.

But recognizing and acting on the necessity of smashing the Gang made it possible for Hua Kuo-feng and the proletarian headquarters as a whole to lead the Communist Party in preserving the proletarian dictatorship and breaking a major fetter barring the masses and the Party from taking up *all* the tasks of building socialism. As the masses are mobilized to carry out these tasks, they will also be taking on in concrete practice the question of which road to follow. With help and guidance from the Party, they will be able to apply Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought to sum up and carry on the line struggle, understanding what class forces and interests lie behind the different lines, and to deal with the class enemies when they do jump out.

Today the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese proletariat and the masses of the Chinese people are carrying out a great historic mission—they are building socialism on all fronts and defending the dictatorship of the proletariat from the spontaneous drag of the old society and from conscious capitalist roaders, whatever form they may take. They are in the vanguard of our class' worldwide struggle to achieve its final goal—communism.

Some Final Points

As we said in the beginning the question of China is a watershed question, a question of principle of the utmost important to the class we are a part of and strive to serve and for the political color of our Party. The new CC report has posed the question of revolution and counterrevolution in our Party, the events since its publication and the actions of the Chairman have clearly demonstrated how deep and fundamental the questions are.

We call on our comrades to hold up the new CC report, to analyze it, based on its content and its method with the microscope and the telescope of our class, of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. We think that what we have written can be a help in making this basic initial analysis, we think it can be a weapon in our hands to evaluate the new CC report, to criticize it and powered by the determination of our comrades, to drive this anti-working-class shit out of our Party.

Fundamentally what we face right now is a basic difference of line. We have two headquarters in our Party, each one determined to drive the other out. This is not struggle over democratic centralism or organizational affairs, this is no struggle to be brushed aside under cover of factionalism or emotional calls to evaluate our Party on any other criteria except for its ideological and political line. Those who do so should check out and obviously think about the reasons behind their motivation.

In spite of the wishes of a few who would love to stem the tide of this struggle, to cut it off and to stop it—the struggle continues and develops momentum. This is because our Party was the Party of the U.S. working class, whose line and practice reflected the day to day aspirations of our class not to be crushed and to break through—to have revolution and move on to communism. But of late problems and mistakes have been consolidated into a line that is and will increasingly lead us away from the orientation that had characterized our earlier days. With the line on China a cancer has developed, real and with a terrible appetite. We can not let it terminate the working class line of our Party, and replace it with a low-road retreat from the class struggle.

Comrades do you think this is untrue? We think the facts, represented by the line of the new CC report speak for themselves. Comrades should take heed of the words spoken by Mao in "Rectify the Party's Style of Work":

". . . We should boycott all the wares of subjectivism,

sectarianism and stereotyped Party writing, make their sale difficult, and not allow their purveyors to ply their trade by exploiting the low theoretical level in the Party. Our comrades must develop a good nose for this purpose; they should take a sniff at everything and distinguish the good from the bad before they decide whether to welcome it or boycott it. Communists must always go into the whys and wherefores of anything, use their own heads and carefully think over whether or not it corresponds to reality and is really well-founded; on no account should they follow blindly and encourage slavishness." (Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 49)

Who is it that has encouraged subjectivism and slavishness? Who has it been that has fought to make this a battle over principles and over line? Who is for cutting the cancer out and who wants the cancer to spread?

This Party is in a state of rebellion, every comrade, every branch, every area will be touched. Already the Chairman has purged over 40% of the membership of the Party. This has stopped nothing, this has turned no one around, this has shut no one up. The exact opposite has been the case. Comrades must decide. Join the rebellion. Hold up the current CC report, criticize it and drive it out of our Party.

In many areas mass meetings have been held, branches have continued to be an arena and special mass cadre forms like China struggle-study groups have been formed, to debate and struggle the issue out. These forms and additional ones must be developed to bring the full play and enthusiasm for revolution to the question of driving the Gang of 4 out of our Party.

Bibliography

As these groups develop the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters will work to give them guidance, in, among other things, developing methods the groups and individual comrades can use in going deeper into the issues raised in this paper and the CC report. A number of comrades have already raised the question of sources. The following bibliography indicates the main theoretical and factual sources on which this paper drew.

A wide range of Marxist classics, among those with particular application are Engels on the force theory in *Anti-Duhring*; Lenin on the struggle against such Gang predecessors as the "left communists" of 1918 and the "workers opposition" and Trotsky in the early '20s, including "A Great Beginning," "Immediate Tasks of

the Soviet Union," and the debates on the trade unions, etc.; and Mao on the theory of knowledge, in particular *On Practice, On Contradiction* and "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From."

We also made considerable use of the works reliably attributed to Mao published by non-Chinese sources, Stuart Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, a U.S. government collection, *Miscellany of Mao Tsetung Thought, Parts I and II*, key articles from which appear in the *Monthly Review* book, *Critique of Soviet Political Economy*.

Many of the Chinese Party internal documents printed were from the Taiwan publication *Issues and Studies* (which also carries biographies of Chinese leaders and articles of analysis from which much information can be gleaned, although it must be double-checked with care.)

Peking Review, *China Reconstructs* and *Hsinhua News Service* can be supplemented by the regular collections of translations from Chinese newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts the U.S. government publishes. Xeroxes of documents quoted in this paper can be provided to areas on request.

The bourgeois periodicals with the most extensive coverage of China have been the *New York Times* and the English weeklies, the *Manchester Guardian* airmail edition and the *Far East Economic Review*. A more scholarly publication, also published in England, *China Quarterly*, is also very helpful.

Few books cover the recent period in China, but three paperbacks on slightly earlier periods are particularly useful for background: Jean Daubier, *A History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Vintage, Jean Esmein, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Anchor, and Jaap von Ginnekin, *The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao*, Avon.

Finally discussion with visitors to and especially long-term residents in China have provided much information on conditions now and in the past.

There are other sources available which must be sought out. The authors of this paper have not yet been able to survey and go into even the ones cited above as fully and carefully as they deserve. The task of study and analysis is continuing, using the method of seeking truth from facts and applying Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought to make a concrete analysis of concrete conditions, as opposed to the method of divine revelation employed by Avakian and for that matter by Mike Klonsky of the OL.

(The restoration of capitalism in China is still a possibility and

a danger as it has been since 1949 and will continue to be throughout the socialist period. If such a restoration were to take place and a chihuahua were to be chosen to take the post once held by proletarian fighters like Mao Tsetung and Hua Kuo-feng, Klonsky would still do just about anything to get his picture in Renmin Ribao.)

The results of our continuing study will be gotten to comrades as soon as possible and a much longer and more thorough analysis is being started now. All comrades studying the present paper can help this by raising questions, formulating criticisms and passing along the results of any investigation they take up on their own.

Internal Journal

The most important thing now is to continue, to deepen and to spread the rebellion. This means first and foremost holding up, criticizing and repudiating the line of both sections of the current CC report. To aid and guide this process and keep cadres informed, the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters will be publishing an internal journal. It will include bulletins from the leading core of the Headquarters and will consist mainly of articles submitted by the individual comrades and branches around the country criticizing the CC report, the development of the left idealist line in the U.S. and the CC's methods of conducting, or to be more precise, sabotaging, the line struggle and contributing to the development of a Marxist-Leninist understanding of China.

Deepen the study and repudiation of the Gang of Four in the interest of proletarian internationalism and working class revolution!