




Reporter

Taiwan Prospect DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT TO GET OUT?

By Hugh Deane and Maud Russell



*Portuguese voyagers first visited Taiwan in 1590.
They named it Formosa, meaning Beautiful Island.*

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Taiwan Prospect

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Taiwan Prospect DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT TO GET OUT?

FAR EAST REPORTER INTRODUCTION

The imperialist policy of the United States is well documented in the history of the United States relations with the island of Taiwan; it is a record of an unchanging imperialist policy that belies so much of the official pronouncements on foreign policy.

After World War II the United States supported Chiang Kai-shek in his civil war against the Chinese people (to the tune of six billion dollars). In spite of this immense support the people won and the People's Republic of China was established on the first of October 1949. Chiang and his Kuomintang had fled to Taiwan and ever since has received U S military and economic support.

In spite of World War II Allies' Declarations restoring to China Taiwan and the other territories seized by Japan some fifty years before - - Declarations which the United States signed - - Washington has contrived - diplomatically and militarily - to keep open the question of Taiwan's status.

The question of United States' position on and in Taiwan has been a thorn in United States relations with the People's Republic of China. The Nixon visit in 1972 formally opened up discussion on the subject between the two governments.

It must be stressed that the question of the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan is not subject to any discussion between the United States and the People's Republic of China. That relationship is strictly an internal affair of China's.

But the People's Republic of China is concerned about the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan.

American citizens too should be concerned about the position and actions of their government on this question of Taiwan.

Taiwan is a part of China. United States actions depriving the Chinese people of their just rights are a violation of the best interests of the American people. Can our country afford to pay the costs - in world relationships and our own liberties of hanging on to Taiwan as a puppet and base for U.S. foreign policy? The "hang-on" policy - Washington's imperialist policy - must be ended by the American people.

Far East Reporter here presents material adapted from Hugh Deane's "The Taiwan Prospect" in China and US of May-June 1975, from Sue Warren's "Formosa" in a 1955 issue of Far East Reporter, and from "Facts on Formosa" in a 1950 issue of Far East Spotlight, the publication of The Committee For A Democratic Far Eastern Policy, of which Maud Russell was the Executive Director.

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Taiwan Prospect

DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT TO GET OUT?

In The United States Carrying Out The 1972 Shanghai Communique?

IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE of February 27, 1972, the declaration that summed up the results of the Nixon visit, the United States abandoned much of the doctrine which it contrived to justify the quasi-protectorate it established over Taiwan 25 years ago this June 27.

Yet a succession of words and deeds shows that the cessation of U.S. intervention in the affairs of China's island province cannot be taken for granted. A great deal of influence, in and out of the government, seeks to minimize and distort the Shanghai Communique and to circumscribe the effects of full recognition, if it occurs. A Taiwan Lobby—a so far modest version of the China Lobby which flourished in the 1950s—has made its appearance here and in Tokyo, where the somewhat divided Liberal Democrats are pioneering in an effort to show that recognition of Peking and trade with it can be reconciled with the expansion of a major interest in Taiwan.

US Post-1949 Taiwan Policy

The first strategic evaluation of Taiwan after Japan's defeat * took place in relation to what Washington saw as calamity on the continent,** and the current strategic assessment is similarly conditioned. In between, Taiwan was one of a number of forward bases with roles to play in an aggressive policy.

In 1948, as Generalissimo Chiang's armies crumbled before the People's Liberation Army, Pentagon strategic thinkers appraised Taiwan and determined, according to Secretary of State Acheson's testimony at the MacArthur hearings, that it was of negative importance—meaning that U.S. possession of it was not essential but keeping it out of unfriendly hands was.

Eisenhower restated the concept forcefully in January, 1955 when the Mutual Defense Treaty and related military policy were being debated in Congress. Loss of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu Islands) would "seriously dislocate" the balance of forces in the Pacific, he said.

*Of Japanese imperialism, at end of W W II

** The establishment of the PRC in 1949

“It would create a breach in the island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes for the United States and other free nations the geographical backbone of the security in that ocean. In addition this breach would interrupt north-south communication between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly to us.”

MacArthur argued for a more positive evaluation of Taiwan when in 1950 he sought to turn American policy toward aggression against China. Picking up a phrase from Japanese militarists, he described the island as a “stationary aircraft carrier and submarine tender.” He saw Taiwan as an important part of an island chain from which American airpower could dominate “every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore.” He claimed that if Chiang Kai-shek’s forces had been allowed to attack the mainland, or even threaten to do so, thousands of American lives would have been saved in Korea.

While MacArthur was recalled and somewhat discredited, American policy incorporated qualified versions of some of his recommendations. The three adventures which Truman undertook on June 27, 1950—the interventions in the Korean civil war and in Taiwan and Indochina—were very largely in execution of a strategy of containing China, of girding the China periphery with anti-Communist bastions, and beyond that, of bringing military, economic and political pressures to bear in the expectation that the Chinese Revolution would prove to be, in the words of Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, a “passing phase.”

Robertson verified the maximum policy in testimony before the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives on January 26, 1954:

Rep. Frederick R. Coudert: Did I correctly understand you to say that the heart of the present policy towards China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-a-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown?

Robertson: Yes sir, that is my conception.

Coudert: In other words, a cold war waged under the leadership of the United States, with constant threat of attack against Red China, led by Formosa and other Far Eastern groups, and militarily backed by the United States?

Robertson: Yes . . .

Coudert: Fundamentally, does not that mean that the United States is undertaking to maintain for an indefinite period of years American dominance in the Far East?

Robertson: Yes. Exactly.

On June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered U.S. intervention in Indochina and Taiwan (Formosa, he called it) as well as Korea, where fighting had begun two days earlier. In the previous January, when he supposed that the island would fall to the People's Liberation Army, Truman had gone into detail in describing Taiwan as part of China, but on June 27 he argued that determination of the status of the island had to await a peace settlement with Japan and consideration by the United Nations. Truman's change of mind accorded with a shift to an aggressive Asian policy which was well along in the making before the first shots at the 38th parallel.

On June 27, 1950, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to "prevent any attack on Formosa," at the same time forbidding Chiang Kai-shek's forces to undertake sea and air operations against the mainland—a "leashing" of Chiang which President Eisenhower revoked early in his administration. U.S. air and army units, and a CIA intelligence apparatus, soon followed the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan.

Taiwan was in fact long used as a base for the harassment of the mainland. U.S. planes, ships and arms in vast quantities made Kuomintang operations possible, and U.S. officers took part in their direction. In an aggressive blockade of China's ports between 1950 and 1954, U.S.-supplied ships manned by Kuomintang crews detained, sank or plundered over 500 ships, including 67 foreign vessels. Commando, intelligence-gathering, sabotage and terror raids and airplane overflights were continued until the beginning of the accommodations that preceded the Nixon journey. Taiwan served the U.S. as an air and support base in the Indochina wars.

