

REFUTATION OF WRONG TRENDS  
ADVOCATING  
WITHDRAWAL OF  
TELANGANA ARMED STRUGGLE

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## PREFACE

The armed struggle, for that matter the revolutionary movement, in Telangana is important for Indian Revolution, in more than one way. Firstly, it has provided an occasion to test the general line followed by the then Communist Party of India. It was proved that the line was wrong. Secondly, it has provided a path for Indian Revolution. I am aware that not all are unanimous about these points. They have been controversial in the past and they continue to be so.

Of late, there has been some discussion going on, on origin, development and end of this struggle. There have been books and articles by authors, some of whom are directly or indirectly connected with the movement and others, were not. For the younger generation, it is a thing of past. Therefore a few of them, who are interested in the subject, are going in for the research work on the subject and its various aspects. All this is a welcome development, because a subject matter which has become a living subject discussed again and again.

Another positive feature, the most important at that is that the discussion is related to the line to be adopted as a path of Indian revolution. So far as we are concerned, our general line is worked out on the basis of the experiences and lessons we have drawn from Telangana Armed Struggle. Others have their own versions of the struggle as well as its lessons. Some others claim that their line is the same as ours but their practice is quite opposite and nothing common with ours. Therefore we have been joining issues with them. Our opponents, more so in Andhra, are attaching importance to the subject because Telangana armed struggle has become part and parcel of the consciousness of entire people in Andhra Pradesh, though there is a difference in degrees from region to region. Therefore they are putting up a show that their general line is in accordance with the experiences of this armed struggle, to convince their following. It is a futile attempt in which they are indulging.

There were two trends in the Telangana people's movement from the very beginning, i.e., anti-Nizam and pro-Nehru, and anti Nizam and anti-Nehru. Of course there was another trend which was of a local nature and was represented by the Hyderabad city committee. It can be characterised as Azad-Hyderabad trend. Though this was part and parcel of the former one although, it has appeared in a specific form and in specific conditions. They have never been academic. They were operating because communists, as practical workers, were working among the people, i.e., workers peasants, middle classes and other sections of the people who were to be mobilised against Nizam's regime. And the mobilisation was not limited to public meetings and rallies, which were rare because there was no semblance of civil liberties in the State. Therefore any genuine mobilisation of people would have only taken place, when the struggles, class struggles at that, were taking place. This does not mean that there were no public meeting or rallies. In fact they were held, but only with the permission of the govt which was accorded rarely and sparingly.

One of these trends is associated with right opportunism represented by late PC Joshi, who was the secretary of the party till the end of 1947. It can be said that it (anti-Nizam and pro-Nehru trend) was dominant during the same period. This expressed in the movement in the form of lining up with a section of the State Congressmen who were claiming that they were for a mass movement against the Nizam. In fact there was no such movement at any time, and there was no programme or activity organising it. They were the state congressmen who belonged to such section as Swamy Ramananda Thirtha, Govinda Das Sharaff etc. They had their counterpart in Telangana, and Warangal District (which includes present Khammam Dist) was an important centre where they were present. But the course

of the movement proved that there were no such elements in Nalgonda district and it left no scope for them to emerge. Of course there were a few individuals here and there who claimed that they were nationalists, but in fact they were Gandhians just like any others. This was the picture outside the Party.

Telangana people's movement, taken as a whole, covers entire Telangana because there was the working class movement, a student movement, a movement of the middle classes, specially the gumastas i.e., clerks working in private shops etc. There was a movement of weavers and such artisans. All these movements had more or less Telangana-wide character because the organisations were spread all over it including Hyderabad. But so far as the peasant movement is concerned, it was more or less concentrated in the two districts of Nalgonda and Warangal, though other districts too had their own share, Karimnagar being one such important district. Therefore, when dealing with the peasant movement we were confronted with these trends more often, and we had to decide, one way or the other, what attitude we should adopt towards these trends.

Nalgonda district was the centre of the anti-Nizam and anti-Nehru trend, which has taken birth in a part of it (Suryapet) and which has grown strong as the movement also grew. At the same time, even in that district, anti-Nizam pro-Nehru trend was present in strength and there was a constant conflict although, though for a long time there was no confrontation between the two. But the anti-Nizam pro-Nehru trend had its own adverse effects on the movement in the district as a whole, but it had its roots in certain parts, where it was strong (Bhongiri etc). Though such trends were there in Warangal District also, the anti-Nizam anti-Nehru trend was feeble and could not assert itself in practice, as the character of the peasant movement which took shape in the district showed. To be more precise, in places where anti-Nizam anti-Nehru trend took roots and asserted itself we could build an agrarian and anti-feudal peasant movement, and where it was weak or non-existent such a movement

could not be built. In such areas there was a general anti-Nizam peasant movement which was loose and less organised, so that it could not be transformed into an anti-feudal revolutionary movement.

## II

Viewed in this background, the mistakes, the communists committed and the shortcomings that were existing in the movement were not related the local leadership alone. In fact the wrong line that was advocated and implemented by the leadership of the centre as well as the state (Andhra PC - - as it was called) was solely responsible for what had happened. There was no line of building an anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary movement under the leadership of the party with a clearcut programme. It is a fact there was a difference between the situation existing in Telangana and Coastal and Rayalaseema districts, which were part of British India at that time. But this was in regard to civil liberties and certain other features existing in deltaic areas. There too were vast areas where feudal exploitation and oppression was rampant and it was possible to develop an anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary movement in those areas. But the right opportunism that existed and dominated at that time prevented the party from taking up this task in right earnest manner. Therefore the anti-Nizam pro-Nehru right opportunist trend was not of a local nature either inside Nalgonda and Warangal districts, or in Telangana. But it was of an all-Andhra character. In fact it was an all-India feature.

Therefore the anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary movement which developed in parts of Telangana, that is Nalgonda and to an extent Khammam, and Warangal, was neither a spontaneous movement nor merely a product of Telangana being a part of feudal Nizam State. It was a revolutionary movement headed by a revolutionary trend inside the party as against the official policy of the then existing party. The anti-Nizam aspect had helped to tone down the struggle between the two trends because both were united against Nizam and

the revolutionary movement that was headed by this anti-Nizam and anti-Nehru trend helped anti-Nizam movement enormously and contributed to the growth of the political prestige of the party not only in Telangana but in coastal and Rayalaseema parts of Andhra also. Perhaps there might be another reason for not having any confrontation between the two trends; it was that the dominant right opportunist trend did not know to what levels this movement would reach in so short a time. In a way, this trend was caught unaware at every turning point, so that, it could not decide what to do and what not to do to suppress the other trend that was revolutionary. But they could contain its growth to a certain extent.

Therefore the top leadership could not enforce totally its line of class collaboration and Right opportunism when faced with a new situation which was developing against that line. There was a shortcoming with the Revolutionary trend also, perhaps indispensable in the given situation, in that the comrades concerned had to work within the frame work of official and wrong line. Therefore even when the movement and organisation were developing as revolutionary and basically on correct lines, certain weaknesses did remain in them. And they could not be fought out as long as the official line was in force, and as long as the revolutionary trend was not conscious of the wrongness of the official line and its consequences. In a way the revolutionary trend co-existed with the right opportunism formally, though in practice both were opposite as was manifested by two different types of the movement, one revolutionary, and the other, reformist.

To be more precise, in the earliest phase of the movement, we were developing contacts and searching for reliable cadres who can work for the party and among the masses. We distributed literature and organised campaigns by mobilising the masses on issues within the framework of the law. This was the period when the party was banned and intense repression was there on it. This period ended by 1942. And then we went into the masses to organise peasant struggles against land-lords

in a limited scale until the middle of 1944. Though there was relaxation in overall repression against the party due to our supporting anti-Fascist war, we had to undergo severe repression due to organising these struggles, though they were limited in scope to an extent. There were differences inside the party at the state level in that the right opportunist trend grumbled that the struggles were premature and uncalled for. But the revolutionary trend argued that they were essential and there was nothing wrong with them. Though the right opportunist leadership could not stop the struggles being organised, it could successfully prevent the development of similar struggles in other parts of the district and Telangana as a whole. Thus the struggles organised and developed by the Comrades belonging to revolutionary trend and its leadership were more or less isolated and were suppressed by the authorities though temporarily and partially. The same thing happened when a struggle developed to a higher level, i.e. covering an extensive area in Janagaon. Though we confined ourselves to legal activities in the main, we had also mobilised peasantry on a big scale against bigger and more oppressive feudal land lords. Though there were no differences in the earlier phase as long as we confined ourselves to legal activities, we again had to fight an isolated battle in 1945 and 1946 when the land distribution and armed resistance began. This time there was no active opposition to this phase of the movement; but not taking up the same issues and not extending the movement in the same district and other districts, had not only weakened the movement (1945-46) in Nalgonda district, but also prevented developing a similar movement throughout Telangana where similar conditions did exist. This was due to the predominance of the right opportunist trend.

### III

Situation changed when "anti-Nizam" struggle started sometime around August 1947, because the Nizam had refused to join in Indian Union. The struggle was joined by the congressmen, and in Telangana we were in the forefront. Then again there were differences whether we should take up the programme of land

distribution or not. At some stage we took up, but to some extent it was delayed. In most of the districts it was not implemented. Obviously this had its adverse impact on the development of agrarian revolutionary movement in entire Telangana. Therefore by the time the Central Government marched its armies into Telangana to suppress the agrarian revolutionary movement which developed in the two districts in the main (Nalgonda and Warangal), the leadership, the party and the movement had to face a disadvantageous situation not only in facing stronger armed forces of the Union Government but also in having no such movement in other parts of Telangana. Added to this, the right opportunist wing of the party stabbed in the back of the movement by disorganising and abandoning it. This was the situation we had faced immediately after the Union armies entered.

This was also the time when there was a change in the party line from one of right opportunism to left adventurism. The second party congress took place in February, 1948 which provided the party, the left adventurist line. Seeing that there was an all-sided recognition to the Telangana Armed struggle that was going on in isolation till that time, P.C. leadership, with the limited understanding provided by the struggle dared to put forward a line for future of Indian Revolution in its document, which was prepared and sent to the Polit Bureau of the party. The Polit Bureau, instead of realising the correctness of the line and working out a line for Indian Revolution, denounced it outright and rejected as reformist. This step of the leadership, which was expected to take up the responsibility of helping the struggle in all its aspects, was again a stab in the back of the struggle which was already undergoing critical phases due to suppression by Nizam and Union military forces.

A left adventuristic line always sees right opportunism of reformism in a basically correct revolutionary line. This was so in the past, the same continues even today. At the same time, it was not opposed to continue the armed struggle in Telangana against Nehru Government and its armies. Therefore it was a blessing in

disguise for us who were for continuing the armed struggle, and in fact we were continuing the armed struggle by the time the Polit Bureau has rejected our line and the document in which the line was incorporated. This is not to say that there was nothing wrong in the document. In fact, it contained certain shortcomings which could be overcome by a healthy and proper discussion. But this did not happen. As a result, we had to face additional difficulties and obstacles which were of a serious nature than what it would have been if there was a correct line.

An armed struggle of this nature could be conducted only on the basis of a basically correct line, or there must be enough provision inside the party to conduct armed struggle and an internal struggle for a correct line basing on it. But to our disappointment, there was no inner-party democracy to conduct an inner-party struggle and armed struggle simultaneously. Therefore a situation has arisen where we had to compromise with the wrong line to certain extent and continue the armed struggle. This again could be compared favourably with a situation which was existing during the earlier phase of the movement when a revolutionary trend backed by the revolutionary movement was developing within the framework of the wrong and reformist line and overwhelmingly reformist mass movement. The difference was that the leadership had a basically correct line as mentioned above, while the central leadership (PB) had rejected it outright characterising it as reformist. This is not a small difference which could be ignored. It was difference of basic and important nature which came in the way of defending and extending the movement in a correct direction.

This is not to say that the PC leadership was free from mistakes while leading the armed struggle. It could not correctly assess the growing level of the movement even in the limited area of two districts and its consequences. Therefore it could not prepare itself and the movement for the impending military intervention of the Union Government and prepare itself and the party to face it. As a result, even a

section of the revolutionary trend which wanted to continue the armed struggle was reduced to a state helplessness. Therefore barring a section of this trend, the major part of the leadership of the area of the armed struggle advocated its withdrawal and in fact laid down arms. They had their own reasons advanced for their continuation of withdrawing it. They were discussed in this document comprehensively. An important feature of this document is that it has not gone in for quotations from the classics. Rather it relied on the experiences that we gained during the various stages of the Telangana movement including the armed struggle. We have summed up these experiences to the extent we understood them and drawn basically correct lessons which are valid even today. At the same time we had to work out this document within the frame work of the wrong line that was forced on us by the Polit Bureau. Some of the quotations and explanations given in this document contain extracts from the Polit Bureau document, 'Tactical Line', as it was called. And we used them to defend our line of continuing armed struggle. Barring this, the rest of the document gives more or less a correct picture of the situation existing then and a correct programme to continue the armed struggle.

#### IV

In fact the Polit Bureau itself was a victim of desperationism, which is manifested in its attitude towards Telangana Armed Struggle in the following manner: "It is no doubt true that Telangana is in danger and it has to bear the brunt. That it is more or less isolated. Yet we must fight to the last. Because by not resisting you are not only not going to save anything, but completely demoralise the people. Whether you resist or not, repression is going to be brutal. Prolonged and protracted resistance, if possible, however might even retrieve the situation if we keep it prolonged for a time." (P. 417, Documents of the History of CPI, Vol VII, PPH)

Here the Polit Bureau, after three months of police action sees that there is a danger of Telangana

armed struggle being crushed because it did not evaporate immediately after it, as was perhaps anticipated by it. Therefore it only could see the danger, having no confidence that a deep-rooted agrarian revolutionary movement, with a programme of land distribution, could not only sustain armed struggle against the onslaughts of the Union armies, but could advance it also, because we had taken up guerilla warfare and not a positional warfare as our form of struggle. It should be noted that the Polit Bureau was silent about guerilla warfare as its strategy and tactics as enunciated by Mao (some of extracts from his works were quoted in the documents) because it was opposed to Mao as such. Not only that; it was waiting for insurrection which it thought was round the corner. Polit Bureau realises that the armed struggle was more or less isolated, which was a fact. But such an isolation was the creation of Polit Bureau itself, because having sufficient time of more than nine months ever since it came into existence in February 1948 (The police action took place after six months -- Sep 13, 1948 and the above formulation was made three and half months after the Police action i.e., the end of the Dec. 1948) -- it could not prepare the organisation and the mass movement in various states either to take up the issue of Telangana and campaign for its solidarity, or to reorganise the mass movement so as to take it to higher levels. It advanced the existence of reformism as the whole reason for it. It did nothing to overcome it.

It wanted that Polit Bureau should fight to the last but not to continue the armed struggle. There is a difference between continuing armed struggle and fighting to the last. The former means a protracted armed struggle reaching higher levels; and fighting to the last means to resist till the last man dies and then the armed struggle automatically stops. This betrayed the lack of confidence in the peasant armed struggle. Therefore Polit Bureau put up a militant posture by advocating to fight to the last. It was not shy of saying that by not resisting we are not only not going to save anything but completely demoralise the people. Therefore, it wanted resistance not to demoralise the people; and not for defending the gains, of armed struggle, about

which the Polit Bureau might have thought that they were already lost. Further, it thought that by prolonging the resistance, the situation might come, wherein struggles might take place in other places leading to insurrection.--Subsequent events show that though the situation is ripe for peasants to take up arms in various places (Armed Struggle in Tripura in 1950), such measures were not taken; instead, the struggles were allowed to be fizzled out (Warli in Maharashtra, peasant struggles in Kerala and elsewhere).

Therefore, the desperationism mentioned in the document applied to the Polit Bureau itself. We did not comment on it; instead, we left it at that. As far as I remember, some comrades, either from Telangana or from elsewhere within the jurisdiction of the PC, had also expressed a more or less similar view.

There are certain mistaken views of the Polit Bureau incorporated in the document as I mentioned above. One of them related to strategy. The strategy has been visualised in Andhra Secretariat's document which is popularly known as Andhra Thesis; it contained the following: "Objective: to overthrow imperialist big business-feudal combine and completely wipe out all the features of feudalism, medievalism and colonial impress. Main force of the revolution: workers both rural and industrial. Immediate reserves: Peasantry in general with the exception of those rich farmers who are unable to shake off their tails of feudalism, and poor and middle peasants in particular remain as immediate reserves throughout this stage of new democratic revolution. Direction of the main blow: against the collaborationist bourgeoisie and its henchmen who have been duping the peasantry and are still trying to keep their grip on them, to betray the revolution. The proletariat must carry to completion the new democratic revolution by allying itself with the mass of peasants in general and poor and middle peasants in particular in order to crush by force the power of resistance of the imperialist-big business-feudal combine and paralyse instability of the middle bourgeoisie, upper middle class and a section of the rich peasantry." (P. 837. Ibid)

I can not say that the strategy as formulated here is correct. It is defective in many respects and was liable for correction and improvement. At the same time, it was a strategy for new democratic revolution in which the object of the revolution was to overthrow the collaborationist big bourgeois - feudal combine. Though the Thesis mentioned that it was imperialist - big business - feudal combine by overthrowing the big business - feudal combine the revolution automatically liquidates imperialism. Therefore to say that it is a partner in the state power was not correct. In other respects, though there is a possibility for improvement, the fact remains, that the strategy visualises a united front with national bourgeoisie and rich peasantry. The national bourgeoisie was mentioned there as middle bourgeoisie. It also was clear about the hegemony of the proletariat in the new democratic revolution.

Therefore the strategy that we mentioned in the document is not correct even according to our own understanding at that time. We mentioned it only to be in line with the then polit Bureau. In the same way, throughout the document, we mentioned it was the bourgeoisie who is in power and not imperialist-big business - feudal combine, as mentioned in the Andhra Thesis. In the same way, there was another extract from the Polit Bureau Document (Tactical Line) which was related to the developing struggles in that period. It was: "These struggles bear one special character ..... its stage being determined by the form and successful character of the resistance offered" (See P. 13 - 14)

This was rather over simplifying the picture of that time though it was the same in 1945 - 1946 and 1947; but later, the mass upsurge was continuing though not of the same level. The very fact that the railway - men strike which was to take place subsequently was a miserable failure, and the struggles that were taking place earlier could not continue, proved that though there was not a period of lull as such, there was no powerful mass upsurge in subsequent months. All the same, people were

on the move, and wherever we could organise them in to struggles, they were ready to take part in them; even then they continued for a long time. Situation in Telangana was also the same.

## V

The document has a distinct feature in posing the question of path of Indian revolution as shown by Telangana armed struggle, though it was forced to link it with the insurrection in accordance with the then Polit Bureau line. This is how it puts it.

"The experiences that we had in Telangana armed struggle have shown a new path for New Democratic Revolution in India. Here the class struggle has reached a higher level in the country side even before the working class was prepared for insurrection. By creating a people's army and overthrowing Nizam's power through armed struggle..... on the basis of the slogans of land to the tiller and Gram Rajyas..... We could commence and advance revolution. Though, after 'military action', the armed struggle suffered major setbacks because of weaknesses in the movement, the Congress-Nizam set of ruling classes failed to suppress it by their armed forces. On the other hand, it is again spreading in the struggle areas and extending to newer areas. Thus Telangana Armed Struggle was not confined to overthrowing Nizam's rule; instead it is continuing to overthrow the Indian Bourgeoisie also from power. The experience of Telangana proves clearly that, even in India, it is possible to overthrow Bourgeois Zamindari rule in the countryside by developing guerilla struggles basing on land question, and that such struggles will be of utmost help to the proletariat's struggle to seize power through insurrection....." (See Page 38).

Earlier we had dealt with the distinguishing features of successful Russian and Chinese revolutions and applied their experiences to our own revolution. But we never said that it will take the course of either of the two or both. We said clearly that it is Telangana

which showed a new path for New Democratic Revolution of India in unmistakable terms. If we had in mind that it is the Chinese path, we would not have said it is a new path. A new path is always a new path, which distinguishes itself with others. Therefore, our view that Telangana armed struggle has shown a new path for Indian revolution is not a new one of today, but it took its origin long back when Telangana armed struggle was developing and continuing. The mention of insurrection was superfluous. Because it was meant only to be in tune with Polit Bureau's line as was mentioned earlier, in fact it contradicts the idea of insurrection. Because the armed struggle being a new path cannot subordinate itself to insurrection. Therefore the insurrection's secondary role will be there and not primary role. This is how the new path took its origin and developed. Therefore, those (Chandra Pulla Reddy etc) who think that I have borrowed this idea from China or Chinese writings in 1967-68 are wrong, and their stand is baseless. I had these views at that time itself. And when I advocated the same after we broke from CPI (M), I was reviving the old idea and not a new fabricated and manipulated one, as CP has developed for his own reasons.

## VI

The document often mentions about the mistakes committed and the shortcomings of the movement. It has pointed out some of them as being the open methods of functioning instead of secret methods; failure to build the Political organisation at lower levels (villages) and doing everything through armed guerilla squads; failure to draw masses to actively participate in the armed struggle in majority of the places and thus reducing them as passive spectators etc. This was true. Apart from this, there was one important shortcoming, that was a wrong line followed by the central leadership, which had its own disastrous effect on the entire course of armed struggle. Unless we realise its important aspect, we cannot understand why the other mistakes were committed in conducting the struggle. Some of the other mistakes were: the tendencies of militarism; compromise



with land lords, and sometimes giving them a leading position in the struggle; having illusions in the liberating role of the Congress and the Union Government and creating these illusions among the people instead of fighting them back; failure to prepare the party and guerillas in advance to face the onslaughts of the Union Army etc. —these were some of the weaknesses manifested. It should be known that we were racing against time with a disinterested central leadership at the top. At the same time, any leadership with a political foresight should take these measures whatever be the attitude of the centre and others.

