New World REVIEW

TWO GREAT ANNIVERSARIES

48 Years USSR

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32 Years U.S.-USSR Relations

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TWO GREAT ANNIVERSARIES

and the War in Vietnam

AS is our custom, *New World Review* marks in this issue two anniversaries of historic importance: the 48th anniversary of the Russian Revolution on November 7, and the 32nd anniversary of the establishment of US-USSR diplomatic relations on November 16.

Overshadowing everything these days is the war in Vietnam, and to stop the war is our over-riding task. But let us consider what these anniversaries mean, and their relation to that war.

The Anniversary of the Russian Revolution

THE first and most important of these anniversaries means that the world's first socialist state is nearing the half-century point of its existence. In this period we have seen the growth of nuclear weapons which could destroy most if not all of life on vast areas of our planet. We have also seen soaring scientific achievements which would make it possible to meet the essential needs in food and clothing and shelter and education of every man, woman and child on earth—if men had the wisdom to scrap all these murderous armaments, to sit down and reason together and cooperate in making a world fit to live in.

In marking the anniversary of the Russian Revolution this year, people all around the world have reason to be grateful to the Soviet Union for using its great power for the pursuit of just these aims—the creation of abundance for the full satisfaction of man's needs. We are thankful for its leading part in striving for peaceful solutions in world affairs. And we are thankful for its great pioneering role in developing new socialist patterns of living.

The Soviet Union has faced and surmounted innumerable problems and difficulties: aggression from outside, distortions and betrayals of socialism from within. Plenty of problems and difficulties remain.

But one great incontrovertible fact blazes out as clear as the noonday sun. The Soviet Union is today a stable socialist state, a great world power wielding its influence to advance human well-being, to end colonialism and further national liberation movements and to create the necessary conditions for true peaceful coexistence among the nations.

This year has in many ways been one of the most important in the whole history of the Soviet Union. It has been a year of substantial improvements in the management of industry, outlined and explained elsewhere in this issue. It has been a year of sweeping agricultural changes designed to increase production, the full effects of

which can only be felt within the next few years since poor weather conditions this year meant a disappointing harvest. It has been a year of continued expansion of Soviet democracy, with growing participation of the people in all aspects of government.

It needs also to be said that in this year the team of Premier Alexey Kosygin and First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, have lived up to their pledges of instituting a real collective leadership. In the reestablishing of industrial ministries, a group of well trained and highly capable younger men have been brought forward who, we believe, will have little use for past bureaucratic methods. The future is in good hands.

There has been continued progress in living standards, in housing, in education and health, in scientific achievements, in cybernetics, in the conquest of outer space. On these matters we report each month and we shall review recent advances more concretely next month after reports delivered at the Soviet anniversary celebrations become available.

One particularly gratifying development is that there is in the USSR today greater freedom of expression than ever before, greater readiness to criticize shortcomings and face the many difficulties that still exist. And along with this, there has been a lifting of the prohibitions from above and the consequent inhibitions from within which in the past have been a brake on the full flowering of Soviet culture.

Along with advances of culture at a professional level there is the extraordinary growth of amateur artistic activities all over the Soviet land and in all the national republics. Two aspects of Soviet cultural activity are unmatched in any other country. These are both the mass participation in the enjoyment of culture through professional performances in theater, opera, ballet and concert, the huge publishing program, the numerous museums, exhibits and other media, and the mass participation in amateur cultural activities by both adults and children on an unequalled scale through Palaces of Culture, Pioneer Palaces, workers' clubs and the like.

A particularly exciting form of cultural activity is the poetry readings that are one of the most popular forms of entertainment, wherever you go. Poetry reading is a highly developed art in the Soviet Union, with much stress on dramatic and rhythmic and melodious qualities. Poetry recitals are called concerts. Poets usually recite their own verses. Not only is every new edition of poetry swept up literally the moment it appears in a book store, but these poetry concerts are simply mobbed, whether taking place before thousands in a stadium, in a public square, in club auditoriums or youth cafes, whether on the annual "Poetry Day" or any day of the week.

The range of the poetry is very great, from purest love lyrics to epics of socialist construction, or satire and poems of protest against negative aspects of Soviet society. It is a very healthy sign that if there are some Soviet publications and literary critics who inveigh against

AN ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE

IN this period of history, when the path of peaceful coexistence seems almost completely enshrouded with the darkness of misunderstanding, political strife and war, it is heartening to find at least some ray of hope, persistently generated through the courageous and tireless efforts of such media as the *New World Review* and the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. Their accomplishments in the dissemination of real facts and truth on the cause and effect of world crises, past and present, including Vietnam, and in the promotion of friendship and understanding among peoples of varying ideologies deserve our highest commendation. Such antidotes to the political platitudes and propaganda, so prevalent in the press, have been long overdue.

As one dedicated to the need for objective self-appraisal and forbearance toward others in the pursuit and achievement of peace, I salute all those who have made these significant anniversaries possible, and extend my best wishes for continued success in their undertakings.

ANNE K. EATON
(Mrs. Cyrus S. Eaton)

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writers depicting any dark sides of Soviet life, there seem today to be even more who come to their defense and insist that only by freely bringing such things into the open can they be corrected. All of the poets and writers who were subjected to sharp criticism a few years ago are writing, reciting and publishing today, and many new ones are coming forward as well.

Yevgeny Yevtushenko, whose long poem "Bratsk" we published in part in our last two issues, remains a controversial but beloved and widely popular figure, and there are a whole galaxy of other poets, both men and women, whose work should be translated and made known to the American people. Writing of poetry and love of poetry are by no means confined to the younger generation. The love of poetry, like the love of music, is something close to the hearts of all the Soviet people and one of their most endearing qualities. It is an interesting commentary on this new generation of highly capable young technologists and scientists that so many of them have taken up song writing and singing as an avocation and some of the most popular songs in the USSR today are written by young physicists, mathematicians and engineers.

Ilya Ehrenburg once wrote about how much the creative geniuses of our peoples could give each other in an era of friendly exchange and competition, and declared that the Soviet people would vie with the people of the West "not only in launching sputniks as companions for Mars or Venus, but also in creating eternal companions for the human heart."

In their love of poetry of the past and present, in their making of poetry, in their love of music, the Soviet people are indeed companions for the human heart. Let us respond to them in this with new love and understanding on this anniversary.

This understanding is especially important for us in these troubled times. We would stress above all the importance of learning the truth about the Soviet Union, their failures and mistakes as well as their achievements, and this truth will be found not only in statistical tables but in their poetry. We say this above all to the youth, because it is the youth of the United States and of the Soviet Union along with the youth of the rest of the world, who will fashion the world of the future.

No Soviet writer of our times has been more widely read both in his own and other countries than Mikhail Sholokhov whose two novels, *The Silent Don,* about the coming of the revolution to the Don Cossacks, and *Virgin Soil Upturned,* about collectivization in the Ukraine, have told the story of the early days of Soviet power with unparalleled sweep and compassion. The giving of the Nobel Peace Prize for literature this year to Sholokhov is the well-deserved recognition of the contribution of Soviet writing to world literature and a testament to the great longing for human solidarity in men's hearts.

The Anniversary of American-Soviet Diplomatic Relations

THE second anniversary, growing out of the first, is that of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR, on November 16, 1933—thirty-two years ago. The discrepancy in the dates of these anniversaries is due to the fact that it was sixteen years before our country was willing to recognize the existence of the Soviet Union.

This brings up the fact that the United States has repeated and compounded this folly in relation to the Chinese People's Republic, which celebrated its sixteenth anniversary on October 1. It is already more than sixteen years that our Government has not only failed to "recognize" this great nation inhabited by a quarter of the world's people, but has kept it as well from occupying its rightful place in the United Nations.

The relations between the Soviet Government and our own, initiated thirty-two years ago led, through many vicissitudes, to the Grand Alliance of World War II and the common victory over the fascist axis, to which the Soviet Union made incomparably the greatest contribution of any nation.

Instead of the gratitude and friendship that should have followed the end of the war, the cold war was unleashed against the Soviet Union, and our country's aggressive anti-Communist policies poisoned the whole world scene. Despite this, the ties between our peoples have strengthened during recent years and had it not been for the ugly

and lawless escalation of U.S. aggression in Vietnam during the past year, there could now be a new flowering of U.S.-USSR relations.

An example of what can be achieved by American-Soviet cooperation was seen when their parallel concern with a cease-fire in the Indian-Pakistan conflict led to a unanimous vote in the UN Security Council.

But American-Soviet relations are gravely endangered by U.S. policies of attempting to crush liberation movements everywhere. And the Soviet Union has warned repeatedly that the United States is running the gravest risks in its lawless attacks on the socialist state of North Vietnam, ally and friend of the Soviet Union, and recipient of ever-increasing Soviet economic and military aid.

The Brutal War in Vietnam Intensifies

FAR from listening to advice from any quarter, our Government is heedless both of the appeals of Pope Paul, who told the United Nations on October 4, "No more war, war never again!" and made peace the main burden of his message to the American people on his visit here, and of the demands of tens of thousands of people who demonstrated all across the United States October 15 and 16 to stop the war in Vietnam now.

Where is the "moderation" the President spoke of last July, in sending "only" 50,000 more troops to Vietnam; where are the efforts for a negotiated peace? All this was apparently only an effort to deceive and to quiet the American people. Instead of 125,000 troops there are already about 145,000 in South Vietnam, and soon there will be 200,000 and no one can see the end. Now a "partial mobilization" of the reserves has been ordered, and bigger draft calls than ever, and Pentagon plans are reported for *fifteen more years of war.*

No longer is there talk of negotiations. *The Wall Street Journal,* (Sept. 21, 1965) said U.S. officials in South Vietnam aren't eager for early negotiations, and in a later story declared that Washington is no longer interested. Talk again is of total war and prospects of military victory. For this reason the conclusion is drawn in many quarters that the Administration has not the slightest intention of pulling out of Vietnam under any circumstances, and that its plan is to establish a permanent military base in Vietnam against China and other Asian peoples.

For this U.S. casualty lists are rising, and for this our government has intensified the mass killing of the Vietnamese people and the laying waste of their land. Not able to win, the United States pours in ever greater quantities of weapons and planes and men to kill and maim and burn and destroy. In what was described as the biggest joint American-Vietnamese action of the war in the Soui La Tinh valley 280 miles North of Saigon, 2,000 NLF troops slipped away from the massed strength of the U.S. and South Vietnamese, who thought they

had surrounded them. But we learn no lessons from such repeated experiences; and the brutalization process goes on.

Numerous mass bombing raids of B-52s, unable to find any adversaries, carry out saturation bombings of large areas, ripping up forests and rice fields, usually killing mainly civilians. Senator George McGovern (D-S. D.), in an article in the *Saturday Review* for October 16, urged that bombing attacks in both North and South Vietnam be stopped, as usually killing the "wrong people." He told of American officers returning to the village of Bagia, recaptured after three days of U.S. bombing and machine gun and rocket attacks, and finding "weeping women holding their dead children or nursing their wounds and burns . . ." Surveying the human tragedy a U.S. officer said "This is why we're going to lose this stupid damn war. It's senseless, just senseless."

"Mom, I had to kill a woman and a baby . . . Mom, for the first time I really felt sick at my stomach. The baby was about two months old . . ." quoted an AP dispatch of September 30 from a letter by Cpl. Ronnie W. Wilson in Vietnam to his mother.

Jimmy Breslin wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune,* September 9, about the methods of the Nuongs, Chinese mercenaries from Taiwan hired by the U.S. to fight in Vietnam, as described by a Marine helicopter gunner:

> They get a VC and make him hold his hands against his cheeks. Then they take this wire and run it right through the one hand and right through his cheek and into his mouth. Then they pull the wire out through the other cheek and stick it through the other hand. They knot both ends around sticks . . . You ought to see how quiet them gooks sit in a helicopter when we got them wrapped like that.

It is not people, you see, that we are fighting. They are "Cong," "VC," "gooks," "them bastards." Anything goes.

Three prisoners executed in the Da Nang stadium in September were not, as widely reported in our press, "Vietcong terrorists." They were political opponents of the Saigon military regime. (*New York Post,* September 29.)

The myth that we are not killing people in the raids on North Vietnam has long since been demolished. Chris Koch, program director of WBAI, who recently returned from a visit to North Vietnam, in *I. F. Stone's Weekly* for October 11 described some of the things he saw:

> The destruction outside Hanoi is appalling . . . North Vietnam looks as if it is being systematically bled to death by U.S. bombing . . . We drove through Nam Dinh, North Vietnam's largest city. . . . I saw a bombed pagoda, a partially destroyed hospital and a school yard full of craters. The famous Nam Dinh Textile Factory built by the French was a jumble of twisted, bombed out buildings. But I was most struck by the working class homes around the factory which had been levelled to a pile of charred bricks and bamboo. . . .
>
> Thanh Hoa province has been heavily hit. At Hospital No 71 which was destroyed by three raids on July 8. . . . Vice Director That said the thirty-building complex had been a research and treatment center for tuberculosis. Now it was a skeleton . . . Forty doctors and patients were dead [we have previously reported the killing of the inmates of a lepers' colony and an old people's home].
>
> Pham Van Ky, the old peasant . . . described the air strike against his village: "There were four raids in 45 days. Twenty children between three months and ten years were killed. Fifteen elderly people were killed; 129 houses were destroyed, 200 were damaged. . . ."
>
> In one small hospital we talked with some of the victims [of U.S. raids]: a ten year old boy who lost his leg above the knee while he was playing in his school yard; a 27 year old woman, seven months pregnant, caught on the highway during a raid . . . When the planes come the tiny children run through the streets shouting "John's coming! John's coming!" [short for Johnson.]

President Johnson is reported to have slept badly some nights following his gall bladder operation. Even in the hospital he kept on picking the targets for air raids on North Vietnam. One wonders how he could sleep at all.

LOVE LETTER TO A FRIEND

IN this month (November A.D. '65) is to be celebrated by all, the world over, who see in Socialism the design for Mankind's destined future way of life, the forty-eighth anniversary of the Russian Revolution; and by all Americans who, wanting lasting worldwide peace to prevail and realizing that it now largely depends upon our "friendly coexistence" with the Soviet Union, the thirty-second anniversary of our sadly long overdue official recognition of a stable, mighty and potentially friendly fellow nation.

But friendship, as symbolized by clasping hands, is like courts of equity neither to be sought nor entered into but cleanhandedly. To wash our nation's bloodstained hands is then for all of us as citizens our first responsibility, peace being not only the *reward* of friendship but peacefulness the *premise* on which friendship is bestowed. "Go thou," said Lycurgus to one who had demanded the establishment of democracy in Sparta, "and first establish democracy in thy household." Of the present disorder of our own house as well as of our bloodstained hands the world at large is well and shockedly aware. Good then, let's get to work!—for "Prayers," as William Blake reminds us, "plough not." Nor does the peace-talk of our timeserving President—mingled in our ears and minds and consciences with the screams of burned and tortured Vietnamese—fool any but the sycophants who echo him.

The Moon? God speed man's conquest of it—that all the shameless, greedy murderers on Earth may go and perish there.

"New World Review," dear friend of peace and human decency: I greet you lovingly,

ROCKWELL KENT

National Peace Demonstrations Call for End of War in Vietnam Now

ONE of the largest U.S. peace demonstrations in many years took place across the country on the weekend October 15-16. Frank Emspak, chairman of the National Coordinating Committee for these events, with headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, estimated that about 100,000 people took part in peace actions in some seventy cities. A measure of the success of the demonstrations was the immediate attack launched against them by Government and Department of Justice spokesmen, who charged "red infiltration." The idea of "infiltration" was of course nonsense. It was one of the broadest and most inclusive demonstrations that ever took place in this country, covering the most conservative of the peace organizations, extreme pacifists, like CNVA, Socialists, Communists and the more extreme left wing groups. It included civil rights advocates, and advocates of civil disobedience and resisting the draft. Participation was quite open, but for the most part not under organizational auspices, everyone coming together under the chief slogan "END THE WAR IN VIETNAM NOW." The movement included people of all political views, all religious denominations, all ages. Women's organizations like WSP and WILPF played a prominent part. But most of all the accent was on students and youth, with Students for a Democratic Society, the W. E. B. Du Bois Clubs and other youth groups in the forefront.

The biggest demonstrations of all took place in New York City, where almost forty different peace organizations supported an "Ad Hoc Committee for the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade," and joined together for a march of 20,000 or more down Fifth Avenue and a street rally at the end, Central Park's mall having been denied. The parade was completely orderly and dignified, the marchers refusing to be provoked by the savage epithets hurled at them by small groups of fascist plug-uglies along the way, many of them wearing "Buckley for Mayor" buttons, or even when they were targets for eggs, tomatoes and cans of red paint. Noisy as they were, there were only a handful of counter demonstrators in comparison with those who supported the peace marchers, and their own attempted rally at the end seemed to be attended mainly by police.

Demonstrations of varying sizes took place in dozens of cities and some fifty college campuses over the week end. The second largest demonstration was in California, where several thousands sought to march on the Oakland army base, but were turned back by police. Police protection was given a later demonstration in San Francisco.

Under the auspices of the Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley, California, international contacts were made, and simultaneous demonstrations against U.S. policies in Vietnam were held widely abroad.

These peace actions in the United States received unprecedented

press coverage and official attention. What must now be done is to escalate the peace demonstrations to the point where they become effective in *ending the war in Vietnam.*

Already big new actions are being planned. The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has announced plans for a November 27 march of 20,000 persons from the White House to the Washington Monument to "mobilize the conscience of America," to end U.S. bombing in Vietnam and support a negotiated settlement. Sponsors of the march include novelists Saul Bellow and John Hersey, playwright Arthur Miller, CORE's James Farmer, Dr. Albert D. Sabin and Dr. Benjamin Spock, Carl Oglesby, Bayard Rustin, and Dagmar Wilson.

Likewise on the Thanksgiving weekend, representatives of all the many peace organizations gathered together under the umbrella of the Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, will converge on Washington for a demonstration and to plan a continuous program of peace activities on a national scale.

A major demonstration will be held in New York November 13.

The only meaningful way in which we can work for the improvement of American-Soviet relations is to work to end the war in Vietnam. The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that the way to settlement lies in the four principles set forth by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which, in effect, mean a return to the principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements.

The people of the United States have no higher patriotic duty than to do everything in our power to stop the immoral and inhuman war our government is waging against the people of Vietnam.

J. S., October 20

Fulbright Flays Administration on Dominican Policy

SENATOR J. W. Fulbright made a scathing criticism of the Administration for the "grievous mistake" of its intervention in the Dominican Republic and its entire Latin American policy, in a statement on September 15, delivered in part on the Senate floor and published in full in the *Congressional Record.*

The speech of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee came at a time of growing doubts as to whether the U.S.–imposed Godoy Provisional regime, installed on September 3, will hold out until the projected OAS supervised elections are held.

Senator Fulbright charged that U.S. policy was characterized initially by "over-timidity," then by "over-reaction" and throughout by "lack of candor." The failure of this policy, he said, was due to faulty advice to the President by U.S. representatives on the spot based on "inadequate evidence" and "false information." By assuming from the beginning, on the basis of fragmentary evidence, that the revolution was Communist-dominated, and overlooking the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support:

We thus failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo.

The Senator called for a review of our policy, declaring that we cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy in Latin America "and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies" as we seem to be trying to do. He declared:

The fact remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of the acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against revolution, which, had we sought to influence instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign intervention.

On September 20, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution supporting armed interference anywhere in the Western Hemisphere to "avert subversive actions," thus attempting to legalize after the event the lawless intervention in the Dominican Republic as well as to endorse similar actions in the future.

A LOVELY GIFT FROM HUNGARY— BUDAPEST CHILDREN'S CHOIR

NO MORE AUSPICIOUS OPENING to a cultural exchange program between the United States and Hungary than the visit to our country of the Budapest Children's Choir, could be imagined. The opening concert of their two-month tour on October 10 in Carnegie Hall was a most joyous event. The musicianship of the chorus, singing without any accompaniment, and of their two conductors, Valeria Botka and Laszlo Czanyi, was of a very high order indeed, the children were darling, and the audience was enchanted. The *New York Times* critic wrote:

"Their enunciation was perfect, their rhythm staunch, their range of emphasis tremendous. Their tone varied in quality from the softest murmur to the most incisive cutting edge, and everything, but everything, they did was shaped to serve uncompromising musical values, not mere entertainment ones. Entertaining they were, of course, and cute too . . ."

They started with a traditional Hungarian folk song in unison, ranged through part songs by Bartok, Kodaly, Bardos and others. The audience demanded an encore of Kodaly's beautiful *Ave Maria* sung exquisitely by the clear young voices. Beside the folk songs, there was a song by Schumann, a delightful and humorous Concert of the Frogs by Weber, a madrigal by Morley and our own Aaron Copland's "'Ching-a-ring Chaw." Several of our familiar Christmas carols were included in a special group of songs for which some of the instrumentalists formed themselves into a small orchestra. There were also piano and violin solos by choir members.