The three adventures did not succeed. The internal disorders which U.S. experts had predicted did not occur, and the victories they expected in Korea and Indochina were not won. The U.S. continental failures have had the effect of making the island chain from Japan south the U.S. forward position. While technological advances have made bases like Taiwan less important, the likelihood is that the U.S. military would not favor the loss of a 14,000-square-mile area 400 miles south of Okinawa and 250 miles north of the Philippines.

Forces Used by the US To Hinder Taiwan Unification With The Mainland

THE U.S. HAS SOME POLITICAL FORCES it can bring to bear, some tactics it can pursue, and some friendly assistance from Tokyo it can count on, if it decides to perpetuate Taiwan's separation from the mainland.

Taiwanization by a Taiwan Middle Class

U.S. aid programs totaling nearly \$6 billion, and foreign investments amounting to \$1.2 billion, have created some fortunes in Taiwan and a relatively extensive and affluent middle class. The reality behind the rise of the per capita income to \$672 annually is that the number of people with an interest in keeping Taiwan non-socialist has somewhat expanded.

In 25 years of intense military and economic activity on Taiwan, the U.S. has had ample opportunity to personalize its influence. Ties of mutual interest and friendship have been formed with large numbers of army officers, factory management personnel, bureaucrats, traders and others, and no doubt extensive networks of agents are at work.

Such forces are influencing and guiding the inexorable process of Taiwanization of the regime. The some two million mainlanders who fled to Taiwan with Chiang and his entourage are dying off, and the exclusive political control which they exercised in the 1950s and 60s is no longer possible. Some 80 percent of the members of the Kuomintang itself are Taiwan-born, though the party leadership remains in the hands of aged mainlanders. The land reform of the 1950s, directed by the Sino-American Rural Reconstruction Commission, steered the Taiwan rural elite into non-agricultural economic activity, while denying it a political role. Now Taiwanese trading and manufacturing enterprises have developed to the point where they command political influence.

Japan has an overlapping Taiwan following. It created and placed in positions of subordinate power a local elite during its half-century of rule of the island, and as it resumed its economic interest in Chiang's Taiwan, it turned to Taiwanese who speak Japanese and relish an occasional serving of sushi. Growing trade and major investments by spinoff firms of the great Zaibatsu combines keep Japanese ties and influence fresh.

Taiwanization means fundamental political clarification—a coming together of the two wings of Taiwan conservatism.

A Taiwan Independence - Separatist - Movement

In 1945 the Japanese-educated Taiwan elite supposed that it would share in postwar profits and power and, along with the people of Taiwan generally, welcomed the Kuomintang takeover. Soon disillusioned by the Kuomintang policy of plunder and monopolization of assets, it led the February, 1947 protest and suffered grievous losses in the subsequent terror; the 10,000-15,000 killed included long lists of members of the Taiwan elite marked for death by the Kuomintang police. A Taiwan independence movement began formally the following year. The revolutionary tide across the strait strengthened it; the conservatives directing the movement were given an added interest in separatism. MacArthur took the movement under his wing in 1949 when the ability of the Kuomintang to establish itself on Taiwan was in doubt, but dropped it when the doubt vanished. Kept a covert sentiment by police power on Taiwan, separatism has expressed itself in the formation of small emigre organizations on the lookout for big power sponsorship.

The withering of the mainlander component of Taiwan conservatism is bringing about a relatively unified political force with an interest in separatism and turning the emigre groups toward cooperation with the Taiwan Lobby. The emergence of a Taiwan regime stronger in some respects than the present one in Taipei is likely.

US Economic Interests on Taiwan

IN A WORLD BEING SCOURED for raw and processed materials and for investment opportunities, Taiwan is a gold nugget, and the U.S. piece of the action has increased sharply in the years since the Nixon visit to Peking. The U.S. also has to take into account sympathetically the very large and growing stake in Taiwan of its ally-competitor, Japan.

Since 1972 U.S. corporate investments in Taiwan have nearly doubled to \$500 million. The number of companies enrolled in the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei has increased from 60 to 200; they include a galaxy of U.S.-based multinational corporations. Five more U.S. banks have opened Taiwan branches for a total of eight. Private and public loans to Taiwan in the last three years (to build two nuclear power plants, among other purposes) total \$2.5 billion; equivalent per capita loans to the mainland would exceed \$100 billion.

Taiwan is the most favored of the manufacturing and assembly centers that U.S. corporate enterprise has established abroad to take advantage of cheap labor, a ban on strikes, tax advantages, profit remittance rights and other such conditions. Over 50 percent of the television sets sold in the U.S. are made in **Taiwan**.

U.S. trade with Taiwan has grown faster than trade with the People's Republic, nearly doubling since the Nixon trip to \$3.7 billion. The U.S. is the leading purchaser of Taiwan exports and is second only to Japan as the island's supplier.

Now the knowledge that the continental shelf off the China coast contains vast oil resources has added enormously to Taiwan's economic attractiveness. No matter how the offshore limit is defined, possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores and other outlying islands is almost certain to bring access to great quantities of the black gold that is now the object of fierce **international competition**.

A major discovery of natural gas in southern Taiwan has led to the development of a petrochemical industry which is challenging Japanese hegemony in the field. U.S. corporations have an interest in it.

Prospecting for oil is being pushed feverishly. Senator Mike Mansfield, in his report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of last January, noted that some U.S. oil companies have obtained concessions from Taipei. "Specifically, these corporations are Gulf, Amoco, Conoco, Oceanic, Clinton and Texfel . . . Amoco, Gulf and Conoco have been involved in drilling off the west coast of Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait, with the work being done by American-owned vessels of foreign registry and foreign crews."

Now American oil companies are talking about building five to 10 drilling platforms in the Taiwan Strait at a cost of \$150 million each.

In his *New York Times Magazine* article, Lelyveld reports the growing U.S. economic stake in Taiwan and points to the "obvious deduction" that American investors would not be putting their money into the island "without assurances from Washington that the rug would not be pulled out from under them."

Japan's Formula: Pattern for US?

New forms will be sought for U.S.-Taiwan relations. Japan is showing the way. While Japan lowered the flag it flew over its former embassy in Taipei and removed the seal from the facade, it kept its staff functioning. An Interchange Association handles its relations with Taipei while an Association for East Asian

Relations represents the Taipei regime in Tokyo. Both organizations are staffed with detached diplomatic personnel and publicly funded.

US-PRC RELATIONS SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

Some Constructive Developments

U.S.-China relations have developed in a number of respects. Liaison offices have been opened in Peking and Washington. Trade has begun. Several cultural exchanges have taken place, and many thousands of Americans have been able to see something of China's ongoing transformation.