That we could improve the situation by continuing the struggle was evident by the reports and subsequent experiences from the struggle areas and those areas where we extended. It shows that if we had a correct line from the beginning and acted accordingly from top to bottom, the situation would have been very favourable, but we could not expect it in the given situation. And also we cannot adopt an attitude of 'if it were so'; and such deviations are products of the internal and external situations in a given period.

The document appears to be belated as the date of its finalisation shows (September 1949, one year after the police action). The background of this situation is as following: We prepared our draft note (Andhra Thesis) in the March itself—roughly after one month of Party Congress—and sent it to the Polit Bureau either in April or in May.

There was no reaction from the Polit Bureau till the meeting of the Polit Bureau was concluded, which was long after the document was sent, i.e., 9 months. Meanwhile the armed struggle continued and advanced till the police action and received severe setbacks immediately after it. We continued armed struggle after the police action on our own responsibility and Polit Bureau had no role to play in it. Though myself and Sundarayya, who were in the struggle areas at the time of police action, instructed the area committees to continue the armed struggle, and to retreat

the guerilla squads and important leading cadres to the forest areas, while making arrangements to put up resistance and defend the gains from the local offensive of the land lords and the Govt. forces, they could not materialise because of the weaknesses existing in the organisation and the movement. The main reason for suffering so many losses was this.

A meeting of the polit Bureau concluded by the end of December, 1948. We had the documents with us either in January or February, when we started discussion on them. While discussing them, we worked out a line for continuing the armed struggle in 'Andhra Committee's letter', and in political resolution on the Hyderabad state, in which the then existing situation was analysed. It was those comrades who were either opposed to the line of continuing armed struggle or are not satisfied with our approach, sent their criticism together with proposing a political retreat by withdrawing armed struggle and abandoning the revolutionary gains. We dealt their views by criticising on the basis of the experiences we had by then in the armed struggle in Telangana itself. We issued a first set of documents i. e. the 'Andhra Committee's letter and political resolution some time in April, and it took six months to issue this document after we circulated them. It was natural that the discussion on our first set of documents in the lower units i. e., area committees and down below went on for about two months, and we started receiving their criticism from May onwards. We immediately attended the criticism and started working on this document and it took some two months to prepare and finalise it. Since we sent comprehensive document—the 'Andhra committees's letter in March itself directing the lower units to organise themselves and continue the armed struggle, there was no occasion to complain that we had provided no guidance. The time gap that appears should be understood in this context.

Though most of the comrades at lower levels, mainly area committees and important comrades down below, laid down arms in violation of instructions we issued on our indivi-

dual responsibility immediately after police action, a good number of them, realising their mistakes, reorganised themselves and guerilla squads with the remaining cadres and continued, the Armed struggle as disciplined soldiers of the party, though some of the leaders of the area committees———could not reconcile themselves to continuing the armed struggle, they did not stage revolts or break away from the organisation, as it has been the practice of the last one decade and more.

The leadership of Huzarnagar area committee could not reorientate itself to the new line for some time; it gradually changed itself and continued armed struggle to some extent. The Palwancha leadership left the struggle area for good and went into the interior area of the forests, with the remaining squads, where there was no need for resistance because there was no military offensive and people were not in action. The Tiruvuu organiser, not reconciled himself to the new line, organised some raids on individual rich men's houses, looted money, gold and other valuables betrayed secrets to the police resulting in the death of many a valuable comrade and sympathisers of our party. After this treachery he left the place once and for all, and took shelter with a top congress man who had his property in an adjacent state. He lived there for the rest of his life not to be seen again by the people in Andhra who knew him. The only comrade who differed to begin with but was convinced of the need of continuing the Armed struggle after we issued this document was Muthaiah of Munagala paragana. He continued the armed struggle with convictions of a communist revolutionary and died a martyr's death after some time.

It was clear from this that there was certain amount of inner-party democracy to enable the comrades expressing their differences with the line the leadership was following without fear, and their differences were taken into consideration and criticised in a way that a healthy discussion could be possible while implementing the line. No action was taken against them for their expressing their differing views. There

were some black sheep in the leaderships of the area committees who refused to implement the line and did not reconcile with it. They could sabotage the armed struggle to certain extent. Barring this we could reorganise and continue the armed struggle with the remaining cadres and guerilla forces so that we could consolidate the struggle areas and extend it to the adjacent districts and forest area. This is how inner-party democracy and discussion helped us in overcoming the differences and continue the armed struggle. Unlike this, today there is a tendency from those who are supposed to have differences, to assert either not to implement the line till the discussions are over or form themselves into a group by disrupting the organisation and the movement.

This attitude of theirs has nothing in common either with the experience of the party or the principles of revolutionary party organisation. We should fight this disruptive tendency to the finish and unify the organisation and the movement in a proper way.

## VII

There are certain similarities between the wrong views expressed by the present-day leaders of various parties and groups, and those that were expressed and dealt with in this document. The CPI holds that it was wrong to continue the armed struggle after the police action and abandoned the gains. They proved to be wrong because congress is no friend of the people. We could defend the gains as long as we continue the armed struggle. As and when we laid down the arms the congress regime liquidated all those gains i.e., land etc. and re-stored landlordism. We can see the domination of land lords even today.

The CPI(M) argues that it was correct to continue the armed struggle after the police action and it was also correct to withdraw it in 1951 before the elections. The armed struggle which continued for three long years after police action could also continue subsequently and there was no reason why it should have been withdrawn half way. The very fact that the revolution gains, the land and armed guerilla

forces, were liquidated after the withdrawal leading to striking of our mass base to the minimum shows that their views are wrong.

Those who claim themselves to be revolutionaries, especially Chandra Pulla Reddy (CP), say that armed struggle should be conducted without land distribution, or express views similar to some extent with those who advocated the above mentioned views. If one says 'no land distribution and no armed struggle', CP says 'no land distribution but armed struggle.' Here both are common in their views so far as abandoning the distribution of land and abolition of landlordism, are concerned. The difference will be only about the need for armed struggle. The CPI (M) advocates formally that armed struggle may be conducted as a partial struggle for some partial demand without raising question of seizing power. CP also advocates that armed struggle can and should be conducted without distributing the land of land lords. Thus his raising the question of seizure of power becomes too formal. Now both CPI and CPM took up the parliamentary path. Therefore what the CPM says has no meaning because of its adopting parliamentary path. Renouncing distribution of land of the landlords and seizure of power is common to all i.e. CPI, CPM and CP group. To say that there can be an armed struggle without land distribution and seizure of power, as CP advocates, has no meaning and is purposeless and it is a fake armed struggle and not a genuine one. It is nothing but trading with the idea of armed struggle.

The comrades who advocated political retreat and withdrawal of armed struggle after police action wanted that the revolutionary gains should be abandoned and preparations should be made afresh for armed struggle. CP advocates 'armed struggle' for armed struggle without linking it to the basic revolutionary gains, i.e., the distribution of the land of the landlords, setting up of Gram Rajyas. Thus there is certain amount of commonness in having no revolutionary gains between these two.

The former was honest enough to advocate withdrawal, but the latter (CP), in order to pose himself a revolutionary, does not admit this. Instead he wants an 'armed struggle' for 'armed struggle' sake etc.

This is how the same mistakes, wrong trends, deviations appear under new conditions

and in new forms. Now that the people and the revolutionaries are likely to be carried away - in fact they were carried away - with such slogans as armed struggle, the new comers in the field needed left slogans to enforce their rightist views and programmes. CP is one who is implementing his rightist programme with left slogans. There are some others who take similar attitude. Of course people have realised the fraud played upon them and are not believing what the new slogan-mongers say. They are discarding them and embracing the revolutionary mass line we are advocating.

## VIII

This document was prepared by me as a draft and was adopted by secretariat of the Andhra Provincial Committee\*. There were no important changes made by the secretariat when it was adopted. I do not remember if any minor changes made at that time. Even if some were made they are of no consequence. As it stands today, the rest of the secretariat members left the politics of this document. I do not want to comment here on them.

There was some scope to improve this document. But I preferred to publish it without any such changes so that readers may know my views and the situation existing then as they were at that time. The necessary explanations are given in the footnotes so that the readers may understand the context and my present views on some of the subjects. In English translation, there is a change in using the word Armed Struggle instead of 'guerilla struggle' in the Telugu original text, since the armed struggle sounds better and more comprehensive than the 'guerilla struggle'. (In Telugu it is used as 'Guerilla Poratam'). The rest of the words were retained as they are and translated accordingly. I hope readers will appreciate our attempt to publish this document which has played an important role in continuing the armed struggle for two years after it was issued. The readers will know more about the revolutionary movement and armed struggle in Telangana after going through this book. Many questions are asked on various aspects of the struggle and there are answers in this book. One can see that my writings in the recent past contain the same views which I expressed in this work.

Dated : 20-9-82

- Author

\* Secretariat Consisted of Ch. Rajeswara Rao, Secretary, P. Sundarayya, M. Basavapunniah, B. Narasimha Reddy and my self.

# In Refutation of Wrong Trends Advocating Withdrawal of Telangana Armed Struggle<sup>1</sup>

## 1. INTRODUCTION

With the entry of the Union army into the Hyderabad State<sup>2</sup>, the party was faced with the crucial question-whether to continue the anti-Nizam guerilla struggle<sup>3</sup> against the Indian bourgeoisie<sup>4</sup> also, and if so, what is its future. As the Union army's attacks and fascist repression assumed serious proportions, this question was also getting acute and appeared in so many forms. Having realised, the Provincial Committee<sup>5</sup> (PC) discussed this question, as also the wrong trends that arose in this connection, and clarified, through the "Andhra Committee's Letter,"<sup>6</sup> the programme that we should adopt in this stage.

The two wrong trends discussed in the "Andhra Committee's Letter" are as follows :

"Firstly, 'desperationism' (Let us die because there is no other alternative. Let us live if possible). Its essence is: "Strikes and armed struggles should be brought about outside the State, so that the enemy's forces are divided and he can not concentrate his forces against Telangana. Or else, it is impossible for the armed resistance to sustain in Telangana. But then, having already

taken to guns, there is nothing we can do now, whether or not there are strikes and struggles outside the State, and we must continue our armed resistance as before. Even if it was crushed, atleast the revolutionary traditions will remain".

"Secondly, 'Pessimism'. Its essence is: "We cannot bring about strikes and struggles which will divide the enemy's forces and make him unable to concentrate his forces against Telangana. So it is no use continuing the armed resistance. Therefore, we should stop the struggle for the time being, mobilise the people on mass issues and make a careful retreat so as to integrate with the movement outside the State".

It was made clear in the "Andhra Committee's Letter" that the two wrong trends arose because of not relying on the consciousness of the people, the level of the movement and other favourable conditions obtaining in Telangana so as to continue the armed resistance there. Further the PC, as given below, has elaborated

1. The original heading was "The State Committee Secretariat's Criticism of the Wrong Trends Advocating Withdrawal of Telangana of Armed Struggle".
2. The term "State" was used to mean "the Princely or native State" of Hyderabad as it was existing in 1948-49. It became part of Indian Union in September 1948.
3. Throughout this work, the words "Armed Struggle" are used for "guerilla struggle" which is used in Telugu Original.
4. Correct terminology would be "Indian ruling classes or big bourgeoisie and the Landlords". The word Indian bourgeoisie was used in accordance with the then existing party line.
5. The then existing Provincial Committee's jurisdiction was present Andhra Pradesh, Marathwada part of Maharashtra and Karnataka districts of former Hyderabad State. Most of the then State Committees were formed on the basis of linguistic regions i.e., Andhra, Tamilnadu, Karnataka etc. Indian National Congress also had such committees.
6. Soon after "Police Action", a party letter was issued on behalf of the Provincial Committee which is named as "Andhra Committee's Letter". There is a mention of this letter throughout this book. It enunciated the tasks before the party in view of "Police Action". It was issued in the month of March, 1949, almost 6 months after the "Police Action" was commenced.

the perspective which the party should have towards armed struggle.

"By rectifying all the shortcomings in the revolutionary movement and armed struggle, by reorganising the party, the squads, and mass organisations in accordance with secret methods, by fully mobilising the people to defend our revolutionary gains, and thus by continuing the mass resistance on the one hand, we will be able, not only to defend our revolutionary movement as against the enemy, but also to extend it to other areas within the State and to border areas outside the State, in particular, to the Telugu-speaking districts which are our strongholds bordering Telangana. If people are to be mobilised, in other areas of the State as well as all over India, in support of the Telangana revolutionary movement, what is required of us in Telangana is not to lay down the guns and keep on waiting until strikes and struggles come to the fore. We can inspire the oppressed people of India only by continuing our armed resistance, and by thus holding high the torch of hope—the torch lit by countless heroes who laid down their lives so it may burn—so that the revolutionary flame can be seen by the oppressed people getting prepared for strikes and struggles in the length and breadth of our country.

"But then, we should keep in our mind that it is on the oppressed people of Telangana, in the main, that our armed struggle should rely. The armed struggle that we carry on by relying on our present strength in the guerilla areas will enable us to inspire and advance the people in other areas of the State and all over India. We should not forget that every mass demonstration, every strike and every struggle, however small, on the part of those people, will give strength to our movement of armed resistance

and will weaken our enemy morally as well as physically". ("Andhra Committee's Letter").

Accordingly, the PC has placed the following programme before the party :

"1. Save the leaders, organisers and guerilla squads from being caught by the enemy. Carry on the armed struggle by reorganising the party and guerilla squads on the basis of complete secrecy and by training them with new tactics.

"2. On the one hand, expose the fraud of the enemy, who is including in the fanfare of a constituent Assembly and bogus land reforms. On the other hand, carry on mass resistance against the onslaught of the Union armies, the landlords and the rich peasants, by organising the agricultural labour and poor peasants into struggles in defence of land and for fair wages, and through it, gradually draw the middle peasants into the revolutionary struggle.

"3. Propagate the gains of the Telangana revolutionary movement among the people of the other areas, within the State, in Andhra region of Madras (province), as well as all over India, and provide strength to the Telangana armed struggle through strikes and struggles for their own rights and through strikes and demonstrations in solidarity with Telangana, thus laying the bridge between the Telanganarevolutionary movement and the Indian people's movement. ("Andhra Committee's Letter").

The struggles that have taken place in the struggle areas of the State, also in other areas and all over India, and the experiences we gained through mass resistance, during the last six months, as well as the present political situation, make it clear that all the main formulations

7. There was no onslaught on the people by rich peasants as such. A section of land-lords (small) who were characterised as rich peasants took part in the onslaughts. According to centre's new policy rich peasants were

treated as one of the targets of revolution. The middle peasant was with us and there was no need for winning over him.

contained in the "Andhra Committee's Letter" are correct. In spite of their incessant fascist violence against the people in the struggle areas of Telangana, the enemy classes are unable to stabilise and consolidate there. To the extent we have pursued the party programme, we have been able to defend the revolutionary movement and its gains and to extend struggles to new areas. The people in all areas of the State are prepared for struggle. And struggles are higher in level and more frequent than in the past all over India. The bourgeoisie<sup>8</sup> is isolated from the people, more than ever. And what is required for the revolutionary movement to develop and gain in strength is but a correct party leadership. This is becoming clear to us, once again.

Some comrades who failed to note this situation have sent in their opinions criticising the main formulations and the programme contained in the "Andhra Committee's Letter". Their essence is as follows :

The Organiser of Tiruvuru<sup>9</sup> says :

"There is no really strong, extensive and deep-rooted party organisation. There are neither the political conditions nor the party organisation in which armed struggle can be carried on. How, then, can we carry on the armed struggle? And that is why the decision seems to be wrong." Further, he suggests a programme of retreat, "at least now, a plan should be worked out for retreat..... and take up building a strong secret party." India "being a single administrative unit, a majority of the whole people should turn to despise the government. Then it can be begun from the Centre or from

one end. Presently, however, such a political atmosphere has not yet developed." So, he theorises, that Telangana armed struggle should be put off until an insurrection develops all over India at a time.

The Organiser of Palvancha<sup>10</sup> (in Telangana) criticises thus :

"Once we start the armed struggle, we should always be on the offensive even afterwards. For that, it should be waged in a sufficiently vast area that permits an advance or retreat as required, and enables hitting the enemy wherever encountered, so that the resistance can go on uninterrupted ..... If, however, this area is very small, the enemy can concentrate all his forces, dump the area with his troops and can drown it in blood .... In my opinion, it is suicidal to carry on the armed resistance in a small area, in a situation wherein we don't have even the middle class people behind us and the party organisation is weak."

The comrade from Palvancha says that the enemy can concentrate his forces, because we are carrying on the armed struggle in only two districts of Telangana. Even if it is four or eight districts, it will still be a very small area, when compared with the vastness of India and the military strength of the enemy. If the enemy is never to be allowed to get onto the offensive and instead ourselves be on the offensive all the time, it is possible only when the "majority of the people" all over India are prepared for an armed struggle in a "vast area." Thus there is no essential difference between the Tiruvuru comrade's plea to stop the armed struggle in

8. See note 4.

9. Tiruvuru (Krishna District) is a Taluka (Tehsil) bordering on present Khammam District. This was used as a rear during "anti-Nizam" phase of armed struggle (September, 1948). Subsequently the police repression was intensified in this area also with the result that it ceased to be a rear, of course in its limited sense.

When it was clear that party had decided to continue armed struggle, he left the party, betrayed the secrets to

the police, helped them in shooting some of the important local comrades to death, left the place once and for all, and took shelter with one of the top Congress leaders, in his landed estate which was situated outside the state.

10. The Organiser of Palvancha, together with some guerrilla squads and leaders left the place to interior forests, without offering any resistance and returned only when the armed struggle was withdrawn. He is no more in the politics.

Telangana until the "majority of the people" all over India are prepared for armed struggle and the latter's plea that Telangana armed struggle should not be carried on unless there is an area vast enough for our offensive.

The Organiser of Munagala Paragana 11 criticises thus:

"It is not correct to carry on both party building and armed struggle, simultaneously. This is so because, unless a strong and organised revolutionary party grows out of a people who are tested in many a small battle, the armed struggle can not sustain. And armed struggle is not begun unless a higher stage is reached... So, the armed struggle should be begun only after the party is brought up to a level in Telangana".

At a time when the party needs to be built up and strengthened through revolutionary struggles, this comrade counterposes party building with armed struggle and advocates to put off the latter. Therefore, there is no difference in practice between this comrade and other comrades of Tiruvur and Palvancha. All the three are demanding the withdrawal of armed struggle.

The Huzurnagar Comrades,<sup>12</sup> without taking into account the revolutionary gains of the people of Telangana in their armed struggle against the Nizam and their impact on the

movement, are concentrating on the weaknesses in the movement, and basing on them, they are making formulations on the anti-Nizam armed struggle, on the present situation of the movement in struggle areas and on the tactics that we should follow and are advocating a programme of retreat. In this connection, they have sent us a 'Review', in which they reviewed the anti-Nizam armed struggle in general, and the struggle in their area in particular. As they have not put forward their main point of view precisely and straight forwardly anywhere in their 'Review', we are unable to reproduce key excerpts from it now. While undertaking to do the same in the course of our discussion on their wrong trends, we are presenting here the essence of their 'Review' for the present.

These comrades contend that the anti-Nizam armed struggle is merely an unorganised and 'spontaneous movement'. Their first contention is that, but for anti-Nizam 'sentiments' (which have no objective basis), the people in Telangana, including those in struggle areas, have no class consciousness as such, and consequently, the whole movement is an "anti-Nizam sentimental" movement devoid of a revolutionary class basis; and so it has wholly collapsed like a "house of cards" in the face of offensive by the Indian Bourgeoisie 12 (A). However they say, once we have launched the armed struggle, there is no question of laying down the arms. The stage has long passed wherein we can carry on the movement in other than the

11. Munagala paragana was a zamindari estate situated in Telangana and surrounded by it. Its villages were bordering Suryapet and Huzur Nagar Taluks of Nalgonda District and Khammam Taluka of the then Warangal District. It was under the jurisdiction of Krishna District administration, which was a part of the then composite Madras province with a congress government. The people and the party in paragana provided facilities to set up district party Headquarters of Nalgonda party from 1946 to 1948 (February - March). This area was a victim of intense repression and many a comrade died a martyr's death.

The Organiser mentioned here was a late Com. Kesaboina Muthaiah, Young and energetic, he was a good organiser. Though he differed with the line of continuing armed struggle in the beginning, once decided, he imple-

mented it honestly and as a disciplined soldier. He together with an armed squad, was encircled in a small range of hills between Suryapeta and Munagala. After a fierce, battle he was shot dead together with the members of the squad.

12. Huzur Nagar is a Taluka in Nalgonda District, bordering on Krishna and Guntur Districts and Krishna River divides it with the other two districts. Huzur Nagar, together with adjacent taluks and areas including Nallamala forests and ranges was formed into an area and there was a committee for it. The comrades mentioned here are those of the Committee. The opinions expressed by the committee in the 'Review', are discussed in the document.

12 A. See note 4.

armed way. There are no possibilities in Telangana, either presently or in the days ahead, to carry on the movement unarmed". Because there is no other way, they say, we should not lay down the arms. They say: we should treat the present as the 'stage of retreat'; we should disband the guerilla squads and Gram Rajyas (Village Soviets) and "propagate that the redistributed lands should be cultivated and that when the feudal chiefs (Doras), landlords and zamindars come to occupy the lands, they should be resisted" and then leave it to the people; we should, while laying the stress on saving the cadres, "consider it a great victory if our comrades manage not to be caught by enemy"; The secret methods required for it should themselves be called as "guerilla struggle" (armed struggle). Thus they are interpreting armed struggle in a strange way.

These comrades do not renounce armed struggle so far as their professions are concerned. But when the question is considered from the point of view of whether or not to continue the armed struggle so as to defend the revolutionary gains and thus to extend it, these comrades are one with the above comrades' formulation that the revolutionary gains be liquidated and the armed struggle be withdrawn. They are contenting themselves that to function as a secret party is itself guerilla warfare (armed struggle).

There are still some others<sup>13</sup> who express the same opinions in a more sophisticated language, as follows :

"The squads need not be disbanded, nor the armed struggle needs to be withdrawn. We should allow the squads to camp in some safe areas. When the wide-spread fear is shed away, the organisation gets strong, and the people are on the move again, we should revive the armed struggle".