This choir, formed in 1954 by its two conductors, who are also teachers, was trained at a music school affiliated with the Hungarian Radio, whose students begin their musical training at the age of siv. Its thirty-five members aged eleven to fourteen, are singing in U.S. cities ranging from Chicago in the Midwest to Miami in the South.

THOUGHTS OVER 48 YEARS

"The workers for peace in the Western World owe the USSR a great debt; debts should be paid, and the payment should be increased efforts to bring our Governments into the ways of peace."

by D. N. PRITT

I WAS thirty years old when the October Revolution of 1917 shook an astonished world that consisted of a number of capitalist countries, several of whom held between them over half the world in colonial subjection, and most of whom were engaged in tearing each other to pieces to decide which of them should have the major share of the loot of the colonial world, which they have all of them almost wholly lost today.

Few people then dreamed that in my lifetime the new socialist state would become the second, and in some senses the greatest, state in the world, and would have in its company other socialist states comprising two-fifths of the world's population; but those who so dreamed—or rather foresaw—were the leaders of the new state. From the start, I followed the history of this new world with great sympathy and some understanding, but I did not have the opportunity to visit it personally until 1932, when it was nearly fifteen years old.

In those fifteen years of its youth, having inherited the wreckage of a poor, backward and primitive tsarist "prison-house of nations," almost without industries and reduced to economic ruin and famine by over three years of war, the new socialist state had held together, defying the innumerable prophecies of its collapse, had beaten off a number of formidable armed interventions, had survived blockades, shortages and even famines, ridden through economic difficulties by the device of the "New Economic Policy," and made clear to a hostile world that it was indestructible and unbeatable, and would win through.

But it had so far proved little more than that; life was still poor and hard; many problems, above all those of agriculture, were still unsolved; and the new industries were still in their infancy. It had still not produced a truck, a tractor, an automobile, a bicycle or a typewriter; and no road out of Moscow on which one could safely drive at over 12 mph ran for more than twenty miles. Nevertheless,

D. N. PRITT, is one of England's most distinguished lawyers and internationally famous for his work in the struggle for civil rights in many countries. The first volume of his autobiography, *From Right to Left*, has just been published in England.

the USSR, on my first visit, electrified me; when I talked to high administrators, their clothes were shabby and their toes could be seen sticking out of their broken shoes, but the unconquerable and optimistic spirit of their new world was shining in their eyes—as it was in the eyes of most of the people one met in the streets, the schools, the few factories, or even in the poorly-stocked shops—and I felt that they were conscious that they were shaping the future of the world as they wrote their plans on poor-quality paper with poor pens. (And still at that time the U.S. State Department could not bring itself to recognize the new state; but it recognized itself clearly enough!).

I visited the country again in 1936, and could see very great advances in many fields. Things were not easy, but they were much easier, and the slogan then current that "Life is growing gayer" was justified; but, although I did not clearly see it at the time, the leaders of the country had already clearly recognized the menace of that Hitler Fascism with which the Western states were ready to cooperate, and had deliberately switched their economy from the many developments that could make life easier in order to build up more rapidly the heavy industries without which they could not hope to withstand and defeat the attack they felt sure already that Hitler would launch against them.

FOR ONE reason or another, I was not able to visit the USSR again until 1946, and in the ten years between my two visits the new world had passed through the terrible years of the Second World War. It had built up just in time a heavy industry that enabled it to fight for years with negligible material aid from outside—Britain, for example, had twice as much aid in the war from the USA as the USSR got from anywhere—and the Soviet army was the first in the world to offer more than a few days or weeks of resistance to the Nazi armies on land. The Soviet peoples held together whilst their armies had to retreat many hundreds of miles, and when the tide turned they still bore far more of the burden of the war, with its terrible human losses, than any other country.

When I returned in 1946, I found that the grave war exhaustion—deliberately heightened as it was by Western maneuvers designed to secure that the state should emerge from the war too weak materially to have any influence in the reshaping of the world—had neither broken the spirit of the people nor prevented the development of a fabulous effort of repair and reconstruction. With all my faith in the new socialist state and its economy, I was amazed by the heroic work it was still able to carry on almost wholly unaided, and I prophesied that within a few years it would be well on the road to real prosperity, equalling all countries and surpassing most in terms of culture, education, and scientific and industrial development.

But with all my faith and confidence I still did not realize how fast and how far it was destined to travel. In the two postwar decades, in spite of some grave shortcomings and many agricultural difficulties, the USSR has made advances to which history can find no parallel. It has built great cities, opened up immense new natural resources, raised its industrial development to almost incredible heights (including developments in automation and other labor-saving developments which are almost a curse to capitalist countries and an unalloyed blessing to socialist ones), surpassed even the immense material power and wealth of the USA in many fields, and given its people the finest system of education in the world. In outer space, the greatest test of the stature of a nation, it has led the world and shown the most skeptical observer what tremendous advances can be made.

Whilst there are still imperfections to overcome, the USSR is certain in the near future to show the world many new and at first sight incredible advances in many fields. Even more important, the new state will play a great and positive role in the advance of peace and human progress. It is now a commonplace that progress presents few problems if only peace can be secured and armament expenditure reduced.

As a socialist state, the USSR can have no motive or reason for war except solely for resistance to aggression; it is indeed admitted even by its most bigoted enemies that it has no aggressive intentions. It can thus profoundly influence the world for peace; indeed, it has already done so, for its wisdom and restraint prevented the Korean war from escalating into world war, it stopped war over Suez and over Cuba, and it has so far stopped world war over Vietnam and—by its mere presence—prevented the revanchist rulers of West Germany from starting war in Europe.

The workers for peace in the Western world owe the Soviet Union a great debt; debts should be paid, and the payment of this debt must take the form of increased efforts to bring our own governments into the ways of peace.

PREMIER KOSYGIN ON U.S. VIETNAM POLICY

SOVIET PREMIER Alexey Kosygin's first interview with the Western press appeared in the London *Sunday Times* on September 12.

He declared that "The problem of Vietnam casts a shadow on all international problems. We can agree or disagree on those, but we don't appreciate the full support by Britain of the U.S. policy in Vietnam . . . It is difficult to see how U.S. aggression can be justified in world opinion. We feel that the U.S. with its policy in Vietnam is getting more and more isolated."

Kosygin further declared that the North Vietnamese were ready to negotiate if their four conditions were met and that these conditions, which were not an ultimatum, should be supported, that indeed this solution was inevitable.

"WHEN THE GUNS BOOM"

The Cultural Exchange Program Today

by MURRAY YOUNG

THE refusal of the distinguished poet Robert Lowell and the internationally famous dramatist Arthur Miller to participate in recent cultural festivities at the White House inaugurated by President Johnson, because of our inhuman policy in Vietnam, focuses with the greatest clarity the dilemma of the arts in times of bitterness, conflict, bloodshed and destruction.

on Boyleston Street, a commercial photograph
shows Hiroshima boiling
over a Mosler Safe, the "Rock of Ages"
that survived the blast. Space is nearer.
When I crouch to my television set,
the drained faces of Negro school-children rise like balloons.

And, Mr. Lowell might have more recently added to his poem *For the Union Dead,** "when I open my morning papers I see the agonized faces of Vietnamese women and children huddled together against the deadly rain of American bombs."

In his letter of refusal Mr. Miller wrote the President, "When the guns boom, the arts die and this law of life is far stronger than any law that man may devise."

If the muses are silenced by the boom of the guns, it is inevitable that all forms of communication between men in the field of art, music, poetry and in the scientific exploration of our shared universe should become timorous, hesitant—at times frozen almost to a standstill.

All the same, so urgent is the need in these critical times for men to talk to each other across all barriers, so sweeping are the challenges of the new worlds being opened up by science, that exchanges, official and unofficial, do persistently continue. Unfortunately the exchanges are by no means on the scale that is possible today, nevertheless continue they do.

But for how much longer if our present lawless aggression goes on in Vietnam, if we practice against other South American countries the kind of brutal interference that characterized our action in the Dominican Republic last spring? The Soviet Union and the other peace-loving peoples of the world grow increasingly impatient with our arrogant defiance.

* *For the Union Dead,* new poems by Robert Lowell. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. New York, 1964. $3.95.

The much-publicized cancellation of the tour to the Soviet Union of "Hello, Dolly!" with Mary Martin, is probably among the least serious results of our brutal bombing of Vietnam, but it does seem a pity that the people of Moscow and Leningrad should be denied a glimpse of Miss Martin's easy, glowing charm. At least the tour of the Cleveland Orchestra in the USSR in the earlier part of the summer has left many happy memories with the Russians who crowded to hear George Szell conduct and to applaud John Browning, Grant Johannsen, and their own great favorite Van Cliburn, as soloists with the orchestra.

And we are again having the pleasure of the Moscow Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Kiril Kondrashin with such superb artists as David Oistrakh and his son Igor, also the 'cellist Mstislav Rostropovich and his wife, the splendid soprano Galina Vishnevskaya, who will give here the first public performance of the full suite of Pushkin poems set to music by the distinguished British composer Benjamin Britten, to express, the composer wrote, "my love and admiration for the Russian people."

The orchestra gave the first of eleven performances in New York (all performances long since sold out) on October 15. The orchestra will then go on a cross-country tour.

THE postponement of a U.S. exhibit of hand-tooled and do-it-yourself equipment in the Soviet Union and a Soviet exhibit of space research in the U.S.A. is a more serious consequence of the temper of the times. (A U.S. architectural exhibit opened on schedule in Kiev this fall, nevertheless.) It was, however, the tensions that revealed themselves at the 14th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in Venice in April that indicate the really serious consequences of our lawless actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

The Pugwash Conferences, established through the wisdom and vision of the U.S. industrialist Cyrus S. Eaton, have made it possible for the leading scientists of the world, both East and West, to come together to discuss not only common problems but the highly important contributions that scientists can make to the affairs of men as they are hurtled by the scientific revolution into the unknown future.

The Venice conference had been planned, because it was being held in the year named by the UN as the "Year of International Cooperation," to deal first of all with international cooperation in science. By April our flagrant disregard of the "conscience of mankind" had "escalated" the Vietnam war to a most dangerous intensity. The peril of nuclear conflict between the great powers was very much in the minds of the scientists participating in the conference. In order not to distract the whole course of the conference, it was wisely decided that one working committee should prepare a statement on the

Vietnam situation that would reflect as much as possible the deep concern—and the division—of the participants.

The statement as given to the press stressed the importance of an early peace in Vietnam and condemned the use of all types of gas in military operations in any part of the world. The statement was not strong enough for some of the delegates—especially those from Japan who wanted much more condemnatory language in describing the U.S. role in Vietnam. However, it was generally felt that the conference, by continuing the prescribed program, achieved its main goal of East-West interchange in significant areas of scientific development.

The recommendation by the conference for an International Year of Preparation for Disarmament in which every effort would be made to inform and instruct people all over the world of the necessity for disarmament; the reaffirmation by the conference of the need for extending the Test Ban Treaty; the agreement of the delegates to broaden international ties among scientists and to increase help to the developing countries in their research programs, especially in the rapid training of scientists, give the scope of these remarkable gatherings. These actions make clear why a period of tension and coolness of international relations seems to these leading scientists of the world to be so full of the most hazardous consequences. The 15th Conference, to be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January of this coming year, may well indicate whether fruitful scientific collaboration can continue indefinitely in a period of hostility in which a stalemate in official negotiations shows little promise of a break.

HOW serious such a situation of stalemate in communication can be was spotlighted by a speech David Sarnoff, chairman of the Radio Corporation of America, gave to some 2,000 lawyers from all over the world at the Washington World Conference on World Peace Through Law, on the subject, "Law, World-Wide Communications and World Peace."

Sarnoff, pointing out that we are already in the era of satellite communications, told his audience that the elaborate facilities used in the Early Bird satellite to channel pictures and sound to the TV networks was not to be the pattern of communications on a world scale in the future. Government and giant corporations would not be able to decide what the viewer could see and hear, within five to ten years, Sarnoff stated. Nuclear-powered satellites would, by that time, transmit TV and radio programs directly to home receivers:

> When for example, a Russian satellite can broadcast directly to a Kansas farm, or an American satellite can broadcast directly to a Hungarian collective, what will be the reaction in both countries? . . . What rules of conduct are to apply, and who is to establish them? This question evades the jurisdiction of any established body, yet it will affect the welfare of all nations and people. . . . it would be a travesty on the hopes of humanity if this immense force for enlightenment, understanding and social advancement were to be subverted to narrow national ends, or become discredited by the failure of nations to agree upon its beneficial uses.

Sarnoff then went on to suggest five broad areas in which there should be, as soon as possible, some agreement between the nations:

a. Culture – "Art forms strike a chord of response regardless of nationality or ideological differences."
b. Major news events which "transcend all national boundaries."
c. Summit conferences in which the principals would not have to leave home.
d. Political activity – Sarnoff suggested one channel in each system for UN deliberations.
e. Instructional – "to bring people everywhere into instant contact with technological and social progress."

The concern for peace from so prominent a representative of powerful industry as Sarnoff is most welcome—however unexpected. How welcome would be similar concern on the part of other industrialists and politicians for mankind's perilous journey through this opening era of nuclear power!

THANKS to the Early Bird satellite we were able to see most of the two-day track meet, between the U.S. and the USSR, July 31 to August 1, in Kiev. The Russians were victors in both the men's and women's events. What was not visible on the TV screen was the cold shadow of the war in Vietnam, described in the stories by reporters. This may explain why the meet—so favorable to the Russians!—was not broadcast to the USSR although they made their TV facilities available to the American Broadcasting Company and to various European outlets.

The dedication by the American Broadcasting System of its broadcast to the memory of an ex-U.S. participant in the previous meet who had just been killed in Vietnam, could only be regarded as provocative and added to the generally lifeless impression of the meet which reporters described in the newspaper accounts. It is to be hoped that the meet to be held in Los Angeles next summer will be able to recapture the inspiring warmth of those earlier meets which seemed, as they flashed across the TV screen, galas of youth, friendship and peace.

The Fourth Moscow International Film Festival was held this summer in July and the city became for a few days the film center of the world, with some 55 countries participating. About forty major films were shown in all the leading cinema theaters of Moscow; the new Kremlin Palace of Congresses was the exhibition center for the serious contenders for prizes.

A large international jury, with the Hollywood director, Fred Zinneman, as one of its members, split the first prize between the

first two parts of Sergei Bondarchuk's version of "War and Peace," which Bondarchuk directs and in which he plays the leading role of Pierre, and the Hungarian film "Twenty Days." The U.S. film "The Great Race," starring Jack Lemmon, Tony Curtis and Natalie Wood, received the silver medal for the best comedy.

"For Humanism in the Art of the Cinema, for Peace and Friendship Among Nations" was the main slogan of the Moscow Festival which, of course, tends to separate it rather sharply from film festivals in the West. But perhaps what separates it most distinctly of all is the attention given to new film makers from the underdeveloped countries. At this festival, films from Ghana, Tunisia, Uganda, the Cameroons, Guinea, and Senegal, to mention only a few, were given prominence and much critical attention was given to their weaknesses and their strong points.

A happy bit of news was released at the festival: the magnificent Soviet film version of "Hamlet," seen here only at a special festival, has been bought for general distribution by United Artists. This is a real treat to be watched for at your local theater. At the same time it was announced that Stanley Kramer's "It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World," will be shown in Soviet film houses, as will also "The Best Man," starring Cliff Robertson, and that delightful spoof, "Some Like It Hot," with dear Marilyn Monroe of fondest memory.

QUIETLY the exchange of graduate students continues. The first group of the 31 students to be exchanged this year, as worked out by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies, arrived in Moscow early in September, the rest followed shortly. The Soviet students are in residence in various U.S. universities.

The *Wall Street Journal* of August 11 said in the course of a story on the study of the Russian language in U.S. schools:

> This fall some 35,000 students in 600 colleges and universities will be studying Russian, up from only 16,000 collegians at 350 schools before Sputnik. An estimated 25,000 public school students also will be learning the language compared with 4,000 in 1957.

But, the article goes on, both business companies and Government agencies say this will not provide nearly enough Russian language translators and teachers to satisfy the needs being created by Soviet technical and scientific advances and by increasing East-West trade.

The U.S. Office of Education is this year offering 200 fellowships, each paying $450 to $2,700 for students studying the Slavic languages, the chief of which, of course, is Russian. Only 125 fellowships were granted last year, and only 50 in 1958. And the number of Slavic language centers is to rise to 12 with the creation of six new ones at Boston College, Oregon's Portland State College, Ohio State, Pennsylvania State, Louisiana State and Princeton. The federal agency is providing $1.5 million in grants to match funds raised by the colleges for the support of these centers.

When the *Wall Street Journal's* reporter told Vladimir Bogachev, first secretary of the Soviet Embassy's information service in Washington, that U.S. Government figures indicated only one out of every 390 U.S. citizens speak Russian, while one out of every 23 Soviet citizens speak English, Mr. Bogachev said this checked with his own information. He estimated that 30 per cent of elementary school children, and 75 per cent of high school students in the USSR learn English. The article then quotes A. Bruce Gaarder, foreign language specialist for the U.S. Office of Education: "With Russian rapidly supplanting German as the second language of science after English, it's becoming more critical each day that the United States have more Soviet language scholars."

High-paying translation jobs, both in Government and industry, are going begging. This means that the Russians are way ahead of us in translating scientific data. The All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information in Moscow employs 2,000 full-time language specialists and calls on another 20,000 researchers and industrialists for part-time help. U.S. experts estimate that the Soviets abstract some 500,000 U.S. scientific articles annually, while only some 200,000 Soviet articles are handled here. Some U.S. agencies are installing computers to help close the translation gap.

The article closes by saying that U.S. colleges are increasingly using Soviet publications as tools for teaching the language. For instance, the University of Wisconsin has its Russian language students read *Pravda, Izvestia, Komsomol* and *Krokodil,* while Indiana University this year sent its Slavic summer school to live on a collective farm and at a sports camp in the Soviet Union, to read at the Lenin library, and attend plays at Moscow theaters.

Interestingly, at Georgetown University in Washington twenty-seven Soviet school teachers spent ten weeks this summer studying methods of teaching English. Georgetown University will be remembered as one of the chief centers of anti-Soviet propaganda. Its influence has particularly been felt in the State Department, many of whose personnel were trained in the Georgetown University Foreign Service School.

IN STILL another area an important development took place at the general conference of the International Council of Museums, held in New York at the end of September. Six hundred council members, representing 63 countries attended. The council, formed in 1946, is mainly supported by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Mr. James J. Rorimer, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art told a *New York Times* reporter (Oct. 11) that he

had had several talks with three of the seven Soviet museum officials attending the conference: Mrs. Irina Antonova, head of Moscow's Pushkin Museum, Andrei Gouber, art director of the Pushkin Museum, and Alexander Zamoshkine, of Moscow's Academy of Art. Mr. Rorimer told the reporter:

> We talked of future plans as we have never been able to do before. They have gone home full of hope and enthusiasm about future exchanges. There was a great desire to cooperate in matters concerning museums. We hope to compare notes on archeological problems. They've been digging for years in a wide area all over Russia, where ancient and Near Eastern civilizations are to be found. In recent years there have been great finds of gold, silver and textiles. There have been particularly rich things of the first ten centuries of the Christian era.

Mr. Rorimer said that the Soviet delegates had visited museums in Washington, Philadelphia and New Haven beside those in New York. They were very much interested in the educational system of the U.S. museums in making art understandable both to children and adults through lectures, movies, publications. The Soviet delegates left some 100 copies of their own art publications as a gift to the Metropolitan Museum.

THE 140 U.S. citizens who paid $650 this summer for a round trip ticket to the Soviet Union (this sum covered the expenses also of a three-week stay) were organized by the Citizens Exchange Corps foundation as the first of what the foundation hopes will be many trips in the future, with much longer stays; these visits by U.S. citizens, are to be matched by similar visits here of Soviet citizens. Stephen D. James (see NWR for April 1964) organizer of the Corps, worked for four years to initiate this first visit with the help of such other members of the foundation as Melvin J. Gordon, of Wellesley, Mass., chairman of the Sweets Candy Company of America (makers of Tootsie-Rolls), the Rev. Robert L. Pierson, Episcopal clergyman and son-in-law of Gov. Rockefeller, and James B. Donovan, former president of the New York Board of Education as counsel for the foundation.