The last U.S. fighterbomber squadron and other military units have been withdrawn from Taiwan, leaving a force of some 2,000.

Patrolling of the Taiwan Strait by the Seventh Fleet ceased in 1969. In the Shanghai Communique the U.S. said it would further reduce its armed forces and military installations on Taiwan as tensions subsided and eventually withdraw them.

In the 1950s and 60s the U.S. insisted that the People's Republic of China renounce use of force against Taiwan as a prior condition for substantive discussions. At Shanghai the U.S. abandoned this demand, while asserting its own continuing interest in a peaceful resolution of problems in the area.

Some Negating Developments: The Hang-On-To-Taiwan Policy

The reduction of U.S. forces and installations on Taiwan is thin evidence of U.S. disengagement. As American units have been withdrawn, U.S. credit sales of arms to the Taipei regime have increased. From some \$45.2 million in 1973, the annual total rose to \$60 million last year and is expected to approach \$80 million this year. The American military exports include two submarines, several destroyers and other surface ships and a new radar system. Advanced F5E fighterplanes are being assembled in Taiwan by arrangement with Northrop—more than compensation for the withdrawal of the U.S. squadron of F-4 Phantoms in June. The simultaneous reduction of American forces and the strengthening of "indigenous forces" accord with the Pentagon's reassessment of Asian strategy in 1970-71, set forth in Nixon's Second State of the World address and related statements.

Last September, the U.S. envoy to Taipei, Leonard Unger—the naming of this senior diplomat with CIA ties to the post was taken by many as a signal of a hang-on-to-Taiwan policy—declared, in the words of a summary by the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, that “while the form of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship might change, the substance of the mutual defense agreement and other U.S. assurances to the Nationalists would not.”

In March the scheduled five-city tour of the Performing Arts Troupe of China was cancelled because its program included the song “People of Taiwan Are Our Own Brothers.” The protest against the song was initiated by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, which is largely staffed by former or detached State Department officials, and then made official by the State Department itself. Its decision was an evident signal.

On May 6 Ford told a press conference that his aim is “to reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan” while strengthening the U.S. positions in Asia generally.

Official actions, by the State Department and Pentagon, add weight to such utterances.

Since the Nixon visit, the State Department has agreed to the opening of five new consulates by the Taipei regime—in Atlanta, Kansas City, Portland (Oregon) and Guam and Samoa. Taipei now has a network of 15 consulates, more than any other foreign government. Those on the U.S. mainland are engaged in more than servicing U.S.-Taiwan trade, substantial as that is. They are the offices of the new Taiwan Lobby and to maintain its eroding hold on Chinese communities here.

Joseph Lelyveld reported in *The New York Times Magazine* on April 16 that the Taipei Foreign Ministry has counted 52 assurances that the U.S. would honor its Taiwan commitments. His article, a plea for a Switzerland-like Taiwan kept separate from the mainland, said in the subtitle “We’re talking about appearances, that’s all.”

WASHINGTON HAS A CONTINUING INTEREST in the Peking connection, as Ford’s planned visit indicates. Kissinger was finally disabused of his conviction that Peking would help the U.S. extricate itself from Indochina, but the turn in China policy still yields domestic political benefits and, even more compelling, is an important part of the instrumentation for dealing with the Soviet Union. Yet the U.S. did not renounce its imperial interests in East Asia when Nixon flew to Peking. Rather, that beginning

of detente set up a series of sharp antitheses which in its early stages Earl C. Ravenal described this way:

. . . our government signals an accommodation with China but works for a regime of "stability" in Asia; it promotes its continuing influence around China's periphery but seeks China's acquiescence in this scheme; it insists on its alliances with China's political enemies and ideological antagonists but advertises, through the Nixon Doctrine, that it will be free of the consequences of involvement in Asia; it pursues constructive contact with China, without constructive concessions.

Taiwan is the antitheses centralized. The U.S. party in Shanghai did not casually revise earlier doctrine; Washington will not lightly jeopardize the Peking tie. Yet the strategic and economic stake in Taiwan is tugging hard.

Taiwan Policy of the People's Republic of China

BUT THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN is being shaped not only by Washington and Tokyo and the Taiwanese elite but by the state that grew out of the Chinese Revolution and the millions of inhabitants of the island who are not privileged.

Taiwan Liberation: China's Internal Affair:

The People's Republic has never ceased to work for the liberation of its island province. In the Shanghai Communique it added one more to a long series of statements of its position:

The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

Reunification By Peaceful Means

China seeks first to end U.S. and other foreign intervention in the affairs of Taiwan and then to bring about reunification, by peaceful means if at all possible, by force if necessary. The two means are complementary. Peking time and again refused to renounce the use of force in Taiwan because to do so was to kiss it off. In recent years it has pressed the development of sea and land forces capable of a Taiwan operation, and their existence increases the likelihood of Taipei-Peking negotiations and a peaceful accord.

Along with the argument of the dire alternative, Peking offers the Taipei regime the promise of a transitional period and good treatment of former enemies, and it holds out to the people of Taiwan the pledge that their living standards will not be lowered but will be improved.

The treatment of Tibet and of small and medium capitalists after Liberation are precedents for a policy of transition in Taiwan, which because of the basic differences in social systems and the need to compromise could be prolonged. Peking has always welcomed defectors from the Taipei regime, and it has released from confinement and extended the hand of friendship to the last group of captured Kuomintang generals and top aides. Chou En-lai likes to remind interviewers that even Pu Yi, last emperor of China and later puppet emperor of Manchukuo, spent the last years of his life a free man in Peking.

On June 21, 1971, Chou was asked by Seymour Topping if the return of Taiwan to China would not mean the lowering of Taiwan living standards. Chou replied:

It is impossible that we would lower the living standards on Taiwan. On the contrary, when Taiwan is returned to China, the living standards will be improved.

First, taxation would be decreased, as it has been here. Second, there would no longer be debts, because the motherland would help construction. China has no internal or external debts, which must be considered a small achievement on our part. Third, there would be no income tax. So the Taiwanese would receive the same income and salaries, which are low, but without income tax. Fourth, if there are unemployed people among those who went to Taiwan from the mainland, they may return to their homes and we will not discriminate against them.

If Taiwan returns to the motherland, the people will be making a contribution, so the motherland, far from exacting revenge on them, should reward them, and we shall reward them

THE TAIWAN PROSPECT

For The United States

President Ford's planned visit to Peking late this year would seem to be the perfect setting for the establishment of full U.S.-China relations, which of course would require the severance of diplomatic ties with the Kuomintang regime in Taipei and the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty reached with it in December, 1954. Such a step would strengthen the position of Peking that Taiwan is an internal Chinese issue and impose constraints on U.S. policy.