Guerilla squads can sustain and develop only through armed struggle that is carried on

to defend and extend the revolutionary gains. But if one goes by their formulation, neither the revolutionary gains nor the existence of the squads can be defended. Therefore, in practice, there is no difference between this and the above comrades' formulation that we should withdraw the armed struggle and retreat.

Thus there are some who advocate withdrawal of armed struggle in clearcut terms. There are some others, who, even while professing that armed struggle should be continued, in practice, suggest its withdrawal. All the same, they are all one on the following essential points :

1. Necessary revolutionary situation does not exist in India and in the State to carry on armed struggle against the Indian bourgeoisie ; 13 (a) There are no party and mass organisations required for this purpose.

2. This is the stage of retreat. By developing the party organisation through local struggles, gradually, the people should be prepared for the final onslaught. In Telangana, we should withdraw the armed struggle and retreat.

It can be clearly understood that their opinions are closely related with pessimism, one of the two wrong trends discussed in the "Andhra Committee's Letter". However, to defend their wrong arguments, they are citing some excerpts from the theoretical writings of Lenin, Stalin and Mao on the questions of insurrection and guerilla war without any relevance to the subject. Further, they are relying mainly on the weaknesses of the revolutionary movement of Telangana (for this purpose).

The Tiruvur comrade says, "Telangana struggle is an adornment to our party history itself. It has given a new inspiration and a new experience. It is a call for a new era of struggle in the history of our party itself". After paying an obeisance thus, he proceeds to criti-

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13. The "others" are same of the squad leaders connected with the Manukota Area Committee which covered by entire forest area of present Warangal district.

13(a). See note 4.



cise it. Huzurnagar comrades begin their Review thus: "We have mainly concentrated on our weaknesses, without giving prominence to our gains. After all our gains won't be lost anywhere. But our weaknesses will endanger our very existence in future". Thus they remind themselves that there are some revolutionary gains, only to forget them then and there, and concentrate on pointing at the weaknesses in the movement. Thus they fail to understand the basic issue that the revolutionary gains and their effects will be the basis for armed struggle; they fail to see their importance in deciding our present tactics. They are coming forward with a strange contention that, the gains have become a thing of past as a result of "military action", and hence, we should now see nothing but weaknesses in the movement.

At a time when military raids and repression are intense, it is common that weaknesses of a movement are visibly seen as in a mirror. If we, revolutionaries, photograph them and proclaim, 'see, here is our movement', and then feel content that we have realised our weaknesses, there is nothing special about it. What is very much needed for these comrades is to realise that we will be fulfilling our revolutionary responsibilities only when we are able to recognise and point at the revolutionary character of a movement when it is, for the time being, clouded because of intense repression.

The revolutionary gains of Telangana and their impact serve as the foundation for the armed struggle that has to be waged against the Indian bourgeoisie<sup>(13b)</sup> also. They are very important in deciding our present tactics. It is only by carrying on armed struggle by mobilising our strength on their basis, that we can rectify the weaknesses, however dangerous, in our movement. On the contrary it is anti-Marxist to recall the revolutionary gains only as a matter of lip-service, and to determine our tactics by basing only on the weaknesses in the movement.

Thus all these comrades have renounced the revolutionary path at the outset and took to

the path of retreat. It is this wrong trend alone that is found at every step in their formulations and opinions.

Revolutionary conditions in India are maturing day by day. On the one hand, the people have embarked on revolutionary struggles to get rid of the capitalist and zamindari systems. On the other hand, the exploiting classes are going all out in their struggle for survival. It is doubtless that the politics of retreat of these comrades, coming as they are at the present critical juncture, are a stumbling block indeed to the advance of the revolutionary movement. Their programme of retreat, which advocates withdrawing the Telangana armed struggle and rebuilding the movement starting once again with ABCs, liquidates the revolutionary struggles waged hitherto and the movement built in Telangana in the course of the anti-Nizam armed struggle. It relegates to the background not only the Telangana armed struggle, but the whole Indian people's revolution itself. It relegates the mass struggles into the background and provides a breathing time to the enemy classes that are gasping amidst mass struggles and allows them to regroup themselves, if only temporarily. As this programme of retreat does not accord with the level of the movement, a situation will arise wherein the party will lose its vanguard role get isolated, fail to withstand the enemy's onslaught and thus faces the prospect of being wiped out.

The main purpose of this document is to criticise the wrong trends adopted by these comrades in assessing the maturing revolutionary conditions of today, in realising the vanguard role of the party, and in understanding the revolutionary character of Telangana armed struggle together with its impact and results, and to criticise their programme of retreat and further, to explain how the main formulations of the "Andhra Committee's Letter" are correct.

13 (b). See note 4.

Before we proceed with our criticism, we feel it necessary to briefly explain the significance of inner-party discussions. That these discussions will go a long way in removing the wrong trends inside the party as also in allaying any doubts regarding the party policy, needs no particular mention. These discussions are needed to achieve political unity inside the party.

Viewed from this point, the opinions exp-

ressed by the organisers of Tiruvuru, Palvancha, Munagala Paragana, and in the Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review, which is sent as their "opinion", will help the party to understand the wrong trends existing inside the party and the confusion towards party policy. Comrades should understand that the purpose of our criticism is only to remove them. This is the only way to get rid of wrong trends and to be able to work with self-confidence.

## II Strategy and Tactics and Maximum and Minimum Programme

The comrades advocating withdrawal of armed struggle and a retreat are defending their arguments by quoting, out of context, and by misinterpreting excerpts from the writings of our leaders and teachers, Lenin and Stalin. By attributing wrong meanings to Marxist phraseology, they are contending that their arguments are correct. The misinterpretations made by Huzurnagar comrades on questions of strategy and tactics, maximum and minimum programme, are a case in example. It is very much necessary to know their misinterpretations and to remove the confusion in understanding these important questions, so as to understand their wrong trends.

The following lines are taken from out of the 32 lines written by Huzurnagar comrades by way of criticising the "Andhra Committee's Letter" (ACL), contending that the PC has adopted wrong strategy and tactics :

"On questions of strategy and tactics, (the letters) have proceeded from an angle which says, 'let us continue armed struggle because the people want it'. These letters<sup>14</sup> while recognising the imperativeness of armed struggle have proceeded from a mistaken angle in discussion the issue. As

a result, it was confused so much so that (for the PC), it was neither the immediate nor the ultimate programme."

One thing has to be cleared at the outset. We have not discussed our strategy anywhere in the ACL. We have mainly discussed only the tactics that we should adopt in the present situation. On strategy, we have comprehensively discussed in the Political Resolution on the Hyderabad<sup>15</sup> State. As these comrades wrongly understood strategy and tactics, and maximum and minimum programmes, they are understanding ACL also from the same wrong approach. So, we should first examine their misinterpretations of strategy and tactics.

### 1. Strategy and Tactics

Huzurnagar comrades define strategy and tactics thus :

"Our strategy in the present stage is insurrection. There is no question of laying down the arms until the congress govt. is wiped out and a democratic govt. is established. But then there will be ebb and tide in a struggle, and accordingly tactics will be changing. Strategy applies

14. The "letters" mentioned here are the correspondence together with "Andhra committee's letter".

15. There was a Political Resolution adopted by the PC

separately for the State which includes the strategy and tactics to be adopted in the State, especially the tasks not be carried out in those parts of the State where there was no armed struggle.

to a stage, whereas tactics are related to realisation of a specific objective in a given situation and to specific events. Our tactics should correspond with the present state of our struggle". (Area committee's Review).

Here they define insurrection as our strategy. It is wrong. Likewise, even without defining tactics, they say that they change according to ebb and tide, and in the process, evade that important question. Thus they get caught in confusion and advance a programme of retreat. Let us see what Stalin says on these important issues.

In his Foundations of Leninism, Stalin explains strategy thus :

"Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (main and secondary reserves), the fight to carry out this plan throughout the given stage of the revolution".

Later, in the same work, he further explained :

"Strategy deals with the main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains basically unchanged throughout a given stage".

We can explain this in a little more specific terms : To determine, on the basis of the role played by various classes in a given stage of revolution, which are the reactionary classes<sup>16</sup> to be fought, which are the progressive classes<sup>17</sup> to be mobilised into a front against them, and the relative importance of various classes in that front ; to determine from which side the enemy camp should be attacked and the course of struggle in the given stage ; these and such other things constitute strategy. There

will be only one strategy for an entire stage despite any number of ups and downs in the course of the movement. There won't be any changes in strategy depending on its ups and downs.

When the above definition of strategy is applied to India, the strategy for the present stage of revolution will be :

"Objective : overthrow of the bourgeois government heading the imperialist-bourgeois-feudal combine, completely wiping out survivals of medievalism and going to the transitional economy through nationalisation etc. The main force of the revolution : the proletariat. Immediate reserves: agrarian workers, poor peasants, middle peasants (also oppressed sections of petty bourgeoisie in towns). Direction of the main blow: isolation of the ruling bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties and groups (Socialist Party etc). Plan for the disposition of the peasantry, firmly relying on the agrarian workers and poor peasants. "The proletariat must accomplish the People's Democratic Revolution by allying to itself the agricultural workers and poor peasants—followed by the middle peasants in order to isolate the bourgeoisie and crush their resistance by force".

( 'Communist', June-July 4, P. 42)17(a)

### Tactics :

The slogans and forms of struggle that are adopted, depending upon the tempo and pulse of the people as also the ups and downs of the movement, to pursue the strategy constitute the tactics. They will be changing several times, depending upon the tempo and pulse of the people in a given stage. When people are ready and the movement is on the rise, offensive tactics, so as to advance, are adopted. When the movement faces setbacks and is ebbing, tactics of retreat are adopted and the movement is thus saved.

16, 17. To say "counter-revolutionary classes" and "revolutionary classes" is more correct. 17(a) It was the journal of CPI at the time

Stalin said the following on tactics :

"Tactics are the determination of the line of conduct of the proletariat in the comparatively short period of the flow or ebb of the movement, of the rise or decline of the revolution, the fight to carry out this line by means of replacing old forms of struggle and organization by new ones, old slogans by new ones, by combining these forms, etc. While the object of strategy is to win the war against tsarism, let us say or against the bourgeoisie, to carry through the struggle against tsarism or against the bourgeoisie to its end, tactics pursue less important objects; for their aim is not the winning of the war as a whole, but the winning of some particular engagements or some particular battles, the successful carrying through of some particular campaigns or actions corresponding to the concrete circumstances in the given period of rise or decline of the revolution. Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate to it and serving it.

"Tactics change according to flow and ebb. While the strategic plan remained unchanged during the first stage of the revolution (1903 to February 1917), tactics changed several times during that period. In the period from 1903 to 1905 the Party pursued offensive tactics, for the tide of the revolution was rising, the movement was on the upgrade, and tactics had to proceed from this fact. Accordingly, the forms of struggle were revolutionary, corresponding to the requirements of the rising tide of the revolution. Local political strikes, political demonstrations, the general political strike, boycott of the Duma, uprising, revolutionary fighting slogans -- such were the forms of struggle that replaced each other during that period. These changes in the forms of struggle were accompanied by corresponding changes in the forms of organization. Factory committees, revolutionary peasant committees, strike committees, soviets of workers' deputies, a workers' party operating more or less open-

ly -- such were the forms of organization during that period.

"In the period from 1907 to 1912 the party was compelled to resort to tactics of retreat; for we then experienced a decline in the revolutionary movement, the ebb of the revolution, and tactics necessarily had to take this fact into consideration. The forms of struggle, as well as the forms of organization, changed accordingly: instead of the boycott of the Duma -- participation in the Duma; instead of open revolutionary actions outside the Duma -- actions and work in the Duma; instead of general political strikes -- partial economic strikes, or simply a lull in activities. Of course, the party had to go underground during that period, while the revolutionary mass organizations were replaced by cultural, educational, co-operative, insurance and other legal organizations.

"The same must be said of the second and third stages of the revolution, during which tactics changed dozens of times, where as the strategic plans remained unchanged." (From Foundations of Leninism.)

This definition by Stalin is quite clear.

According to Stalin's definition, insurrection is only a tactic, to be adopted in a particular phase of revolution, and not strategy as defined by these comrades. Therefore, the tactic of insurrection is adopted by the party in any stage of the revolution at the time of seizure of power.

Apart from not explaining what is meant by tactics, these comrades are misinterpreting Stalin's definition, by terming insurrection as a strategy, which in fact is only a tactic to be adopted in a given phase. Without distinguishing the two, they are mixing up strategy and tactics, and, in a slipshod manner attribute it all to ACL.

Now we can say without any doubt that their tactics of retreat are a result of this confusion.

"Insurrection is our strategy", according to their theory. They surmise: We "are in the stage of self-defence, more so in its preliminary stage" "because the enemy -- dizzy with success -- is in full offensive", and "because the people and party have to maintain their political existence"; and so, they advocate, our tactics should be based on "the movement's cadres saving themselves by evading the enemy by not being caught and establishing the party organisation among the people". Land distribution and establishment of the Gram (village soviets) can be carried out only in the stage of insurrection, i.e., the stage when we realise victory in revolution with the help of guerilla squads and by marching ahead the regular armies." So, they advance their programme of retreat, that regular guerilla squads and Gram Rajyas should be disbanded and the question of redistributed land should be left to the people. Thus, the confusion that begins with terming insurrection as strategy, extends to misinterpretation, and ends with beating retreat by liquidating Telangana's revolutionary gains.

## 2. Maximum and Minimum Programmes

Huzurnagar comrades have not stopped at their anti-Marxist definition and mixing up of strategy and tactics. They divide the programme of Democratic Front into two, i.e., "immediate programme" and "ultimate programme". They opine that the programme advanced by ACL is confusing, bearing no relation with either.

It is theoretically wrong to divide, as they do, the programme for the present stage, i.e., to divide into immediate and ultimate programmes in the same stage.

The History of Communist Party of Soviet Union (B) explains the Programme adopted by the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, held under Lenin's leadership in 1903, in the following words :

"This programme consisted of two parts : a maximum programme and a minimum programme. The maximum programme dealt with the principal aim of the working-class party, namely, the Socialist revolution, the overthrow of the power of the capitalists, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The minimum programme dealt with the immediate aims of the party, aims to be achieved before the overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, namely, the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy, the establishment of a democratic republic, the introduction of an 8-hour working day, the abolition of all survivals of serfdom in the countryside, and the restoration to the peasants of the cut-off lands (otrezki) of which they had been deprived by the land lords.

"Subsequently, the Bolsheviks replaced the demand for the return of the "otrezki" by the demand for the confiscation of all the landed estates.

"The programme adopted by the Second Congress was a revolutionary programme of the party of the working class.

"It remained in force until the Eighth party Congress, held after the victory of the proletarian revolution, when our Party adopted a new programme." (p. 41 Moscow 1945 edition)

It follows from the above that the maximum and minimum programmes are divided to correspond with two stages of revolution, and not as two parts in the same stage. The Second Congress had decided on a programme that accorded with the principal and immediate aims of the proletariat. It is in line with this that we should consider that, in Indian revolution, setting up the New Democratic Govt. is our immediate aim, and that the programme of the Democratic Front is the minimum (or immediate) programme. Likewise, we should treat proletarian dictatorship as the ultimate aim and the socialist revolutionary programme as the maximum programme.

Thus, party programme should be divided into maximum and minimum, or "ultimate" and "immediate" programmes, basing on the above principles, and it is theoretically wrong to divide into two parts within the same stage, as these comrades have done.

If it is their contention that minimum programme is one that should be adopted in the absence of revolutionary conditions, and that ultimate programme is for a revolutionary situation, that also is wrong. Because, when there is a revolutionary situation, we consider it as a phase of tide, and when such is not the situation, we consider it as a phase of ebb, and accordingly, we adopt tactics of offensive or retreat. But we do not divide the programme into two parts. We carry on the struggle wherever the people are prepared for it, on whatever issue and in whatever form they are prepared for. If, in an area, people are prepared for land distribution (naturally, this happens only when there are revolutionary conditions), we carry on struggle on that issue. We adopt the corresponding forms of organisation and resistance such as organising a People's Army and Grama Rajyas, and regular armed struggle. Thus we advance the people's revolution. Tactics are meant for the same.

To continue the armed struggle, as we are doing now, in order to defend and extend the revolutionary gains of Telangana, is nothing but tactics that we are adopting in accordance with the level of the revolutionary movement in Telangana and revolutionary conditions obtaining in India. That being the case, to say, as the Huzurnagar comrades do, that PC's "was neither the immediate nor the ultimate programme" and was confusing is nothing but mixing up strategy and tactics, and maximum and minimum programmes.

It is as a result of this confusion that the Huzurnagar comrades are considering a programme of retreat as an immediate programme, and land distribution and other revolutionary programmes as the ultimate programme. And,

further, they fail to realise the necessity to continue the guerilla struggle to defend Telangana's revolutionary gains.

It is because of this confusion, again, they are unable to understand strategy and tactics from a Marxist standpoint, and instead, are indulging in misinterpretations leading to wrong conclusions.

And now, we will proceed to discuss the tactics that we should adopt in general in the present conditions.

### III. Maturing Revolutionary conditions and our Tactics

Some comrades contend that the revolutionary conditions that call for an armed struggle against the Indian bourgeoisie *18(a)* do not obtain in the country today, that the enemy is strong in every way while the people are weak, and therefore, the Telangana armed struggle should be withdrawn and we should retreat, because it is a period of retreat, and they compare it to the situation that prevailed after 1905 Revolution in Russia. In this connection, we quote below the views of Tiruvuru and Huzurnagar comrades :

"We are committing a mistake in assessing the influence of the bourgeoisie ... It has inherited lot of good - will. It has a very great deal of experience indeed." And "when we don't have the requisite strength, it is the best thing to retreat". (Tiruvuru's organiser).

"Until the Congress is isolated from the people, as in the case of the Nizam (and of Kuomintang in China), our guerilla life will continue to have less of mass support. The people are yet to reach the level wherein they can stand up to accept the challenge."

"..... the enemy, dizzy with success, is in full offensive... we are in the stage of self - defence, more so in its preliminary stage." (Huzurnagar AC's Review).

18 (a). See note no. 4.

The Indian bourgeoisie 18 (b) still enjoys a strong position in the people. The bourgeoisie 18 (c) got strengthened, rather than weakening, as a result of its "military action" against the Hyderabad State. The people are not in a position to support armed struggle. The same is the case not only in Telangana, but the whole of India. So we should treat the present as a stage of retreat and, accordingly, adopt tactics of retreat only— This is the essence of their views.

## 1. Indian Bourgeoisie<sup>19</sup> and Economic Crisis

The Indian bourgeoisie 20, as part of the world capitalist class, is caught up in a permanent crisis. In view of the colonial economy prevailing in India, this crisis is all the more intensifying. The developments before our own eyes are proving that all the attempts made by the Indian bourgeoisie 21 to get out of it are failing, and that it is getting weakened.

Failing to solve any one issue of the people the bourgeoisie is coming out with its naked fascist form everyday. The military budgets of the Central and State govts,<sup>22</sup> extending fascist repressive machinery, the fascist Constitution 23, the worsening food crisis, exorbitant taxes and rise in cost of living, fascist repression etc., all go to show that the bourgeoisie 24, failing to wriggle out of the permanent economic crisis, is greatly harried by it.

The unprecedented defeats suffered by the Congress Party in bye-elections (Calcutta, Bombay and Cochin), and in municipal and district board elections; and the fear of the

Congress to hold elections on the basis of adult franchise, make it clear that the Congress party's position in the people is getting eroded.

Formation of power groups, corruption and nepotism are very much rampant in the congress leadership. The administrative machinery had become too unwieldy to work and is getting disintegrated.

All these go to show how much the bourgeoisie<sup>25</sup> is getting weakened. If Kuomintang needed 20 years to tumble in China, the Indian bourgeoisie<sup>25</sup> is facing the state of decay within two years, as a result of worsening economic crisis.

This decline is clearer than ever, after the "military action" in Hyderabad State.

The people of Hyderabad State, who harboured illusions that with "military action" they are going to be liberated from the cruel rule of the Nizam and Razakars, are gradually shedding their illusions and taking the path of struggle, after having seen the failure of the bourgeois-military<sup>27</sup> rule in solving the major issues facing the people, and its reorganising the shattered administrative machinery of the Nizam and continuing the anti-people rule as ever. As soon as the military raids commenced in the struggle areas of Telangana, the people began to realise the real character of the bourgeoisie.<sup>28</sup> Thus, after 'military action', the bourgeoisie<sup>29</sup> got isolated from the people than in the past, let alone getting strengthened in the State.

The divisions within Hyderabad State Congress for power, and its quarrels with the central Congress leadership, clearly show how the bourgeoisie<sup>30</sup> is getting weakened within the State also. (See Political Resolution on Hyderabad State for more details on this).

18 (b), 18 (c), 19, 20, 21 See note no. 4.

22. Though Defence is a Central subject, the expenditure incurred on military operations in the States and provinces to suppress the people's movements was forced on them and the governments included them in their budgets. More often the amount was treated as loan to be repaid. The same is the case even today.

23. The constitution was under discussion when this book was written. The draft constitution made it clear that the congress regime was going to be as repressive as British colonial regime. There was wide-spread fascist repression all over India.

Our present attitude towards the constitution is that it provides a semblance of democracy for our country.

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, : See note 4.

It must be said that the comrades who maintain that the bourgeoisie is still very strong are failing to grasp these developments.

These comrades are assessing the strength of the bourgeoisie<sup>31</sup> by counting the number of its bullets, but they fail to see its state of decay. Thus they are overestimating its strength, only because of confusing its military strength with political strength.

## 2. Revolutionary Upsurge and Tactics of Advance

Huzurnagar comrades say that "the people are yet to reach the level wherein they can stand up to accept the challenge." And this they say of Telangana people, who for a whole year<sup>32</sup> faced Nizam's hordes, distributed land among themselves, set up Gram Rajyas and waged armed struggle. Tiruvuru comrade says that the people are ready to move in "local struggles", but not in armed struggles; so he advocates retreat. Thus these comrades advocate that conditions to wage an armed struggle are not obtaining in India and that it is a period of retreat calling for tactics of retreat.