In Moscow, Mr. Donovan told reporters that a wide variety of Soviet organizations—writers, artists, trade unions—had agreed in principle to the exchange proposal. Special tours were arranged for the members of the group according to their interests as lawyers, teachers, students, trade unionists, etc., and at the same time members of the group on their own made contact with people whose names they had been given by friends at home and frequently just by talking to people in restaurants and on the streets with what Peter Grose of the *New York Times* (Aug. 22) called "startling success."

The announcement that a Soviet machine workers union had agreed to send a small delegation here this coming spring, though short of

what the foundation had hoped for, seemed, according to Melvin J. Gordon, chairman of the foundation's executive committee, "much better than we expected." (*N.Y. Times* Aug. 28.) And Mr. Donovan in Moscow, speaking of criticism that had been levelled, said, "unless someone starts making a concrete effort any kind of mutual understanding will never get off the ground."

This summer a group of trade unionists, largely from the New York area, visited the Soviet Union with the specific purpose of observing and learning in detail about the organizations and methods of Soviet trade unions. It is to be hoped that many other trade union groups will go for a visit—a person to person visit—to their fellow trade unionists in the USSR.

It is interesting that the Government has at last had the courage to condemn quite another type of private group—those professional patriots who have for a good many years organized successful boycotts against trade with the socialist countries. Six major cigarette companies had appealed to the State, Defense and Commerce departments for backing against right-wing criticism of their buying of Yugoslav tobacco. The letter in answer from the Secretaries of the three departments said that the Government "regards commerce in peaceful goods with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, as completely compatible with our national interest."

The *New York Times* (Oct. 10), commenting on the letter editorially, said: "The Administration's action in the Yugoslav tobacco case now makes it clear that all American companies engaged in lawful trade with the East can obtain full public backing against intimidation simply by asking for it. At last."

It is significant in the connection of East-West trade that in June, at a conference on world patent systems conducted by the National Association of Manufacturers in New York, the Soviet Union participated for the first time. Eugene I. Artemiev, deputy chairman of the USSR state committee on inventions and discoveries, invited U.S. businessmen to enter into licensing agreements for the production of U.S. goods in the USSR, and in exchange offered U.S. concerns patent rights to covering Soviet products. This invitation follows upon the declaration by the USSR last spring of adherence to the Paris Union, an international agreement to allow foreigners to file for patents in a country and to be given the same patent protection under the country's laws as its own nationals get. This agreement became effective for the Soviet Union as of July 1.

THE challenge of space—man's newest frontier—gives a quite different perspective to ancient quarrels, greeds, ambitions. True, the U.S. Air Force has at last received the go-ahead they have long sought to build a manned orbiting laboratory (see NWR, Oct.), nevertheless the very magnitude of the space challenge makes attempts to forward

narrow national ambitions seem particularly inconsequential, however potentially dangerous such efforts may prove to be. The space scientists and the remarkable pilots who have been in space have, it would seem, different goals.

Recently, for example, in New York, representatives from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration met with representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to reaffirm the agreement for the exchange of weather satellite data which is to start in a few months (daily exchange of conventional weather data continues as before), and to set up a joint editorial board for the purpose of publishing a review of research in space biology and medicine.

But what of the astronauts and cosmonauts themselves? After all, only twenty human beings have so far had the experience of hurtling through outer space—ten Soviet men and one Soviet woman, and nine Americans. The courage, the daring, the skill of these pioneers is surely unparalleled in human history. How do they regard man's future in space?

Last month, four of them, Col. L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., Commander Charles Conrad, Jr., from the U.S., and Col. Pavel I. Belyayev and Lieut. Col. Alexei A. Leonov, from the USSR, attended the 16th International Astronautical Congress in Athens where the space pilots from the two countries managed to have a long private talk among themselves. Col. Cooper, speaking in October at St. Louis before the Fourth Manned Space Flight meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, said that he foresaw greater space cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR. He based his belief, he said, on the talks he and Commander Conrad had had in Athens with their fellow-pilots from the Soviet Union. The Soviet space pilots, the Colonel went on, were "mighty nice fellows who appeared to be very happy that we could get together and talk. I think if we have more group efforts and get-togethers it's bound to encourage cooperation." (*N.Y. Times,* Oct. 11.)

Col. Cooper's simple, direct plea for human solidarity and his quiet confidence in the value of "group efforts" and "get-togethers" surely find an echo today in the hearts and minds of millions of people in our troubled world.

PETE SEEGER SINGS IN THE USSR

PETE SEEGER sang this autumn in Alma Ata, Frunze, Tashkent, Ashkhabad and Baku, capitals of the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Turkmen and Azerbaidzhan Republics. He finished his tour with a concert in Moscow's huge Tchaikovsky hall singing songs by Woody Guthrie, Negro spirituals, civil rights songs, a Cuban revolutionary song and a Russian-Jewish folksong about a Jewish collective in the Crimea.

Seeger ended his final concert, as he had ended all the others, by singing "We Shall Overcome," in which he was joined by the audience. This civil rights song is widely known throughout the Soviet Union.

HOW FARE THE SOVIET TRADE UNIONS?

by ERNIE DE MAIO

MERE mention of the Soviet trade unions invariably evokes a flood of scorn. This is especially true in trade union circles. There is a tendency in this country to equate wages with living standards.

We are big and, therefore, blissfully believe we are not only the biggest but also the best. We readily resent the notion that unions elsewhere *may* be bigger, or if not, *may* have greater influence in their country than we do in ours.

Conditions vary in different countries. All the more important therefore, that we shed our illusions, if not at home, then at the water's edge. As the TV whodunit put it: "the facts, man, just the facts." This is what we at last have in the handsome booklet, *Journey to the Soviet Trade Unions,* by Charles R. Allen Jr.* It is not about dead statistics, however, but people dealing with their everyday problems at work, producing the wealth that give them a full life.

Recently Frank W. McCulloch, chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, in a statement commemorating the passage of the Wagner Act, observed that thirty years later employers still bitterly oppose unionism in the United States. This partially explains why only one out of four of the 68 million workers in the U.S.A. is today a member of a union. Wages have not kept pace with the rise in productivity. Unemployment has hovered around 5 per cent for a decade.

The emasculation of the radicals from unions in the McCarthy era is reflected in the failure of the unions to become identified with and participants in the progressive movements of our times. To be active in a union means being recorded and cross-indexed in the voluminous dossiers of the Right. When this activity extends beyond the limitations of collective bargaining to political and legislative matters, it leads to rough surveillance by the FBI and highly publicized hearings by the Congressional witch hunters.

This, in brief, sketches the lot of American labor in the cold war years. How fares our Soviet counterpart? The men and women who fought to the death to defend Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. Have they donned sheep's clothing to be driven by trained dogs to whatever fate a faceless hierarchy has in store for them?

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* *Journey to the Soviet Trade Unions,* by Charles R. Allen, Jr., Marzani and Munsell, 1965. 64 pp. 65 cents.

ERNIE DE MAIO is an International Vice President of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), and the president of that union's District 11, comprising more than 40,000 workers in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin.

FOR answers let us journey with Chuck Allen who with open mind, keen eyes, ready ears (and a fast lip!) trekked the highways and by-ways of Soviet trade unionism.

Membership in unions in the USSR is voluntary. Union dues which are 1 per cent of the monthly wage are paid by the individuals to collectors. There is no check-off. Every member has a union book in which is placed his monthly dues stamp.

Total union membership is between 70-72 million, more than four times the size of unions in the U.S.A. Many of their functions are similar to ours, such as the negotiations of contracts covering wages, hours, working conditions, disputes procedures (grievances), social insurance, pensions, and policing the contract.

The differences interested me most. Insurance and pension programs, rest homes and vacation resorts, and mass sports programs are completely controlled by the unions. *This is a vast program involving annual expenditures of billions of dollars.* In every enterprise the unions have libraries with tens of thousands of volumes plus educational facilities and training programs. In addition to technical training there are courses in history, geography, biology, math, physics, languages and philosophy.

"In matters of housing, social welfare, education, child care, youth programs, cultural and sports pursuits, catering facilities and so on, they (Soviet trade unions) play a main role in connection with the establishment and the community with which they are identified."

The unions operate as powerful instruments to protect and promote the needs, interests and welfare of the workers. "Their recommendations had the force of a directive which management was required to consider and implement," Allen notes in commenting on the Soviet unions' role in managing the plant.

Progress in technology, automation and cybernation which casts a shadow of unemployment over the American worker, poses no threat to the Soviet worker. There is an acute labor shortage there. The seven-hour day, five and one-half day week, is standard; there will soon be the 35-hour week there. Overtime is frowned upon and is permitted only with the special permission of the trade union committee. In the budgeting of plant operation, funds are set aside for the retraining of workers displaced by automation. Workers' wages are paid in full during the retraining period.

Allen's odyssey is an interesting, lively report not only of the trade unions in the USSR but also—and more importantly—about the men and women who make up these unions. It deals with the flesh and blood of Soviet unionism. If we are to have peace, it will be because of our mutual understanding of each other's differences as well as our similarities.

Allen's tale touches all four bases. It's a home run in any major league park and an excellent introduction to the subject.

WHY THE BOMB WAS DROPPED

An Article-Review

by CORLISS LAMONT

THE twentieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has inspired a spate of books on the subject. Messrs. Giovannitti and Freed, able producers of TV documentaries, have written, after two years of research, a first-rate, exciting and carefully documented study on the political aspects of the United States decision to bomb Japan.*

As to their own opinion on whether the decision was justified, the authors keep the reader in suspense until the very last sentence of their narrative. That sentence reads: "Until and unless new evidence is uncovered to prove otherwise, it is our belief that the decision to use the bomb was taken in good faith not to unleash a weapon in vengeance against a ruthless enemy, but primarily to bring a quick end to a barbaric war and secondarily to derive the benefits of a timely victory."

Yet throughout this volume there runs a pattern of statements by the authors, and quotations from leading American officials, that strongly suggests quite another thesis. That thesis is that the A-bombs were unloosed on two Japanese cities not because Japan's surrender was in doubt, but to bring it about *before* the USSR entered the war; and to stage the mightiest military demonstration in history for the purpose of making the Soviets more amenable to U.S. pressure. In fact, Giovannitti and Freed themselves concede that the bombs were used partly "as a political weapon against the Russians."

Although President Roosevelt never said a word to Vice President Truman about the Manhattan Project that was to produce the atom bomb, he did confide the details of this portentous enterprise to James F. Byrnes, who was director of the Office of War Mobilization. After Truman became President, he appointed Byrnes Secretary of State at the beginning of July, 1945. Byrnes had already stated that Russia might be more manageable if impressed by American military might and that the demonstration of the bomb might impress Russia with America's military might. Later, in high-level talks about the bomb in April, Byrnes told Truman, "It might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."

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* *The Decision To Drop the Bomb*, by Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed. Coward-McCann. 1965. 348 pp., Illustrated, $6.00.

CORLISS LAMONT, philosopher, writer, lecturer, has for many years been a leader in the fight for civil liberties, international understanding and peace. He is chairman of the E.C.L.C. Among his many books may be mentioned, *Soviet Civilization* and *The Philosophy of Humanism.*

In discussing these talks Giovannitti and Freed write: "The policy makers were thinking beyond the end of the war, to the use of the bomb as a political and diplomatic weapon in the peace that would follow, in particular in the relations of the United States to the Soviet Union. And if they still regarded the bomb primarily as a means to end the war, to avoid the invasion of the Japanese home islands, to save thousands of American lives, they nevertheless more and more turned their attention to those secondary benefits they foresaw growing out of its use again Japan."

President Truman twice postponed his meeting with Churchill and Stalin in Germany because he hoped to go there with the trump card of knowing that the Manhattan Project had attained its end. Finally, the Potsdam Conference was scheduled to open on July 16, but was put off one day because Stalin was delayed. Truman had timed the Conference perfectly. For the amazingly successful explosion of the first atomic bomb took place early on the morning of July 16 in a desert area of New Mexico designated by the code name Trinity. Recalling the psychology of the scientists in charge of the test, J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the laboratory that built the bomb, asserted: "It was certainly very true that we felt very earnest about doing it in time for the Potsdam Conference . . . and we did it under weather conditions which were not ideal because we saw there was danger in postponement."

THE authors show that very soon after Truman appointed Byrnes Secretary of State, he began to rely on him rather than on Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson for advice on how to end the war with Japan. Truman invited Byrnes, not Stimson, to sail with him on the U. S. cruiser *Augusta* for the Potsdam Conference. And on that trip across the Atlantic the new Secretary of State had plenty of opportunity to win the President to his views. Writing later about the conversations on the *Augusta,* Byrnes noted: "I cannot speak for others but it was ever present in my mind that it was important that we should have an end to the war before the Russians came in." Both Byrnes and Truman, of course, were aware that by the terms of the Yalta Agreement drawn up by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill in February, the Soviet Union was scheduled to launch an offensive against the Japanese forces in Manchuria ninety days after V-E day. That meant that the Soviet attack would begin August 8.

On the evening of July 16 Truman, Byrnes and Stimson learned by cable from Washington that the A-bomb was a fearsome reality. This news brought about a drastic change in Truman's attitude on the Russians entering the Japanese war and reinforced Byrnes's earlier position. Byrnes later recalled: "Neither the President nor I were anxious to have them enter the war after we had learned of the successful test. . . . Personally, I was praying that the Japanese would

see the wisdom of surrendering and we could bring the war to an end before the Russians got in." Secretary Stimson and Army Chief of Staff Marshall agreed in general with Byrnes.

Prime Minister Churchill reported to Foreign Minister Eden: "It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan." After both Truman and Churchill had received a more detailed report of the Trinity blast, Churchill wrote: "Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday [at the July 21 plenary session of the Conference]. I couldn't understand it. When he got to this meeting after having read this report, he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting."

Beginning late in 1944, the Japanese Government had been making peace overtures to the United States through one channel or another. Early in 1945 General Douglas MacArthur forwarded to the White House surrender terms suggested unofficially by the Japanese and almost identical with those finally accepted. In the spring of 1945 the Japanese were reeling from the effects of firebomb air raids on Tokyo and other cities, and from the blockade of the country by the United States Navy. On June 22 Japanese realization of their desperate situation was intensified by the American capture of Okinawa after a fierce and bloody campaign. But even then, according to Eugene Dooman, Far Eastern expert in the U. S. State Department, Secretary Stimson "wanted no call for surrender until or unless the A-bomb was a reality."

As early as May 10 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting in Washington, had concluded that "the 'threat' of a Soviet invasion of Manchuria might, in itself, be enough to 'shock' Japan into surrender before the American invasion was launched." And in June General Marshall was of the opinion that "The entry of Russia on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation."

HOWEVER, in this book of many merits, the authors unfortunately make no attempt to explore this theme. President Truman has never answered the question as to why he allowed the two A-bombs to be dropped on August 6 and August 9 without awaiting the results of the Soviet offensive starting August 8. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Marshall suggested, the Japanese Government might have quickly surrendered after the Soviet onslaught; and there would then have been no further loss of either American or Japanese lives.

To the unanswered question my own reply, buttressed heavily by *The Decision to Drop the Bomb,* is twofold: First, Truman and other top American officials were most eager to obtain the capitulation of Japan before the Soviet Union came into the war, or could mount more than a symbolic involvement, because they wished to avoid So-

viet participation in the Far Eastern peace negotiations; second, they wanted to make a tremendous demonstration in weaponry that would impress the entire world, especially the Russians, and which would thereby, as Byrnes had put it, enable the United States "to dictate our own terms at the end of the war," in Europe as well as Asia.

I do not deny that other motivations played a role in the dropping of the bomb, but I think they were *secondary*. My basic disagreement, then, with Giovannitti and Freed is that they evaluate as *secondary* the political, anti-Soviet reasons for the atomic massacre of some 140,000 Japanese, mostly civilians. Their own book, I contend, gives much more support to my interpretation than theirs. I must add that my position is in general the same as that adopted by many scientists, historians and writers more competent in this field than I am.

Our two authors go deeply into the question of whether a warning demonstration of the power of the A-bomb should have been given the Japanese people and the Japanese Government. They agree with a host of other students of the subject that some such warning should have been arranged. Curiously enough, however, they do not cite the important article in *Look* magazine of March 14, 1950, in which Dr. Alexander Sachs, a New York economist and close associate of President Roosevelt, tells how the latter, a few months before he died, approved a complex plan for a warning demonstration of the A-bomb to both the Japanese and the Germans.

The book under review quotes a number of eminent persons who opposed the detonation of the A-bomb over Japan. For instance, Rear Admiral Lewis Strauss, who later became chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said: "It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world." Leo Szilard, physicist who helped initiate the development of the A-bombs, drew up a petition to be presented to President Truman, who never saw it. Szilard argued: "Once they were introduced as an instrument of war it would be very difficult to resist the temptation of putting them to such use. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale."

That the statements of Strauss and Szilard were prophetic can easily be verified by noting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and particularly the policies and plans of the United States. It has been common knowledge that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the brink-of-war apostle, and President Eisenhower offered nuclear bombs to France in 1954 when the French forces were on the verge of decisive defeat in Vietnam. Fortunately the American plan did not go through because of the vacillation of the French and the opposition, at the last moment, of Prime Minister Churchill and the British Cabinet.

As part of a preview of Eisenhower's new book, *Waging Peace, 1955-60, The New York Times* of Sept. 12, 1965, disclosed that in 1953 Eisenhower as President "let word leak out that unless a satisfactory armistice could be arranged in Korea, the United States would use its nuclear power to gain full victory. Shortly thereafter the Communists agreed to armistice terms." In the same article the *Times* revealed that in order to defend the Chinese offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy (less than seven miles from the mainland) against the Communists, Eisenhower and Dulles in 1958 drafted a memorandum on how the United States, to be successful, might "face the necessity of using small-yield atomic weapons against hostile airfields."

In view of Eisenhower's willingness on three separate occasions to bring into play atomic weapons, it is small wonder that the United States Government has refrained from following the example of the Soviet Union and Communist China in pledging not to be the first to utilize nuclear weapons in the future.

EVALUATING finally the U.S. destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by means of nuclear bombs, with no warning demonstration and no serious effort to follow up the Japanese peace overtures, I am compelled to agree with those large segments of public opinion throughout America and the world that have found the explosion of the atomic infernal machine unjustified from both the military and moral viewpoints.

The Truman decision to make use of the A-bomb against Japan, his later insistence on the manufacture of the far more powerful H-bomb (first tested by the United States in 1952), and the Dulles-Eisenhower blueprints for using atom bombs against the Chinese Communists—all this in my judgment adds up to a callous disregard for human life and for elementary ethical standards in international conduct. The cruel precedents established have brutalized a considerable proportion of the American people and have helped pave the way for the wanton military bombing and indiscriminate slaughter of non-combatants in President Johnson's war of aggression against Vietnam. The United States Government has truly become a past master in the practice of international immorality.

In view of the steady U.S. escalation of the Vietnam conflict and the plentiful supply of nuclear warheads in Guam, from which B-52's frequently fly to bomb the Vietnamese, there is no guarantee that the President and the Pentagon will not resort eventually to nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia. In fact, *The New York Times* on April 27, 1965, reported that high officials from President Johnson down have stated, in reference to Vietnam, that "they do not rule out the possibility that circumstances might arise in which nuclear weapons would have to be used."

This terrible danger today is our legacy from Hiroshima.

IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE FAILING COLD WAR?

by **D. F. FLEMING**

IS THE Cold War really waning, after it has nearly bankrupted us internationally and stultified our life at home very dangerously? Is there still time to ease ourselves out of huge, unproductive arms expenditures and save our overwhelmingly urbanized life from disintegration? Or will another long and giant effort to "contain" China lead to our undoing as a Great Power and as a humane civilization? These are not "academic" questions, but life and death issues. We have started a war on poverty and established a Department of Urban Affairs, but these are only meager beginnings. Shall they be choked off by continued and new astronomic appropriations for cold-hot war in Asia?

A new understanding of the forces, emotions and myths that drive us to and fro from nuclear doom is to be found in two new and vividly contrasting books. The first is *Struggle for the World: The Cold War,* 1917-1965 by Desmond Donnelly.*

Back to the Nineteenth Century

DONNELLY has written an excellent history of the Cold War from the viewpoint of a cold warrior. It may seem strange that he is one since he is a British Labor Member of Parliament, but beyond that he has the strong aversion of a democratic Socialist to Communism and the deeply ingrained feeling of a patriotic Briton for Power politics. The key to his interpretation of these twenty years seems to lie in the remark in his Preface that "The Cold War has its origins in the struggle for power in Central Asia between the rival imperialisms of Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century."

The book, then, starts with a nineteenth century outlook and, I think, never really escapes it. "The European Civil War" of the two world wars is now over, he says, and is replaced by new drives, especially "the Communist drive for domination."