There are two paths to a solution of the Taiwan question. One is that of peaceful reunification with the People's Republic of China, the other is the non-peaceful path to the same end. The dangers of the non-peaceful path are heightened by United States adherence to its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Kuomintang government on Taiwan.

For the Taiwan Kuomintang and People

The gradual merger of the Taiwan separatist and Kuomintang conservatives on Taiwan is narrowing the political choices. The succession of events will show that independence is a myth on an island blessed with the attentions of the great multinational corporations and Morgan Guaranty Trust and Chase Manhattan, and that the real choice is between a form of colonialism and sharing the benefits and struggles of the Chinese Revolution. The truth about the mainland has no doubt reached many more of Taiwan's people than is evident; it will get to many others. China's economic stability and social pioneering will contrast ever more starkly with the hurts of the Taiwan anachronism, and China's national stature will attract even those who have no economic reason to be drawn to socialism. A magnet of nationalism and social change is pulling the island to the mainland.

The choices before the Taipei regime, and the role of the people, are being shaped by the same elemental forces of nationalism and social protest and aspiration that made the Chinese Revolution, decided the Korean and Indochina wars and frustrated American policy.

For the People's Republic of China

Imperialism is imperialism - despite the Shanghai Communique - and the Chinese know it.

APPENDIX No. I

TAIWAN: SOME LONG HISTORICAL DATA

The issue of United States relations with the People's Republic of China revolves around the United States current (1949-1975) involvement in Taiwan.

Behind this current issue lies the long history of China's tie with the island - beginning in the second century A D and the United States relations with Taiwan - which began in the 1850's.

Taiwan: An Age-long Part of China

Before there was an independent United States, before Columbus touched the shores of the American continent, Formosa was Chinese.

Chinese expeditions from the mainland to Taiwan began in the Second Century, formal administration of the island was established in the middle of the 13th Century and the majority of Taiwan's population is made up of people whose family roots are on the mainland and who regard themselves as Chinese, not "Taiwanese." Any talk of separating Taiwan from China is like suggesting the tearing off and recognizing as a nation any of China's other provinces—a truly unthinkable thought,



A 200 year-old map of China, showing "Tay-wan or Formosa," in Gordon's Geography Anatomiz'd; or, the Geographical Grammar, published in London in 1754. The text says, "Formosa which also belongs to China, is 200 Miles long; not broad in Proportion but shap'd like a Mint or Bayleaf. It lies on the Southeast of China . . ."

Taiwan was not a Chinese colony or outpost or, since the late 17th century, a frontier region. It was a part of China. The freeing of Taiwan from Dutch control in 1662 by an expedition from Amoy commanded by Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga), a Ming loyalist, began a largescale settling of the island. During the following half-century thousands of peasant and fisher families from Amoy and elsewhere in Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces ditched, diked and terraced Taiwan's great western plain and built there villages like those they came from. Apart from the Kaoshan (High Mountain) minority in the eastern mountains, the people were and remain Hans. They were misruled by the Ching Dynasty, but that was an adversity they shared with all the Chinese people. They were exploited, not because they lived on Taiwan but because they lived under feudalism.

Japan, which acquired Taiwan in 1895 after inflicting a swift defeat on the forces of the decaying Manchu Dynasty, undertook a systematic development of the island's economy which made possible not only large profits but a rise in the people's standard of living. Despite this, and despite official efforts to Japanize the people, they retained their Chinese feelings and gathered at the railroad stations in their holiday best to cheer Kuomintang officials and troops as liberators in October, 1945.

Japan's conquest and occupation of the Island (initiated, incidentally, by Japanese aggression in Korea) from 1895 to 1945, was never conceded as justifiable in the eyes of the world. During this entire period the people of Formosa never ceased their struggle against the alien Japanese rule. In a memorandum dated April 18, 1947, recorded in the State Department's "U.S. Relations With China," U.S. Ambassador Leighton Stuart wrote that the Formosan people "After fifty years under Japanese control . . . welcomed a return to China which they had idealized as the 'Mother Country.'"

Because Formosa is acknowledged as historic Chinese territory by the whole civilized world, it was restored to China by common agreement of all the Allies after World War II. On December 1, 1943, President Roose-

velt, Prime Minister Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, then head of the Chinese state, meeting at Cairo, issued the following Declaration:

. . . all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

This solemn international commitment was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration signed July 26, 1945, by the United States, the United Kingdom and China, and subsequently adhered to by the USSR.

The Chinese Government accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces on Formosa, and during the five years from 1945 to June 27, 1950, Chinese sovereignty in Formosa was never questioned. With the victory of the People's Republic of China over the utterly repudiated Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, there were those who still could question which was the actual government of China; but the question of Chinese sovereignty in Formosa was established *de jure* and *de facto*.

Kuomintang Taiwan: Preservation of Old China's "Bitter Past"

The overtures from Peking have been ignored or rejected by the Taipei regime for a quarter of a century, and the people of Taiwan have been relatively passive, though many small incidents are reminders of the tradition of rebelliousness which the people of Taiwan share with other Chinese. The pouring in of foreign investments and development of the island's semitropical agriculture have made life a bit better for some of the people. Police rigorously enforce the martial law which has been in effect for over a quarter of a century. Mainland realities are systematically concealed or distorted.

Despite some trickling down of the influx of investment, Taiwan is China's "bitter past" in living flesh, preserved by an irony of history. It preaches morality in Confucian resonances, serves up its labor force for sweating, institutionalizes vice for the promotion of tourism and the bribery of corporate envoys, and produces ever

sharper contrasts between want and injustice and "the smell of meat and wine at the palace door." It has been in a period of economic ascendance, despite zigs and zags. Yet though it did not feel the full impact of the world recession and the oil crisis, thousands of its workers lost their jobs when demand for television sets and other manufactures dropped off in the U.S. and elsewhere. Dependent on trade even more than Japan, the island's economy would be hard hit by any prolonged contraction of its external market. The lot of Taiwan's people is tied to intensifying capitalist competition and recurrent crisis.

Pre-1949 United States-Taiwan Relations

One Hundred Years Ago

Influential Americans Coveted Taiwan

US interest in Taiwan has a history.

In the 1850's Commodore Matthew Perry, New York merchant and diplomat Townsend Harris, and Peter Parker, a China missionary and diplomat, argued in memos to the State Department that the US ought to seize Formosa.

"The U S alone should take the initiative in this magnificent island," Peter wrote. He saw the island as a coaling station and forward base from which the US could compete advantageously for the China trade.