This cannot be a correct formulation. They are going in for such a strange formulation because they fail to understand the objective situation and even to see many developments before our own eyes.

While reviewing the struggles that have taken place ever since the Party Congress<sup>33</sup> until September 1948, the Polit Bureau has described their features in the following words:

"The basic causes of the capitalist crisis, the impossibility to solve it remain and bring fresh collisions. The basic cause of the revolutionary upsurge thus gets accentuated at every step. Last eight months have conclusively proved it.

"Out of this has arisen the great struggles of the last eight months—the struggles of workers and peasants, students—struggles against which most barbarous methods of repression were used (Kerala, Andhra, Tamilnadu, West Bengal)—struggles which saw fascist terror against the toilers,

"These struggles bear one special character. Not only are they born out of economic desperation; but they come in the wake of growing disillusionment with the Congress governments and are undertaken by toilers in defiance of the congress governments. In them are being trained and steeled the new forces which are destined to overthrow the bourgeois rule. They reveal not only the rapid process of disillusionment, the rapid decline of the influence of the Congress, but also the growing desperate determination and militancy of the masses. They often develop into armed clashes in the face of terror. The terror—one-tenth of which would have formerly demoralised the fighters—now evokes only indignation and greater determination. How often have the leaders of the party, in recent struggles, underestimated the power of resistance of the masses under terror (Coimbatore, Kerala), and thinking that all resistance is broken, have been surprised by the masses who have refused to yield to terror and decided to continue resistance? All old standards of measuring the resistance power of the masses, afraid of terror, always dragged back by the illusion of a secure life. They are the new masses on the eve of revolutionary battles—those who more and more realise that retreat is impossible and those who are developing a great confidence in the victory of their cause, because they have begun to see their real strength.

"The partial struggles of the present period therefore become wide mass battles, armed conflicts—miniature civil wars—and when

31 : See Note 4.

32. From August 1947 to September 1948.

33. This refers to Second party congress, which was held in Calcutta from February 28 to March 6, 1948.



they are organised on a sufficiently big scale easily develop into political battles and throw up embryonic State forms (Telangana)-such is the logic of the situation. No Chinese wall today divides the two as it did divide during the period of stabilisation. The terroristic repression teaches the masses to march forward and to challenge the state with all their power. It convinces them that without such a fight no struggle is possible, thus raising the struggle to a political plane-its stage being determined by the form and successful character of the resistance offered." (Communist; P. 26-27. June-July, 1949.)

This is the experience of only 8 months since Second Party Congress. Experiences of the last one year also go to confirm every one of the words written here.

The people of Andhra have not only been able to withstand fascist repression, they have now launched armed resistance.<sup>34</sup> Militant struggles by peasants and farm labour are developing in every province. Workers' strikes are going on for months together. (Bombay Municipal Workers' Strike).

Experience of Telangana also proves the same. The Union military's raids and fascist repression going on for the last one year have failed to subdue the people. The people of other areas of the State are also coming forward into struggles.

When such is the situation, what is the point in saying that "the people are yet to reach the level wherein they can stand up to accept the challenge"? What else is it if not failing to see the objective reality, to say that "only local struggles" are the way and that armed struggle is "suicidal"?

Because of these reasons, it is wrong to say that a period of retreat has set in either in Telangana or in India. Stalin describes the period of retreat in Russian revolution after 1905 thus:

"...The revolutionary movement was on the decline, the working class was in a state of extreme fatigue, and the position of the reactionary classes had been strengthened considerably". (History of CPSU (B), P. 133. Moscow, 1945).

Such conditions do not exist either in India or Telangana. Far from it, the above experiences show that revolutionary situation is maturing day by day.

How should our tactics be in this stage of maturing revolutionary conditions?

Tiruvuru's comrade says we should withdraw armed struggle and retreat; Huzurnagar comrades say we are in a period of "self-defence"; the Munagala Paragana's organiser says there is no party organisation at all; thus all of them advocate tactics of retreat. Among chief reasons they cite in their support, they give emphasis to the situation in India. But the present situation, as described above, makes it clear that the party must adopt tactics of advance.

How then should be our tactics in this situation? The Polit Bureau replies to this question thus:

"The forms of struggle are determined both by our strategic objective and the revolutionary period. The objective of overthrowing the bourgeoisie combined with the existence of the revolutionary period and the rapidly moving revolutionary developments impose on us the militant and revolutionary forms of struggle and organisation. Hence strikes, agrarian struggles, armed conflicts, general strikes, political strikes-all leading towards insurrection--such are the forms of struggle that flow from the situation. Corresponding to that are also the forms of organisation which are revolutionary peasants' Committees (Telangana), or strike committees, illegal factory committees, or peasants committees--to con-

34 It was not a people's armed resistance. Individuals were assassinated by armed squads formed out of party mem-

bers. After realising that it was individual terrorism, the party had stopped these actions in the first quarter of 1951.

duct the struggle, or squads, guerilla or volunteer squads to defend the workers and peasants, which develop into an instrument of attack also." (Communist 1949, June - July. P. 49).

Its essence is that, in the present phase of maturing revolutionary conditions, tactics of advance-forms of struggle and organisation must be adopted.

By formulating that "the people are yet to reach the stage wherein they can stand up to accept the challenge", the Huzurnagar comrades are underestimating the people's determination for struggle. On the other hand, when the bourgeoisie, 35 which is essentially depending upon its military might to defend itself and the class of zamindars, has despatched its military and armed police forces to suppress the people, they are confusing it as the enemy's political strength and thus are overestimating it.

By saying "only local struggles, and no guerilla struggle", they are slighting the revolutionary character of local struggles. And they fail to understand the present situation, wherein such struggles have the potential to reach higher levels and take the form of guerilla struggles (as in the countryside). They fail to see the fighting stamina displayed by the people.

It is because of this wrong understanding that the Indian bourgeoisie 36 is very strong today, while revolutionary forces are weak, and that the present should be treated as a period of retreat calling for the adoption of tactics of retreat that these comrades come to a wrong conclusion.

The Second Congress has warned the party about the danger posed by this wrong trend in the following words :

"Therefore the chief danger before the working class today is to underestimate its own

strength the strength of the anti-imperialist camp of democracy and socialism, and to overestimate the strength of the enemy camp, the camp of imperialism and reaction and its puppets and collaborators in each country". (Political Thesis).37

It is very much necessary that these comrades, who argue that the enemy camp is strong while the revolutionary forces are weak, understand this warning.

"Andhra Committee's Letter" has described the weakness of the Indian bourgeoisie,38 thus:

"On a deeper examination, it becomes clear that the fierce onslaught launched by the Indian bourgeoisie is a result of its weakness rather than strength.

"The foundation of the Indian bourgeoisie is very weak today. If we strike at it wherever possible, it is not that difficult to overthrow its power".

The experience of every struggle that we are conducting today testifies the correctness of this formulation. And for the same reason, it is once more clear that it is correct to adopt tactics of advance.

How is the situation in Telangana? Following the Union military's offensive, have conditions emerged warranting withdrawal of armed struggle? Let us discuss this question.

## IV. Are not the People Ready for Struggle in Hyderabad State ?

These comrades who advocate "withdrawal of Telangana armed struggle and retreat" contend that conditions favourable to armed struggle do not exist in India as well as in Hyderabad State, including its struggle areas. In line

35&36 See note 4.

37 The political Thesis mentioned here was adopted in

the Second Congress of Communist party of India .

38 See note 4

with the same, they review not only the present situation in areas of struggle, but also the character of the anti-Nizam armed struggle and advance certain formulations, whose essence is as follows:

1. The anti-Nizam armed struggle is a "sentimental" movement (having no relation with objective situation) devoid of a revolutionary class basis. If we could wage armed struggle until "military action", it is not because of the revolutionary consciousness of the people and the independent role of the party, but chiefly because of an all-round isolation of the Nizam.

2. The anti-Nizam movement which has been a house of cards tumbled with the very first wave of the "military action" and now the people are opposing the struggle.

3. In other areas of the State, it is the influence of the bourgeoisie<sup>39</sup> which is stronger. When the people of the areas of struggle themselves are opposing the struggle, the question of people preparing for struggles in new areas does not arise.

(The relevant excerpts will be given when each of them is examined).

The contentions of these comrades do not accord with the objective situation. They bring in such queer arguments simply because they fail to see the foundations the armed struggle has in Telangana and because they underestimate the people's consciousness for struggle. However, let us examine them.

What are the foundations of Telangana armed struggle?

What are the effects of "military actions"?

If these questions are discussed, how far these comrades' arguments are reasonable becomes clear.

## 1. The Basis of Anti-Nizam Consciousness is Anti-Feudal Consciousness

Huzurnagar comrades characterise the Telangana guerilla struggle in the following way :

"The atrocities of Nizam's forces crossed all bounds and reached a climax. The whole people came to hate the Nizam. That bourgeois methods of struggle are futile is proved in practice for the people to see. Just as a cat locked up in a room and beaten charges upon, having no other go, the embittered people got prepared for a revolt. But then their hatred was merely against the cruelty in the administrative system of the Nizam, but it has not reached the stage of class consciousness when people seek to eliminate the exploiting class itself. To hate Nizam has become a moral responsibility; it has become a tradition.

"The movement was going on spontaneously at any given time. The primitive consciousness of the people found expression in 'it is enough to get rid of Nizam' and stopped at that. Whether lands were distributed or class issues taken up, it must be said that the pulse of the movement was no more than hatred against the Nizam.

"The people have played more or less the role of spectators." (A.C. Review).

The Telangana armed struggle has neither class character, nor a revolutionary character, nor an organised form. It is a "house of cards" and a bubble. This is the essence of what they say.

The same is the view of the comrades of Munagala Paragana, though there is some difference in his language. "How could the movement go to such a high level? Because it is an utterly isolated government at home and abroad ..... but that is not the strength of our organisation."

<sup>39</sup> - See note 4.

Before we discuss the actual question, we will point out some of the mutually contradictory positions in their views.

Huzurnagar comrades had to concede that people are hating Nizam, and that they got prepared for a revolt after Nizam's "atrocities crossed all bounds and reached a climax" and after their realising the futility of bourgeois methods of struggle. (We think others also won't oppose this). This one point is enough to show that they contradict their own arguments, though indirectly. We will explain how :

—Hyderabad State reflects zamindari system. To hate Nizam, its vanguard and defender, is nothing but hating zamindari system itself. To say that Nizam must go, is to say that the zamindari class must go. Evidently it is nothing but the anti-zamindari consciousness of the people.

—If the people were prepared for a revolt against Nizam after they shed their illusions and faith on bourgeois methods of struggle, as admitted, it only goes to prove the revolutionary and organised character of the revolt.

Keeping aside these contradictions, however, we will discuss various aspects of their formulations.

1). What do they mean when they say people's hatred for Nizam is "sentimental" ?

Is it because Nizam is a muslim nawab (ruler) ? Or is it that people take him to be a demon or a devil or a satan ? Or is it because of the economic, political and social conditions in Hyderabad State ? (An unendurable zamindari system of exploitation, the absence even of a nominal bourgeois democracy, suppressing people's culture and forcing on them an alien culture etc.).

It is wrong on our part as Marxists to characterise the hatred against the Nizam on the basis of petty bourgeois sentiments, instead of from class struggle-point of view. The economic and social conditions in the State are the real basis for the hatred against Nizam. And

that is the correct Marxist characterisation.

There has always been discontentment in one form or other against Nizam's zamindari system of rule, among the people. As exploitation was getting intensified and as struggles to come out of it were either crushed or fizzled out and failed, this discontentment turned into hatred and began to manifest in higher forms of struggle.

As zamindari system of exploitation was ever getting intense in the countryside, and all land was concentrated in the hands of landlords, the thirst for land among peasants also increased. And this land question itself is the basic reason for the present agrarian struggles. Those who can not understand this, cannot understand Telangana struggle itself. (For necessary details of economic crisis in the State, see political Resolution on Hyderabad State.)

The development of peasant struggles against feudalism in the State may be traced thus :

—Struggles against Jagirdars, Deshmukhs and landlords commenced almost 30 years ago. They were being waged against their practices of forced labour (vetti), illegal taxation and other atrocities and to defend lands in their possession from illegal occupation (waged by tenants, peasants who tilled *ljara* (*banjar*) lands, and by peasants in jagir areas). They were spontaneous in character in the beginning and then took the form of litigation in courts for years together. Various struggles that took place in the present area of armed struggle —the peasant struggles in several jagirs in Bhuvanagiri (Bhongir) taluq as well as in the jagirs (*makta*) of Betavolu and Garla, and banjar peasants' struggles in Janagaon, Suryapet and Manukote tehsils (or taluqs) — can be cited as examples. Murders of some very big landlords can also be bracketed under the same category.

—Gradually these struggles developed against forced labour, corruption and other atrocities perpetrated by the officials. They were waged with people's initiative, in several areas of the State against forced labour (vetti). Revolts against highhandedness in the course of colle-

ction of levies can be cited as an evidence. The incidents of Akunoor and Machireddyalli were standing examples of the same. They were also spontaneous in character and were ruthlessly suppressed.

-- There were some struggles also in the form of mass revolts against govt. taxes (land revenue), levy and other forms of exploitation. When there was a famine in Karimnagar district in 1940, peasants moved in their thousands in demonstrations and with petitions demanding cancellation and remissions of land revenue. They achieved some of their demands. The struggle was led by Andhra Mahasabha. Evidently the people's consciousness was quite high.

-- Peasant struggles led by the party and Andhra Mahasabha in Nalgonda district (Suryapet, Janagaon) : These were struggles waged by people for possession of tenancy lands, against forced labour (vetti), illegal exactions and atrocities by feudal landlords, and for seizing back the lands that were illegally seized by feudal landlords. To begin with, they started against landlords' misdeeds, then developed into resistance to police atrocities and gradually developed to the point of paralysing the govt. (Nalgonda struggle).<sup>40</sup> These struggles took place between 1942-46.

The impact of these struggles is one of the main factors that moved the people on a massive scale in the anti-Nizam armed struggle until "military action". It was these struggles which later developed into anti-Nizam armed struggle. The people's resistance against Nizam-Razakar hordes, driving away the feudal class from the villages, distribution of lands, setting up Gram Rayas (village soviets), formation of guerilla squads, supporting and participating in armed struggle (we will explain about it later) etc. - these acts reflect a high degree of political consciousness and definitely not spontaneity and

primitive level of consciousness.

In view of this course of struggle and its development, we can come to the following conclusion: The anti-Nizam consciousness among the people of the State is the political manifestation of their advanced consciousness against feudalism as represented by Nizam. Therefore the anti-Nizam armed struggle is nothing but a political struggle to overthrow Nizam's feudal regime.

Hence the hatred against Nizam is not a "sentimental" hatred that has developed into a "tradition". On the other hand, it represents the class consciousness which developed against feudalism.

If it is assumed that the movement developed out of anti Nizam "sentiments" without any class consciousness among the people, then how do they explain the struggles going on for years against Hindu as well muslim jagirdars? Are they class struggles? or are they also a result of "sentiments"?

What about the anti-feudal struggles led by the party against a section of feudal class that was behind the liberal leadership of Andhra Mahasabha (in Nalgonda and Warangal districts)? What are the anti-Nizam sentiments that led to them?

Was it with anti-Nizam sentiments that the people have distributed, during the period of anti-Nizam armed struggle, the lands of the landlord sections that joined the congress? Or was it with a consciousness to abolish feudalism as such?

What is meant by "primitive consciousness"? If people's consciousness is presumed not to have crossed primitive level even after they distributed lands, does it not mean that there is no difference in level between struggles for land distribution on one hand, and tenants' struggle for reduction of land rent and for occu-

40 The armed struggle led by the party during 1945-46 is also called as Nalgonda struggle because it was not confined to any one taluka (tehsil). It was spread in three

talukas in the main (Janagaon, Suryapet and Huzurnagar) together with adjoining areas in other talukas. Janagaon is presently in Warangal dt.

pation right on the other hand? If setting up Gram Rajyas, armed struggle and such other activities were a reflection of primitive consciousness of people, then there should not be any difference between them and local struggles which are within the confines of exploiting<sup>41</sup> system? Where is the end to their arguments?

Failing to see the difference in level between local struggles and armed struggle, and the fact that Telangana armed struggle is but the highest form of class struggles that have been going on till then, they are rejecting it as a "sentimental" movement. By maintaining that the movement never crossed the primitive level, they are negating the class struggles that have been taking place for years.

(II). By formulating that "the people have played more or less the role of spectators", they are contending that there is neither class nor revolutionary foundation to Telangana armed struggle. This also runs counter to the objective situation.

There have been mass revolutionary activities not only during Telangana armed struggle led by the party, but during the earlier struggles in Suryapet, Janagaon and Nalgonda also.

Tenants of Suryapet area defied (1942) the then existing land and tenancy laws in about 20 villages, and defended their lands by resisting occupation by feudal landlords.

During Janagaon struggle, thousands of people demonstrated for about 4 months against outrages perpetrated by feudal landlords. They unitedly resisted occupation of lands (Mundrai). They militantly faced up to rowdyism (Palakurthi).

During Nalgonda struggle<sup>42</sup> (covering about 250 villages) they organised massive resistance with sticks and slings ('Vadisela') against rowdies of feudal landlords, police and even

Nizam's troops. (Struggles in Kadavendi, Balemela, Pata Suryapet, Devuruppala, Mallareddy gudem and Puligilla). They drove the feudal landlord class from out of the villages. They carried on embryonic rule through village committees. They redistributed about 5000 acres of landlords' lands.

And then during the subsequent period of Telangana struggle the revolutionary activities of the people touched the sky. The mass collective resistance with sticks and slings against Razakars, the land distribution, the conducting of Gram Rajyas, logistic support to guerilla struggle such as by breaching the roads, annihilating the Razakars during "military action", procuring arms for guerilla squads, razing the feudal landlords' forts to the ground, these and such other revolutionary activities, together with the revolutionary consciousness displayed by the people, set an example to the whole Indian people. Did such things take place in the history of our national movement?

These comrades alone should tell us which revolutionary fervour has fired the people in their hundreds and thousands to lay down their lives in the battle field, either as members of guerilla squads or as ordinary people.

How could it happen that these comrades so easily forget the Telangana revolutionary struggle, even before the first chapter of the nascent Indian revolution has been completed, and even while a pitched struggle is going on between the revolutionary activities of the people and the counter revolutionary activities of the enemies?

The revolutionary zeal, initiative and practice displayed in the course of Telangana revolution has opened up a new chapter in Indian people's revolution; it has heralded a new path.

The people may not participate in struggle at the same level in all areas because of organi-

41 Exploiting system—feudal as well as capitalist system of exploitation. Sometimes it may include slavery also,

where it exists.  
42 See 40

sational weaknesses in the movement. In fact it is because of this that the movement could not extend on a larger scale. But it is impermissible for revolutionaries to cloud its revolutionary character simply because there are such weaknesses. Even the enemies—who are jailing some mass leaders and gunning down some others to proclaim that they have “crushed the unrest”—are unable to deny it being a mass movement. To arrest, against such a background, that “the people have played more or less the role of spectators” and to deny its revolutionary character—doesn't it amount to indirectly support denigration which even the enemy is not daring to indulge in ?

Weaknesses in the movement, however dangerous, have after all to be rectified. They cannot by any means be a reason to negate the revolutionary character of a revolution. We must rectify them to advance the movement. On the other hand, by seeing the weaknesses, to go wild and out of senses, to degrade so much so that they cannot see its revolutionary character, and to make an about-turn out of desperation, is all a result of sheer petty-bourgeois degradation that does not enable to face the enemy's onslaught. What a great obstacle it presents to the advancement of revolutionary struggle need not be stated.

(iii). While characterising that Telangana armed struggle has neither a class nor a revolutionary nor an organised character and that it is a “spontaneous” movement, they bring in another strange argument that the chief reason for the movement to with stand so long and to score victories is Nizam “being hated by all”. It is wrong trend that seeks to belittle the role played by the party and mass organisations in elevating the class struggle in Telangana to the level of armed struggle. It is a trend of spontaneity which holds that the people prepared on their own to overthrow Nizam's rule. It is theoretically wrong and goes against reality.

1. As a result of struggles in Suryapet Taluka led by the party and Andhra Mahasabha

(AMS), and the thorough-going struggle waged against the liberal section of AMS, the influence of the party and AMS had extended. As the struggle in Janagaon Taluka was organised under their leadership, AMS soon developed into a struggle-oriented organisation of the people and played a magnificent role in mobilising the masses of Telangana against Nizam.

2. And in the course of Nalgonda struggle 43, the organisation of AMS has not only extended, volunteer squads and mass organisations developed in every village; and through them the struggle has reached the higher stage of land distribution and of resistance against police atrocities.

3. The mass organisations reached the highest level during the period of anti-Nizam armed struggle. The setting up of Gram Rajyas guerilla armies and village squads were the new forms of organisation during this stage. They mobilised the people to overthrow Nizam's rule and drove Nizam's hordes into defensive.

4. The party has played a remarkable role in taking initiative and in implementing a militant revolutionary programme so as to take the struggles to a higher level. That the struggles of Suryapet, Janagaon, Nalgonda, and then the Telangana armed struggle were waged in succession in such a way that one was at a higher level than the preceding one, is a graphic evidence of the same.

5. It is baseless to contend that there is no party organisation. There are Area Committees and Organisers. The entire local party cadre are organised into squads. There are still party militants in the villages, besides those arrested. What else is this if not party organisation?

The problem before us in Telangana movement is not the absence of organisation; the main question is how to get rid of the organisational weaknesses in it.

As a result of the wrong trends and organisational weaknesses that manifested, before launching the anti-Nizam armed struggle, in taking the struggle to a higher level, the movement had faced hurdles at every step and failed to extend.