This theme pervades the book throughout. Like Hitler, Lenin pursued "policies aimed specifically at world domination." Yet Lenin said in 1918: "The absolute truth is that without a revolution in Germany we shall perish." Stalin also believed that the capitalist

* *Struggle for the World: The Cold War,* by Desmond Donnelly. St. Martins Press. New York 1965. $7.95.

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world would attack again, as for various reasons it had during the 1918-1920 interventions, and his foreign minister Chicherin "maneuvered constantly to postpone the day of armed attack." "Stalin's reaction—ever since he saw the war coming in 1936—had been to keep out of the war at all costs." Nevertheless, in spite of these defensive reactions, duly recorded, Donnelly is certain that "The Communist mind is perpetually preoccupied with and fascinated by power and largely indifferent to other considerations."

He quotes Moscow's strong promises to aid Czechoslovakia before Munich and he details the dilatory British-French parleys with the Russians before Hitler's attack on Poland. Then when Stalin made his pact with Hitler in August 1939 he ascribes it partly to Stalin's "respect for power, and his fascination by it," and he finds a block to alliance with the Soviet Union against Hitler in "the Soviet Union's fundamental incompatibility as an ally for the Western democracies because of Communism's belief in world revolution, and Stalin's earlier decision to come to terms with Hitler if he could do so." He calls his chapter on the Russo-German negotiations. "Idiot's Delight," concludes that "the Soviet-German Pact has made war inevitable" and thinks that behind it was "the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of two worlds and the ultimate goal of Communist world revolution."

He writes that history will be merciless on Chamberlain for what he did at Munich, and before, but he refuses to recognize the climactic, irrevocable nature of the 1938 Munich Conference. After Chamberlain had broken down the Czech bastion and opened wide Hitler's way toward collision with the Soviet Union, he speaks of "the perfidious farce" of Stalin's negotiations with both Hitler and the West down to the day when Hitler forced him to choose, and near the end of his book he writes about Stalin's "miscalculated treachery" in the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

He sympathizes with Churchill's efforts after Stalingrad in late 1942 to find some way to forestall the Russian return sweep into the middle of Europe, down to his last frantic efforts to persuade Eisenhower to push Montgomery across Germany to seize Berlin. He thinks there was a moment, on April 11, 1945, when we might have won a race to Berlin.

These are natural British yearnings, but the forces released by Chamberlain at Munich were too vast to be recalled later, even if there had been any sanity in coming into collision with the Russians to seize German territory already conceded to the Russian zone of occupation.

Donnelly's belief in vast impersonal forces, such as Communist world revolution, is deep. Indeed he closes his book with a quotation from Tolstoy indicating that Attila was not leading his hordes of Huns at all and casting doubt upon the ability of "event-producing men" to determine events against the more manifest "law of necessity."

On the other hand, he dedicates his book to Dean Acheson and Ernest Bevin, two event-producing men who rallied the West against the supposed Stalinist flood. Bevin is credited with skillfully leading us to take over responsibility in the Mediterranean and Europe, and with leading us into NATO. He hails Kennedy, too, for sensing in the 1962 missile crisis that Khrushchev intended to use the threat of his missiles in Cuba to force a Berlin settlement, and goes on to credit Khrushchev with expecting "to seize West Berlin and eventually to subjugate West Germany and perhaps other European countries."

Germany and Korea

ABOUT Stalin's "hopes for securing all Germany," he portrays him as finding in 1946 "prostrate before him the greatest industrial, technological and political prize in Europe, if not in the whole world —Germany" and states positively that Stalin "thought of Marx' dictum: He who holds Germany, holds the key to Europe." As evidence of Soviet intentions he tells how Red Army officers were "dazzled by the extent of German industrialization" and promptly tried to cart it off to Russia by train. Then on May 11, 1959 a Soviet draft of a German peace treaty proposed that Communists should have "unhampered activity" in West Germany, whereas all "revanchist and revisionist" groups would be banned in East Germany. This constituted "an open return to the basic objective" of dominating Germany.

Stalin is credited also with a clear case of aggression, in South Korea in 1950. "Checked in Berlin, he had been casting his eyes around for easy pickings and here, so he thought, was his opportunity." (291) "The evidence indicates that the North Korean venture, in the first place, had been a Soviet-inspired expedition, equipped by Russian arms and undertaken on Stalin's authority."

Yet Donnelly gives no evidence, and there is the highly puzzling factor that when the invasion occurred, Russia had been boycotting the proceedings of the UN, in protest against the refusal to allow the Chinese Communist delegate to take China's seat. This boycott had started in January 1950 and the Soviet delegate to the UN, Malik, had been in Moscow for about six months and was still there. This enabled Acheson to move swiftly and to enlist the UN behind the U.S. action in defense of South Korea. Why did Stalin make this colossal blunder when he pushed the North Korean button and fail to have Malik there to veto UN action? This has puzzled every student of the Korean War, including Donnelly: "The significant, puzzling and indeed extraordinary factor in the chain of these events . . . was the absence of the Soviet delegate from the meetings of the Security Council. Stalin was guilty of a major oversight. . . ." Why? "The explanation is simpler than many realize—it lies in the basic incompetence that stemmed from the over-centralization of major decisions in the USSR, an inevitable consequence of the authoritarian regime."

But is the Kremlin really that incompetent? We give it credit for diabolical cleverness and thoroughness in planning our downfall everywhere. When a really major stroke was allegedly being planned, against a ward of the UN about which it had been greatly concerned, did the Kremlin forget not only that Malik was in Moscow, but that the UN existed? Nothing was more certain than that the United States would try to mobilize it against North Korea.

Toward a New Cold War with China

DONNELLY'S commitment to finding Communist world revolution behind everything is strong indeed. When Khrushchev told Kennedy on December 19, 1962 that he thought the time had come to end nuclear tests "once and for all," the author hastens to add that "this did not mean that Khrushchev had suddenly forsaken the revolution—far from it." He was only seeking a "minor respite" for the Soviet economy, which had always been "a war economy" impelled by "the evangelical desire to extend its power." There is here no allowance for a great upsurge of Soviet desires for a higher standard of life and no foreign adventures. Such statements give no hint of the terrible memories that haunt Russian minds.

Nevertheless, this is a book which should be read carefully by all students of the Cold War. It has excellent chapters on the Sino-Soviet split and our Cuban missile crisis. The account of John Foster Dulles' efforts to block the Geneva Conference of 1954, which ended the first ten years of Vietnam's struggle for independence and social revolution, is the best that has yet appeared. The lengths to which Dulles went to prevent peace and to go to the aid of France militarily are incredible—and highly pertinent to U.S. Government policy in Vietnam today.

There is valuable information throughout the book which I believe is honestly presented. Though he has "read over a thousand books," and "scrutinized innumerable documents," there are only a few footnotes in the book and they are of a general nature. He leaves it to us to trust his accuracy and his sources.

He leaves us also firmly committed, in his view, to holding the line against world Communism, backed by American nuclear power, only the main theater has moved to Asia, where "China's military threats" must be "matched by Western military strength," while we struggle with incredible conditions in the vast underdeveloped world.

There could hardly be a greater contrast between this book, which accepts as inevitable our plunge back into power politics after two world wars, and *After* 20 *Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe,* by Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin.*

* *After* 20 *Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe,* by Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin. Ravelon House, New York. 1965. $5.95.

The authors are young men who have been deeply involved in cold war politics in Washington, as counsel to a number of Democratic Congressmen; as officials in the State Department and the White House, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the staff of the National Security Council, and the staff of our delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Both have published books on disarmament issues.

While Donnelly left us firmly, and I think hopelessly, mired in the nineteenth century, Barnet and Raskin seek to move us toward the twenty-first century. Donnelly ends by committing us to another great confrontation with China; they begin by saying that "the history of the Great Confrontation with the Soviet Union over Europe can tell us much about how *not* to conduct our relations with China."

They trace the origins of the idea of attempted Soviet world domination and find that the brash talk of Soviet propagandists in 1946 was "a calculated fierceness designed to give an attacker pause at a time when only the U.S. had the atomic bomb." Yet by 1949 neither Dulles nor Forrestal could find any danger of a Russian attack on West Europe. Even the fear of Communist take-overs had passed by then.

Still, we proceeded with a long, determined build-up of military power in NATO, constantly urging our allies to provide more and more forces which they did not believe necessary or want to pay for. This reluctance was compensated for by sending 400,000 American troops and giving West Europe grants totalling 70 billion dollars, 19 billions of which was military aid. Our great effort to weld Europe together as a partner for us created a big bureaucracy, at SHAPE in Paris and elsewhere, which developed vested interests in planning war games and defenses against every conceivable kind of Soviet attack, and committed to constantly adding miraculous and expensive weapon systems. It is this giant machine of international militarism which de Gaulle now proposes to disband.

Incredible Strategies

HE and the other Europeans have discovered that none of the American strategies for defending Europe with our nuclear weapons are credible. Dulles' massive retaliation proposal was obviously ominous for Europe. Then the Eisenhower "new-look" strategy of using tactical nuclear weapons to wage limited nuclear war in Europe promised to leave Europe a smoking ruin especially since the war games themselves dramatized the killing of millions. Tactical weapons could destroy Europe but not defend it. Yet the Eisenhower Administration decided not only to leave them in Europe but to *increase* them "perhaps as much as a hundred fold." So Kennedy found thousands of officers occupied in building up these forces, several industries subsisting on orders for them and powerful American political figures fascinated by the limited nuclear war idea. Therefore, the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe was again actually increased by 60 per cent.

When the follies of the Cold War are fully recorded surely this will be one of the most unbelievable. But so is the rest of our playing at defending Europe with nuclear weapons. Seeing the patent folly of the limited nuclear war delusion, while continuing to add to its physical base, the Kennedy Administration offered still another strategy of finally inducing our allies to close "the gap" in conventional forces and be ready to fight the advancing Russian armies with non-atomic weapons for a few weeks or months, but the Europeans saw that this too was silly, for several reasons: (1) there was no conventional gap; (2) they did not fear any Soviet attack, ("They had not thought in terms of a Soviet invasion for years, if, indeed, they ever had."); (3) the conventional war would be almost certain to escalate soon into nuclear; and (4) once again it seemed "that Washington was looking for a way out of its suicide pact with Europe."

That the NATO pact is a suicide pact became constantly clearer, since it requires us to incur the destruction of our entire society, if necessary "to defend" Berlin or any other point in West Europe. Our authors knew men in the State Department who really believed that we should all die for Berlin. Yet the inherent absurdity of the idea led to still another doctrine under Kennedy, that of "flexible response" or "no cities." By this military dream we proposed to fire only at Soviet missile bases, not at their cities, trusting them to play the game in this gentlemanly fashion. However, our allies saw that this was only another attempt to fight a nuclear war without committing suicide and they saw that it was obviously based on false assumptions, before McNamara told Congress he thought the Soviets would strike with everything, if at all, and that they would soon have many invulnerable missiles.

Consequently the myth of defense by our nuclear weapons has evaporated in Europe and "No matter what strategy the U.S. recommends for the Alliance, it is increasingly clear that it will not satisfy the Europeans."

Artificial Community

AT the same time, it has become equally apparent that NATO does not provide the basis for a community, stretching as it does from Turkey to the United States and leaving out some of the finest Western nations. It also offends implicitly the remainder of humanity, the Communist nations, because it is aimed at them and all of the others because it represents a "separately organized subworld of white, wealthy, Western nations." In the world that is just ahead of us this too is an invitation to suicide.

On top of these false foundations NATO also serves to prevent the Europeans from forming a European community for which there is real basis, and inhibits settling the problem of German reunification.

Barnet and Raskin find the evidence of any Soviet ambition to control Germany insubstantial, but they are sure that "until the U.S. is forced from Europe, there is little hope of persuading the Soviets to relax their grip on the Eastern half." In the meantime, the Common Market excludes us, as we long excluded the world from our markets, while we pressingly warn Western Europe "not to act as a super-power, not to establish any wall around itself, and not to give itself any preference, i. e., not to behave as powers have customarily behaved."

Quite obviously, the American dream of organizing a group of states "in which Washington would continue to play the dominant role," retaining a veto on nuclear weapons and managing East-West negotiations, has failed. It was always "an implausible vision," yet "our Grand Designers cannot grasp the idea that they lack both the ability and the power to plan the destiny of another continent." They did not foresee that Atlantica could not be viable as a closed society, resting on a negative ideology, an accident power alignment, and on class and race lines. (180-82)

Observing the break-up of NATO and the reasons for it, Barnet and Raskin come to the unavoidable conclusion that the only way forward is toward a universal world community, adequate to deal with "ending the use of war, controlling disease, overpopulation, mass starvation, and the conservation of resources."

The authors grapple realistically with the difficulties of returning to building the world community, toward which we were set when Roosevelt died. The Cold War has frustrated this saving undertaking for twenty years and the hour is late to return to it, but let no one say that it is too late when another 20-year Cold War with East Asia will almost certainly bankrupt us internationally, internally and morally.

In the world community there will, of course, be tension and conflict, "but to turn such feelings into a Holy War for or against a set of beliefs is self-destructive." Of course Barnet and Raskin are not sure that we will "learn fast enough to find new ways to control our passion for destruction and chaos," but they end their clear-sighted, constructive book with the hope that "a growing awareness that his problems are too vast for either parochial community or a parochial ideology may help man to come to terms with his trembling existence."

This is one of the most constructive and truly conservative books published in recent years. It should help us to avoid disasters that are clearly in the making in our relations with the rest of the world.

ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

by **MAURICE DOBB**

IT WOULD be surprising indeed if the economic problems, and the mechanisms appropriate to their handling, were not different today in socialist countries of Eastern Europe from what they were three decades ago in the Soviet Union. True, one cannot speak of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe as a uniform group. They remain at different levels of development, despite a significant levelling-up of their economic conditions and potential over the past twenty years. During those twenty years they have gone through an intensive process of industrialization, and at least the foundations (if no more) of a socialist economy have been laid.

A country like Czechoslovakia represents a high level of industrial development comparable to that of countries of Western Europe; similarly East Germany; and so to a lesser extent do Poland and Hungary. The pace and degree of industrial development in the Soviet Union since the 1930's are well-known. By contrast, in the decade before the war the Soviet Union was still in the middle of her "big push" towards industrialization and towards laying the foundations of a socialist economy.

The Period of Rapid Industrialization

IN those days the main economic tasks were in one sense simpler, even if their successful achievement was difficult and involved heroic efforts. The order of priorities was comparatively simple. The global objectives can be summed up as being the achievement of the highest possible rate of growth, subject to the maintenance of certain necessary living standards (*plus* the requirement of a system of differentiated incentives to production) and of certain necessary social expenditures (e.g. for education and public health). To this end the existing economic potential had to be harnessed, and available resources including labor-power had to be appropriately mobilized, so as to concentrate these upon key objectives.

In such circumstances it was inevitable that planning and direction of economic life, and of key decisions about new investment and

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production, should become highly centralized. Not only was the order of priorities simpler in such circumstances, as we have said, but the complex of decisions to be taken by the central authorities was also simpler because the decisions to be taken were fewer. Investment was concerned in the main with a number of large construction projects like the famous Dnieprostroi, key steel plants like Magnitogorsk, engineering works like the Gorky motor-factory or the Stalingrad tractor-plant. Over a wide range of industry products were deliberately standardized (in the interests of securing economy of "long runs" of output) : particular examples were tractors, motor-cars and machine-tools.

To this extent the fixing of output-targets was simplified: the number of targets to be set was not very large, and they could largely be set in terms of physical units (e.g. so many trucks or tractors, or in conventional units as in tractors of given horse-power) ; whereas less standardized, heterogeneous products have to be measured in *value* units, with the complication that the value-total can be affected by shifts (merely) in the composition of the output-total (i.e. a rise in some items and a fall in others—what is called in Soviet planning jargon a shift in the "assortment"). Moreover, to the extent that a particular type of product was specialized to a particular plant, the working-out of the so-called input-norms or coefficients was very much simplified, and also the supply-allocations (of materials and components) based upon these input-norms.

Another feature of this earlier period, when the order of priorities was both clear and relatively simple, was that if the priority-sectors suffered from bottlenecks in supplies or in necessary equipment, these could be fairly quickly dealt with by a scaling-down of the targets for non-priority sectors, with a release of resources for transfer to the former. (This had been a familiar feature of the civil war period under "war communism", as indeed of *any* war economy.)

Such bottlenecks could occur, either because input-norms had been too strictly calculated and the "balancing" of needs against supply-availabilities had been too summarily and approximately done, or because unforeseen hitches had occurred in producing the supplies and components needed by other industries—or yet again, perhaps, simply because the priority industries in question had succeeded in *over*-fulfilling their targets. In such a situation retardation and dislocation will occur unless *either* sufficent reserves exist (an expensive luxury in a rapidly developing economy) *or* the necessary supplies can be diverted from low-priority sectors.

Thus in the pre-war decade, when growth and maximum saving of time were the prime objectives, these low-priority sectors (mainly industries producing consumers' goods) provided such a "reserve," and their targets tended to be pruned when there were hitches elsewhere or when rearmament needs in face of the Nazi menace required

an upward revision of plan-targets in defense industry or heavy industry.

There was much talk in those years about each five year plan having its specific "key" objectives and sectors of concentration. It followed as the obverse side of such concentration that there must be industries or sectors of *non*-concentration that were treated as "residual" so far as the allocation of scarce resources was concerned —in other words, these got what was left over.

Over-Centralization and New Situations

WHENEVER for any reason anything went wrong and plan-targets failed to be fulfilled, the natural tendency was to deal with the situation by direct administrative intervention from the center and by more detailed specifications and directives. Thus planning became more detailed, and industrial managements became increasingly hemmed in with obligatory indices or "limits"—wage-limits defining the size of their total wage bill or stipulations about their output assortment as regards lines, qualities, style or models. This was an understandable reaction when saving time and "beating the clock" was at a premium, as was the case in the pre-war years. But it meant that planning became progressively more complex; decisions on a lot of particular questions were taken at top levels that inevitably were distant from the actual production situations to which these decisions applied; and the discretion, initiative and freedom of maneuver of factory and enterprise managements was increasingly fettered.

This tendency to over-centralization (as it was eventually to become) was continued in the period of post-war reconstruction; and, in the newly-established "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe in the period of their own industrialization drive between 1948 and the middle 50s, the system was mechanically copied and too indiscriminately transplanted on to their own soil.

After this period of rapid growth with comparatively limited key objectives was over, the highly centralized system associated with it became increasingly unsuitable. Planning problems and planning decisions had now become more complex (as to some extent they always had been in the most industrially developed of the "people's democracies"). Not only was it that the *number* of products (and varieties or lines of a given product) had grown enormously, also the number of different plants producing a given product as well as the aggregate number of plants in existence, but the essential nature of planning and of supply-allocation had changed in a quite fundamental way.

It was no longer a matter of concentrating on certain key objectives and treating everything else as residual. Now that socialism had been firmly built in U.S.S.R. (and at least the foundations of socialism laid in other countries), it was time for the efforts and

sacrifices of the "heroic years" to bear fruit in a rising standard of life, and "the growing resources of industry" to be "used more and more to meet fully all the . . . household and cultural needs of the population" (as the new C.P.S.U. Program of 1961 has it). All-round satisfaction of consumers' needs, as well as growth, was the order of the day.

This was expressed, *inter alia,* in the fact that since the early 50s the sector of industry producing consumers' goods has grown at a pace approaching that of so-called Group A producing means of production or capital goods (in addition to which some branches of the latter have taken up the production of durable consumers' goods). The days when unqualified priority was given to heavy industry are over; and emphasis on light industry, such as clothing and food-processing industries, and the need to bring production of these into much closer touch with consumers' demand, are now on the agenda. This represents a crucial qualitative shift.

The retail market for consumers' goods has always (outside special years of rationing) constituted a market in the full sense, where commodity-relations and the laws of the market (the "law of value") unquestionably hold sway. Hence the relationship between production and the market is different from that in industries concerned with producing capital goods, where production is largely a "circular process" in which outputs are fed back as inputs for so-called "productive consumption" within the same sector or department. (Although many are saying today that even the capital goods sector is characterized by commodity-relations, so far at least as the production of means of production destined for use in consumers' goods industries is concerned.)

Planning and Market, and Incentives

A NUMERICAL illustration of increased complexity is that when the Central Statistical Administration in 1959 drew up what is called an input-output matrix (or table) for main products, this covered 65 industrial sectors or branches and nearly 200 products; but the official industrial nomenclature list of 1960 contained as many as 15,000 product groups. The "system of balances"* (which is crucial to planning methodology) operated before the war with some 400 to 500 items and today with something in the neighborhood of 1,500—and even these cover less than half of all output in value. This number of balances could scarcely be calculated and re-calculated in the time available without the aid of electronic computers. Similarly

* A "balance" for a product consists of all the uses for it listed on the one side, and all the sources of supply of it on the other. Thus it can be thought of as an equation of supply and demand. Whenever a plan target is altered, all the relevant balances have to be recalculated and supplies or uses readjusted to secure a new "fit." The repercussions of an initial change may be very extensive, but the time-factor usually limits the area over which recalculation is possible.