Parker, who was strongly supported by Harris, declared in 1857, "The subject of Formosa is becoming one of great interest to a number of enterprising fellow-citizens...It is much to be hoped that the government of the United States may not SHRINK from the ACTION which the interests of humanity, civilization, navigation and commerce impose upon it in relation to Taiwan (Formosa)." The US was then torn by civil discord which was to become war and such foreign adventures were not practical. Still, Taiwan remained attractive to Americans in Asia, and two years after Appomatox the American consul in Hongkong reported to Washington that the US acquisition of Taiwan would be "the greatest boon that our Government could confer upon our national commerce in the East."

The US thrust into East Asia when it seized the Philippines in 1898; but by that time Taiwan had been a Japanese colony for three years.

For more detailed US involvement see Appendix #2

FACTS ON TAIWAN (FORMOSA)*

By THE EDITORS

Americans are now faced with the critical question of war or peace with China, a nation of 485 million people toward whom we have always felt friendship and with whom we strongly desire normal diplomatic relations and mutually beneficial trade.

The crisis was precipitated by President Truman's statement on Taiwan and his order dispatching the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the island, an integral part of China both historically and under the Cairo and Potsdam agreements. General MacArthur has now further demanded that the U. S. should take permanent control.

The sharpness of the crisis was underscored when the People's Government of China responded by declaring that armed aggression against China had taken place and the integrity of Chinese territory violated. The Chinese charge of U.S. aggression was subsequently placed before the United Nations.

Thoughtful American and foreign commentators are unanimous on one point. Tracing the Formosa issue in U.S. policy, not from last June but from last January, they agree that Truman and Acheson have moved constantly toward what Administration spokesmen used to call the interventionist "China Lobby" program of General MacArthur, Senators McCarran, Taft, Bridges and Knowland, Henry Luce, Herbert Hoover, and John Foster Dulles. The Formosan

measures Secretary Acheson and Administration Senate Leader Tom Connally denounced loudly in January had become Administration policy in June.

Though this new policy is being accorded the status of holy writ not subject to examination and challenge, the free competition of ideas remains fundamental for the formation of an informed public opinion on Taiwan and other issues. This memorandum is accordingly presented to help clarify and bring into sharper focus the underlying issues.

Truman's Statement

On June 27, the President announced, in the course of his message on the dispatch of U.S. forces to Korea:


"The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces permitting their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.

"As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.

"The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

In this statement, despite the fact that the U.S. is only one of twelve nations (not counting the Latin American countries) bounding the

*Chinese historic name of the island known as Formosa is Taiwan, Formosa was the name given to the island by Portuguese navigators who sighted it in 1590. It is the Portuguese word meaning beautiful.



"Pacific area," President Truman set himself up as sole judge of "security in the Pacific."

On this basis, and with the deployment of U.S. ships to enforce it, he equally unilaterally announced the abrogation of the sovereignty of one of the most important of these nations, China, over her territory of Formosa. The People's Republic of China, the real Chinese government which already controls 99% of the nation's territory and people, was simply classified as 'Communist' with no national label, and ordered to refrain

from making its control complete on pain of war with the United States. The remnant Chiang Kai-shek group, which still rules 7 million people on the island, and to which Truman referred as "the Chinese Government on Formosa" was ordered to let the United States take over its defense. The People's Republic immediately reasserted its sovereignty by a strong reply. The Chiang group grumbled, but of course took the U.S. orders. It does not seem to have occurred to the President that, in dealing so cavalierly with the bankrupt group

which the U.S. still recognizes and supports in the United Nations, he himself has exposed its lack of every pretense of sovereignty, even over Formosa, and shown it to the world nakedly, for the U.S. puppet it is.

Finally, with regard to the future, the President foresaw every kind of approach to the question of disposal of Formosa except the unconditional recognition of Chinese rights there, to which the U.S. government had previously pledged its word. Even in his listing of other alternatives — "restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations" — the weasel word, "or," tells us that only that path will be chosen which the U.S. finds most convenient at the time.

Formosa is historic Chinese territory which was seized by Japan following the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95 (initiated by Japanese aggression in Korea) and restored to China, by common agreement of all the allies, after World War II.

Truman Statement Flouts Treaties

On December 1, 1943, at the Cairo conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, then head of the Chinese state, issued a declaration which contained the following pledge:

"... all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."

By the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, at which Soviet entry into the war against Japan was for-

malized, the U.S., U.S.S.R. and Britain repeated:

"The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out . . ."

In accordance with these declarations, Chinese troops and administrators were transported to Formosa immediately after V-J day, accepted the surrender of the Japanese on the island and set up Chinese control.

Truman in January vs. Truman in June

The Cairo and Potsdam declarations were violated by President Truman's statement of June 27 because:

- a) Far from making the future status of Formosa dependent on "a peace settlement in Japan," its restoration to China was part of the Potsdam declaration which Japan accepted in her surrender, and a condition of the peace treaty that was made mandatory in advance and susceptible to no further negotiations.
- b) Consideration of the status of Formosa is outside the mandate of the United Nations, from whose jurisdiction the German and Japanese settlements were specifically excluded.

Last January, when right-wing Republicans in the Senate launched a "grab Formosa" drive, Pres. Truman and other Administration spokesmen affirmed these very facts which they now flout. President Truman declared on January 5, 1950:

"In the joint declaration at Cairo on December 1, 1943, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister and the President of China stated that it was their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as 'Formosa,' should be restored to the Republic of China.

"The United States was a signatory to the Potsdam Declaration . . . which declared that the terms of the Cairo declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this declaration were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender.

"The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa . . ."

Secretary of State Acheson elucidated the President's policy declaration the same day. He added a specific repudiation of the Republican-advanced idea of "waiting for peace with Japan."

"The world must believe that we stand for principle and that we are honorable and decent people and that we do not put forward words, as propagandists do in other countries, only to throw them overboard when the change in events makes the position difficult for us . . ."

"It is important that our position in regard to China should never be subject to the slightest doubt or the slightest question . . . When Formosa was made a province of China, nobody raised any lawyer's doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments.

"Now, in the opinion of some, the situation has changed. They believe that the forces now in control of the mainland of China, the forces which undoubtedly will soon be recognized by some other countries, are not friendly to us, and therefore they want to say: 'Well, we have to wait for a treaty.' We did not wait for a treaty on Korea. We did not wait for a treaty on the Kuriles. We did not wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.

". . . the United States of America, Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyer's words about the integrity of our position. Therefore, the President says, we are not going to use our forces in connection with the present situation in Formosa . . ."

By contrast, the "grab Formosa" position was developed by such men as Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R. N.J.) and Sen. Robert A. Taft

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The Enemy

(R. Ohio). Sen. Smith wrote in a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dated November 29, 1949:

"Our overall command in the Far East should be unified under one control such as General MacArthur has so ably demonstrated in Japan . . ."

"It is my urgent recommendation that under no circumstances must we let the island of Formosa fall into hands hostile to the U.S."