We could not develop a strong and independent party organisation because of a wrong approach towards party building. So was the case during armed struggle also. It is indisputable that our organisation was greatly damaged after "military action", as a result of wrong approach towards organisation and wrong tactics adopted in guerilla warfare. But to characterise, simply on this count, that Telangana armed struggle has no organised character, and hence there is no movement after "military action", is only not differentiating between organisational weaknesses and lack of an organisation as such.

Not only that. If one were to go by their arguments, the Gram Rajyas, the guerilla squads and other revolutionary organisations must all be either mobs of hooligans or Heaven's gifts. Weaknesses in an organisation that has developed through revolutionary struggles need to be removed even while carrying on the struggle by functioning Gram Rajyas and organising guerilla squads etc. Instead, to characterise suicidally on that basis that there is no organisation at all is utterly wrong.

Likewise, to say that we could score so many gains only because the Nizam is the "most hated", is only to belittle a revolutionary programme such as land distribution and also the Gram Rajyas and their role, and to negate the sacrifices made by the people and the party to raise the struggle to a higher level. Why is it that the movement led by the party in Karimnagar, Adilabad and Marathwada districts, was suppressed by Nizam's hordes? After all the Nizam is "most hated" even in those districts. The main reason for the movement in Nalg-

onda and warangal districts being able to withstand the onslaught of the Nizam's hordes, and to go to a higher level and extend to Atraf Balda 44 and other border districts, is that it has the organised character. Likewise the chief reason for the setback suffered by the movement in other districts is lack of organisation and non-implementation of a revolutionary programme such as land distribution and setting up Gram Rajyas. It is the failure to understand the organised character of Telangana armed struggle that has led to wrong formulations as above.

## 2. "Military Action" has not uprooted Telangana's Revolutionary Foundations

As a result of applying the theory that Telangana armed struggle is a "spontaneous movement" to the post-"military action" period, some other wrong formulations emanated. One of them is this :

"And finally when the day of severest test, i.e., the day of class test came in the wake of military action, the whole movement collapsed like a "house of cards"... Same is the situation in all areas of Telangana where we had our movement". (Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review).

These comrades are characterising the consequences of "military action" on the movement as stated above. But experiences of and reports from struggle areas as well as other districts of Hyderabad State do not support their formulations. In fact even their own reports are contrary to this. We are presenting a brief account of the state of the movement in various

44. Atraf Balda—It was a district consisting of surrounding areas of Hyderabad city, during Nizam's

regime. Subsequently it was named as Hyderabad district and now it is called Ranga Reddy District.



areas. (For details see Visalandhra<sup>45</sup>, vol., No. 1, Supplement on Telangana).

**Manukota Area**<sup>46</sup> :- In the intensive military campaign after December 1948, it became impossible for the squads to remain and work in the 'front' because of the wrong tactics pursued in the past. Some of the squads suffered losses in Suryapat and Khammam taluqs. In spite of this, the Area Committee leadership had moved the squads in other areas to safer zones and reorganised them basing on the experiences gained till then. Cadres were given political and military training. Some squads and some cadres were allocated to extend into Forest areas<sup>47</sup>. The rest of the squads and cadres were sent back to struggle areas<sup>48</sup> and resistance is being continued.

The people in this area are cooperating in the operations of the regular squads. They are actively cooperating in informing the whereabouts of the military camps and in annihilating CID's (intelligence men). They are directly participating in such activities as causing obstacles to enemy movements in forest areas. Youth are joining in squads afresh. Cadres from among poor peasants and farm labour who were temporarily thrown into confusion and were disheartened after military action, are reestablishing their contact with the party and continuing the work. The land lords are unable to stay in villages except where there are military camps. Even their farming operations are going on in only such villages where there are permanent camps.

In areas where we are extending a new, the people are very active. In all the villages the people are ready for distribution of lands.

People are facing repression which is a consequence of our squads' attacks against the enemy. Enemy's plans are being foiled for the time being as a result of our attacks, facilitating our organisational activities also.

In spite of brutal fascist repression for so many months, people are looking for the party to provide a programme. Nowhere comrades encountered the problem of not finding shelter.

In spite of weaknesses shown by organisers and squad members in the secret method of functioning, loss of major part of local cadres, and other organisational weaknesses, all posing obstacles to our advance, the party leadership is making intense efforts to overcome them.

The movement of these areas has extended to Pakala<sup>49</sup> and Mulugu taluqs (it is all a dense forest area). While continuing this extension work, comrades are reestablishing contacts with all plains areas and are organising resistance.

**Palwancha Area**: All the main squads in this area have reached safer areas after "military action". Comrades are reestablishing contact with the party, taking up its programme and again working in the field.

Because of declension of leadership in Khammam and Madhira areas and betrayal by some, leading to major losses of local cadres, there was some delay in reestablishing contacts. Now efforts are being made to extend to all areas and to develop resistance. (It is notable that this situation prevails in spite of the fact that the main organiser of this area has expressed reservations on the question of continuing armed struggle and said he would not go to the

45. "Visalandhra" was an illegal Journal of Andhra Provincial Committee during the period of armed struggle.

46. This was an Area Committee which stood for continuation of armed struggle after "Police Action" without any vacillation whatsoever. It consisted of major part of Suryapat, and Manukota (Mahabubabad)

talukas. Later Yellandu, Mulugu Talukas and adjoining areas were also included.

47. Forest zones were treated as safe. Hence they were also called areas of "defence".

48. Old areas of struggle, mainly plains and those adjacent to forests.

49. Presently Narsampet Taluka,

field until they are removed; in fact he has not gone to the field for 6 months.)

There has been a good impact of Telangana armed struggle on the bordering Tiruvuru taluq, where the mass upsurge did not die down despite arrests of major part of party cadres. Only recently there was a spate of farm labourers' strikes in about 25 villages, which are gradually extending to other areas.

**Bhuvanagiri Area :** The entire leadership of this Area Committee was arrested. Majority of the organisers in West Bhuvanagiri zone betaryed.<sup>50</sup> Many of the zone organisers<sup>51</sup> were either captured or shot dead. In spite of this, the rest of the leadership, in accordance with the Provincial Committee's programme, has taken up to reorganise the movement. They are reorganising the squads, giving training to the cadres and continuing the armed struggle.

People in these villages have not abandoned the lands they distributed among themselves; they are cultivating them. Struggles by farm labour are going on. When the squads attacked on a camp in Indrala village and annihilated the main tyrant of the area, all the people in the area celebrated it as a festival by lighting lamps. Militants are coming forward from among poor peasants and farm labourers to join in squads. With the squads, party leaders as well as ordinary party members rigorously practising technical regulations in accordance with the discipline of underground life, there is heightened self-confidence among people, cadres and squads, and comrades are working with vigour. People are cooperating very well.

At the time of intensive raids, the squads of this area went to safer areas and extended

into Bagetu<sup>52</sup> taluq. They are continuing the resistance by reestablishing contacts with struggle areas. They could reestablish contacts with and organise squads in West Bhuvanagiri zone where there was a total setback. They are continuing resistance by getting into safer areas when the raids were intense and by returning to the villages as soon as they abated.

There are still Adda Gudur and Kapraipally zones (Bhuvanagiri<sup>53</sup>) with which party did not yet have contact. This area is a good example to show that conditions are mature to consolidate Telangana's revolutionary gains and to extend, provided correct organisational methods are adopted.

**Janagaon-Warangal Area :** After "military action" the entire leadership of this area was captured by the enemy. A few central organisers and squad members are left in a scattered manner; contacts with the party were totally broken. In spite of that, these comrades, without losing heart and on their own initiative, began to strike at the land lords here and there, so as not to allow them stay in the villages. Presently the party leadership succeeded in reestablishing contacts with a part of this area, in regrouping the scattered cadres, in giving political and military training to and in reorganising the party and squads. Arrangements are completed to reorganise the rest of the area also. Reports are reaching that armed struggle started again in the reorganised areas.

**Huzurnagar Area :** <sup>54</sup> Basing on wrong theories and formulations, which are under dis-

50 : The word "betrayed" is used for one who joined enemy camp by giving out our secrets and helping the military in organising the raids.

51 : There used be zone organisers under Area Committees. They were in charge of party's political-organisational work in a specified zone.

52 : Present Ibrahim patnam Taluka was then called Bagatu. Its literary meaning was orchards or gardens. As part of it is a hilly region, guerilla squads took shelter in this region.

53 : Presently it is Ramannapeta taluka of Nalgonda district.

54 : This is an area Committee which received instructions immediately after "Police action" to move the squads, cadres and organisers into forests which were adjoining to areas of armed struggle, and to continue the armed struggle to defend the gains. But they violated the instructions and followed its own line. Subsequently they changed their line and followed that of PC to continue armed struggle.

cussion here, the leadership of this area has disbanded guerilla squads and Gram Rajyas, gave up defending the distributed lands, and are working by following the programme of 'self-defence'. In spite of all this, it is clear from the Area Committee's reports that agricultural labourers' struggles are going on, and that people are urging to again organise the squads and continue armed struggle. It is an evidence to understand the level of people's consciousness for struggle.

**Mahabubnagar District:** We had only a few contacts in this district during the period of anti-Nizam struggle. There was some work done in 10-12 villages. With the arrest of the one or two comrades in work, we lost contacts with the district. Efforts were made to reestablish contacts after "military action". When party organisers went into people with a programme of local struggles to those areas where we had contacts in the past, the people are ready to straight-away seize their lands from the land lords and to wage struggles. Our organisers, who earlier thought that the movement was not having the requisite level to take up the land distribution, have revised their programme after seeing their readiness and decided on the programme of land distribution and worked on it. Strikes of farm labourers are taking place. Village militants are coming forward enthusiastically to join the squads. It should be noted that the mass upsurge has not died down though repression is already unleashed in the area.

**Adilabad District:** Likewise people in Adilabad district are ready for struggle on land question. The District Committee decided to lead these struggles. As a result of the impact of Telangana armed struggle on this district also, the people are waiting for the party to give a lead in struggle.

The above details make it clear that the people's energy for struggle is not sapped as a result of "military action" and that they are ready to defend and extend their revolutionary gains. In the areas where we are working in accordance with our programme, we are finding its good results. The fact that the enemy had failed to suppress even after one year has rolled by since "military action", and our being able to continue the armed struggle, are a standing evidence to it.

That does not however mean that we can underestimate our organisational weaknesses and the consequent difficulties in consolidating and extending the movement. The movement will advance only when they are overcome by correct organisational methods.

Ups and downs are quite natural in any revolutionary movement. The party would have fulfilled its vanguard role only when they are faced and the movement is advanced. On the other hand, to see only the setbacks resulting from repression, to treat the movement as a "house of cards", and to suggest a programme of retreat is nothing but negating the vanguard role of the party and failing to realise the responsibilities of revolutionaries.

In certain special circumstances when Marxist knowledge, experiences in revolutionary struggles as well as objective conditions do not help in deciding our task, our enemies' views become useful. It is better our comrades open their eyes atleast after seeing the statement given by Mr. Konda Venkata Ranga Reddy,<sup>55</sup> a prominent State Congress leader, on the situation in certain taluqs of struggle areas in Telangana. We are reproducing some excerpts below:

"..... There are no postal facilities in villages. Schools are not reopened. Even the Patels and Patwaris<sup>56</sup> have also left the villages.

55 Konda Venkata Ranga Reddy was a prominent leader even in Andhra Maha Sabha, representing feudal interests. It was against him and his following we fought so that we have driven them out of the organisation. He

was a prominent Congress leader till the end of his life.

56. Patels and Patwaris are local names for village munsifs and Karams respectively i.e., police and revenue officials respectively.

"..... Even the weekly information reports to the police are not being sent. There is no doubt that murders have gone down. That should not however lead us to assume that communist violence has abated.

"..... The panch committees formed by communists in the villages are still working and they intervene in all affairs in the village. They are evicting pattadars<sup>57</sup> and distributing lands. And because of these communist activities, patels and patwaris are not able to return to the villages.

"It is wrong to assess the intensity of communist movement by the number of murders. If one has to understand the nature of communist activities, one must go by the state of order prevailing in the villages. One must see how far the patels, patwaris and pattadars <sup>57</sup> are able to carry on with their daily chores ....." (Andhra Prabha, 17th July).

### 3. Fascist Repression : People's Fears and Hatred

After having theorised that the whole Telangana movement is a "house of cards" that has collapsed with the "military action", these comrades are bringing in certain strange arguments to justify their programme of retreat. The more important among them are :

1. "We cannot withstand this military onslaught. Ultimately we will win. But let us put off the struggle for the time being. You go and take shelter somewhere for some time'.—This is the slogan of the people. It is their view that we can not carry on the struggle in the present situation." (Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review).
2. "It is their view that we can not be victorious over the strong enemy now. And

what is more, the congressmen have the Union armies behind them. And when are the Russian, Chinese and Burmese troops going to arrive to trounce them and liberate us?—It is said even the Koyas 'of Palvancha are asking thus.'— (Tiruvuru's organiser).

And this is shown as an evidence for lack of consciousness for struggle among the people.

If one goes into the various excerpts from what the Huzurnagar comrades themselves said, it will be quite evident how queer and self-contradictory their formulation is :

"...But the more the people saw the violence perpetrated during raids which had exceeded those by the Razakars, the more they thought over it all again. The people themselves began to tell us that the Congress had by far outdone the Razakars. Though we could not catch up with the situation in exposing the Congress, stories of their violence are spreading in no time as if by wireless. Hating the congress and at the same time fearing whether we can survive this ordeal..... such are the feelings expressed by the people.

"The people do not at all like to help capture the Sangham<sup>58</sup>. Though the rich peasants are bent on helping our capture and some within the Sangham are betraying the people are not giving any such room for it in the entire area. They are putting up with beatings, but are not prepared to help capture our comrades. And if they feel that they can no more protect any material we keep in their custody, they are asking the Sangham to take care of them. And when we lose such things, they are sorry. And they scold us how we kept them so foolishly.

57. pattadars are the title holders of the land. Here they mean landlords.

58. Sangham: It is a word used by people for Andhra Maha

Sabha in general and local branch in Particular. The leaders as a whole were also called Sangham. Once all the leaders of a village were arrested, people used to say that 'Our Sangham arrested'.

"We have broken into twos and threes instead of as squads. So people are hiding us and taking care, in places which are not likely to be located by the enemy. People have love for us and confidence in ultimate victory. They are determined that the Sangham will ultimately triumph.

"...They are visibly pleased to hear of the victories scored by China. They innocently express their desire that it would indeed be fine if Russia and China launch an offensive here in this area"... (Area Committee's Review).

"There is an evidence of consciousness of a preliminary level among the people after they have seen the military raids in Huzurnagar taluq that, either we should resist now or we will have no other way. Consciousness of this order was not in evidence in the last two years (of armed struggle). Here and there we find cell members asking, 'Why any more delay? Take out the arms. Unless we revolt, it is no use'...

" As soon as camps are wound up our cells are catching up. And people are greatly enthused to see our cells back in action. Though there is fear on the hand, people are also displaying great courage. In spite of so many raids, people of Ragadapa<sup>60</sup> village enjoyed the summer crop (on the lands of Tummadam<sup>60</sup> desh mukh)... With great courage they are seizing back lands they mortgaged in the past and are cultivating them... "(Report by the Area Committee Secretary ; 6/7/1949).

Even while saying that the people feel "let us put off the struggle for the time being", these comrades admit in their reports that people are keeping party secrets, giving shelter to comrades, having confidence towards party leadership and "ultimate victory", and are ins-

pired by Chinese victories. If we remember that all this is happening at a time when the repression is intense and there is no programme before the people as to how to continue the struggle and when there is widespread confusion among them, it will be clear to us that this is not because of people "losing heart" or because of their aversion to struggle. If they have not abandoned the lands they redistributed even at this time (as admitted in their reports), it is only clear that the people's consciousness or struggle was not diminished by military repression. The party should have provided leadership to the people to defend revolutionary gains and explained to the people on how to carry on armed struggle, and thus prepared the people for it. At a time when the party could not perform this task, the people may have asked us to "evade for the time being"; it would be correct to interpret it as their view in favour of continuing the struggle; but to interpret it as their aversion to struggle is only failing to understand their views.

These comrades who paid lip-service in the beginning of their report by saying that 'the gains after all won't be lost anywhere', never felt the need for knowing the people's attitude towards the lands they redistributed even while there was repression. But when the people, who stuck to the lands they distributed among themselves, themselves advised after two months, "why any more delay? Take out the arms. Unless we revolt, it is of no use," and thus shown the way to our comrades, they comment that "there is an evidence of consciousness of a preliminary level among the people ... that either we should resist now or we will have no other way". (And these comrades are adopting a programme of self-defence" after disbanding guerilla squads and Gram Rajyas). Where did the people abandon their lands as expressed by these comrades? Is not defending lands part of resistance? Isn't it for a higher level of resistance that they are asking

59. Cell means party cell in the village and people knew that the party functions through it and secretly too. Once our comrades appear to them they were happy that they were safe.

60. Ragadapa and Tummadam are villages in Miryalaguda Taluka in Nalgonda District. The Deshmukh's headquarters was Tummadam village. He had lands in Ragadapa village too, which were distributed to the peasants and agricultural labourers.

to reorganise squads? In fact this is not the first time that such consciousness for struggle is seen in the people. It is the first time for our comrades to realise it, that too at a "preliminary level". If only our comrades try to observe the revolutionary gains and activities of the people, so many instances where people's resistance of a high order was displayed can be seen in this area itself.

Our comrades have not realised party's responsibility and vanguard role in moving the people into struggle, by removing their confusion towards a course of struggle and by basing on their consciousness for struggle. Not to speak of that, when the people out of their own experience indirectly suggested that the programme of retreat which our comrades adopted was wrong, and directly urged to reorganise the squads and carry on regular guerilla warfare, our comrades are still not in a position to take their guidance, and yet, they strangely interpret the revolutionary initiative of the people thus :

"1. Union army is very strong. It has plenty of arms and troops. Can we fight this govt.? — Such fear;

"2. Rather than a consciousness that they themselves should fight, there is a trend as in the past that the squads alone should take up arms and fight .... there is as yet no consciousness that they should fight against the exploiting classes by taking up anything that is available; .. The above two trends are strongly working in the people. But among them poor people of all types of thinking are all the time siezed of one thing : 'When can they<sup>61</sup> be smashed? How will we do it? Unfortunately we are people of only two districts and they are able to suppress us easily by being able to concentrate all their forces

here. This is how they think all the time."

This is closely related to the report that "the people are looking towards Russia and China for liberation", as formulated by Tiruvuru's comrade.

All of them characterise that "the people are not Conscious that they themselves have to fight."

One thing should be noted here. Within two months after they characterised that the "people are losing heart" and that "the people have not yet reached the stage wherein they stand up and challenge", the people proved it wrong by defending their lands and by urging the formation of regular squads; thus they provided the guidance that the correct programme is to defend revolutionary gains and to carry on armed struggle. It was proved in practice that every word in ACL's programme is correct. But in the eyes of our comrades, even this is consciousness of a "preliminary level." The people should prepare for struggle on their own, without any need for the party, by deciding on and preparing to implement a fullfledged programme, and then they can be considered to be having a consciousness for struggle. The party should give a programme for the people to "take up whatever is available to fight" and organise the people on that basis. Then people will fight. When The party has explained to Koya<sup>62</sup> men and women in Warangal district on how to resist the military, they are able to do not only that, but are also participating in sabotage activities to foil military movements. Koya youth are joining in squads.

To say that "people should fight on their own", represents the trend of spontaneity, which belittles party's vanguard role. It is the same which makes our comrades to expect the people to annihilate the CIDs and the farm labourers to "propagate on their own". Thus

61. "They" refers to the enemy.

62. Koyas-- a tribe living in certain parts of forest areas in Andhra Pradesh.

the leadership role of the party has been reduced all round.

There is the required consciousness among the people to struggle. None of them is under any illusion that we can reach our goal without any effort on their part. There is only one problem before the people: 'How can the enemy be smashed?' In political terms it only means that the people are engrossed with the question, what is the programme to smash the enemy?. The party must give a programme to the people and fulfill its vanguard role.

There is nothing wrong in people expecting the squads to fight. It is indisputable that people are aware of the fact that it is their own children who join in the squads. Not only that. If the redistributed lands and the Gram Rajyas must be defended, it is not enough for people to "fight with whatever is available" to them. It needs a regular guerilla struggle. The people have realised this quite well in two years of experience of armed struggle. It is obvious that it is our comrades who have not realised.

Likewise, if people feel that Russian and Chinese armies should march in to smash the Congress armies and liberate them, as reported by the Tiruvuru's comrade, it is not out of their lacking in consciousness to struggle, nor out of helplessness. If the people are able to appreciate liberating role of the Russian and Chinese, armies treat their victories as their own and are inspired by them, it only speaks of their political consciousness and international solidarity. It is a consciousness that has developed out of the present national and international situation and Telangana armed struggle. The party should educate the people on how the people of Russia and China fought and liberated themselves from the exploiting system, on the establishment of New Democratic States in East Europe, and on the history of struggle of the people of Malaya, Burma, Indo-china, Greece etc, where guerilla struggles are being waged; and that victory is ours if we persist in the armed struggle which we also started likewise.

What about the fear and hatred among the people? "Hating the Congress, and at the same

time, fearing whether we can survive this ordeal".... This feeling is the general feature among the people, write the comrades of Huzurnagar. And they show it also as one of the reasons why the "people are not ready for struggle". It is meaningless. As long as there is hatred for the enemy, and urge and determination for struggle, the fear that is spread among people can not be a significant obstacle for us to carry on armed struggle. And whatever obstacle is there can be removed if the party gives a correct programme of struggle to the people.

People are after all realists. They are participating in struggles by risking their lives and the lives of their beloved children, as well as their meagre livelihood. If one were to characterise only such people who are in the battle field all the twenty four hours without fear or fright as those who are prepared for struggle, then to such minds, the people must not be human beings but only dolls made of mud. Those who argue thus are no realists; they are petty bourgeois idealists; they don't see the earth. They have some ideals fixed in the skies and seek to realise them on earth. In their view, a people prepared for struggle means dolls which have no consciousness nor fear of repression.