Poland the number of products included in the system of balances is between 400 and 600. In the pre-war dozen years alone about 9,000 new large-scale Soviet industrial enterprises were put into operation. In the single year 1963 more than a thousand new large-scale industrial enterprises entered upon activity; and in total the Soviet Union today has more than 200,000 State enterprises.

In a country like Czechoslovakia the number of centrally approved planning targets by 1953 (though they were reduced later) had reached a total of 2,251, and the number of centrally allocated goods as many as 974. It is said to produce today all-told a million and a half types of output!

The changed structure and relationships of production characteristic of a settled and established socialist society are sometimes spoken of in terms of the relationship between planning and the market; alternatively in terms of economic instruments and incentives governing production, by contrast with administrative directives or orders. A restatement of the connection between planning and the market has been put by Professor Ota Sik of Prague (of whom more later) in the following words:

> Until recently the connection between planning and the market was incorrectly understood and the concept of the market was applied to a socialist economy in a sort of shamefaced way. It was held, wrongly, that planned social coordination, planned management of production was the absolute antipode of orientation on the market, of utilizing market levers. Planning was assumed to be an attribute of socialism alone, and production for the market a feature solely of capitalism. These tenacious theoretical premises brought much harm; because of them a system of planning and management was adhered to which meant that production could not be adequately geared to its proper aim—that of satisfying the home and foreign market demand—and consumers could not exert any direct influence on the producers. . . . Socialist planned production should consistently seek to satisfy the market demand, and sales of goods on the market should be the main criterion of the social usefulness of labor expended in the production process.

Yet a further respect in which the economic situation is different in the 60s from what it was in the 30s in the Soviet Union (and in the immediate post-war years in other socialist countries) is the passing of the previous situation characterized by the existence of an agricultural hinterland of surplus labor on which industry could draw. As industry grew in the past, employment grew with it and most of the new labor force was drawn in from the countryside. Mechanization of agriculture was itself labor-saving and was an additional factor in releasing labor for industry. Although it is probably true that many collective farms are still overstocked with labor compared with what is economically necessary, this older situation of a labor reserve for industry to draw upon is passing, or has already passed, in the most industrially developed countries of the socialist camp.

It follows that for industry and the industrial potential to expand further, it is necessary to introduce continually more labor-saving methods of production, on the basis of new and improved techniques. Technical progress is not something that can be arranged by directives "from the top": it requires continuous initiative and zealous search for innovation at the place of production. Hence the urgent necessity in the new situation of affording the maximum stimulus at the factory and workshop level to pioneer new technical methods and constantly to raise the level of labor productivity thereby.

Defects of the Old Methods

SINCE the working out of new, more decentralized methods was preceded by several years of criticism of the defects of the old over-centralized system, something should first be said about the latter. Some of these defects have been cited so often as to have become by now pretty familiar. In the first place, there are the numerous stories of how the various ways in which production targets were measured gave a bias to the form in which the target was fulfilled. To the extent that there was latitude at the plant or enterprise level regarding the type of product to be turned out, the management not unnaturally took advantage of this so as to achieve the target in the *easiest* possible way (and the fact that managerial and technical staffs were awarded a bonus for plan-fulfillment that represented a sizeable addition to their salaries was an added inducement to do so).

Thus, if output was measured in weight, it paid to make objects heavy rather than light. A stock example was bedstead-design, where it paid to make them large and ponderous in preference to lighter and more numerous. Similarly with glass and paper, and the tendency to spin thicker yarn of lower count in preference to higher counts. Another example was nails: *Krokodil* once had a cartoon of the workers of a nail factory bearing aloft in procession one giant nail, the cartoon being headed "The Factory Fulfils its Plan."

In other cases surface area was the measure; and *Pravda* quoted the example of an inventor of a new and much more efficient type of boiler who could not persuade anyone to adopt it and put it into production; the reason being that output plans for boilers were expressed in terms of surface area, which the new type reduced.

One might suppose that such difficulties would be avoided if production targets were expressed in terms of value (that is, at current wholesale prices). However, this was not so, since it was traditional to calculate value for this purpose as *gross* value, i.e. the final value of the product in question (say, a piece of clothing or a tractor or a motor), *including* all the materials and components produced at earlier stages of production by other enterprises and possibly other branches of industry. This was found to encourage an enterprise to concentrate on so-called "material-intensive" types of product:

i.e. types which embodied relatively much material purchased from outside the enterprise compared to the actual value-added within the enterprise in question.

Thus, human nature being what it is, the production of a given yardage of cloth made from expensive rather than cheap materials was encouraged, or tools made from high-quality steels rather than from lower-quality, which would have served almost as well and would have released the scarce better steel for more important uses. This was encouraged because the plan was more easy to fulfil in this way; and it was hardly surprising that managements under very great pressure to fulfil their targets (in disgrace if they didn't, as well as losing their bonus) should have taken the line of least resistance. To this reason has also been attributed the shortage of spare parts (e.g. for tractors and machines of all kinds) which at times assumed critical proportions: when a factory had made a particular part, this would book-in more towards plan fulfilment if it were combined with a lot of other components (made elsewhere) to assemble a completed tractor than if it were sold separately.

It might seem that these difficulties are not very fundamental and could be met by minor changes, involving no radical alterations in the methods of planning and management. To some extent this is true: for example, gross output as a basis for judging plan-fulfilment was changed to *net* output (or "value-added") over a large part of Soviet light industry; and after 1959 the former was abandoned in all but a few industries as the basis for premiums to managerial and technical staffs.

Similarly in Poland *net* output was adopted *in principle* as far back as 1957, and would long since have been adopted generally but for the slowness of industrial administrators to abandon traditional methods for a new one.

Nonetheless the defects we have referred to have an importance for this reason: it is because the traditional indicators of plan-fulfilment, with their emphasis on purely *quantitative* fulfilment, have defects of this kind that attention has recently been turned towards some alternative and "synthetic" index, which we shall see in the proposals of Liberman and others has been found in the *profitability* (in a balance-sheet sense) of the productive activities of an enterprise. Almost any *particular* index of the sort we have been describing has a distorting effect of some kind upon output-assortment.*

Negative Effects on the Enterprise

TO COME, however, to three defects of the previous system that are certainly more fundamental.

* Of course with profitability as the index, assortment may be affected if the profit margins on different lines of output differ appreciably. This is why a reform of the price system, as well as more frequent adjustment of prices in line with changed costs, is a logical accompaniment of other changes.

Firstly, emphasis on purely quantitative achievement, whether as a mere "success indicator" or as a basis for material incentives, has been found to conflict seriously with improvements of quality, and with the introduction of new products and of novelties in design. Yet in an age of technical progress and rising levels of consumption, the introduction of new products and the widening of variety is as important as increasing the output of an existing range or "menu" of products.

Just because capitalism in the age of ad-men and high-pressure salesmanship carries novelty and variety to a ridiculous and wasteful excess, there is no reason to go to the opposite extreme and to deny them any place in a rational socialist society.

Yet to introduce a new product, whether a new machine or a new line in consumers' goods, usually involves time and trouble. It involves experimentation and trial runs, which interrupt the production-flow, possibly some reorganization of the production-line, and even re-tooling. A manager who is under pressure to fulfil a quantitative output-target will heartily grudge such delays and concentrate on uninterrupted production of the old product, whether consumers are sated with it or no.

Secondly, the management of an enterprise will obviously have an easier life and be more likely to reach the plan-target, the more leniently this target has been set in relation to the productive resources and capabilities of the plant in question.

It has to be remembered that the planning authorities inevitably rely to a large extent on the enterprises themselves to supply them with the essential costing-data on which such norms are based. True, the planners have certain means of checking the data supplied to them, such as investigations made by local planning representatives and comparing the results of like-situated enterprises. But an overworked planning apparatus cannot check every item of information it receives from more than 200,000 enterprises; and in practice it is the case that the management of a large enterprise has an appreciable say in the targets and norms assigned to it.

There is a saying, at any rate, that a wise manager may overfulfil his plan by four or five per cent but never by as much as twenty: if he did, he could hardly fail to have his plan-target stepped-up sharply next year. In the past there was a tendency for the planning authorities, suspecting that what came up from below erred on the "soft" side, to over-compensate by what was called "over-tight planning"—setting targets higher (and norms lower) than were attainable without special effort and strain. This served to penalize the conscientious and to have negative consequences of its own in the shape of failures to deliver necessary supplies by the stipulated date (with resulting dislocations of production-schedules at the receiving end) and accentuated shortages.

To quote Professor Sik, the Czechoslovakian economist, again:

> It is common knowledge that in the past enterprises sought to obtain allocations for investment irrespective of anticipated returns, and as big a labor force as possible, while keeping production tasks to the minimum. Owing to this, plans were finalized largely on the basis of subjective considerations and compromises between various management bodies.

Thirdly, experience has shown that there has been too little economy of plant and equipment, and too little care taken to put it to the best use and to maintain it. This is because hitherto the cost of using (or of non-using) equipment has not been made to impinge upon the enterprise. The size of so-called basic funds (or fixed capital) does not affect the costs of output, and the provision of new equipment is made by a free grant to the enterprise from the State. To this extent the fault lies in the price system rather than in the system of management. But the more the system management is decentralized, the greater the influence of defective prices; so that the two questions are inevitably intertwined and cannot be separated.

Profitability and Khozraschet

BEFORE describing the new or proposed changes, another brief excursion into history seems to be desirable, in order to make clear what has been the traditional role of the enterprise, and also the part played by "net income" or profit as an accounting category and an incentive (of which bourgeois journalists seem to be perversely ignorant).

As far back as the early '20's, in the days of Lenin, the principle of operational and financial independence of the individual enterprise was established on the principle of what was known as *Khozraschet* (cost accounting): meaning responsibility for its own outlays and expenditures and for balancing these with the financial receipts resulting from its activities.

This principle was again affirmed in 1928 on the eve of the first five year plan, and remained as an unchallenged principle throughout the pre-war decade and after. To balance its accounts and show a profit was one, at least, of the necessary conditions of successful performance by an enterprise. Moreover, in the later 30s (1936) a specific profit-incentive was added in the shape of the Director's Fund (later called the Enterprise Fund); payments into it being made as a certain proportion of profits, and expenditures from it being designed for purposes beneficial to the enterprise, including bonuses to its workers.

Thus profit as a criterion of successful productive activity has always existed and is an original Leninist principle (just as is the use of "material incentives" generally, i.e., "payment by results").

True, it came in the 30s to be increasingly overlaid, both as a

criterion and an incentive, by quantitative plan-targets and bonuses geared to their fulfilment; also by a series of other incentive payments geared to other so-called "qualitative indices" (introduced at various times in attempts to redress the purely quantitative bias of the plan-fulfilment incentive).

Moreover, payments into and from the Enterprise Fund were hedged in by various conditions (e.g., prior fulfilment of the main targets and indices); its use for incentive purposes was subject in the USSR to a pretty low ceiling (5 per cent of the total wage bill) and so had comparatively little influence; and in some cases the Fund came to be used as a source for financing investment-expenditures initiated by the management rather than for incentive- payments, collective or individual. This is why the question of resurrecting it in a new and more comprehensive form has come upon the agenda in recent years: moreover, of relating it in some way or other to the size of the total capital employed by an enterprise (its "basic and turnover funds"): i.e. treating it for purposes of calculation as a profit *rate*.

After all that has recently been written (by Liberman himself and others) it should hardly be necessary to emphasize that profit as the net income of a socialist enterprise has an altogether different significance from profit as an economic category under capitalism. But in view of the confusing talk of so many bourgeois commentators, and of those with Chinese Party leanings, this perhaps needs underlining. For one thing, when selling price is fixed (i.e. fixed by higher authority) the enterprise cannot make a profit by restricting output and *raising its price*: it can only do so by enlarging its output to the maximum and by lowering costs (i.e. being more efficient than the plan budgeted for).

This comes out clearly in Liberman's contribution to the *Pravda* discussion of September 1964, when he declares:

> Our profit, if one starts from the fact that prices correctly reflect the average costs of production of the branch [of industry], is nothing else but the effect of increasing productivity of social labor expressed in a money form. That is why we can, in basing ourselves on profitability, encourage real efficiency of production. At the same time encouragement is not enrichment. Profit cannot be transformed into capital, since no one can privately acquire means of production with his bonus, neither the manager nor the trade union nor individuals.

And in his original and much-quoted article in *Pravda* of September 9, 1962, he declared:

> Our profit has nothing in common with capitalist profit. The nature of categories such as profit, price, money are quite different with us. . . . Our profit, with planned prices and utilization of net income for the good of the whole of society is the result and at the same time the measure of the real effectiveness of labor expenditures.

Similarly an article by Sukharevsky (from *Kommunist*), after maintaining that

> the index of profit possesses various advantages over that of [reducing] prime cost from the standpoint of stimulating enterprises,

goes on to say that

> the level of profit reflects the same quantitative and qualitative indices of the functioning of an enterprise. If the prime cost per unit of production remains unchanged when the volume of production is increased, the mass of profit increases. The lowering of prime cost does not depend as directly as the size of profit on the extension of production. . . . The size of profit depends on the realization of production at least by the wholesale centers. The cost-price of market production reflects the cost of production without taking account of whether production has been sold or remains in the depots of the producing enterprise.

The Start of Decentralization

ACTUALLY, the tendency towards some decentralization in planning is to be dated from the middle 50s. Yugoslavia as early as 1951 (three years after her unfortunate, Stalin-provoked, break with the Soviet Union) initiated an extensive decentralization which gave individual enterprises as much independence as Soviet "trusts" had enjoyed during the NEP period in the 20s; and which also made wages and salaries vary (above a basic wage) with the "net income" of the enterprise in which the workers in question were employed.* At the same time long-term (e.g. five year) planning was terminated. Elsewhere it was in the course of 1956 that moves were first made (notably in Poland and to a smaller extent in Czechoslovakia and USSR) to reduce the number of products allocated at topmost levels, leaving the remainder to be determined at some lower level (in USSR mostly at the level of the separate republics). Curiously, at this time economic discussion mainly centered on the question of price policy (also on the use of mathematical methods); although in Poland there was also some discussion of so-called "economic models," or modes of economic functioning, in a socialist economy (e.g. the work of Professor W. Brus).

In 1957 in the Soviet Union came Khrushchev's sweeping decentralization on a regional basis; substituting control and administration by over a hundred regional economic councils (*Sovnarkhozi*) for that of the previous highly centralized all-Union Ministries. At the same time more responsibility was assigned to republican *Gosplans* (e.g. in fixing prices and in controlling the wholesale sale-and-purchase organizations of various industries). But this change, sweeping

* Also introduced was a large measure of self-government within the enterprises. Initially enterprises (or associations of enterprises) could even fix their own selling prices; but this had obvious disadvantages, and centrally fixed price ceilings were later imposed, and in 1962 a Federal Board of Price Control was instituted.

as it was, had no more than a minor effect upon the independence of individual enterprises. The activities of the latter were still bounded by various indices and "limits" imposed upon them from above, and the bulk of their supplies were still subject to allocation-quotas fixed by higher authorities (although there was some increase in the category of supplies which could be contracted for directly between enterprises and the appropriate trading agencies, especially in the case of consumers' goods).

In Czechoslovakia in 1957-58 there was an extensive decentralization which had a very considerable effect in increasing the powers of enterprises. As a result of it, something approaching two-thirds of all industrial investment undertaken came from funds at the disposal, either directly or indirectly, of industrial enterprises (i.e. either enterprises themselves or associations of enterprises for certain common purposes*).

The Soviet Discussions of 1962-4

IN ADDITION to the kind of criticisms we have mentioned of existing success-indicators and incentives, there has been a strong demand for the financial results of industrial enterprises to be related to the size of their capital, since the technical equipment of an enterprise so largely determines the results it is capable of achieving. There have also been demands that central allocation of supplies should yield place (save for things in specially short supply) to a more flexible system under which enterprises are free to obtain the supplies they need (and to dispose of their products) by direct contract with other enterprises and organizations.

In September 1962 *Pravda* launched the well-known discussion opened by the contribution of Professor Liberman entitled "Plan, Profit, Premiums." He called for a new system whereby enterprises should be freed from "petty tutelage" and a mass of detailed regulations (he spoke of "costly efforts to influence production by non-economic administrative methods"). At the same time they should be governed by an incentive system such that "what is advantageous to society is advantageous to each enterprise" and "what is disadvantageous to society is disadvantageous for the personnel of enterprises." He proposed an incentive scheme under which bonuses to the enterprise and its members should be proportional to its net income or profitability.* Once this was introduced, the enterprise would be encouraged to draw its own production plan. "It is the enterprise itself which knows and can best discover its own potentialities"; and under such a scheme it would be stimulated to mobilize reserves, not to hide them, to raise labor productivity and to cease hoarding idle

* These associations, which took over some of the functions previously carried out by sub-departments of Ministries were not organs of administration, but were *Khozraschet* organizations controlled by and acting on behalf of the enterprises themselves.

manpower or equipment. It would be stimulated to win the custom of consumers by producing what was in demand and by attention to quality and the initiation of new products and varieties. ("Note that the system we propose will oblige enterprises only to produce what can be realized and purchased. Enterprises will be led to calculate the effectiveness of modern techniques and cease to ask unthinkingly for no-matter-what new equipment at the expense of the State.")

Two years later, after some experimentation in the interim, the discussion was reopened in *Pravda,* this time with an article by Trapeznikov, an automation expert and a corresponding-member of the Academy of Sciences, in which the substitution of economic for administrative measures of direction and the introduction of a new incentive-system along the lines of the Liberman scheme was strongly urged.* The upshot was that the system was extended to 400 enterprises in consumer goods industries, mainly clothing.

Latest news is that all textile and shoe factories in the Leningrad and Moscow regions are about to go over to it. The enterprises base their annual production plans primarily on the basis of advance orders from wholesale and retail organizations, and in some cases the enterprises set up their own shops (as has happened for some time in Yugoslavia). The signs are that the system will be extended more widely in the near future.

Changes in Other Countries

IN Czechoslovakia the proposals of Professor Ota Sik, which were adopted in principle by the C.C. of the Czechoslovak C.P. in January of this year, bear a cousinly resemblance to the Liberman scheme, although they have one or two special features of their own. They can be regarded as a crucial step beyond the decentralization measures of 1957-8. Like the Liberman scheme, they provide for incentives to the enterprise related to its net revenue or profitability, and for enterprises to frame their own annual plans within the framework of the investment and output trends laid down in the long-term plan.

The profit of an enterprise will be subject to a prior tax (payable into the State Budget) proportioned to the enterprise's capital. Purchasing organizations and enterprises will be free to choose and to change their own supplies, thus strengthening consumers' control over production; and producing enterprises will be free to change both the materials and the technical methods they use at their discretion. Pro-

* In his original proposal profitability was interpreted as a *ratio* to basic and turnover funds (i.e., total capital): bonus was to be proportional to profit-*rate*. The scale of payments proposed in the first article was, however, defective and in subsequent versions of the scheme as adopted it seems to have changed to one in which bonus is proportional to profit *after payment* to the State of a tax or charge according to the size of total basic and turnover funds.

* *Pravda,* August 17, 1964. It was stated among other things: "The question of the utilization of fixed capital (buildings, equipment) by enterprises is an essential question. At present this index is not taken into consideration in judging the activity of enterprises. Meanwhile many enterprises endeavour to obtain new investment although their fixed capital is badly utilized." *Pravda* of June 23rd this year reported that a general conference of economists had endorsed the Liberman proposals.

vision is also made for a more flexible system of price-fixing as well as an early reform of existing prices.

There are to be three categories of price: firstly, products whose prices will be centrally fixed by the planning bodies as heretofore; secondly, products where the actual price paid may be fixed contractually by enterprises within certain "price-limits" established by the price-fixing authority; thirdly, products of which the prices will be left uncontrolled and free to vary with the market situation (e.g., luxury items and grades, special-order lines).* The intention is that the new system, after some concrete elaboration in the course of this year, should come into general operation at the beginning of 1966.

In East Germany new methods of planning and of management were adopted by the Council of Ministers of the GDR as far back as July 1963. This also stresses the use of "economic levels" to raise productivity, to improve quality and to bring output into conformity with needs; and to this end it provides for an incentive-system of bonuses** related to profits after payment of a tax proportioned to the productive capital. (It is stated that "profit should effectively become the criterion for judging the good management of enterprises and of groups of enterprises.") Enterprises are also to have at their disposal "rationalization funds" for financing technical innovation. Commodity-money relations (i.e., contractual relations of sale and purchase) between enterprises are to replace the old centralized allocations of supplies. Prices, however, are to be controlled by a State organ "empowered to sanction the prices of the main products of each branch of industry," these prices to be based on "exact calculation of the costs before and after fabrication."