I recommend that this situation be carefully explored with the further recommendation that any possible steps should be reported at once to the United Nations, with an expression of determination on our part to keep the island out of the war area and assist in its economic development. We might explore the possibility of a United Nations Trusteeship. . . ."

Senator Taft declared January 11, 1950:

"Just before the first of the year, I expressed the opinion in an interview in Ohio that we should 'hang on' to Formosa and prevent Communist occupation of Formosa, even though it involved the use of our Navy. I did not suggest the occupation of Formosa nor the sending of any army, or

even the sending of the Navy. Our Navy is there . . . and its ships between Formosa and China . . . There can be no crossing if our Navy makes it clear that ships carrying troops will not be allowed to cross . . ."

It is this position in all its details, not the position that Truman maintained at the time, that was announced by the President a half year later, on June 27. The "threat to security of the Pacific," the ringing in of the Japanese treaty and the United Nations, the form of the order to the Navy and even "determination on our part to keep the island out of the war area" are all there. This alone should serve as absolute proof — and there is more evidence which we shall produce — to show that these formulas were not developed with the Korean crisis to reflect the situation existing after June 25. *Instead, they indicate most persuasively that the Korean crisis was used as a pretext to put into effect plans that had already been carefully set up.*

Here is what Administration Senators said about these plans at the time, i.e. before the Administration's surrender.

Senator Tom Connally (D. Texas), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on January 6, 1950:

"Do you want to send our troops into the Chinese civil war . . . I shall not favor sending a single American boy with a gun in his hand to Formosa to settle a civil war six or seven thousand miles away from home . . ."

Senator Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, Democratic floor leader, said the same day of the proposal to use the Navy to "protect" Formosa:

"Any time you send any part of the American Fleet, you had just as well plan to send more than the American fleet."

The stakes were well realized by the Administration and the press. Speaking in the Senate Jan. 10, Sen. Connally replied to Senator Knowland's proposal that Formosa be taken:

"I am not in favor of casting a single vote that would endanger plunging the United States into another war."

A State Department directive on Formosa dated December 23, 1949, said:

"Dispatching naval units or taking any similar action would . . . involve the United States in a long term venture, producing at best a new area of bristling stalemate and, at worst, possible involvement in open warfare."

Walter Lippmann wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* the same day:

"The case for military intervention in Formosa really rests on the argument that we should wage an undeclared war against China . . ."

The *Wall Street Journal* wrote Jan. 9, 1950 of the Republican proposals:

"We think such action would incur the grave risk of war."

Policy Switched Before Korea

When did the Administration switch to the China policy of MacArthur, Taft and Dulles, of Hoover, Knowland, McCarthy, Hearst and Luce? (Note the connotation of these names in domestic policy!) Did the real switch come after the outbreak of fighting in Korea, when it was announced by President Truman with that explanation and motive? Or was it decided earlier, in a policy shift in Asia that produced both the Korean and Formosan crises? Was a policy calculated to breed war adopted before war occurred, or forced by the actual commencement of hostilities?

The evidence is that the decision came *before the first shots were fired in Korea June 25.*

On June 14, *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent Marguerite Higgins reported from Tokyo that it was not the risk of war, but the perilous gamble that Formosa could be grabbed without war, that initiated discussion of a switch.

"General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's headquarters, which has consistently opposed accepting as inevitable Formosa's fall to the Chinese Communists, believes there is reason to hope for reconsideration of American policy concerning this strategic island . . . It is believed here that a formula for saving Formosa from Communist occupation will be discussed during the forthcoming visit in Tokyo of Sec. of Defense Louis Johnson, Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and John Foster Dulles, Republican consultant to Sec. of State Dean Acheson . . . One reason that officials believe there is still time to save Formosa is that recent intelligence reaching Tokyo indicates that the Chinese Communists have postponed their expected invasion. Veteran American officials are convinced the Soviet Union does not intend to provoke war at this time and will not permit the Chinese Communists to do so. If the U.S., backed by the United Nations, takes a firm stand in Formosa, the Communists can be deterred altogether from attacking, headquarters believe. They are reluctant to go into detail on the nature of this 'firm stand'."

On June 17 Miss Higgins reported further that:

". . . MacArthur will press during the forthcoming high-level talks here for an extensive and dynamic military-economic program to regain American initiative in the Communist-threatened Far East . . . An early and benevolent peace treaty for Japan and a reversal of American policy on Formosa so as to keep the strategic island . . . are only two of the many steps considered necessary . . . The accomplishment of the 500-member American military mission in training the South Korean Army is frequently cited in headquarters as an example of what well-applied effort can do."

On June 18, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley arrived in Tokyo and were briefed by headquarters while "Mr. Dulles, now in South Korea, is expected back Tuesday to talk to General MacArthur," according to the *New York Times*. The *New York Herald Tribune* of the same day reported that Tokyo discussions included "the possibility of saving from Chinese Communist attack the island of Formosa."

On Jan. 20, according to Associated Press from Tokyo:

"A reliable U.S. officer said today that Defense Secretary Johnson is 'leaning our way' on Formosa. That would mean United States aid to keep the Chinese Nationalists' island bastion out of Communist hands."

On June 28, after the Korean outbreak and the President's statement, the *New York Times'* well-informed diplomatic correspondent James Reston wrote from Washington:

"The whole issue of reversing U.S. policy in Formosa would have been raised with the President again even if the Communists had not attacked South Korea."

As a footnote to these published peaks of an iceberg nine-tenths of which is still hidden from the eyes of the American people, we bring two other quotations that may not be irrelevant.

On June 10, while General MacArthur was suppressing the Japanese Communists and labor movement, a Tokyo dispatch to the *New York Times* quoted General Walton H. Walker, commander of the Eighth Army and now in charge in Korea, in a speech to his troops:

"Our mission now is to achieve a degree of combat readiness that will not only discourage any aggressor but crush any who attempt to encroach upon the princi-

FACTS ON TAIWAN

(Continued from page 9)

ples of justice and government that we stand ready to defend. Your mission and mine is to maintain the splendid Eighth Army in a state of readiness which will assure success in any role we may be called upon to assume . . ."

On June 19, *Barron's*, magazine of Wall Street, wrote editorially:

"As the conference in Tokyo progresses, one can only hope that ways and means are found to implement a new policy and are brought home to Washington. And here history, if we will let it, may be given guidance. Speaking of the open door, John Hay said in effect: 'The moment the United States declared itself the rest of the world paused and finally came over to our ground'."

All this saber-rattling and reference to "dynamic" moves in the Far East *preceded* the fighting in Korea, which was supposed to be a total surprise, and the Truman statement, which was supposed to have been purely a result of this "surprising" development.