If we peruse the experiences of our struggles one after another, it will be seen that the people always feared repression in one way or the other. However, on that count, they never refused to participate in struggles. On the other hand, they accepted party's programme and waged struggles, some of which were of a higher level, it goes without saying.

-- In the early phases of Janagaon struggle, the people, afraid of the Dashmukhs and their hirelings, used to hesitate to join in Andhra Maha Sabha (AMS) either in ones or in groups. But when party organisers assembled the people of the village and made them realise the need to fight unitedly, entire villages rallied to join in AMS.

-- As soon as the Deshmukhs mobilised their hirelings to terrorise the people, the party gave the programme of massive and militant demonstrations. The people who demonstrated in their thousands struck terror in the minds of the hirelings and ultimately prepared for militant struggles.<sup>63</sup> Did not the people have any fear for the hirelings? They did have, it must be said. However, they have not shown their backs to struggle. As soon as the party advanced the programme of collective resistance, the people took it and implemented.

-- In Kadivendi struggle, within 12 hours after armed hirelings of the deshmukhs shot dead martyr Komaraiah, people came out with sticks and slings and trounced the hirelings. Can we say the people had no fear of being gunned down? It will be wrong to say so. In spite of such fear, they were all rallied behind the militant programme of resistance given at party's initiative. Thus they faced the enemy forces and triumphed.

-- And from that day until military firings in Nalgonda district, there were so many militant demonstrations that marched right in front of police camps in Suryapet, Huzurnagar, Janagaon and Bhuvanagiri taluq. Would it not be audacity to claim that those people had no fear? But all the same, they demonstrated with the confidence given by the collective strength of Sangham and struck terror in the heart of that enemy.

-- The people have displayed great energy for resistance and courage and valour when they faced bullets from police and military in Pata Suryapet, Balemla, Mallareddy Gudem, Devaruppala, Puligilla and other villages. But alongside that, did they not have lurking fear

about the deadly fire-arms of the enemy? Or, because of fear, were they averse towards struggle itself? Didn't we hear from so many people, after firings, that we can face up to the enemy if only we also had arms? How is it that land distribution and farm labourers' strikes were simultaneously going on, even while there was intense repression in the same taluqs?

-- What about the ravages by Razakars? Were not the people afraid of them? How could they resist in spite of it? How could they implement the revolutionary programme including land-distribution? How could they help armed struggle?

Could the people who participated in Janagaon struggle even imagine before hand that they are going to offer a more militant resistance in Nalgonda struggle? <sup>64</sup> or could they foresee anti - Nizam armed struggle?

What was the main force which drove the people into struggle even when they had fear on one hand?

Apart from the unbearable economic plight, it was the ever - increasing hatred towards the ruling classes that has stirred the people for such a determined struggle. Even as the ruling classes ruthlessly, and with force, suppress the struggles waged by the people in order to come out of their economic plight, the people's hatred is ignited preparing them for a protracted struggle to overthrow the ruling classes.

The hatred towards the land lord class grew many times more afterwards, than before the 'Janagaon struggle. The hatred towards the Nizam was likewise many times more because of the ghastly repression unleashed by Nizam's ruling classes, apart from exorbitant land reve-

63. In the manuscript which we have with us, there is a sentence here which runs thus: ("In Mundrai struggle five thousand peasants and farm labourers were mobilised to face the hordes of hirelings of the deshmukhs"). In fact there was such a huge mobilisation at the time of Komaraya's death in Kadivendi, which was mentioned in subsequent para. This sentence should have been

including in that para. But at the time of Mundrai struggle, there was no such mobilisation. The peasants of Mundrai sent for help on their own to adjoining villages. It is quite possible that some peasants from those villages were present on the spot.

64. See 40



nue, levies and other illegal extortions. It was this hatred that made the people to participate in the anti - Nizam armed struggle with a revolutionary determination never seen and heard before. Even today there is widespread hatred among the people towards the congress' military rule that has outdone the Nizam's rule in its cruelty. It is quite intense already in struggle areas. The people are determinedly supporting the continuation of armed struggle.

Because of repression, hatred also grows alongside fear and helps to drive the people into struggles of a higher order. Our party -- a revolutionary party -- should note this and give a programme to the people to prepare them for struggles of a higher order.

We must grasp Stalin's teaching that the party must be 'with the people and at the head of people'. It is with that approach that the party leadership is required to show the correct path at times of repression and intense struggles. And people's revolution will advance only when the party thus leads and guides the people ahead. However, the Huzurnagar comrades are not taking note of the hatred which the people have for the ruling classes and which helps to advance the struggle, and their consciousness to struggle and revolutionary determination; instead, they base on people's fears and underestimate their consciousness for struggle by saying that "people lost heart" and that "they have not reached the stage wherein they can stand up and challenge". Thus with

such wrong assessments, they apply Stalin's principle—"with the people and at the head of the people"—only to suggest a programme of retreat. It is unbecoming for revolutionaries to misinterpret the teachings of Lenin and Stalin and use them to relegate the struggles.

Only when the people are led by tactics that are in tune with their consciousness for struggle, their revolutionary determination and their hatred against the ruling classes, people will come to disregard the fear they normally have and participate in struggles. But these comrades do not think over whether people are afraid of struggle even when they are led by the party. And that is why the programme for advance looks "impractical" to them, while that of retreat is "practical"!

The essence of our discussion is this :

Telangana armed struggle is one of a highest level. It has its impact spread not only in entire Telangana but in entire State. Though the movement has suffered a setback after "military action", there exist the required revolutionary conditions as well as organisation to continue the armed struggle by defending and extending revolutionary gains realised during the anti-Nizam armed struggle. The people are ready to support the programme to continue the armed struggle, which is the task before the party and which calls for correct tactics.

The "Andhra Committee's Letter" advanced the same programme.

## V. Mass Struggles and Mass Organisations

We have already explained, basing on the Polit Bureau's resolution, that under the ever-maturing revolutionary conditions prevailing in India today, today's partial struggles have the potential to develop into struggles for land and into guerilla struggles, and therefore it is a wrong outlook to believe that there is a gulf between partial struggles and political struggles which are waged to overthrow a government. We have also explained that the Telangana armed struggle is a political struggle that has

overthrown Nizam's rule, distributed land and has reached the stage of setting up Gram Rajyas an embryonic form of new democratic government. (in struggle areas); that, under its impact on Telangana as well as entire State, the peasantry in the countryside are prepared to wage struggle for land; and that, in areas of struggle, the people are prepared to defend the land and Gram Rajyas, their revolutionary gains. We have further shown, by citing experiences we had in various of struggle, how it is

correct to defend and extend the revolutionary gains and to continue armed struggle.

But there are some comrades who are criticising this programme as wrong; these comrades, who, on the plea that conditions favourable to insurrection do not obtain in India, suggest withdrawal of Telangana armed struggle, are also advancing their own programme of retreat. In fact Huzurnagar comrades decided on that programme and are already implementing it.

The essence of their programme is to abandon the lands that were distributed among the people, to disband the guerilla squads and the Gram Rajyas, to give up other revolutionary gains, and to restart the movement with partial struggles.

We will take them one by one and discuss their wrong trends.

## 1

The views of these comrades on the programme that we should adopt in areas of struggle are as follows :

"..... By waging many a local struggle on various issues and by thus developing people's political consciousness in that process, we should extend to other areas and into working class ..... and advance." (Tiruvuru's organiser)

"We should propagate that the redistributed lands should be cultivated, that Deshmukhs, landlords and zamindars must be resisted if they come to occupy the lands; we should propagate to refuse to pay land revenue, to seize grain and on other issues. We should prepare people for strike-struggles on the issues facing agricultural labourers and farm hands. We should prepare agricultural labourers (men and women) to propagate about their rights on their won". (Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review)

Huzurnagar comrades think that the programme is intended "to organise the people on mass issues in the present preliminary situation".

Munagala Paragana's comrade also suggests that "we should carry on local struggles as in Union-area".<sup>65</sup>

All of the comrades are suggesting to wage partial struggles of agricultural labourers on wage issue. Huzurnagar comrades however add that we should propagate resistance on land question. They say that we should see to it that agricultural labourers on their own propagate about their rights. We can say that this programme is decided on the basis of their principle: "Rather than a consciousness that people themselves should fight, there is a trend as in the past that the squads alone should take up arms and fight...there is as yet no consciousness that they should fight against the exploiting classes by taking up anything that is available". Thus their propaganda is only to see that people "on their own" put up resistance on the land question and propagate on their own on issues of agricultural labourers.

We have already explained that there will be only one programme in a stage, that the programme changes only with a change in the stage, that it is theoretically wrong to divide the same programme into immediate and ultimate programmes, and shown how they are mixing up tactics that change with the ebb and tide in the same stage of revolution with immediate and ultimate programmes (See Chapter II 'Strategy and Tactics and Maximum and Minimum Programmes').

Presently let us see how this confusion leads in practice to beat a retreat. They say for record's sake that "our victories after all won't be lost anywhere"; then they proceed to negate the revolutionary character of Telangana struggle; and finally they come out with a programme that advocates giving up revolutionary gains. We will now explain how suicidal it is.

65. Areas and regions administered by Union government in contrast to those by the then Nizam's gov't.

Huzurnagar comrades say that we should propagate that "if Deshmukhs landlords and zamindars come to occupy lands they must be resisted". Who are those who did not yet realise the need to cultivate and defend the lands that were redistributed - in these areas? According to reports from these comrades, only in certain centres like Ramadugu, where our squads and party were wiped away, people are helpless, and taking advantage of that, the deshmukhs could reoccupy the lands. But in areas where our comrades are moving about, the people are boldly defending their lands even in the absence of squads. What is the lesson that we should learn out of this?

The question before the people who participated in Telangana struggle that has reached the stage of overthrowing Nizam's rule is not whether or not to defend and cultivate the redistributed lands; not whether or not to resist if the deshmukhs etc. come to occupy the lands. How - to defend, to cultivate and to resist - that is the crucial question today. All slogans that we must "resist", "cultivate" etc., without showing the way out to this question are meant only to cloud this crucial question and to evade the main responsibility. So we must centre our propaganda on HOW to defend the lands. And it is clear it has no place in the programme suggested by Huzurnagar comrades.

They may then argue: "Rather than a consciousness that they themselves should fight, there is a trend as in the past that the squads alone should take up arms and fight..." So, they may argue, 'we are making them realise the need to defend the lands on their own'. But that is wrong. It is nothing but misinterpreting the people's mind and coming to a wrong decision that they have no consciousness for struggle. It is necessary that all comrades realise that the struggle to defend the redistributed land a mass struggle of a higher level. It won't be enough for only people to participate and resist as they did in strikes and demonstrations and in resistance against hirelings. Because this one is a struggle to overthrow the government and calls for a resistance of a higher level

which ought to be carried out by guerilla squads as well as mass resistance. And thus land is defended.

It is only in the anti-Nizam struggle that the people have seen for the first time that only way to overthrow Nizam's rule, to drive away the landlord class, to distribute lands, to set up Gram Rajyas and to defend them. Today they want to take the same road and rightly so. It is a naked truth that it is impossible to defend the lands without continuing armed struggle. But then we should take care on one point. We should not repeat the mistakes that we committed in developing an organised mass resistance in the period of anti-Nizam struggle. It is very much necessary to develop organised mass resistance on the land question, as part and parcel of our armed struggle.

Without realising the need to develop an organised mass resistance -- in addition to carrying on the armed struggle -- in order to defend the land, the Huzurnagar comrades are formulating that the people on their own should put up resistance, and claim that their propaganda is meant for the same. In this way, the mistakes made by the party while developing an organised mass resistance during the anti-Nizam struggle is being introduced from the other end. If in those days there was the wrong trend advocating all forms of resistance by guerilla squads alone, today we seen the wrong trend advocating that 'the people should resist on their own' without armed struggle and guerilla squads. While they advocate that people themselves should resist, they do not give even a programme on how to develop mass resistance; thus these comrades are disowning their responsibility to develop mass resistance as well.

Because of this reason, just as it is wrong to advocate defending the lands by guerilla squads alone and without the need for any mass resistance, it is also wrong to advocate that 'the people on their own should struggle with whatever is available to them', that is,

without any guerilla squads and without preparing the people for an organised resistance. As a result of the latter, there would not be any guerilla struggle and organised mass resistance. Even if the people, directionless as they will be, resist in the way and to the extent conceivable and possible to them, at some stage the whole land will be lost to the enemy. In practice that trend leads only to giving up the land.

Thus the consequence of the programme of retreat advocated by Huzurnagar comrades is to give up land, which is one of the revolutionary gains of Telangana struggle.

Huzurnagar comrades say that conditions for a final insurrection do not exist today, and that there should be an "immediate" rather than "ultimate programme" in these conditions of retreat. And so they advocate a programme of agricultural labourers' strikes. Let us see how it will be in practice, together with the "local programmes" advocated by other comrades.

Under the present revolutionary conditions, every local struggle should be waged as part of the political struggle to overthrow the bourgeois - zamindari alliance. A programme to limit them to partial struggles only means to underestimate their revolutionary character as well as the present revolutionary upsurge. Revolutionary conditions are mature in all districts of the State because of Telangana's revolutionary influence. Possibilities have emerged for struggles in the villages - on whatever issue they might have commenced - to transform in no time into struggles for land distribution, or to straight - away start as struggles for land distribution. The news coming from Telangana districts is an evidence of the same. The thirst for land among rural masses and the path blazed by Telangana struggle are the main reasons behind this. Therefore, only when we lead the partial struggles in the villages as struggles for land distribution, or lead them in such a way that they transform into struggle for land in no time, we would be leading in keeping with the people in action.

In struggle areas, class struggle crossed the level of partial struggles to reach the higher stage of overthrowing feudal system. While in some areas the higher level was preceded by local struggles, in other areas it was reached straightaway. It is possible in today's revolutionary conditions, when there is the influence of struggles in one area on other areas.

Accordingly, instead of further advancing a struggle that has reached a higher level in the struggle areas, to advocate its abandoning, and then beginning all over again with partial struggles, is wrong. Such a formulation will be a counter-posture to armed struggle waged to defend land. And it will amount to mechanically divide the revolutionary stage into an era of partial struggles as different from an era of political struggles that overthrow ruling classes, and to create a gulf between them so that the latter can not be reached without the former. It is as a result of this wrong trend that dangerous formulations have come to the fore that Telangana armed struggle which has reached the highest stage is not a revolutionary struggle, that its participants have no class consciousness and that the movement should be started all over again with ABCs.

The partial struggles that we are organising and going to organise in the struggle areas today must be conducted as part and parcel of, and to strengthen, the armed struggle waged to defend and extend the land and other revolutionary gains. If on the contrary they are sought to be organised without relation to the main issue before the people, i.e., defending the revolutionary gains and armed struggle, they would be of no help to resolve the main issue; on the other hand they would themselves be suppressed, failing to withstand the enemy's onslaught.

To sum up : Huzurnagar comrades counterpose guerilla resistance with mass resistance; advocate that people should resist on their own without any need to develop organised mass resistance; and thus they renounce not only armed struggle but mass resistance as well. All of them are counterposing the struggle to

defend land with partial struggle, and finally are narrowing even the latter.

Huzurnagar comrades are not stopping at that. They are adopting the programme of disbanding Gram Rajyas, thus extending their programme of retreat to that also.

## 2

Huzurnagar comrades' programme in respect of disbanding the Gram Rajyas is as follows :

"It should be announced through the people that all the previous panchayat committees are dissolved. Honest people should be secretly elected and appointed as persons in charge of panchayats until fresh elections are held. They should fulfill the responsibilities of panchayat committees to the possible extent without getting exposed". (Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review).

These comrades have not shown reasons warranting such a dangerous formulation. Pointing at the mistakes in the conduct of Gram Rajyas, they wrote in their Review that "even village panchayats have become nominal." At another point, while commenting that the sentence "Nizam's rule has been overthrown in 3000 villages" in the Political Resolution is not correct, they wrote thus : "...It is suggesting that we have liberated these 3000 villages. We have unnecessarily created an illusion from the beginning that it is a liberated area. It should be corrected at least now. It is not a liberated area. We must make people realise that it is an area of resistance. The sentence should be that Nizam's rule has been paralysed in 3000 villages as a result of mass resistance." Thus, in essence, their view is that it is wrong to call them as Gram Rajyas.

To say that Nizam's rule got paralysed on its own might possibly be correct if Telangana armed struggle were a "sentimental movement" and a "house of cards" in which "people played more or less the role of spectators". But to

say that "Nizam's rule has been paralysed in 3000 villages as a result of mass resistance" goes against their own main formulation on Telangana armed struggle. Isn't it ridiculous to speak of "mass resistance" when there are no people at all, as they say, in the battle field? Thus their referring to the struggle areas as "areas of resistance", and to "Nizam's rule being paralysed" is only formal, and it has no meaning whatsoever. And that is why they are unable to see the revolutionary significance of the Gram Rajyas, which are an embryonic form of new democratic rule the Telangana people established by overthrowing Nizam's rule in a revolutionary period. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, in their view, the Gram Rajyas are only a few "rooms of cards" in the "house of cards" that Telangana movement is.

Who are setting up these Gram Rajyas? Who are attempting to smash them? What is the task of the party on this question?

Gram Rajyas are a creation of the revolutionary masses; they are an embryonic form of new democratic state set up by them as a parallel govt. to replace the Nizam's government that has collapsed in the villages as Telangana people's struggle has reached a higher level into the stage of land distribution. Any mistakes made while establishing or running them must be corrected by continuing the struggle; on the other hand, to seek to disband them in the name of mistakes is only suicidal. The enemy is deploying his armed forces in countless numbers with a view to smash and erase them from people's memory. He has been enforcing brutal fascist repression. But still the people do not want the return of congress-Nizam rule. They are eager to defend their most cherished "rule of the Sangham" (Sangha Rajyam). And the party has to fulfill its responsibility of preparing the people by placing before them a comprehensive programme to defend them. The programme given in "Andhra Committee's Letter" (ACL) to the party members is the same.

The contention that establishing Gram Rajyas and defending those which are already

existing is not a correct programme today because conditions favourable to insurrection do not exist, also flows from the same wrong trend. The same wrong trend lies behind their characterisation of ACL which has given the call to defend our revolutionary gains, the land and Gram Rajyas - as one that gave a programme which was "steeped in confusion and which was neither immediate nor ultimate programme". We have already explained that it is theoretically wrong, that the Telangana struggle has the required level to defend land and Gram Rajyas, and that the required revolutionary conditions do exist in India.

\* \* \* \* \*

What is the programme that we should adopt to defend land and Gram Rajyas in struggle areas, and to develop mass organisations in the course of building mass struggles on other mass issues?

A comprehensive programme on these questions was advanced in ACL. We will explain some of the main formulations contained in it.

1. The defence and extension of revolutionary gains (land, Gram Rajyas etc) are inseparably linked. Unless we carry on struggle to defend them in struggle areas, we can't extend to new areas. If struggle areas that are tested in struggles and have the foundations for an organised and stable resistance against the enemy are abandoned, the enemy may encamp there and get consolidated. However actively the people may move in newer areas, we cannot put up organised resistance and score stable victories until some experience of struggle is attained by them. Therefore to attempt to extend without carrying on the struggle to defend revolutionary gains in struggle areas means to underestimate the latter. On the other hand if we confine our programme to struggle areas by not extending to new areas, the enemy will organise relentless attacks, cause serious setbacks to our activities and will be able to go into an offensive position. As a result our orga-

nisation will be undermined, instead of getting strengthened.

On the other hand, if we coordinate our activities of defending the revolutionary gains, and of consolidation and extension, the enemy will not be allowed to consolidate, and instead we will be able to strengthen our position. We will be able to drive away the enemy from newer areas, lay foundations for the movement there, gradually advance and thus consolidate the revolutionary upsurge. If we thus prevent the enemy to get a foothold in the struggle areas, and drive him out of newer areas, his forces will gradually get disorganised and demoralised forcing him into the defensive.

To grasp the inseparable link between the defence and extension of revolutionary gains and to work accordingly is the first step to our victory.

2. What do we mean by defending the revolutionary gains? It will be nothing but a gross misunderstanding of the course and character of revolutionary struggles if we think that the enemy has won and that our struggle has been overrun simply because the redistributed land falls into the enemy hands either in a village or in some centres, or because the enemy is able to collect taxes and seize crops by unleashing unceasing repression, or because some panchayat members are arrested or surrender. As long as the enemy is able to directly confront us, he will directly attempt to smash the revolutionary gains of the people. Therefore, it should be realised that the revolutionary gains may continue to change hands until the enemy's ability to resist is dealt a death-blow.

The revolutionary gains should not be given up simply because the enemy happens to gain the upper hand in the villages. We should attempt to regain and maintain them by hitting at the enemy. If the land falls into enemy hands, we should not helplessly leave it at that and take a programme of retreat. We should see to it that the enemy can not make use of it (by destroying or seizing the crop.) We should not allow the enemy to stay in the village. The peasants should seize the land whenever it is

possible and continue to hold on to it for some days or even months. They should attempt to enjoy the crop they cultivated. The enemy should not be allowed to cultivate, or if it can't be done, to enjoy the crop. The struggle for land should be continued without caring any physical hardship or economic loss and until the enemy is driven out of the respective areas and dealt a deathblow, no matter even if the land changes hand ten or even a hundred times in the mean time.

The reorganisation, development and extension of Gram Rajyas and mass organisations, and through them to develop the organised strength of the people, should be realised even while waging armed struggle to defend and extend the revolutionary gains. The present mass organisations should be developed into struggle - oriented organisations in the course of implementing the revolutionary programmes.

It will only be renouncing class struggle if one doesn't put up a serious resistance by fearing at the hardship and losses to be faced in this respect. All party members should realise that the responsibility to prepare the people for this lies on the party.

## VI Guerilla Struggle

The wrong trends of the comrades advocating withdrawal of Telangana armed struggle and a retreat are manifesting in the following forms in the main :

1. Tiruvuru, Palwancha and Munagala comrades are mixing up guerilla struggle and insurrection, and contend that guerilla struggle should be waged only when the majority of people all over India are prepared for struggle, and as such, Telangana armed struggle should be withdrawn.