Similar changes are about to be discussed in Hungary; and Poland is also preparing to introduce changes in a similar direction. These latter include improved incentives at the enterprise-level geared to profitability, greater price-flexibility, payment by enterprises of a percentage on fixed capital; power to the associations of enterprises to undertake investment out of their own accumulated funds, and more financing of investment *via* credits instead of by direct grants.

The similarities to be found between all these schemes are due partly, of course, to the influence of discussion and experience in one country upon the other. In particular it has been influenced by the growing tendency to re-think critically the accepted precepts and dogmas of the past period. But this influence has by no means been of a one-way kind; and thinking and discussion have been too independent for any mechanical copying of one country by others such as occurred in personality-cult days.

* As described originally to the present writer, there was to be included the issue to industry of *future* price trends of key products. But I have not seen this explicitly mentioned in subsequent statements.

** It is envisaged that these bonuses should amount to between 10 and 20 per cent of wages and salaries.

The old and dogmatic modes of thinking in defiance of experience, which have obstructed change (and which form the basis of absurd Chinese charges of "bourgeois tendencies") have not entirely disappeared but are rapidly dissolving.

Basically the similarity in solutions is due evidently to the similarity of problems in socialist countries that have achieved a high level of industrialization and face a new stage of development.

What gives these solutions a vital interest as an enrichment of Marxism is that they represent the working out (in the spirit of scientific discussion and bold experimentation) of new, more decentralized models of socialist economy, whereby market relations (and the *Khozraschet* autonomy of enterprises) play a larger role within the framework of planning (which governs the major relations and general structure of development).

For the present writer these changes possess a quality of excitement; and he hopes that they will also appear exciting to, at least, his fellow economists.

This article, which first appeared in the British Marxism Today, *for September, 1965, was written before the economic changes it describes were enacted into law by the USSR Supreme Soviet.*—Ed.

VIETNAM AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION

. . . THIS WAR IS a guerrilla war, and such a war, supported or at least not opposed by the indigenous population, can only be won by the indiscriminate killing of everyone in sight—by genocide. The Germans proved that during the Second World War in occupied Europe; they were prevented from accomplishing their task only because they were defeated in the field. The logic of the issue we are facing in Vietnam has already driven us onto the same path We have embarked upon a scorched-earth policy by destroying villages and forests; we have killed combatants and non-combatants without discrimination because discrimination is impossible. The logic of guerrilla war leaves us no choice. We must go on torturing, killing, and burning, and the more deeply we become involved in Vietnam, the more there will be of it.

The brutalization of our armed forces would be a serious matter for any nation, as the example of France has shown. It is intolerable for the United States. For this nation, alone among the nations of the world, was created for a notable purpose: to achieve equality in freedom at home and thereby set an example for the world to emulate. This was the intention of the Founding Fathers, and to this very day the world has taken them at their word. It is exactly for this reason that our prestige has suffered so disastrously among friend and foe alike; the world did not expect of us what it had come to expect of others.

Cam Ne and Chau Son are not in the line of succession to Lexington and Concord and other great battles of American history; they give the lie to that tradition. War, the wanton killing of human beings, can only be justified by a transcendent end; that makes a war just. There is no such end and there is no justice here. The policy-makers who are so concerned about our collective and their personal prestige might take a moment to reflect on the kind of country America will be when it emerges from so senseless, hopeless and brutalizing a war.

—From *Vietnam and the United States* by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau

SIBERIA'S "OLD BOLSHEVIKS" *Tell Their Story*

by **JESSICA SMITH**

"YOU have been meeting a lot of the young people of Siberia, as you asked," Tatiana Ogorodnikova and Victor Diemen said to us one morning. "But some members of the older generation in Irkutsk have invited you for tea this evening. How would you like to meet with some of our Old Bolsheviks?"

We said we would be honored. Unfortunately we had stayed so long at the Polytechnical Institute that afternoon, that we kept our hosts waiting two hours. They had obviously gone to great pains to prepare this meeting, but they were very sweet about it and greeted us with great warmth.

The apartment we entered had two large rooms, in addition to the kitchen, bath and hallway. The furniture was of the heavy, old-fashioned type, comfortable and homelike. There were lace curtains and heavy draperies, decorative rugs on the walls, photographs of family and revolutionary heroes. We were led ceremoniously to a table set for tea in the center of the living-room.

Spokesman for the group was Ivan Dmitrovich Shipovskikh. He had a large, round, ruddy face and huge, bright, intense blue eyes, magnified by his glasses. His hair was not yet gray, and he looked younger than the others, although all proudly bore the title "Old Bolsheviks." Speaking in a hoarse whisper he introduced us to his own wife; to Alexandra Benediktovna Gudoshnikova, a stout, gentle, grandmotherly woman; to Ignaty Simeonovich Pestun, tall and white-haired, with full lips that tremble a little when he speaks, enfeebled with age, but still full of revolutionary ardor like the others; to Pestun's wife, Yevdokia Fillipovna; to our host, Nikolai Yevgenovich Kuzian, small, dark and intense, and his wife.

Ivan Dmitrovich told us they had discussed beforehand how to make this evening most useful to us. They had decided that each of them would tell us briefly something of their revolutionary experiences and about their lives, and then we could ask them questions.

It was an extraordinary experience to be sitting here among these "Old Bolsheviks," a term I had heard for many years. Somehow or other I had the feeling that they should all be older than I. As a matter of fact, with the possible exception of old Pestun, they were all younger!

Tovarish Shipovskikh called on Alexandrovna Bendiktovna Gu-

doshnikova to open up "Because she knew Lenin personally," he explained. She told her story simply:

"I was born in Petrograd. At the time of the February revolution I was seventeen years old. [This would make her about 64 now.] I was an ordinary factory worker then. When Lenin came back from Finland, I was one of the many people who went out to meet him. There was a big crowd—I had never seen so many people together. We gathered around the armored car he rode on—I couldn't get very near—but I heard the great cry that went up when he said 'Long Live the Socialist Revolution,' and again when he spoke from the balcony of Ksheshinsky Mansion—where the ballerina who had been the Tsar's mistress had lived.

"After the October Revolution, Lenin had his office in Smolny, the former school for rich maidens. I was working there too, and I saw him often. The Germans were advancing, and a call went out for women to go to the front as nurses. They would come to Smolny from all over, and it was my job to see that they had meal tickets and a place to sleep and arrange for their transportation and sometimes go with them to the front to make sure they made connections with their medical units.

"Sometimes I would take Lenin his tea. He worked all the time, day and night. He paid little attention to food for himself, but he was always concerned about others. He would scribble something on a scrap of paper and I would scurry around through the long halls and deliver messages for him or find someone he wanted to see.

"I shall never forget those days when I worked for Lenin. When he died I was one of the many who went from Leningrad to his funeral in Moscow.

"Lenin was a very simple man. He was always very polite to everyone, very thoughtful of other people. I shall never forget him. He is in my heart always."

SHE said this with sincerity and deep emotion. When I told her that I, too, had been at Lenin's funeral in those long ago days, she leaned over the table to clasp my hands in hers.

"After Lenin died," she went on, "I studied a lot. That was what he taught us—study, study, study. I graduated from both the literature and juridical departments at the University. Then I married, and came here. My husband was a professor of history at Irkutsk University. I also taught. Now I am retired, on pension, but I am often asked to speak at schools and tell the young people about the revolution, about Lenin."

Tovarish Shipovskikh himself spoke next. He, we learned, was a native of Siberia, having been born and lived his whole life here.

"I would like," he said, "to tell you about the meaning of Siberia in the building of socialism. In 1919, when our country was being

pressed on all sides by the counter-revolutionists, Lenin sent a telegram saying 'If we don't take the Urals by winter I believe the revolution will be lost,' to all the Party organizations in Siberia. I was only sixteen then [making him now a youngster of 61] and I knew I had to help. I had managed to keep up with my schooling in that civil war period. I knew how to read and write, and young as I was, I had been made a member of the Revolutionary Council of the Baikal Region. Kolchak had been driven out of Omsk and when he retreated to Irkutsk and seized power here, I worked in the underground helping organize the guerrillas to throw him out. Lenin told us Kolchak was a dictator worse than any Tsar, and we had to get rid of him."

He gave us figures on the interventionists backing Kolchak, whom they had to fight in Siberia. There were, he said, 60,000 Japanese, 1,500 British, 10,000 Americans, 1,540 Italians, 1,100 French—altogether, including the Czechs, who were also helping the Whites—150,000 foreign soldiers in this area alone.

Had he heard about General Graves,* I asked, who had tried to follow strictly his original instructions from President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker not to take part in fighting the Bolsheviks, but only to protect military stores supposedly threatened by German and Austrian war prisoners, and to help get the Czechs out of Russia? Oh yes, but only later. He knew that there were some decent Americans who opposed the intervention. But general U.S. policy as carried out by most of its representatives was to crush the new Soviet Government; and Wilson had given in to the interventionists. And whatever General Graves had tried to do personally, General Graves' troops had been used to defend the trans-Siberian railroad which had been completely in the hands of the Whites and used only for their benefit, so they were really supporting Kolchak, and fighting the Reds. Thus in actual fact the Americans in Siberia were acting as their enemies along with the other interventionists.

IVAN Dmitrovich went on to say that the United States had given Kolchak millions of dollars worth of military equipment. This included 600,000 rifles, several thousand machine guns, over 3,000 cannon, clothing and other supplies.

"But in the end," he went on, "we were grateful to America for these supplies. We captured and used them all!

"After we had caught Kolchak, who had caused our people so much death and agony, and he was judged by a revolutionary military tribunal and executed on the shores of the Angara, then the most important thing was to develop Siberia!"

* See *America's Siberian Adventure*, William S. Graves, Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931. Out of print, but no doubt available in libraries.

Then Shipovskikh told us of a talk he had had with Max Frankel, when the *New York Times* correspondent had visited Irkutsk in April, 1959.

"I told Mr. Frankel the history of the intervention here, and how we had since developed the riches of Siberia. In one of his articles he wrote that the Soviet Communsts have found Siberia 'the key to their dreams of plenty and enduring world power.'

"Now just imagine what the *Times* correspondent was trying to say. He meant by this that Communism could only succeed on the basis of the resources of Siberia. He was wrong, of course. Yet there was a grain of truth in what he said—after all, why did the interventionists try so hard to conquer Siberia, if not for its riches?"

Ivan Dmitrovich was a very interesting study at this point. Most passionately and sincerely he wanted to refute the idea that the success of Communism was dependent on one section of the country alone. And yet, at the same time, with that overwhelming special kind of love and patriotism of the native Siberian, he probably felt in his heart of hearts that the future really did depend on Siberia to a great extent. He went on, referring to his little notebook:

"SIBERIA has one twelfth of all the land in Europe. It is one and a half times the United States in size. It has forty per cent of the land of the Soviet Union. Over 20 million people live here. It is a rich land, perhaps the richest part of the USSR. Eighty-eight per cent of all the coal of the Soviet Union is in Siberia, over 50 per cent of the iron ore, 90 per cent of the gold and non-ferrous metals, 80 per cent of the lumber, 96 per cent of the mica, all of the sable—which we call our 'soft gold'—which your Hollywood actresses like so well!

"The Volga, the Don and the Kama rivers all together give less power than our Angara. All this is why Siberia is so important! You remember that Radishchev wrote that the future of Russia lies in Siberia. Yes—Siberia is fantastically rich. Centuries will pass before it is fully developed. When it is, you'll see that it will play an important role in the history of our country and the world. That's why it means so much that out of this land that was the prison house of Russia we have already built a Socialist Siberia and we are now in the midst of building a Communist Siberia!"

We said it must be a very great satisfaction to him to have had a part both in the revolution and in building Siberia.

"We Bolsheviks are very modest," he said, and he meant it too—"We are only a small flower in the bouquet. Without the workers, the peasants, the people, we could not have done all this—but the Party was the leading force.

"I have always done Party work in Siberia—working in the city, district and regional Party organization. Then in 1937 I was arrested

and sat in jail for three and a half years. This was part of the great misfortune that befell our country.

"It is not important that I suffered from unjust accusations, that I lost all my teeth, that I lost my voice (now we understood why he could talk only in a hoarse, high whisper), that in fact I lost my health. Others suffered more, lost their lives. What is important is that I and many of the others never lost faith in our Party. We knew the truth would win in the end, as it did.

"All of us here have undergone the same hardships." There was a nodding of heads around the table. "All of us suffered during the period of the cult, all of us went through that terrible meat grinder. But all that is over with now. We all came out of it with our basic faith undimmed. We remained Party people, true to our convictions, and we are passing on the truth as we know it to the younger generation. Although we are now all retired, we carry on active work with young people. We speak on anniversaries and other special occasions, we give lectures, we try to educate our young people in the spirit of the revolution, and to explain to them the meaning of the Leninist norms of Party life, which were distorted during a certain period, but which have now been restored."

HOW did they explain, I asked, how things so alien to everything that socialism stood for could have developed in a socialist state?

"That is something to which we give a great deal of thought," he replied. "We do not yet have the full answer. There is much that still isn't known or understood. Part of it is that in the beginning we had *too much* faith, we believed too much in our leader, in his infallibility. We truly believed that Stalin was the Lenin of today. Then, when things went wrong, we believed that others were to blame, not Stalin. When I was released from prison and my wife met me and told me that she believed Stalin himself was responsible for the things that were happening I was so shocked that for a while I could hardly speak to her."

We could, no doubt, have learned more about all these things had we probed more deeply. These people were revolutionaries of the purest and most devoted type, they had known struggle and suffering and the greatest suffering of all had been the betrayal of the things they had fought for by the leader in whom they had placed all their faith. They were willing to speak of all this, but it was obvious that it was terribly painful for them to do so and on such occasions it became difficult to try to probe too deeply.

Shipovskikh went on thoughtfully:

"Yes, it is a very long story—not yet all told. It was, as I have said, partly a case of revolutionary romanticism. There was a tradition of believing in the Party, of having blind faith in our leaders. We did not believe they *could* be wrong. In the early days of the

Revolution that kind of faith was necessary. We had to be able to do what was required or what was ordered without thinking whether it was right or wrong. It had to be right. How fortunate we were that we had a great and wise leader like Lenin.

"But it was different later, when the situation was more stabilized, when we were building the new instead of destroying the old, and many things were not so clear, and people began to be more dependent on material things. We must blame the misfortunes that happened to us partly on those people who saw what was going on, who understood, and yet were afraid to speak out. Some of them were afraid that they would lose their power, their comforts, their positions if they spoke out. Such people were very much to blame. When young people come to me to ask me to explain all the things that have happened, this is part of what we tell them. We cannot put all of the blame on one man—many shared in it in one way or another.

"When the revelations about Stalin were made at the 20th and 22nd Congresses of our Party, it was a terrible shock. At that time we thought not only of ourselves. But we were filled with anguish at the thought of what the effects of all this would be on our brother Communists in other countries, on the many friends in other countries who had supported us, the many people who had had faith in Stalin just as we had had. Our hearts bled, too, for what it would do to the young people.

"We wanted to help our comrades abroad to keep their faith, as we had kept ours in spite of everything. . . ."

He trembled, his face flushed, his eyes shone with deep emotion as he said this.

"But the main thing," he went on, "is that none of these things should ever happen again. We have restored the Leninist principles in our Party. Now we can speak out freely against anything we see that is wrong. The publication in *Pravda* the other day of Togliatti's last statement in which he called for freer discussion and criticism, testifies to this."

THE white-haired Ignaty Simeonovich Pestun now filled in his part. He was seventy-eight, the oldest of those present.

"I had one main qualification as a revolutionist," his voice quavered, but brought out these words proudly: "I was a member of the working class! I was born near Peter, and went to the city to work in 1901, when I was fifteen. From the age of 17, I began to work in the underground movement. My first meeting with Lenin was in 1907. I was arrested several times for my revolutionary work. The third time, caught and arrested for collecting weapons for use in an armed uprising when the time would come, I was sentenced to be hung. I spent fifteen days in the death cell, and then my friends managed to get the sentence commuted to twenty-five years in Siberia

at hard labor. I spent several years in different prisons in the West, and was finally liberated along with other political prisoners at the time of the February revolution. I took part in the October Revolution, and then I was sent out here to Siberia during the civil war years—and later was asked to come back again and help in the building of socialism here.

"I was working in Cheremkhovo, the mining town, when Kolchak had power here and we were fighting him, and I took part in the preparations to seize him. We wouldn't let him get away with all the gold he had stolen! We needed the help of the Czechs, and we threatened to withhold coal from them if they wouldn't help. They were afraid of freezing, so they agreed to put our Party men in the convoy in Kolchak's railroad car that was taking him from Cheremkhovo to Irkutsk.

"In 1920 I was Chairman of the local Party Committee, and then I had to do Party work in Chita and Lena. Out there we had to fight bandits, who were terrorizing the region, and clean up the region and stabilize it. I finally got rid of the outlaws, they came to me and surrendered.

"Those were difficult, rough days. We often had to be very strict and roughshod in our methods. Sometimes we had to make people write things they did not want to write, sign documents against their will. With enemies all around us and even in our own ranks, we could not always stop and argue about the best way to do things." He said this apologetically. "There was a fierce struggle for power going on in Siberia, and such methods couldn't be avoided at that time. We could not have won otherwise. The mistake came when such methods were continued later when Soviet power had won. . . ." The others nodded in agreement.

"Well—later I came back to Irkutsk. I worked for five years in a salt factory. After that I worked for a number of years in the Irkutsk City Soviet. Now I am receiving a pension, my work is about done. But I still take an active part in speaking to students and young people in general about the things we did in the past."

YEVDOKIA Fillipovna Pestun, the old man's wife, spoke shyly: "I was also a Petersburg worker. I worked in a big factory on the Viborg side until I was 17, and then I found myself a friend. . . ." She said this looking lovingly at Ignaty Simeonovich, who interrupted, "No! *I* found myself a friend!"

"I saw Lenin on May 1st in 1917—how well I remember it! And then again, when he came back from hiding, to lead the revolution. There were so many people there, the whole street was teeming with people, it was almost impossible to move.

"Then in 1918, I came out to Siberia with my husband. I was not yet a Party member, but I helped in various revolutionary activities.

Can you imagine, I even helped in the transport of dynamite—a good thing I didn't realize at the time what dangerous things I was doing. I had to be housekeeper for the head of the Kolchak counter-espionage organization. For many years I did Party work among women—and I have continued to work in that field, even though I now have a pension."

Now the small, dark intense Kuzian. He was one of those eternal Young Communists. He had established the Komsomol organization in East Siberia back in 1920, when he was its Secretary in Irkutsk, and was called a Komsomol still! He too was one of those who took part in the underground struggle against Kolchak.

"Our instructions," he said, "were not to let Kolchak get beyond Studianka—which is encircled by mountains. I helped in preparations to blow up the tunnel there that would have been his only means of escape. The young people here were very active in helping us Bolsheviks in our underground work in those days—hiding us, carrying out all sorts of dangerous undertakings.

"After the capture of Kolchak I organized the first Komsomol Committee here.

"We had difficulties here for a long time. Many of Kolchak's followers remained here in Irkutsk and tried very hard to corrupt the young people. There was an American here at the time, a certain Mr. John, representing the YMCA, who worked with these elements. He had plenty of food, clothing, movies, sport equipment—all sorts of things with which to entice the young people. We had nothing, and had to work hard to win them over to our side.

"Yaroslav Hasek, the renowned Czech writer, author of *The Good Soldier Schweik,* was here at the time with the Czechoslovaks. While many of them were against us, he was very interested in our work and helped us. He managed to get hold of some paper, and helped us put out our first newspaper here.

"The Komsomol did a lot of work with the national minority groups. I worked especially among the Buryat Mongolians and helped them set up their own Komsomol organization.

"I had only three years of schooling before the revolution. But after we won, I was given a chance to finish my education and graduate from a mining academy. Thanks to Soviet power a working man could become an engineer! I have worked for fifteen years in production—first in the Lena Goldfields, then as director of a gold mining combinat. Now I have a pension, but I still keep up my work—I am chairman of the Party Commission for activities among young people. I also work in the organization *Knowledge,* arranging for lectures. By the way, we would like to have lectures from you about America while you are here!"

It was his wife's turn. We learned that she was Jewish, and had had her special troubles during the Stalin repressions—but since

she was the hostess, and responsible for the feast that now appeared before us, we did not get to hear her story.