The Crisis After June 27

President Truman's June 27 statement on Formosa drew a plain and unequivocal statement from the People's Republic of China. Its Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, declared June 30:

"On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I declare that Truman's statement of June 27 and the actions of the American navy constitute armed aggression against the territory of China and total violation of the United Nations Charter . . . The fact that Taiwan is part of China will remain unchanged forever. This is not only a historical fact, it has also been confirmed by the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and by the situation since the surrender of Japan.

"The people of our country will certainly fight to the end to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors. The Chinese people who defeated Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, the hireling of American imperialism, will surely be

victorious in driving off the American aggressors and in recovering Taiwan and all other territories belonging to China. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China calls on all peoples throughout the world who love peace, justice and freedom, and especially on all oppressed nations and peoples of the East, to rise as one and halt the new aggression."

President Truman's statement was also widely deplored and denounced abroad, a chorus in which the voices of America's foreign allies and dependents were particularly significant.

The Conservative London *Observer* wrote July 2 that nothing in Korea

"alters the legal and diplomatic position in Formosa — a position which has hitherto rightly been seen as not justifying American intervention in the Chinese civil war. Putting Formosa under American naval protection is to undertake such intervention. By doing so, the double risk is taken of spreading the conflict and blurring the issues."

Lord Beaverbrook's right-wing *Daily Express* wrote the same day of the dangers to Britain:

"Do not let us blind ourselves to the difficulties and implications of the situation. We may, for example, be called upon to protect Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa against the new rulers of China, whom we have recognized. Deep and grave troubles could result."

The Co-operative party's *Reynold's News*, also on July 2, declared:

"New China should be brought into the United Nations and Chiang Kai-shek thrown out, and the U.S. should retract its dangerous and unjustified decision to protect the discredited remnants of Chiang's 'government' in Formosa."

The Labor weekly *Tribune* wrote July 14:

"In recognizing Communist China, Britain also recognizes her right to take over the sphere of interest in Formosa. Hence the wisdom of the (British) government's course in refusing to associate itself with the American declaration of defense . . ."

The declaration was hasty and outside the scope of the Security Council's action."

Twenty-three Labor members of Parliament demanded withdrawal of U.S. forces from Formosa and the admission of China to the United Nations and a similar demand was made by the 650,000-strong London Trades Council.

In France, the *New York Times* reported August 10, the government had as yet taken no stand on Formosa but it was pointed out that "President Truman's statement on the question did not involve the French government."

Commentator Maurice Duverger, writing in the influential *Le Monde*, asserted that the U.S. made a big mistake in relating the questions of Korea and Formosa.

The world-famous Pertinax, wrote in *Paris Soir* that Formosa was a thorny question in which the U.S. may find itself more deeply involved than it bargained for. He suggested that Great Britain and India intervene to try and save the situation, and added:

"But the British diplomats will not start anything unless Washington at least gives its formal approval . . . It goes without saying that a settlement in Formosa would open the way for a settlement in Korea."

In Asia, the reaction was even stronger. Analyzing the feeling and comment in non-Communist Asian countries, Warren H. Phillips admitted soberly in the *Wall Street Journal* of August 24 that they were "solidly opposed to United States intervention in Formosa and would never support America in a clash with China."

MacArthur to Truman to War

After his visit to Formosa in early August, reportedly undertaken without State Department sanction, General MacArthur issued his

statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 27. This statement spoke of the use of Formosa for offensive, as well as defensive purposes, proclaimed the Pacific an American lake, and stated anew MacArthur's long-standing empire builder's claim to understand "how to deal with Orientals." It read in part:

"Prior thereto (to the past war) the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway and Guam to the Philippines . . . All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it . . . We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands, extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas, held by us and our allies. From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific . . .

"The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States is an enemy salient in the very center of the defensive perimeter . . . At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca . . .

"Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific, that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive resolute and dynamic leadership. . . .

This statement was followed not only by an order from President Truman that it be withdrawn, after it was already in print, but also by a new flood of alarmed and angry comment from Britain.

The *Daily Herald*, organ of the

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ruling Labor party, carried an article on Aug. . . bluntly entitled "The Menace of MacArthurism."

The *Manchester Guardian* of August 24, asked:

"But does Asia desire that the Pacific should be an American lake? Are these the arguments to advance in the middle of a United Nations campaign?"

The tabloid London *Daily Mirror* wrote of MacArthur's breach of his trust as a United Nations commander:

"It is profoundly shocking that he should risk entangling the U.N. elsewhere by his ill-advised and provocative claims concerning Formosa."

The United Nations as Catspaw

Commenting on the position in relation to Formosa developed by President Truman and the State Department at the time of the MacArthur statement, the well-informed *U.S. News & World Report* stated September 1:

"Officially, U.S. State Department is willing to have Formosa treated as a United Nations problem, eventually. ACTUALLY, the MacArthur outline of defense strategy virtually commits U.S. to keep Communists away from the island — permanently."

Reading the term "Communists" as a code-word for the government that directs, and is supported by, the Chinese people, we shall be in a position to understand President Truman's latest policy statement on Formosa. This statement took the form of a letter to Ambassador Warren Austin, chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations Security Council, specifically endorsing and repeating the wording of a previous communication Austin had sent to U.N. Sec-Gen. Trygve Lie. Equal to MacArthur's "withdrawn" statement in its determination to keep Formosa out of the hands of China at all costs, it also



Civilian Victims in Korea

followed Republican recommendations dating from 1949, to make the United Nations the vehicle for carrying this out.

One paragraph of the Truman-Austin letter stated:

"The actual status of the island (Formosa) is that it is territory taken from Japan by the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."

Another paragraph declared:

"The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa . . . We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful rather than a forcible solution of that problem."

Liberal Americans to whom "United Nations consideration" of any problem sounds like an advance, and for whose special bene-

fit this formula has been devised, should bear in mind the context of the loaded Truman-Austin offer. This context includes:

a) repudiation of previous solemn commitments to restore Formosa to China as an act of historic justice;

b) proposing United Nations consideration as a substitute for these commitments for the purpose of legalizing a different, illegal and unjust solution;

c) persistent U.S. voting against any representation for the real government of China in the United Nations or even its presence when its own complaints to the U.N., on Formosa among other subjects, come up for discussion, and

d) an effort to put China in the position of defying the United Nations, not merely the U.S., if she acts to safeguard territory that is already hers by law.

Undermine U.N.

The effect of such "U.N. consideration" would be further to pervert the world organization from a channel for orderly progress and justice, which it was founded to be, to a backstop for bankruptcy and an excuse for keeping territories out of the hands of their own people. It would pervert such U.N. concepts as "trusteeship" from preparation of peoples for self-government and full independence who have never had it, to deprivation of self-government and perpetuation of colonialism for peoples which have broken away from it.