2. Necessary conditions for insurrection do not exist in the country today. All the same, ones we took to arms there is no question of laying them down. So we should disband squads, make a retreat, and use arms only for self-defence of party members; this itself

should be termed as armed struggle. This is the contention of Huzurnagar comrades.

All are one in saying that continuation of armed struggle to defend and extend revolutionary gains of Telangana is not correct. And they bring in their own arguments in support.

The Telangana armed struggle has commenced at a stage when class struggle has reached the highest level, and at a time when the Nizam's rule has been overthrown, when the slogan of land to the tiller is implemented, and Gram Rajyas are set up in the process; and it was in order to defend and extend the land and Gram Rajyas. Thus the armed struggle was inseparably linked with land distribution and setting up of Gram Rajyas, and continues to be so even today. Forgetting this essential point, Huzurnagar comrades are understanding it as an isolated question, unrelated to the defence and extension of revolutionary gains. And, for the same reason, they say that they will disband the squads and continue armed struggle.

To go into this question in a greater detail, we have to examine, one by one, the arguments advanced in this connection.

## 1. Why Confuse Guerilla Struggle with Insurrection?

India "being a single administrative unit, a majority of the whole people should turn to despise the government. Then it can be begun from the Centre or from one end. Presently, however, such a political atmosphere has not yet developed .....

"To engage in insurrection against the present bourgeois government is suicidal." (Tiruvuru's Organiser).

"We wage armed struggle as an offensive struggle alone .... We should wage armed struggle only in an area which is suffici-

ently vast as to permit retreat and hitting at the enemy wherever possible. An armed resistance in a small area against a formidable enemy is suicidal." -- Palwancha's organiser.

When the Tiruvuru comrade says that insurrection should commence "either from centre or from one end", he means that power should be captured in key cities such as Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta, or that our armies should capture power in such areas as Kashmir and Assam which are bordering on Soviet Union, China and Burma, and gradually advance.

Before we proceed to examine their views, let us analyse the experiences of Russian revolution where power was captured through insurrection, and of Chinese revolution where power was captured by building a people's army and by liberating one area after another.

In Russia, the proletariat, which was seasoned in many a revolutionary struggle, seized power through insurrection when the conditions were mature for it. Peasant struggles that could reach the level of guerilla struggles did not develop in the countryside until that time. Land distribution and the setting up of village Soviets took place mainly in the period of insurrection and subsequently. The 1905 Revolution was suppressed not only in towns but villages also<sup>66</sup>. But after that struggles that reached the level of land distribution and setting up village Soviets did not develop in the countryside until 1917 October revolution. Therefore the Kulak class was suppressed and land was distributed to the peasants after power was seized through insurrection by the proletariat in the cities, and without the question of guerilla struggle. This is the experience of Russian revolution where power was captured through insurrection, which was by way of a concerted armed uprising in the towns by the working class and not by land distribution together with guerilla struggle.

In China also, there was an armed uprising of the working class in the key city of Shanghai in 1926 against the Manchu dynasty, but the city was lost to the bourgeoisie because of political weaknesses. When the bourgeoisie betrayed the revolution, joined hands with the imperialists and resorted to brutally crush the mass upsurge, the Communist Party awoke and seized power in Canton through insurrection. But the Kuomintang could suppress it with the help of the imperialists. But under its impact all over the country, peasantry prepared itself for a revolt in the countryside. Feeling the pulse of this mass upsurge, the Chinese Communist Party developed guerilla struggles in the villages. It has built the People's Army, and through a protracted struggle for 22 years to liberate China from the Kuomintang rule, it has liberated one area after another, and today it has drawn close to liberating entire China by occupying all the major cities.

Both the Russian and Chinese revolutions are led by the proletariat and have the worker-peasant alliance as their basis. There is no difference between them in the main aspects. But still there was a new experience in Chinese revolution that was not there in Russian revolution. The world proletariat itself got an invaluable experience that, even if the working class was, for the time being, suppressed because of overwhelming strength of the enemy class, it is not necessary that we sit helplessly on the plea that we can not do anything unless and until the working class is prepared for insurrection, provided the oppressed people in the countryside are prepared for an armed struggle; and that the proletariat can realise ultimate victory by overthrowing the bourgeois<sup>67</sup> power through guerilla struggle in the countryside, ie. by setting up liberated areas, and then, by liberating the towns and other rural areas. The armed struggle waged in the Nazi-occupied

66. There is a mention of peasants uprisings in some places leading to seizure of land etc. (during 1905 in the History of CPSU (B). Lenin's famous article on Guerilla Warfare appeared during this

period (1906) only, in which he defended certain types of peasants' actions as part of guerilla warfare.

67. see note no.4



territories during World War II, and the one being waged today in Greece prove the same. Without taking note of this new experience out of Chinese revolution, to bring in the formulation that it is suicidal to seek to accomplish revolution with the help of the vanguard at a time when the proletariat and the other oppressed masses of people are not prepared for an insurrection—a formulation that was made basing on the experience of Russian revolution—so as to counterpose it with Telangana armed struggle and advocate its withdrawal is meaningless.

The experiences that we had in Telangana armed struggle have shown a new path for New Democratic Revolution in India. Here the class struggle has reached a higher level in the countryside even before the working class was prepared for insurrection. By creating a people's army and overthrowing Nizam's power through armed struggle—on the basis of slogans of land to the tiller and Gram Rajyas—we could commence and advance revolution. Though, after "military action", the armed struggle suffered major setbacks because of weaknesses in the movement, the congress-Nizam set of ruling classes failed to suppress it by their armed forces. On the other hand, it is again spreading in the struggle areas and extending to newer areas. Thus Telangana armed struggle was not confined to overthrowing Nizam's rule; instead it is continuing to overthrow the Indian bourgeoisie<sup>68</sup> also from power. The experience of Telangana proves clearly that, even in India, it is possible to overthrow bourgeois-zamindari rule in the countryside by developing guerilla struggles basing on land question, and that such struggles will be of utmost help to the proletariat's struggle to seize power through insurrection.<sup>69</sup> After analysing all these experiences the Polit Bureau has resolved, as given below, on the

interrelationship between nationwide general political strike and armed uprising of the working class on the one hand, and the liberation struggles waged in the countryside on the other, in the present revolutionary situation:

"At the same time it is true that the battle is a hard one, people have to be won over, and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries who think that for revolutions people are not necessary, who forget that revolution is made by the majority of the people, have to be told that a swift and easy victory can not be expected. But this does not mean that general strike and uprising disappear. It is quite conceivable that in these revolutionary battles, centres in the cities might be temporarily crushed while in agrarian areas, because of the vastness, centres of resistance might continue and the struggle may reach high pitch. But this does not mean general strike disappears, armed uprising disappears, only civil war in the country-side remains. On the other hand in such circumstances general strike will have an electrifying effect. There is another trend which considers that agrarian struggles, Telangana etc. are nothing but partial struggles, that these struggles are to be fought as partial struggles, and that until the working class in the cities is able to capture power, agrarian struggles can not develop upto the point of liberation. This is an erroneous view. It fails to take account of the depth of the crisis of capitalism and the agrarian crisis growing as part of it. It fails to see that mass political strikes in the cities, at a time when agrarian struggles burst out in the rural areas, may strengthen the agricultural workers and poor peasants to raise their struggle to the highest pitch. upto the point of liberation of the area where such struggle develops". (Communist; June-July 1949. P. 88).<sup>70</sup>

68. See note no. 4

69. We used the word "insurrection" in accordance with the line the then Polit Bureau followed. We have used this word in subsequent pages also. We have

commented on this point in our foreward.

70. Presently this extract can be found on P.306 in volume VII of Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India; People's Publishing House, 1976.

Viewed in this perspective, it becomes clear that the decision to continue Telangana armed struggle is correct. On the contrary, to contend, as the Tiruvuru comrade does, that only partial struggle, and not armed struggle, can be waged in the villages today, and to thus counterpose insurrection and guerilla struggle, will not help to prepare the majority of Indian people for insurrection.<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, it only amounts to rejecting guerilla struggle, which is an essential component in such preparations. It needs no particular mention that it will greatly facilitate the working class to vanquish the bourgeoisie<sup>71</sup> and to seize power if the zamindari-land lord classes are dealt a death blow and the rule of their ally, the Indian bourgeoisie,<sup>71</sup> is overthrown in the countryside, even by the time the working class launches insurrection. On the other hand, to say that insurrection should take place all of a sudden and succeed, amounts to viewing insurrection as a very simple matter, wherein one fine morning the whole working class will wake up and, with guns on their shoulders, simply march on to Delhi, overthrows the ruling classes and seizes power.

In the present revolutionary situation, the strike-struggles of the working class and the peasant struggles in the form of armed struggles should go on simultaneously and in coordination, and they should all culminate into insurrection.<sup>72</sup> This is the path to be pursued in India today to accomplish the New Democratic Revolution. Telangana armed struggle is an integral part of these struggles, and hence, it is but suicidal to withdraw it.

Let us now consider the contention of Palwancha comrade that we should wage armed struggles as an offensive struggle and not otherwise. Such a view goes against the very fundamentals of guerilla struggle. "What is meant by guerilla struggle? What is offensive? What is defensive? If we understand these questions, it will be clear how his contention is wrong.

The people's struggle to liberate themselves from slavery under exploiting classes takes the form of guerilla struggle after it reaches a particular stage. This is the form of struggle adopted by people to advance revolution when they are confronted with an enemy who is superior in numbers, in training as well as in modern lethal weaponry. Therefore, a guerilla struggle is waged with the given strength they have and in an area where the people are prepared for it. Thus a guerilla struggle begins in a small area and with a small force (ie., with a few arms), rather than in a vast area and with a force large enough to wage an offensive struggle. This is how guerilla struggles commence and extend in the present era when the bourgeoisie<sup>73</sup> has to be overthrown.

What is meant by an offensive struggle and by a defensive struggle?

Until the time we become stronger, politically as well as militarily, than the enemy on an all-India scale, we will wage only a defensive struggle. In this stage we establish our base areas,<sup>74</sup> then organise liberated areas, raise a regular army, wage mobile warfare and then gradually pass into the offensive. We should not forget that in Chinese revolution, it was a defensive struggle that was waged until the fall of Mukden (1947-1948). It was only after the Chinese Communist Party became stronger, politically as well as militarily, than the Kuomintang that it had gone into the offensive.

Explaining that defensive measures are not opposed to Marx's enunciation on armed uprising, Mao wrote thus :

"When Marx said that once an armed uprising is started there must not be a moment's pause in the attack, he meant that the masses, having taken the enemy unawares in an insurrection, must give the reactionary rulers no chance to retain or recover their political power, must seize this moment to beat the nation's

71 See note no. 4

73. See note no. 4

72 See note no. 69

74. "Base areas" used for "guerilla zones".

reactionary ruling forces when they are unprepared, and must not rest content with the victories already won, underestimate the enemy, slacken their attacks or hesitate to press forward, and so let slip the opportunity of destroying the enemy, bringing failure to the revolution. This is correct. It does not mean, however, that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way." (Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War. Originally Quoted from China Digest, No. 7, 1949. Now it is taken from P. 106, Selected Military Writings, Peking, 1967.)

This view of Mao applies to us also. To launch guerilla struggle in a small area in the present situation, when we are required to fight against a militarily stronger bourgeoisie<sup>75</sup> to seize power, is in no way against the concept of insurrection.<sup>76</sup> On the other hand, it is only by thus launching the guerilla struggle in a small area and gradually extending and intensifying it while setting up base areas that we can seize control over a vast area. To say that we should have such an area right in the beginning goes against the concept of guerilla struggle. And thus there is no essential difference in the approaches of the Tiruvuru comrade, who contends that we should launch insurrection only after the majority of the people rally behind us and this does not necessitate any armed struggle in the mean time, and of the Palwanha comrades, who contend that we should straightaway launch armed struggle as an offensive struggle in a vast area without any guerilla struggles in smaller areas to begin with.

Even when viewed in the light of the experiences we had in Telangana armed struggle, their approach proves to be wrong.

After all we have not started Telangana armed struggle in the three districts all at a time. We began it in a few taluqs with a few squads.

It need not be recalled that it was a tough job for our squads to face the Nizam's police at that time. But soon the number of squads began to increase as land was distributed and Gram Rajyas set up in more and more areas. And gradually armed struggle spread beyond the two districts to newer areas. It should not be forgotten that we extended so much in spite of many wrong tactics.

Thus not only areas of armed struggle have spread, party's influence also increased by far. Under its impact people in areas where there was no struggle also are on the move. As a result, there developed conditions favourable to armed struggle in wide areas, particularly in entire Telangana.

Likewise we did not wage armed struggle as an offensive from the very beginning. Until two months before 'military action' our squads had to struggle at great sacrifice and with utmost hardship to be able to stand up in the field. It was only later that the enemy was demoralised and we could get on to the offensive.

Though the armed struggle suffered major setbacks after 'military action', it could still extend to newer areas. We are able to extend at great difficulty; with utmost effort we are able to resist the enemy and advance; but if we rectify our organisational weaknesses and lead the mass upsurge, there is no doubt that the armed struggle will develop and extend at a greater speed than now.

Tiruvuru and Palwanha comrades are not realising this process of development of armed struggle. It is only because of that wrong trend that they are contending that arms should not be taken up until a majority of people and a vast area is prepared for it; they are counterposing guerilla struggle and insurrection and are advancing a wrong programme to withdraw armed struggle and retreat.

And now let us examine the wrong approach of Huzurnagar comrades who advocate continu-

75. See the note no. 4

76. See the note no. 69

ing armed struggle without people and a guerilla army.

## 2

In "Andhra Committee's Letter" we have sharply criticised the wrong tactics that we pursued in armed struggle before and after "military action", pointed out the consequent damage caused to the movement and comprehensively explained the tasks to be fulfilled in the field of armed struggle. We have suggested that we should defend and extend our revolutionary gains by continuing the armed struggle after reorganising the squads and with tactics of lightning attacks.

Huzurnagar comrades are of opinion that "Andhra Committee's Letter" has only recognised "the imperativeness of armed struggle"; "but proceeded from an angle 'since people are demanding, let us continue armed struggle'; more so "it proceeded from the angle 'armed struggle only when there are squads'; and while cautioning about "utmost secrecy" it is giving a call for "street fighting". Thus they advocate an armed struggle without people and a guerilla army. Such an argument will only amount to making a mockery of armed struggle, and in practice, to stopping it and beating a retreat.

We are giving here below some extracts from their programme of retreat which covers not only questions of land and Gram Rajyas, but also armed struggle. An examination of the same will provide us a clear understanding of their approach.

"There is no other alternative than the guerilla way even to lead cell life. Cells should adopt the guerilla methods only to fulfill political organisational responsibilities. So only guerilla struggle will save our existence. Therefore 1. guerilla struggle is inevitable. 2 The political and guerilla activities should be carried out by cells themselves...

"To think that only killing a policeman or two is to strike at the enemy and, that only

then can it be considered as guerilla struggle, is a folly. Not to allow the police attempts to succeed and not to suffer losses at their hands is itself an attack on the police enemy.

"In taking action against people's enemies people's role itself should be the main role. It is futile to fire at the police to scare them away. On the other hand, it will only alert the enemy. So such firings on camps to create scare should be given up" -- (Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review).

All the tall talk that "there is no question of laying down arms" is only for this programme!

What is the essence of the above views?

1. The secret method of functioning the party cells is itself armed struggle, rather than the struggle to extend the revolutionary gains (land, Gram Rajyas etc.) by trouncing the enemy.
2. Guerilla squads should be disbanded. This is their programme of retreat.

How did armed struggle develop in Telangana? What is the relationship and the difference between party organisation and guerilla army? How should our tactics be in the present stage? Keeping these questions in view, the wrong trends of these comrades should be examined.

The development of Telangana armed struggle can be briefly traced as follows:

In the initial stages of Nalgonda struggle, village defence squads were organised to face the atrocities perpetrated by feudal landlords, their hirelings and the police. Thus they were successfully resisted. But when the struggle reached the level of farm labour's struggles and land distribution, it was impossible to put up resistance with that organisation. Because it was not developed into armed struggle, the

movement could not withstand the enemy's offensive and slackened.

The mass upsurge that slackened for the time being was once more on the upswing in a big way with the advent of the State congress movement.<sup>77</sup> The party took up the task of organising the upsurge. We organised village volunteer squads on a large scale and prepared the people to defend themselves as against the Razakars' hooliganism. We formed 'long-march squads' and extended the movement to newer areas with their help. These squads used arms ranging from slings to country-made guns. There is no doubt that, despite defects in organisation, they fulfilled their historic role by being of great help in checkmating the Razakars, in preparing the people for resistance by enhancing their self-confidence, in extending the movement, and in advancing it to the level of land distribution and setting up Gram Rajyas. And this armed resistance served as a preliminary stage for regular guerilla struggle.

It was in this stage that the regular guerilla struggle commenced. The formation of a regular guerilla army began at a stage when the people were distributing land and setting up Gram Rajyas after driving away the zamindars, Deshmukhs and landlords from the villages, so as to defend those gains and to prevent the Nizam reestablish his authority in the villages. Gradually it advanced and extended. To negate this form of mass struggle, by pointing at the defects, wrong tactics and other local mistakes, is against Marxist standpoint.

When we analyse the history of Telangana armed struggle, it becomes clear that it is a higher form of struggle adopted in the stage of land distribution and setting up Gram Rajyas. Even after 'military action', we are defending and extending the revolutionary gains, i.e. land, Gram Rajyas etc., and in line with it, continuing

armed struggle. When they fail to recognise the revolutionary character of Telangana armed struggle, and are prepared to liquidate the revolutionary gains, the land and Gram Rajyas, what then is their "guerilla struggle" for? Thus they forget the very objective of armed struggle and liquidate it in practice.

By labelling the armed struggle that is waged to defend and extend revolutionary gains as a "street fighting", by terming party's secret life as guerilla life, secret methods as guerilla methods and party's secret activities as guerilla struggle, they are making a mockery of armed struggle.

While it is true that all our activities and methods in armed struggle are secret in nature, the secret methods of functioning which the party adopts to protect itself from the enemy onslaught are not guerilla methods. The secret activities of the party by themselves are not armed struggle.

Further, by contending that 'striking at the police should not be considered as the main thing', and that "in taking action against people's enemy, people's role itself should be the main role", they are advocating renouncing not only the defence and extension of revolutionary gains but destruction of the enemy as well. Thus, we can not but conclude, that they are waging armed struggle only on paper and in words, but not against the enemy.

Having disbanded the guerilla squads, these comrades are unable to distinguish between cells, the primary units of the party, and guerilla squads, the primary units of a people's army. As a result they are merging the guerilla army in the party.

During the phase of anti-Nizam armed struggle, we merged the party cells in the guerilla

77. The State Congress started a satyagraha movement in 1947, August onwards to bring pressure on Nizam to join Indian Union. To begin with, it was a movement to 'fill the jails', and later, in the name of armed

struggle, Congressmen used to attack unarmed customs posts which were situated on the borders of the state. It fizzled out in no time.

squads rather than organising separately; thus we allowed the local party organisation to go astray. These comrades are introducing the wrong trend from the other end, by merging guerilla squads in the party. Not to build the local party organisation when the people are on the move, and not to build the guerilla army when the movement faces a setback—both of them are different forms of the wrong trend that mixes up party and people's army. In the absence of a local party organisation, the movement remained organisationally weak, and we could not extend to more areas and score more victories. And today, with the liquidation of the organisation of people's army<sup>78</sup>, the people go without their chief weapon of struggle that enables them to defend and extend the revolutionary gains and to realise victory in revolution.

If we examine the fundamental organisational principles of party and people's army, how absurd it is to seek to mix up the two will be clear :

1. Communist Party is the party of the proletariat that leads the New Democratic Revolution (NDR).

People's Army, on the other hand, is the military organisation of the people that wages armed struggle to make the NDR a success.

2. Party members are expected to accept the minimum as well as maximum programme of the party, be a member in the party unit, observe a conscious discipline with socialist consciousness and participate in evolving the party policy<sup>79</sup>.

A member of the people's army must accept the objective of accomplishing the NDR and to fight as a soldier in realising it. He should ob-

serve conscious discipline as required by the military organisation.

Thus the party and the people's army are two separate organisations. Therefore, to undo the separate existence of guerilla squads will amount to liquidation of armed struggle. To say that Telangana movement does not have the requisite level so as to build guerilla squads, i.e., the primary units of people's army, is only to assert that it does not also have the necessary level to wage armed struggle.

These comrades gave up the revolutionary gains, disbanded guerilla squads, renounced attacking the enemy. They equated secret methods of party functioning with guerilla struggle. And they have not stopped at that. They descend to characterise it as a "guerilla struggle that has reached the highest level" which has shed away "all the anti-guerilla and anarchist methods and policies" that existed in the anti-Nizam phase of the struggle. And they seek to defend their views by citing Lenin's references to unorganised, irregular and anarchic guerilla actions which cannot be equated to armed struggle.

While speaking of the efforts to be made by the leadership to remove the anarchist features that were found in squads when the countrywide guerilla struggle was going on against Japan, Comrade Mao, in his treatise on Guerilla Warfare<sup>80</sup>, referred to Lenin's views, and said that, simply because such anarchic features are noticed in some, they should not be branded as anarchist and bandit bands, and that such features can be removed through struggles. And comrade Mao never advocated, as these comrades do, disbanding the squads, liquidating the revolutionary gains, renouncing the task of attacking the enemy and withdrawing the armed struggle, and he never called secret party functioning itself as

78. guerilla forces.

79. by Participating in its day to day activities and providing his experience to the party. "Principles of Party Organisation", and other classics may be referred for further study.

80. See Lenin's article on "Guerilla Warfare" [Marx-En-

gels- Marxism - - P. 157 (1968 Edition)] It was quoted by Mao in his treatise on Aspects of Guerilla war Against Japan. The full text is not given in Mao's Selected Works; only the part dealing with the "Problems of strategy in guerilla War against Japan" is given in the Selected Military Writings., Peking Edition, 1967.