The table was piled with fruits, jams, candies, breads, caviar, pastries, cakes. All of this had been meant for afternoon tea, but since we had been delayed so long it was now supplemented with some more solid things and turned out to be our dinner.

There was a great deal more we wanted to ask these remarkable people about. But amid their hospitable urgings to eat it became somewhat difficult to continue the discussion. It was clear that the older ones were getting tired, although they tried not to show it, and I had reached the point after a long day of interviews when I could no longer take in what was being said. I do remember that one of the things that came out in the rest of our conversation was that next to the agonies caused by the Stalin revelations came the shock of the sharp differences with the Chinese.

"The disunity in the socialist camp has been one of the greatest blows of all," said Ivan Dmitrovich. "The position of the Chinese, coming just at the point where we were beginning to overcome our problems, has done much damage." When we asked what they felt was the main cause of the dispute, he said:

"One of the main problems, I think, is that they have refused to pay any attention to our experiences, to learn from our mistakes. They have developed a cult of personality of their own. They are no longer thinking for themselves. Everything depends on Mao. That is wrong and very dangerous."

They wanted us to come back again, so that we could tell them about the United States. They wanted very much to talk about how to improve relations between the two countries, how, above all, to make sure there would never be another world war. They wondered about Goldwater's chances, and when we assured them he could not win the election, they said they understood Johnson stood for peace. . . .

We could not manage that second meeting, to our sorrow, but look forward to it another year when we hope the world picture—and above all the situation in Vietnam—will be brighter than it is today.

SOVIET TOYS AT INTERNATIONAL FAIR

SOVIET TOYS and sporting goods will be exhibited for the first time at the international Toy and Trade Fair to be held in New York, March 6-11. At a preview of the Fair, held on October 22 at the New York Hilton Hotel, a variety of dolls, cloth and plastic animals, and hand-carved troikas were shown. In March a wide variety of sporting goods and musical instruments will also be displayed.

"TO DIE IN MADRID"

A review by **SIDNEY FINKELSTEIN**

TO DIE IN MADRID is a full-length motion picture of the war in Spain of 1936-39, made in France by Frederick Rossif from on-the-scene films in American, British, French, East German and Russian archives, as well as films in the possession of individual cameramen. People in every community should plan to have it shown in their local theaters.

Some may find it a masterpiece of film aesthetics, its cutting composition, rhythm and montage reminiscent of the great Eisenstein and Pudovkin films of the 1920's. Some may find in it the excitement of being at a window, so to speak, open upon a real historical event, with people fighting and dying as they actually did during the fascist onslaught against the Spanish Republic. What is most important is that most onlookers will be moved to the depths by the images of the Spanish people, miraculously brought to life as they lived and fought then, and saying, "Do not forget why and how we fought, for we did this for you as well as for us."

While there are enough shots of battle, bombings and front lines to give the watchers a feeling of what war is like, they are relatively few. The high artistry of the film is that its technique is primarily at the service of human documentation, providing an understanding of the people and forces involved in the conflict. And as these gripping individual and collective human portraits emerge, we are reminded of a great work of pictorial art depicting a war in Spain, done almost a century and a half ago. It is Francisco Goya's set of eighty-three etchings, "The Disasters of the War," depicting the guerrilla war of the Spanish common people in 1809-12, against the French army that had entered Spain with the blessing of the Spanish royalty, aristocracy and church. Goya's work is one of the great achievements in art precisely because he abandoned precepts of what was "good" or "proper" art, and aimed solely to tell the world the truth of what happened.

So it is in its way with this film. And just as Goya appended to a special scene of anguish, the caption, "This I have seen," and to another, "This, also . . .", so in the scenes of this film we can sense the caption, by the anonymous cameramen, "This, we have seen." With them as with Goya, the revelation of the truth was meant to appeal to the conscience of the world.

We get from the film an idea not only of the ordeals and heroism of the mass of Spanish people, but also of the course of the war itself. It was a historic test as to whether a people today can break the grip of a tyrannical, dictatorial ruling class and establish a working democracy, by parliamentary means. For this is what the Spanish people had done, immediately preceding the war. The ruling caste of royalists, aristocratic landowners, business agents for English investments, and church hierarchy, who had kept Spain impoverished to serve their selfish interests, had expected to win the election, trusting to the illiteracy of the people and the exhortations of the church. The people voted in a popular front democratic government. And so the "rebellion" of the generals started, led by Franco and plotted by him in collaboration with Mussolini and Hitler. They did not have the people with them but they had most of the trained soldiers and officers, most of the guns, and unlimited money. They "bought" battalions of Moorish mercenaries and flew

them into Spain to kill Spanish people. Then Italy sent flocks of tanks, and planes, with crack troops.

At the same time, aid to Franco of a more hypocritical kind came from the presumably liberal, anti-fascist, "West,"; namely our own country, England and France. They had previously boasted of their "principle" of supporting any legitimate government against a "rebellion." But now they—and we—showed that this principle was meant to operate only to help unpopular governments, not popular ones. The United States, England, France announced their "neutrality," and put an embargo on arms to the Spanish republic.

ONLY the Soviet Union refused to abide by this criminal procedure, but the supplies it sent had to run the gauntlet of the fascist planes and submarines which controlled the Mediterranean. The one land border over which the Republic could get arms, that between France and Spain, was shut down by the French "Socialist" premier, Leon Blum.

The war became one of men against machines. And when the Spanish "amateurs" turned back the Italian machines, in came Hitler's tanks, guns and planes, with his generals gloating in their opportunity to try out the blitzkrieg tactics, or machines plus terrorism, slaughter of civilians, bombings of cities, that they would later use against the "West." The courage of the Spanish people against these overwhelming odds is one of the glorious chapters in history, and some glowing pages in this chapter were written by the International Brigades. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Americans, anti-fascist Germans and others came to fight alongside of the Spanish people, knowing also that the defense of the Spanish Republic and defeat of the fascist would block the way to a Second World War.

To Die in Madrid, affectingly narrated by John Gielgud, Irene Worth, William Hutt and George Gonneau, limits itself to the actual war in Spain. Yet it is worth thinking about the aftermath. For this war in Spain was the first chapter in a history of which the Second World War was only the second, not the final chapter. The fascist axis was finally smashed, at a cost which some decent support for Republican Spain would have made unnecessary. And then came the "'cold war." The end of Hitler and Mussolini had pulled out the underpinnings from the fascist dictatorship of Franco in Spain. But our own country, the United States of America, rushed to provide new props, with money, investments, and deals for American bases; this despite the fact that Franco had sent Spanish troops to join the Nazi forces, and had permitted the Germans to use Spain as a base for bombing American troops in Africa. The German blitz bombing of Guernica, in Spain, and massacre of the population, had aroused cries of horror throughout the rest of the world. Then came such repetitions as the Nazi blitz of Rotterdam, and the terroristic missile bombing of London.

And now it is we, the democratic United States of America, that is supporting a shaky, unpopular, militaristic dictatorship in Vietnam, carrying on a war of machines against men, bombing the population of that country and using new terror weapons like napalm bombs. Such thoughts are inescapable when seeing "To Die in Madrid." The connection is clear, that the Americans now gallantly opposing the official Vietnam policy, in parades, teach-ins, and demonstrations, are expressing the conscience of America, and defending the people's welfare and future, as did those who supported the Spanish Republic. (*The picture opened at New York's Little Carnegie.*)

THE CONSCIENCE OF RUSSIA

A Review by **MURRAY YOUNG**

Sons Against Fathers, Studies in Russian Radicalism and Revolution, by E. Lampert. Oxford University Press. 1965. 405 pp. $10.10.

> Each generation has its gestures of revolt. But the hostility that animated the Russian "sons" was much more profound than anything to be explained merely by the conditioned reflexes of problem children, of rebels without cause. They were rebels because they felt man's inhumanity to man; because they found themselves driven into a world where there were only two choices, and any other choice than the one made was, to them, a betrayal of humanity. They became the incarnation of human decency in one of the least attractive periods of Russian history. They were the conscience of Russia.

Thus the author of this extremely interesting study describes the young Russian intelligentsia of the 1860's—the generation of Turgenev's "Fathers and Sons." Indeed the long historical analysis that serves to define these young men and women and introduce the three important writers of the period who were the leading spokesmen of their time—Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Pisarev—is an important addition to our understanding of 19th century Russian thought.

The "quarrel" between the liberal generation of the 1840's and their dedicated young "sons" of the 1860's is made understandable to the non-Russian-speaking reader, probably for the first time. The reader is made to see why Chernyshevsky's *What Is To Be Done* had for so long the power to call young Russians into action against the injustices of their society. And the aesthetic ideas and moral attitude of Dobrolyubov and Pisarev are so clarified that it is possible at last to understand why they had, and still have, a deep influence on Russian literary and aesthetic attitudes.

Written with full appreciation of the distance that separates us from the Russian "sons" of the rebellious 1860's, not only in time but in the great differences of social, philosophical and spiritual attitudes as well, the author of this study is always sharply aware of our own distraught era and its problems and perils as the intellectual atmosphere of tsarist Russia in the 19th century, is masterfully presented.

Here, for example, is another passage on the intelligentsia who came to maturity after what had seemed to their liberal fathers the very climax of all progress—the emancipation of the serfs in 1861:

> They represented a new type of man who may be defined as an intellectual politician, and conspirator rolled into one, but first and foremost a man who says "no" to the existing order. Being a radical meant a way of life, in which intellectual activity was not something special or separate, for its practice involved the whole of a man's thought and attitude.
>
> He inherited nothing, not even his personality, which he had, as it were, to create anew. He detested conventions and hierarchies, the careers and rights of literary men, and all the stuffy pomposity of life. Everything in his condition led him to sunder the secure, comforting bonds of custom and familiarity, to cut himself off from the group in which he grew up.

But he did not pride himself on his lack of roots, like the pathological "outsiders" of our time; his passion for freedom was on behalf of others; it was vicarious and self-sacrificing . . . he was bent on creating a new society, not gate-crashing, ideologically or convivially, the old one, whch he believed to be doomed.

Aware, the author goes on to explain, that Russian culture, in the 19th Century was available only to the smallest and least functional section of the social order, and that the masses were profoundly alienated from it, the intelligentsia felt they must begin anew, without ancient myths and without divine or social sanction to create a new society:

> This attitude might have condemned the radical intelligentsia to sterility or killed their imagination, but they were saved by an awareness of human values, of historical momentum, as well as by social responsibility. Their greatest virtue was their ability to judge in terms of human integrity, their vision of man acting from the center of his being and spurred by his sense of solidarity with other human beings, rather than conditioned by his position in society.
>
> They discovered a break-through to the human person and a new sense of human dignity. With all their limitations, this enabled them to achieve remarkable moral independence—in their attitude to life and people, in their habits, actions, and principles of conduct. Even those traits, which, on the purely private level, were often little more than fads, became in public a proclamation or asertion of freedom, of love of truth and nobility. This ethos continues to animate the post-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia.

Both Dobrolyubov and Pisarev died in the 1860's, while still in their twenties; Chernyshevsky lived on, in prison and exile for the most part, until 1889, by which time Marxist socialism had begun to penetrate the contemporary intelligentsia.

The reason why Marxism then rapidly won the decisive elements of the intelligentsia is made abundantly clear in this unusually rich and illuminating study, of the growth of political consciousness in Tsarist Russia in the decades leading up to the revolution of 1917.

"PACEM IN TERRIS"

". . . Therefore Choose Life," a collection of essays by Norman Cousins, Robert M. Brown, Herman J. Muller, Everett E. Gendler, Thomas Merton, on "Pacem in Terris," the encyclical of Pope John XXIII. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif., 1965. Sample copy free.

THIS pamphlet was published in connection with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions' Convocation on ways to peace, February 18-20, 1965. Like the wide spectrum of speakers who took part in this significant convocation, these essays by a rabbi, a monk, a Protestant theologian, a scientist, and an important editor, express a variety of religious and philosophic opinions. But like the speakers at the convocation, the writers of the essays are united in the urgency with which they speak out for peace in the dangerous world of today.

You should take advantage of the offer of a free sample copy of this interesting pamphlet, and write to the publishers for it.

SOVIET MARKET

Selling the Soviet Market, A Guide to Trading and Licensing. Prepared and published by Business International. New York. 1965. 94 pp. $50.00.

THIS guide is addressed to manufacturers interested in getting in on what the editors obviously think is "a good thing." Stating in the introduction that all Soviet imports grew from $3.06 billion in 1955 to $6.99 billion in 1963, and from the West alone in the same period from $430 million to $1.41 billion, much information is presented to those ambitious businessmen—whose political misgivings are overweighed by the attractions of so brilliantly rising a market.

The facts presented are most detailed and they have been carefully researched; the political opinions are what, after all, would be expected.

SOVIET CHEMISTRY

Chemistry in the Soviet Union, by John Turkevich. D. Van Nostrand Co. New York. 1965. 566 pp. $12.00.

THE author, in his preface stresses the importance of science in bringing the people of the world together on the basis of mutual understanding and respect: "This book is an attempt to present to the Western reader the impressive story of chemistry in the Soviet Union."

Starting with a condensed history of chemistry in Russia from ancient times to 1850, a more detailed survey is presented from that date to 1962. This is followed by an extensive survey of the principal sites where Soviet chemical research is currently pursued. Each site is described and wherever possible the name of the director, major scientists working there and list of current projects is given. Scientists will be especially interested in the comprehensive list of dissertations prepared in Soviet universities and institutions.

MUSICAL TERMS

Russian-English Dictionary of Musical Terms, by Leila Katayen and Val Telberg. Telberg Book Corporation. New York. 1965. 125 pp. $9.80.

THIS compilation should be useful to musicologists, historians, and performers. Contemporary application of terms is emphasized so that the fields of television, cinema, recording, and jazz are carefully covered, as well as those of folk song, folk dance, opera, ballet, etc., Special stress is placed on ethnic and folk music.

RUSSIAN NAMES

Dictionary of Russian Personal Names, with a Guide to Stress and Morphology, compiled by Morton Benson. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1964. 175 pp. $4.75.

THIS dictionary is intended for students and teachers of Russian as well as radio announcers, government officials, scientists, research workers, librarians and others who need to know where the stress falls in Russian surnames.

The stress and formation of Russian names is a complex subject and this dictionary compiled with much help from Soviet sources by Dr. Benson should be found to be widely useful. The list of approximately 23,000 stressed surnames drawn from characters in Russian fiction, the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia,* the 1960 Moscow telephone books is useful.

RUSSIAN TURKESTAN

Mission to Turkestan, Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen. Edited and introduction by Richard A. Pierce. Oxford University Press, 1964. 241 pp.

THESE memoirs, translated from the German in which they were written, are by the Baltic nobleman who headed the tsarist commission to investigate in 1908 the corrupt and inefficient administration of that vast area, known as Russian Turkestan, that stretches from the Caspian Sea to the borders of China—the land of Tamerlane.

These personal notes written down in 1922—long after the nineteen volume official report had been made—are lively and revealing about this remote area. By 1922 the imperial power was already five years over so the Count's recollections are franker than they probably would have been if written before.

This is a book mainly for the specialist in the history of this area but the general reader will find it of considerable interest.

SOVIET EDUCATION

Education in the USSR, A Collection of Readings from Soviet Journals, edited by Fred Ablin. International Arts and Science Press. New York. Vols. I and II. $12.00 per volume.

DESIGNED to give a comprehensive picture of the content, methods and aims of Soviet education, this collection of articles that first appeared in English in the translation journal *Soviet Education,* which has been published in this country since November 1958 by International Arts and Science Press, provides a picture of the general direction of Soviet education since 1917, with special emphasis, of course, on development in education in the past decade.

The essays were chosen from leading Soviet educational journals and give the reader a most useful insight into the educational ideas of leading Soviet educators.

RUSSIAN ART

The Art and Artists of Russia, by Richard Hare. Methuen & Co. London. 1965. Illustrated. 293 pp. Five pounds, ten shillings.

A STUNNING book whose purpose is to open up the whole world of Russian visual art from the introduction of Christianity to the end of the empire. Lovers of Russian music, ballet and theater will be enchanted as chapter after chapter presents icon painting, silver and jewelry, porcelain, portraits and genre painting, and other forms of decorative art. Each chapter is superbly illustrated by black and white and magnificent colored photographs.

The visual arts in Russia are by no means widely known outside of the country and it is the keenest of pleasures to turn the glittering pages of this book and see how easily the craftsmen and artist from the earliest times kept their own Russian individuality as they learned from foreign sources; took what they responded to and gave it a unique quality that links the most primitive icon with a Bakst sketch for a ballet costume.

Mr. Hare's text gives much helpful information about the historical periods covered, and his loving and perceptive comments on the pictures and decorative objects does much to bring them alive, as does the great skill and care with which all the photographs are taken, especially the splendid ones in color.

american-soviet facts

PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN THE U.S.S.R.

WE rejoice with the people of the Soviet Union celebrating on November 7 the 48th anniversary of their socialist state. With the welfare of all its citizens the goal of this society, tremendous progress has been made. Serious problems continue but this dynamic and self-critical society determinedly institutes necessary reforms. The future is promising—if there is not a war.

The 32nd anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, also in November, is an occasion for rededication on both sides to the improvement of American-Soviet relations and acceptance of larger responsibility for the peace of the world. Note the sober statements of Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Gromyko and American Walter Lippmann. And let us resolve to do our part to turn our own country from war-making to peace-making.

New School Year

SOME 45 million children went off to school on September 1 in the Soviet Union. Some 780 new elementary and secondary schools opened their doors for the first time and will care for half a million pupils. Schools are built in line with a standard design to accommodate from 1,000 to 1,300, but Moscow has one new school for 2,000 and Kiev soon will complete a school for a 2,560 enrollment.

Authorities announce that special attention has been paid in recent time to the provision of added school facilities in outlying regions in the Far North, the Far East, and in the high mountains of Central Asia. Because of immense distances, many new boarding schools have been set up so that boys and girls take up residence at the school. Beginning this year children in rural districts will not have to pay fares for bussing to school.

RICHARD MORFORD, Executive Director, National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, is editor of this department.

New Apartments Go Up

HALF a million new apartments have been provided by the housing built during the first six months of 1965, Ignaty Novikov, Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Construction, announced recently. This figure does not include single houses and other small housing units in the rural areas.

In Moscow alone in the past six and one-half years, some 700,000 new apartments have been built; kindergartens and nurseries for 154,000 children, 312 schools; hospitals with 18,000 beds; 1,754 shops, 1,800 canteens, cafés and snack bars and 50 mechanical laundries and dry-cleaning establishments.

Already city planners believe that down-town Moscow needs a "face-lifting" and have established a competition soliciting comprehensive plans. Peter Grose, in Moscow for the *New York Times,* writes that the central consideration is to make the Soviet capital beautiful, "to introduce esthetic values into a city long dominated by drabness and stark utility." Public debate on the subject has been led by the newspaper *Literaturnaya Gazeta.* Thus a 23-story tower hotel, the Rossiya, adjoining the Kremlin, now somewhat more than half completed, is being criticized as overshadowing the historic heart of the Soviet capital and marring the world-famous skyline of the Red Square district. Nevertheless Soviet and foreign correspondents were recently given a preview of the hotel to accommodate 6,000 guests (the St. George in Brooklyn 2,632 rooms; the Conrad Hilton in Chicago 2,500; the Waldorf-Astoria in N.Y. 2,000). The Rossiya will have a half-dozen restaurants, a 3,000-seat concert hall and two wide-screen movies theaters. A 20-story addition to the National Hotel, also overlooking Red Square, is under construction.

Pensions Are Increased

THE invalided and disabled of the USSR are getting bigger pensions since October 1, 1965. And, as well, the families who have lost their breadwinners.

"First-group" labor invalids will have their pensions *increased* by 20 rubles a month ($22) "Second-group" invalids—industrial and office workers will now have the same minimum as the regular pensioner retired from employment.

A total of 170 million rubles ($188.7 million) is added to the Pension Fund of the Russian Republic alone to meet the increase.

CPSU Membership Increases

ON January 1, 1965, there were 11,758,169 enrolled Communists in the Soviet Union (including 946,726 candidate members). Exactly four years ago the total was 9,275,826.

In the year 1964, 879,000 became candidates for membership, the largest annual replenishment of the Party's ranks since World War II. Among those accepted 45 per cent were workers, 15 per cent collective farmers. Engineers, technicians, doctors, agronomists, teachers and students were included in the remaining 40 per cent.

One important source of recruitment is the Young Communist League from which have come more than half of those accepted as candidate members in the last four years. There is a steady increase in the number of women Communists which now accounts for 20 per cent of the total.

Reporting these figures Mark Maximov, Novosti Press Agency correspondent, writes that new members are accepted on a strictly individual approach:

> The CPSU accepts in its ranks the more advanced, the more conscious representatives of the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the intelligentsia who are loyal to the ideas of communism, who can set an example in performing their duties in public life and at work, and whose general behavior is in keeping with high ethical standards. The party "keeps its own house clean," and rids itself of those who do not live up to the title of Communist.