The idea of this sort of misuse of the United Nations was perhaps first advanced by General Albert T. Wedemeyer in 1947, not only for Formosa but for Manchuria and Korea as well. In each case, the

recommendation was made to bolster up reactionary regimes while they existed, provide for a substitute for their rule if they crumbled, and under all circumstances to keep the future of these areas from being determined by their own restless peoples.

The result of this strategy as applied in Korea was the present bloody warfare.

In Manchuria it was never applied. The Truman Administration itself withheld General Wedemeyer's report on this subject for the following illuminating reason, given on page 260 of its White Paper on China issued in 1949:

"Among the recommendations of the Report, however, was one requiring immediate action by the United Nations to place Manchuria under a Guardianship of Five Powers, including the Soviet Union, or a U.N. Trusteeship. It was the conviction of the President and the Secretary of State that any such recommendation, if made public at that time, would be highly offensive to Chinese susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty . . . In any event, they believed that to place upon the United Nations responsibility for action to implement such a recommendation might well seriously endanger the future of the organization . . ."

With regard to Formosa, Wedemeyer proposed trusteeship in the event that the people of the island would rise up against the predatory regime of Chiang Kai-shek, as they had done once already. Here the purpose was to prevent them from making common cause with the people of China as a whole.

This is the project that is now being revived in a different context, succinctly stated by Gill Robb Wilson, a reactionary columnist in the *New York Herald Tribune*, as long ago as January 3. Advocating the seizure of air bases for U.S. use in Formosa, Wilson wrote:

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"There are complications, however. In 1945 Formosa was returned to China as a province. This move was in line with the general stupidity of American policy in China. However, the status of Formosa has not been fixed by treaty since it was taken away from Japan . . . The answer would seem to be independent status for Formosa under the mandate of the United Nations."

This kind of reasoning was characterized as follows by a letter to the *New York Times* by a reader of that paper on April 23, 1950.

"To think of placing Formosa under trusteeship at this very late date is to force an artificial situation where trusteeship is not needed or wanted or justified except for political reasons. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD HOLD THE UNITED NATIONS HIGHLY SUSPECT AS A TOOL OF WHATEVER GREAT POWER HAS PRE-DOMINANCE IN ITS CONSELS . . ."

Conclusion

The question of Formosa cannot be considered apart from the larger question of China as a whole. The People's Republic of China is here to stay. This is an irreversible historic fact. What is more — the People's Republic of China came about as the result of a profoundly popular revolution. This is confirmed again and again throughout the United States State Department's own publication "United States Relations With China," better known as the White Paper on China released in August, 1949. In his Letter of Transmittal contained in that document Secretary of State Acheson says, speaking of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang,

"In the opinion of many observers they had sunk into corruption, into a scramble for place and power, and into reliance on the United States to win the war for them and to preserve their own domestic supremacy."

In sharp contrast are the words of U.S. Foreign Service Officer,

John Davies, describing the Communist movement in that same White Paper.

"The reason for their phenomenal vitality and strength," he says, "is simple and fundamental. It is mass support and mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people."

The People's Republic of China is the only effective government of China and enjoys the support of that nation. The United States Government has solemnly committed itself at Cairo, Potsdam and in the January 25th statement of President Truman to return to China "all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as "Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores . . ." It has just as solemnly disavowed 'subterfuge by legalities' in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's words, (Jan. 26, 1950) "When Formosa was made a province of China, nobody raised any lawyer's doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordanc with the commitments." All talk of a final settlement of the Formosa question by "peace treaty with Japan," "UN Trusteeship" and the like are legal evasions of these solemnly given commitments.

Can the American people really believe that it is in the interests of a genuine American security (so demagogically invoked by MacArthur and his spokesmen) to obstruct the democratic advances of the peoples of China and the Far East in their centuries old struggle for national independence? Can such a policy reap anything but a harvest of hate for America and all things American? Can it do

more than compound the disastrous errors already made in supporting Chiang Kai-shek's war against the Chinese people? Like that policy it can only end in defeat and moral and political bankruptcy for the United States.

What is the proper course with regard to the United Nations by Americans who want peace with China and with all countries?

Clearly, military intervention in Formosa is the logical consequence of die-hard opposition for more than a year to the recognition of the new government of China.

In relation to Formosa we must not be hoodwinked into supporting any revival of the "gun-boat" policy or any scheme which will make the United Nations an accomplice in the alienation of territory from China, a receiver of stolen goods chosen for its sanctimonious front. Instead we should press for withdrawal of American military forces and an end to intervention in support of the bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek clique.

Millions of Americans, regardless of political beliefs, favor recognition of the new government of Chi-

na as a fact of life which it would be folly to deny. Even more millions oppose military intervention in Formosa as unjustified and creating the danger of war with China. By speaking now for peace we can best defend our country from catastrophe.

In another crucial period of American history, Mark Twain, speaking out against US domination of the Philippines and for a policy of friendship and aid to the oppressed colonial peoples put it to his fellow Americans this way:

"Rich winnings are to be gathered in, too; (from a policy of friendship and support to the colonial liberation movements) rich and permanent; indestructible; a fortune transmissible forever to the children of our flag. Not land, not money, not domination — no, something worth many times more than that dross: our share, the spectacle of a nation, long harassed and persecuted, set free through our influence; our posterity's share, the golden memory of that fair deed."

This is in the democratic tradition of the whole American people as opposed to the narrow interests of American monopoly. This tradition carried forward in our time is the real and indestructible source of American strength and security.

Kuomintang Taiwan "Culture"


Not only does Kuomintang Taiwan preserve the "bitter past" of old China it also caters to American big business "civilization"

TAIWAN PROMISES GIRL-FILLED NIGHTS

While tourist promotion of Taiwan offers something for everybody, it stresses the delights it has in store for visiting males. Here are quotations from the 1968 Directory of Taiwan:

Taiwan Provincial Government FOREWORD

It is my pleasure to be asked once again by the editors of the Directory of Taiwan to write a few lines to introduce its latest edition to the English-reading public.



Huang Chieh
Governor
Taiwan Provincial Government

"The wine houses number hundreds, big and small in Taipei. The big ones are gaily decorated with many private rooms exactly like harems in the Arabian Palace...Male patrons choose their favorite girl or girls as their companions, exchanging pleasantries, toasts, jokes, dirty or clean depending on the prevailing mood of both parties. This fun is usually titillating with bawdry and the love caressing without lewdness.

"Like the ravishing girlie restaurants, the alluring cabarets in Taipei pride themselves on the bevy of girls, bossomy, lissome and coquetish. The hostesses parley their charms and dance into their patrons' favor at some US \$2 per hour. "Myriad hotels, big and small, dot the hillside in Peitou and girls are called right to the rooms by hotel maids for selection by patrons. A transaction costs US \$5.00 and more pay for longer service...Hotel rent is counted on hours as patrons stay there for hours of pleasure, not days of sojourn."

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