PRAVDA CRITICIZES IZVESTIA

EDITOR Alexey M. Rumyantsev of Communist Party newspaper *Pravda* in a signed 5,000 word article on September 9 criticized a second chief daily, Soviet Government organ *Izvestia* and the farm affairs newspaper *Selskaya Zhizn,* for condemning authors whose works expose negative aspects of Soviet life.

The article marked a new turn in the quiet campaign against "nihilistic" writings in which newspapers have taken the lead. It is said that the campaign was launched by Party leadership in face of a growing indifference among young people. Rumyantsev, however, felt that *Izvestia* had gone too far, and was taking a position that "would mean the denial of any artistic criticism in respect to any drawbacks in our life."

"Awareness of social responsibility," said *Pravda's* editor, "is of tremendous importance for the entire Soviet intelligentsia, especially so for artists and writers." Neither writers nor artists may impassively fence-sit in the great present-day world wide struggle between opposed class forces. They should live precisely in the midst of the interests of their times [quoting Engels], ever more precisely determine their place in the struggle, calculate all the consequences of their works, their influences upon all the strata of the reading public, youth in the first place. He continued:

"The portrayal of the positive hero of our time is undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of the educational impact of our literature... At the same time, it is a great mistake to regard the presence of positive characters as almost the only criterion of the

value of the work of art . . . Socialist realism is the life-asserting method of our art. However, this does not mean in the least that the criticizing of vices and their censure is something alien to socialist realism. The hushing up and the biased padding out of drawbacks, instead of their exposure, with the purpose of overcoming—that is actually what engenders nihilism, especially in some young people." Irreconcilability to shortcomings is incompatible with their being hushed up.

On this principle the *Pravda* editor took to task *Izvestia* and *Selskaya Zhizn*. [An *Izvestia* article had condemned V. Aksionov's story "Comrade Handsome Furazhkin." The farm paper had made a devastating review of V. Tendryakov's story "Short Age of Ephemera."] "They have substituted intolerance for principle and a prejudiced one-sided attitude for the comprehensive approach. Instead of well-wishing criticism the reviews are pointed to annihilation while our critique should not disintegrate but unite everything which serves the ideas of Communism."

Mr. Rumyantsev defended Party guidance of the artists and writers along the road of communist construction, nurturing in them the feeling of social responsibility for their endeavors, at the same time upholding their free choice of theme, plot, genre, style and form. He insisted that there must be no "rude administration by fiat" in artistic life, and that Party guidance must be of a truly flexible and principled nature.

In a somewhat similar editorial on February 25, Mr. Rumyantsev had said that the habit of "giving orders in literature" must be abandoned, and declared that "True creativeness . . . is only possible in an atmosphere of search, experimentation, and free expression and clash of opinions."

(Shortly after the September 9 editorial, it was announced that Mr. Rumyantsev had been relieved of his *Pravda* post for reasons of health, and would henceforth devote himself exclusively to his work as a member of the Academy of Sciences. Speculations were rife in the U.S. press that he was removed because of his liberal attitude on the arts. This seems not to have been the case. We learn from reliable sources that Mr. Rumyantsev has a serious heart condition which has made it impossible for some time for him to carry out the rigorous functions required by the chief editorship of the Party newspaper. He has been replaced as editor by Mikhail V. Zimyanin.)

PREMIER KOSYGIN REPORTS ON SOVIET ECONOMIC CHANGES

THE Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on October 2, wrote into basic law the proposals earlier approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party for improvement in the management of industry and for the strengthening of economic incentives of industrial production.

The wide-ranging economic reforms were outlined in a report to the Central Committee by Premier Alexey Kosygin, on September 29, 1965, on behalf of the Party's Presidium and the Council of Ministers. He said that the proposals had been comprehensively discussed by management and workers in the industrial enterprises of the chief cities of the Soviet Union, by economists and planning experts; also by the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics, the State Planning Committee, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. From all sides there emerged a general approval of the essential theses.

Reporting to the Party, the Premier recounted the successes and steady growth in industry. He analyzed the shortcomings. The conclusion was that the forms of management, planning and stimuli no longer conformed with modern technical and economic conditions and the present level of productive forces. "The economic initiative and the rights of enterprises are cramped; their area of responsibility is insufficient."

The Primary Tasks

THE starting point of reform would be the recognition of the importance of centralized planned management. The *first* task is to *raise the scientific* standards of state planning to bring a *rapid application* of the latest achievements of science and engineering; to *establish norms,* and to *estimate* carefully the prospects of scientific-engineering development and *lay out long-term plans.*

The *second* necessity is the *ending of excessive regulations* on the economic activities of enterprises and to establish legislative guarantees for their expanding rights. The *third* task would be to strengthen the system of cost accounting and to intensify the stimuli to production with the help of such indices as *price, profit, bonuses and credit.*

New Rights and Responsibilities of Local Enterprises

NOT infrequently, the Premier admitted, enterprises are now producing low-quality goods in order to meet quantity quotas—goods which the consumer does not want and which, therefore, remain unsold. Incentives to increase interest in quality as well as quantity production are now to be introduced and can be the means of raising the wages of industrial and office workers. New responsibilities are to be placed on management for the marketing of what is produced; closer ties between producer and consumer will result. Quality will become one of the decisive factors.

Under the new plan the *volumes* of goods to be produced (determined in part by known demand), the selection of the main assortment, the wages fund, payments into the state budget and allocations of capital from the state budget will be decided by central planning

bodies. But, within this framework, there is to be a sufficient area for individual enterprise initiative to make it possible to cover expenditures out of income and make a profit.

More of the profits than before are to remain with the enterprise to add to its own production development fund (over and above the State's basic investment), to the improvement of techniques, and to the increase of wages of the workers.

At the same time fresh obligations are to be placed upon the enterprises to compel an efficient and economical use of capital funds for expansion: new plants and installations. The new plan envisages the establishment of a system of long-term credits for capital grants. Up to now there have been few strings attached to capital grants from the states; if deficits were incurred the state supplemented.

Another aspect of the reform now to be instituted has to do with prices. Improvements in the system of price determination have been entrusted to a new State Committee on Prices. It is expected a new system can go into operation in 1967-1968. First, there must be a re-evaluation of criteria for establishing wholesale prices with the objective of bringing these prices as nearly as possible to the "expenditure of socially necessary labor." The primary objective in reconsidering retail prices will be to reduce them, the Premier said.

Improving the Organization of Industrial Management

THE Premier's report took account of the fact that recent years had seen a large-scale reorganization of industrial management. Beginning in 1957 industry had been managed through economic councils on a regional basis, the council exercising authority in all the varied industries. It was thought this plan of decentralization would have a salutary effect, placing authority and responsibility more closely and directly in the hands of the people and enterprises of a given region. To do this the separate ministries for each major line of industry were abolished. But the regional economic council plan has developed major shortcomings.

It has been decided to abolish all such councils and return to the scheme of industrial ministries to plan and control production. There will be All-Union, Union-Republican and Republican ministries. Of the first All-Union ministries there are to be nine. A closely corresponding division of ministries are the Union-Republics where it is desirable to bring the Republics into a position of equal participation in planning, control and decision. There are to be eleven of these.

Again the State Planning Committee will assume top-level importance and will be responsible, together with the All-Union Ministries, directly to the Council of Ministers. Retained, however, is the net-work of *territorial* material and technical supply bodies to be operated now as a Union-Republican State Committee.

The Premier said it would be wrong to think of the proposals as a mere return to former ministries. The ministries are going to operate under much-improved conditions since the other half of the reform, so to speak, is to bring about through added incentives a greater initiative and responsibility upon the part of all enterprises. "One should give up the old notion that in relations between leading economic bodies, [The Ministries, Planning Committees, et al] and the enterprises that the former have only rights and the latter only duties."

Implementation of the Reform

TO implement the total reform is a vast undertaking that will consume some time, the Premier admitted. New regulations, methodological instructions, directives must be worked out by the State Planning Committee, the Finance Ministry, the State Labor and Wages Committee, the State Price Committee. There will have to be much shifting and sifting of executive personnel. The training of specialists for industry under new conditions assumes much greater importance, requiring considerable reordering of the educational system.

Perfection of management is impossible without a considerable extension of the participation of the masses in industrial management. The role of the factory workers in the solution of planning problems, stimulation and the proper mobilization of the manpower to do the job, the assessment of the results of the work, must be substantially raised, the Premier said. The role of the collective agreement [trade union contract] will now be greatly enhanced.

The Party, trade union, government and economic agencies are called upon to arrange for a thorough explanation of the entire range of reforms in industrial management.

In concluding his report, Mr. Kosygin told the Party leadership that it may expect "bourgeois ideologists" to distort the reform now undertaken; there will be some talk "of some kind of a 'chaos' and 'crisis' in Soviet economy . . . about the failure of our system of socialist production, about the Soviet Union returning to the positions of capitalist economic management." The reply to these distortions, the Premier declared, was to point out that the "essence of the economic system is in the fact [of] who holds the state power, the means and the tools of production, in whose class interests production is being developed and profits are being distributed. This is the basic issue and on this issue we always have and always will adhere to the unshakable principles of Marxism-Leninism."

Premier Kosygin then declared as he ended his report:

"The great international significance of the economic reform proposed lies in the fact that it will strengthen the positions of socialism in the economic competition between the two different social systems."

U.S .–USSR RELATIONS DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

Walter Lippmann Says Peace Depends on American-Soviet Relations

WALTER LIPPMANN in his *New York Herald Tribune* column of September 28, declared that "all hope and prospect of a reasonably peaceable world is tied up with an improvement in Soviet-American relations."

"A fleeting but tantalizing glimpse of what might become possible if the cold war subsided was provided," Mr. Lippmann said, when the USSR and the USA, acting on their parallel interests, made it possible for the UN to order a cease-fire to avert a war between Pakistan and India:

> What is there between us that now sets us against each other? . . . the conflict of ideology and interest, of emotion and prejudice over the revolutionary condition of the so-called third world . . . . in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In its official ideology, the Soviet Union is committed to the support of the revolutionaries . . . In the American ideology, we are not absolutely opposed to wars of national liberation, provided they are not inspired or supported by Communists. We are very much disposed to feel, however, that all revolutions will be captured by the Communists who invariably participate in them.

How is the vicious circle to be broken? Mr. Lippmann answers: "By fostering the ascendancy of national interests over global ideology." It was in adhering to national interests, he contends, that the USA and the USSR found themselves on the same side in trying to stop Pakistani-Indian war over Kashmir. Mr. Lippmann wishes the issues of the revolutions in our time to be opened for a public debate and praises Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.) for a sound beginning made in his recent speech in the U.S. Senate.

BREZHNEV ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

From a speech by Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on September 29, at the Plenary Meeting.

IN THEIR efforts to impede the movement of the peoples to freedom and progress, to weaken the forces of socialism, in the hope of retaining their slipping positions or even, where possible, of recouping their losses, the imperialists, with the United States at the head, are resorting to violence and aggression, to armed intervention in the affairs of other countries and peoples. . . .

The Soviet Union has been fulfilling its internationalist duty to the Vietnamese people. We have been rendering great assistance to the Vietnamese comrades. We have already delivered to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a considerable amount of weapons and military equipment. Our line is to continue to render the DRV every assistance, both material and political, which it needs to repulse American aggression. . . .

Now a few words about our relations with capitalist countries . . . about Soviet-American relations . . . We clearly declared to the U.S. leaders that the normalization of our relations is incompatible with the armed aggression of American imperialism against Vietnam, a fraternal socialist country . . . Our relations with the United States have been considerably complicated and have a clear tendency towards freezing . . . further development . . . will depend on whether or not the leaders of this country will show enough common sense to abandon the policy of aggressive attacks on socialist countries and interference in internal affairs of other nations.

GROMYKO AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Excerpts from the speech of Mr. Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. September 24, 1965.

TODAY it is particularly in order to pose the question whether the UN justifies the hopes that were vested in it and whether it is coping with the tasks proclaimed in its Charter. . . . The UN possesses sizable possibilities and does have a future before it provided it is able to imbibe the new and sound tendencies injected into international relations by the storms of progressive social changes and national liberation movements and by the powerful popular drives for independent and free development, and for peace. . . .

Vietnam

With all their shades, and at times differences, in positions, the Socialist and non-aligned nations are at one with each other in that there is no place in international affairs . . . for aggression, diktat or interference in other people's affairs.

The United States is indeed acting in Vietnam as an aggressor, as a violator of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 which guaranteed the peace, independence, neutrality and restoration of the national unity of Vietnam. Whatever versions are put forward by the U.S. Government, it is clear to all that it is not the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, nor the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, that have attacked the United States, but the American armed forces that have invaded Vietnamese soil in order to impose an order which suits the United States in a land where the Vietnamese people alone can be master.

The Soviet Union vigorously condemns the aggression of the United States in Vietnam. The cause of the Vietnamese people is

a just one. They are defending their home. The Soviet people are in solidarity with the heroic struggle of the population of South Vietnam led by the National Liberation Front. We have rendered and will go on rendering the necessary fraternal aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Is there a way out of the situation? There is. ... The Soviet Government fully supports the just demands set forth by the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on April 8, 1965, in the form of the well-known four points.

Non-Interference

.... The Soviet Government is proposing that the Assembly should consider as an important and urgent matter the question of the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of States and the safeguarding of their independence and sovereignty.

[The Soviet Union submitted a formal Declaration on the above subject for study and action by the General Assembly.]

If anyone were to see in the Soviet Union's initiative merely a desire to place some power or group of countries in an awkward situation, he would be mistaken. Our goals are above any desire ... to square accounts. If someone should nonetheless see a condemnation of his own actions in the appearance of a Declaration forbidding foreign interference, we can only reply that he evidently knows best.

Germany

Regardless of the attitude of this or that State towards the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany, regardless of its evaluation of the situation presently obtaining in Central Europe, the completion of a German peace settlement was and remains the salient problem of European security.

True enough, shots are not ringing out in Europe today. Taking place there are verbal clashes and loud arguments whose outcome, however, may prove more fatal than some shots. Indeed, the question of associating Western Germany with nuclear weapons, either in the form of a Multilateral Nuclear Force, as proposed by the United States, or of an Atlantic Force, as proposed by Britain, is a permanent feature in the agenda of various conferences and consultations between certain NATO Powers.

The Soviet Union and other States members of the Warsaw Treaty have firmly declared that if the members of NATO ... embark on the implementation of plans to establish a Multilateral Nuclear Force, in whatever form this is done, then, faced with the grave consequences this would have for security in Europe, they will be compelled to carry out the necessary defensive measures to ensure their own safety.

[The United States submitted to the General Disarmament Conference (8/17/65) a draft treaty "To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Arms." Mr. Gromyko finds the U.S. proposal in contradiction with the U.S. plan continuously discussed in recent years for the creation of a multilateral (NATO) fleet equipped with nuclear weapons.

[On October 16 the New York Times' *correspondent, Jack Raymond, said that the Pentagon conceded that the proposal of a NATO fleet with nuclear missiles is dead. He noted that permission had been given him to attribute this comment publicly to defense officials, although not by name.*

[Two days later (10/19/65) the State Department declared that the plan had not been abandoned. Next day in a New York Times *dispatch (10/20/65) John W. Finney said that "the long-stalled move to give Western Europe a voice in its own nuclear defense is gaining unexpected support in Congress"; that privately some legislators said "they would not necessarily be adverse to an agreement permitting a majority of the NATO nations to exercise control over the use of some atomic weapons." It can be presumed that West Germany, which does not now posess nuclear weapons, would have a voice in this control. To this eventuality Mr. Gromyko raises objections.]*

Disarmament

This session of the General Assembly is due to take an important decision on the convening of a World Conference on Disarmament to be attended by all the nations of the world.... We propose that this World Conference be convened in the middle of 1966.

The Soviet Government believes ... that it is one of the paramount tasks of its foreign policy to propose ... an agreement on disarmament under effective international control. We have no biased approach as to the starting point in the process of reducing and eliminating the armed forces of States, the stages into which it should be broken down and arrangements for control over disarmament, and, we repeat, *over disarmament,* not over armaments. What is important ... [is] that the measures being carried out should not offer any military advantages to either of the sides.

The prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons is inseparable from the struggle for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons and for the prevention of nuclear war, which is the invariable aim of the foreign policy of the USSR. Of course, an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can have real and not imaginary value only when it completely blocks all the channels through which these weapons could leak.... Thus the American draft which was recently presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva, though it speaks of prohibiting certain forms of dissemination of nuclear weapons, nonetheless leaves a "tiny crack" through which will pass unobstructed neither more nor less than a whole multilateral fleet equipped with hundreds of nuclear-tipped missiles.

[Submitted by the Soviet Union for General Assembly study and action, and introduced by the address of Mr. Gromyko, was A Treaty on the Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons.]

An acute question in international affairs which is closely related to the disarmament problem is the question of eliminating foreign

military bases.... The Soviet Government fully shares the conclusion of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Nations that foreign military bases in effect constitute an instrument for pressure on nations and for slowing down their liberation and their development based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas. We believe the General Assembly has all grounds to demand that States which maintain military bases on foreign territories should immediately remove them.

Colonialism

The UN Declaration of 1960.... solemnly proclaimed the need promptly and unconditionally to put an end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.... The people who are fighting for their freedom and independence have a sacred right to use all the means of struggle, including arms. Colonialism as such is an embodiment of violence and arbitrary rule, and all that is done to overcome it is just and humane. The comprehensive assistance which the people receive from friends in their struggle is assistance in achieving the objectives proclaimed by the United Nations. Consequently, it is assistance to the cause of the UN as well.

Trade Relations

The development of sound and mutually beneficial economic ties, which has recently been called for by the UN Conference on Trade and Development, is a very important thing which is in line with the common interests of the peoples. At the same time this is a natural and good foundation on which to bring about a turn for the better in political relations too, because politics cannot be divorced from economics.

The close and many-faceted cooperation between the Soviet Union and the sister-countries of Socialism is expanding and growing stronger. We have established relations of friendship and trust with many non-aligned States.... There is readiness to expand contacts and fields of cooperation with France, Britain, Italy and other capitalist countries which display a desire for this. We would like to have good relations with the United States as well, but naturally with all due reciprocity and not at the cost of other countries.

China

As hitherto the United Nations gravely damages its prestige and lowers the effectiveness of its undertaking and actions due to the fact that to this day the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations have not been restored. The sooner justice triumphs and People's China takes its rightful seat in all UN bodies, the better it will be for the interests of the United Nations itself and for the interests of peace. The Soviet Union vigorously supports the inclusion of the question of restoring the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the agenda of the United Nations and favors its prompt positive solution.

Kennedy Would Invite Peking to Parley on Arms

SENATOR Robert F. Kennedy (D., NY) has urged that China be invited to participate in the 17-nation Geneva disarmament conference, to reconvene probably in January. Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield (D., Mont) and Joseph S. Clark (D., Pa) immediately endorsed the proposal. It was reported the State Department was "lukewarm." (NY Times 10/14/65).

Said Senator Kennedy: "China may be persuaded that their long-run interest, like that of the US and all other nations, lies not in the spread of nuclear weapons but in their strict control." In an address last June Kennedy had urged that a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons be made "a central priority of American policy."

The October 13 address both praised and criticized the Administrations disarmament policy. Indirectly he criticized the non-prolifaration treaty already submitted by the US because it would permit the creation of an international nuclear force within NATO.

State Department reaction to the inclusion of China in disarmament talks was that China could not participate usefully until it changed its hostile policy. Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., NY) commenting on the Kennedy proposal said such an invitation could impair US efforts "to get together with the Soviet Union."

No Economic Peril in Disarmament

"EVEN general and complete disarmament would pose no insuperable problems; indeed, it would mainly afford opportunities for a better life for our citizens." This is the conclusion of a committee of Government experts in a 92-page report released by the White House in September.

The 13-member group, known as the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, appointed by President Johnson, notes that defense and defense-related expenditures have been relatively stable at slightly more than $55 billion annually. They represent a declining proportion of a *rising* gross national product—9.6 per cent in 1962, 8.4 per cent for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965. General and complete disarmament, or more moderate shifts or cutbacks in defense, would add a new element to the economic equation but would not be as significant a factor as over-all economic growth if that can be maintained.

The committee admits that cutbacks in defense expenditures could cause problems for individuals and communities temporarily but there has already been "an impressive array" of Federal programs designed to alleviate adjustment problems.

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1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and carrier carrier sales	713	648
2. Mail subscriptions	4,529	4,299
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D. Free distribution (including samples by other carrier or other means	311	200
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JESSICA SMITH, Editor