"real" guerilla struggle. The essence of what Mao and Lenin said was only that weaknesses in the movement and the squad organisation should be removed and armed struggle continued. And they are totally contrary to what is being advocated by these comrades. Therefore, to thus cite Lenin's views irrelevantly and to misinterpret them, is only making a mockery of armed struggle as well as Lenin.

And now we proceed to give some general suggestions to solve the problems which we are facing in the course of reorganising guerilla squads, and which are arising because of shortage of cadre and repression. They should be applied to the situation prevailing in various areas and a suitable programme decided upon.

1. The remaining cadres in various areas should be separated into those who can work in the guerilla front and those who can fulfill organisational responsibilities of the party; the former should be allocated for that front only.

2. There are a number of militants in the villages who have the required consciousness to join and work in central squads. As repression intensifies, people's hatred against the military regime also grows, and the number of those who come forward to join in squads and to fight also increases. Then there are militants who fight to defend their lands. Extensive recruitment into the central squads should be organised from among those who are courageous and have the struggle-consciousness. It is evident from experience that militants are newly joining in squads from among poor people in Manukota<sup>81</sup> and Bagath<sup>82</sup> areas. In view of the mass upsurge prevailing in the people today, it should be realised that such recruitment is not only possible but also necessary.

3. In areas which suffered setbacks, there are some who had quit the squads and were inactive due to political confusion that followed 'military action', but who are again getting ready to resume work. Reliable people from among

them should be recruited and reorganised into squads. If necessary they can be entrusted some ordinary work to begin with, and taken into squads after their integrity is tested.

4. The training to be given to central squads should be based on the tactics suggested and the perspective provided in the "Andhra Committee's Letter".

5. Local squads that can operate with cadres who are not exposed to the enemy should be formed on a large scale. They should be as one among the people and never get exposed under any circumstances. All their activities must be kept secret. In certain special circumstances they should not hesitate to claim to be congressmen and be prepared to be lost in the people. The local squad members should keep their presence secret and protect it carefully.

6. The local squads should be specially trained for sabotage activities. Squad members should develop the habit to use country-made arms. It should be realised that the positional war-approach, of treating only rifles, sten guns and bombs as arms and belittling country-made arms, is wrong and detrimental. Mao said in his work on Guerilla Warfare that even regular squads can continue to have country-made guns, spears and daggers, and warned that it is impossible to provide modern arms to all squad members. Our central as well as local squads should pay attention to using country-made arms.

7. The local squads should acquire skill in attacking the intelligence men, dislocating the enemy movements, confusing the military and police in the camps.....and in such other operations. Squads may be given a programme that suits their level, and their tasks can be gradually increased as they grow in experience.

It is wrong to contend that "the people themselves should play the main role in annihilating the CID's" (intelligence men). It emanates from a wrong trend which expects the people to stru-

81. Manukota -- Mahabubabad in Warangal District.

82. Bagath-- Ibrahim Patnam in Ranga Reddy or Hyderabad District.

ggle on their own. Of course people's cooperation should be enlisted in attacking the CIDs and such attacks would not succeed without such cooperation. But to contend that people themselves should attack, it must be said, is only to underestimate the role of the local squads.

8. Enemy movement will not only be more on the communication lines (Railway, highway, link roads that connect the highway and the camps) under enemy control, he will be in a position to immediately get reinforcements under any contingency. Therefore, secret squads that can carry out incessant sabotage work in those strategic areas can go a long way in harassing the enemy and driving him into a state wherein he cannot indulge in frequent attacks on areas which are far-flung from communication lines.

The wrong trend, "central squads for every operation", which arose as a result of positional war-approach during the anti-Nizam phase of struggle, should be shed. Central squads may some times become necessary in the absence of local squads. But to ignore the local squads and use the central squads in their place, is not only dangerous from the technical point of view, it will amount to shrinking the guerilla army organisation and guerilla activities also.

9. Party cells should be organised in central as well as local squads. We should distinguish squad members with party consciousness from those without it, and form the cells. The party members in the squads should command the affection and respect of the other squad members by dint of their ideal squad life, initiative, courage and political vision, and conduct themselves in such a way that they treat the party cell as the leader of their squad.

In this connection, it should be realised that the view, often entertained by comrades in the military front, "Party cell is detrimental to squad unity", is wrong. It arises as a result of not realising the leading role of the party cell.

10. A political programme should be commenced to develop a clear and correct perspective

in the squads towards the goal and programme of New Democratic Revolution and the leading role of the party.

Only when comrades realise the revolutionary character of Telangana struggle, the mass upsurge that could not be crushed even by fascist repression, and the opportunities for reorganisation, they can overcome the difficulties that crop up in this connection and can advance. Those comrades who do not realise these main points are adopting the path of retreat.

## Guerilla Tactics

Then the Huzurnagar comrades proceed to discuss the tactics that we should adopt. To give up the revolutionary gains, to disband the guerilla squads and 'not to attack the police' so that "the enemy may not be alerted" - such are the tactics that we should adopt in the "present stage of self-defence, more so in its preliminary stage", as they say, so as to preserve ourselves. That is, they give the label of "self-defence" to survive, without defending the revolutionary gains, and without destroying the enemy. It can only be a misrepresentation of "self-defence" and can not be defining self-defence from the point of view of guerilla tactics. Mao emphasises the importance of offensive for self-preservation and for destroying the enemy thus:

"...The initiative can be decisively grasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation must be organised on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Measures of tactical defence are meaningless if they are divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect support to an offensive... The offensive is the only means of destroying the enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while pure defence and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role in self-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy". (Mao: Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan; Chapter IV).



It is clear from the above that self-defence and destroying the enemy are inseparably linked. Without going in for destroying the enemy, we can not defend ourselves. If we are to preserve our forces, attacking the enemy is a must. It is one of the fundamental principles of guerilla warfare. There can not be a guerilla squad without guerilla activities. And to persist in guerilla activities, destroying the enemy is a must. Whatever the stage and whatever the tactics adopted, destroying the enemy and an offensive against the enemy must never be forgotten. It is for this reason that an offensive against the enemy and to be on the defensive, are not only closely but inseparably linked. Viewed thus, the tactics advocated by these comrades are either useless or of transient use for self-defence, and will, it must be said, lead only to self-destruction.

Thus it is clear that tactics of self - defence without destroying the enemy, are of no use even for self - defence. By contending that destruction of the enemy is an obstacle to party activities and hence needs to be put off for the time being, they are having another wrong trend. (They say it alerts the enemy). The organiser of Munagala Paragana is also one with him (Don't hit at the police). Everyone of our attacks on the enemy foils the enemy plans for the time being and prevents him from consolidating his position in the villages. It helps to demoralise and harass the enemy forces, while redoubling the people's capacity to resist. And as a result, there will be greater opportunities than before for the party activities, and not vice versa. On the other hand, to imagine that the enemy would allow the party activities if we do not attack him, is only an illusion. Everybody knows that the enemy's repression is same in areas of struggle, no matter whether we have just distributed pamphlets or attacked the enemy. This happens so because the enemy's objective is to wipe us out. Therefore it is wrong to counterpose destruction of the enemy and party activities. Our task is to advance the struggle by coordinating both of them.

Viewed in this perspective, the guerilla tactics, advocated by the "Andhra Committee's Letter" are practical and comprehensive, and in accordance with the present situation. However, it is of no surprise that in the eyes of Huzurnagar comrades, who not only do not give any importance to destruction of the enemy but are posing an obstacle to the advance of struggle, it is a call for "street fighting".

In addition to them, we need to adopt some more tactics in the light of our experiences over the last one year and a half. We will explain them here.

There are several important questions facing us in the present situation, when we are waging armed struggle to defend, consolidate and extend our revolutionary gains. If we are to continue armed struggle by withstanding the enemy's offensive, it is necessary that they are resolved with a correct perspective. Preserving our forces when the enemy's offensive is intense, keeping our squads well trained and fit and further developing them, preparing for an offensive against the enemy, to carry on party activities constantly, these and such others are some of the important problems before us, as is well known. And keeping them in our view, we should decide on our tactics. It calls for the following measures:

Firstly: we should develop the areas of struggle and areas where we are newly extending into guerilla base areas and guerilla zones.

Secondly: To resolve the problems that crop up during temporary retreat.

Thirdly: Propaganda among the enemy forces.

It is necessary that we briefly know the experiences in the struggle areas before we discuss these problems.

Explaining that areas where armed struggle goes on but the enemy is not yet destroyed, should be considered as guerilla zones, Mao says thus:

"When guerilla warfare began, the guerillas could not completely occupy these places but could only make frequent raids; there are areas which are held by the guerillas when they are there and by the puppet regime when they are gone, and are therefore not yet guerilla bases but only what may be called guerilla zones." (ibid. Chapter VI)

Our squads and the enemy forces confronted each other and fought unceasing battles until two months before "military action". Though we had to suffer greater losses in these battles because of our mistakes, Nizam's forces had their morale shattered, and were driven into the defensive as a result of the struggle that we courageously carried on. And gradually our squads launched their offensive. From that time onwards until 'military action', the area of armed struggle expanded over the entire districts of Nalgonda and Warangal and to their adjoining taluqs in Atraf Balga 83, Medak and Karimnagar districts. Land distribution and establishment of Gram Rajyas took place on a large scale. The squads grew in number. The intensity of raids over forest areas and areas far-flung from communication lines abated. The enemy was forced to wind up his smaller camps so as to concentrate his forces in a limited number of camps, and was able to raid only during daytime. With a more effective implementation of the mass programme in this stage, and with a pick-up in mass organisations and greater participation of people in resistance, the enemy's position in these areas was increasingly getting eroded, while our position was getting strengthened. And there were greater opportunities to develop the forest areas into strong bases, if we adopted correct tactics.

However, following the 'military action', the movement in the whole area had to suffer a major setback because of certain wrong tactics we had been pursuing since the beginning. However to say, on that count, that these areas ceased to be guerilla zones is wrong. Mao described the changes that take place in the

guerilla areas under such circumstances, as follows :

"Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversal of the state of affairs described above, i.e., a guerilla base may turn into a guerilla zone, and a guerilla zone may turn into an area under relatively stable enemy occupation". (Ibid. Chapter VI).

It was in the same way that we have lost a major part of our guerilla army and leadership in the wake of the enemy offensive that followed 'military action'. The leadership and squads that were saved left the struggle areas for areas of defence. As a result, the following situation emerged.

— Vast areas of defence, and plains areas surrounding them, where we have reached in course of our retreat: Armed struggle is going on in these areas. We should regard them as guerilla zones. Manukota, Pakala, Mulugu, Illedu, Palwancha taluqs are examples of such areas.

— Though we had lost contact with the struggle areas, the enemy could not "consolidate" there, because of mass resistance, and because the zamindars, Deshmukhs and landlords, shattered as their morale is, are fearing to stay in the villages. Most of the redistributed land is still in the hands of the people; the cadres remaining in the villages and the people are sniping at the feudal landlords; these and such other conditions are prevailing in these areas. And today guerilla squads are being reorganised and fighting is being renewed in these areas (Janagaon, Bhuvanagiri, Nallagonda, Suryapet, Khammam and other taluqs).

— There are areas where the enemy's occupation is more or less stable. Roadside villages, villages with stable camps where the feudal landlords can stay on, come under this category.

This in brief is the present situation. Now we can very well see that the view of these comrades - that the guerilla struggle waged in the anti-Nizam phase had no guerilla character, and so the movement had to be presently started with ABCs in the struggle areas - is untenable.

To develop armed struggle in all these areas, the following measures should be taken:

1. Areas that are safe by virtue of their topography should be developed into guerilla bases.
2. Areas which are otherwise, but are far-flung from communication lines, should be developed into strong guerilla zones.

How to carry out this programme?

**Developing Guerilla Bases:** Imparting political and military training to cadres in every area; production of arms and literature; other activities of Area Committees; (access to) areas that can meet requirements of temporary retreat when the enemy's offensive is intense in plains areas; these and such other main problems are confronting us today. So long as we do not develop topographically safe areas into guerilla bases, we can not solve these problems. For this, it is necessary that every area includes topographically safer terrains that have the potential to be developed into guerilla bases. In fact there are many such areas in our present area of struggle as well as in the area where we are newly extending. The crucial question before us is to develop them into guerilla bases.

Though it is not impossible to develop even plains areas, which are not topographically safe, into guerilla bases, it may not be possible to accomplish it in the immediate future, in view of our being forced to wage guerilla war in a rather limited area, and the enemy being able to concentrate his forces in large numbers. However, it is indeed possible to so develop the topographically safe areas.

Mao explains the need for guerilla bases in the following words:

SUPPLEMENT

"What, then, are these base areas? They are the strategic bases on which the guerilla

forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war. It is a characteristic of guerilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear." (Ibid, Chapter VI).

Thus guerilla bases are necessary not merely for solving the immediate problems. We have to develop them and make preparations, so as to go over from defensive to offensive and to intensify guerilla struggle.

However, we can realise that guerilla zones that are topographically safe have good potential to be developed into guerilla bases, if we keep in our mind the basic point that it is in course of struggle that guerilla base areas develop. Mao propounds that the transformation of a guerilla zone into a guerilla base area is possible only after the "enemy troops are annihilated" there and work advanced in mass fronts.

"A base area for guerilla war can be truly established with the gradual fulfilment of the three basic conditions, i.e., only after 1. the anti-Japanese armed forces are built up, 2. the enemy has suffered defeats and 3. the people are aroused", (Ibid); Mao says that a guerilla base can be established when there is this situation. By applying this to our conditions, we should take up the task of developing base areas.

The areas where we want to establish guerilla bases (they are topographically safe areas such as forests, mountains) are economically, politically and socially more backward than areas in plains. There is unlimited exploi-

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tation in these areas. The rich peasantry is smaller in number than in plains. They are even lesser or absent in tribal areas. Thus we should know the conditions of the people in the base areas we are going to setup, and evolve a suitable programme.

1. It is wrong to imagine that militants will come to the fore from among the people and join in squads, simply by our squads and organisers going to these areas and carrying on propaganda work. That will happen when we mobilise the people — against the system of exploitation by taking up such issues as illegal taxes and land on the one hand, and against repression with a suitable programme of resistance on the other hand. Though the people provide us shelter and help in the initial stage<sup>84</sup> because our squads and organisers are from plains areas, we need to put up lot of effort if they are to repose confidence in us and move in struggles. Our conduct should be ideal and above board giving no scope for doubt. We must display utmost patience in organising campaigns on various issues and in preparing for struggles.

By giving military training to the militants who come to the fore in such struggles, we should build large guerilla troops in these areas. We should think and decide on ways and means to launch attacks on the enemy with the native arms they use. This guerilla army will gradually develop into a regular army. This is the work that we should do to build the people's army.

2. The following course of action should be adopted to make these areas free from the enemy.

-- We should drive away the officialdom who are posted in these areas on behalf of the govt. to collect taxes and for supervisory work.

— We should drive away zamindars, dsh-mukhs, landlords and village officials.

-- We should keep a watch on those caste-elders and group leaders who are amidst the people but are working as enemy's agents; we should thoroughly expose them among the people and isolate them.

— We should be merciless towards the enemy's CIDs.

— We should drive away the enemy camps so that he can not remain in the safe areas. By seeing to it that the enemy cannot launch frequent raids from camps outside the area, we should gradually make it impossible for the enemy troops to set foot in these areas.

It is indisputable that all these can not happen overnight. Local squads have to develop and there should be sabotage activities on a large scale. Then we should develop regular guerilla squads, launch relentless attacks so that the enemy can not move his troops out of his camps, and we should create such conditions that the enemy is gradually driven into winding up the camps. The more this programme is advanced, the more these areas develop as base areas.

3. To raise the people's consciousness, mass organisations should be developed in addition to implementing a mass programme. They should be developed into organs of struggle free from the influences of caste-elders. Every issue should be presented in a straightforward manner, because the people are backward. Any programme of social reform should be carried out only when people are moving into struggles, repose full confidence in our leadership and mass organisations are being formed; it should be done through mass organisations only. To attempt to implement a programme of social reform without such ground-work, will be like imposing it on them. There will be the danger of the caste-elders and reactionaries exploiting it to rally the people against the party.

All these problems were indeed encountered by our squads and organisers in recent period, when they retreated into safer areas<sup>85</sup>

84. People were influenced by the armed struggle we carried on in the plains earlier.

85. "Safer areas" used here and elsewhere are forest and mountainous areas to which guerillas, faced with the offensive of Union armies, had retreated.

from areas of struggle. As a result of the efforts made by the party, the people in these areas not only helped guerilla warfare, but themselves participated in sabotage activities. They are joining in squads. Thus they are playing their own role in advancing armed struggle. But it should not be forgotten that this process has just began and we have a long way to go.

### Developing Strong Guerilla Zones in Plains Areas

In order to develop an effective armed, struggle in plains areas that are far-flung from enemy's communication lines, guerilla squads should be reorganised, people should be mobilised, to defend the revolutionary gains and secret party organisation should be established. (We have already explained these questions; on party organisation, we will discuss later.) However, we should presently take note of some important points. It is not possible to carry on the programme of struggle uniformly throughout the year in plains areas. During rainy and winter seasons, areas with standing crops and fields, big tank and river-banks greatly serve to protect us. Areas with water everywhere greatly curtail the movements of the enemy. Therefore we should intensify our resistance as well as mass programme in these seasons (it is also the season for the peasants to struggle for lands), and develop guerilla zones. With the onset of summer, the fields will be cleared, and the enemy will have the facility for greater mobility, which in turn will curtail our programme of fighting. At such times, we should leave behind in the villages some cadres and squads that will function secretly and carry on resistance, and move some of the guerilla troops to base areas.

### Disorganising the Enemy Bases in Areas With Road Communications

We have already mentioned that in these areas, there will be greater concentration and movements of the enemy. So it is not that easy to defend and consolidate our gains in such areas. This is so mainly because every minute we will be within the reach of enemy's attack. Therefore, we should intensify sabotage activities, cause obstacles to the enemy movements all the time, and persist in weakening the enemy bases. We

should intensify our raids on the enemy movements in areas that are topographically safe. Likewise, this programme should be intensified in the plains areas during rainy season and winter, so as to cause obstacles to raids on areas far-flung from communication lines.

**How to make a temporary retreat?** : Based on the experiences of the last one year, comrades in all areas are realising that, when the enemy is seeking to wipe out our squads and cadres by concentrating all his forces in one area, we can protect our movement and our squads and cadres only by retreating in a planned manner. What constitutes such a plan? What are the problems encountered during a retreat? What are the solutions to these problems?

These are the problems confronting us; Where should our squads and cadres retreat? What is the programme for our squads after retreat and before they reestablish their contact with the people? If squads, organisers and cadres -- all leave the people, what are the problems the people face? How to provide leadership to them at times of repression? These are some of the important problems that are confronting us today.

The question of where to retreat our squads and party leadership, can be solved only when we develop stable guerilla base areas. Therefore we should pay greater attention to the question of retreating into such bases in every area, however weak they may be. However, if such areas are too distant to permit an immediate retreat, we must start retreating even before the enemy launched his offensive. So we should see that the base areas we are going to build are within reach to plains areas. If we are far away from guerilla bases, we should retreat to guerilla zones where the enemy concentration is relatively less. Because the enemy will be in the know of our safe areas and bases, he may encircle them ahead of us, and seek to foil our programme of retreat. The Area leadership should scout it out, and make arrangements to reach into the bases through arcs and points where the enemy concentration is relatively less. If care is not taken in this regard, there is the danger of our squads

being bewildered and falling in the hands of the enemy. And we must retreat even while being prepared to resist the enemy.

It is indisputable that there is the danger of the cadre getting demoralised if they have no programme after retreat and before they re-establish contacts with the people. Therefore, basing on the new experiences gained during this period, the squads and local leadership should be given political military training; necessary organisational changes should be made; organisers should be given political training; and all this training programme should be completed in the intervening period. Such a policy will help us in two ways. Firstly: We can utilise the time and opportunity we have in the wake of retreat for such training without being required to specially recall the cadres from the front for training, which would have curtailed the programme of resistance atleast temporarily. Secondly: The retreated cadre will not get dispirited because of being away from the people; instead, they will gain new experiences, will be well trained, and be back in the front in full spirits. And, therefore, the resistance will now forge ahead with redoubled vigour. If the Area leadership is prepared for this well in advance, the training programme will go on briskly.

One problem that is being seriously encountered is: When the whole cadre is shifted away from the front, with no cadres who can function secretly left behind in the villages, how is it to maintain contact with the people? Because of not observing secret methods of functioning during the anti Nizam phase, the whole cadre was exposed to the enemy and most of them were caught by the enemy. And it becomes impossible even for the rest of the cadres to remain in the front during times of enemy concentration.

Therefore, the solution to this problem hinges on building a secret party organisation and secret local squads in the villages. When we

advance with this organisation, secret propaganda as well as sabotage activities will continue, in spite of enemy concentration.

At the time of retreat of squads and party leadership from an area, a detailed and comprehensive programme should be provided to cadres<sup>86</sup> who function secretly, and arrangements should be made for contact with them during times of offensive. It will be very useful if a section of the leadership remain in a nearby guerilla area where the enemy concentration is relatively less, and extend help to the cadres functioning secretly. While retreating from areas where such cadres who can function secretly are not yet ready, the cadres should not leave for base areas in their entirety; some of them should remain in guerilla areas where the enemy concentration is less, and then return to their areas to work; they should maintain contact with the cadres who left for the base areas. To resort to retreat without taking advantage of the protection that is naturally available during rainy season and winter, and of possibilities to remain secretly, and without observing technical regulations, is detrimental to the struggle.

The rainy season is coming to a close and it is quite possible that the enemy concentration will be all the more now. So our squads will be required to retreat not once, but frequently. We should be prepared to do it organisationally from the beginning.

The comrades advocating a retreat may now ask us: We are also for retreat and where is the difference between you and us? Comrades! Where is it that we do not differ? It is in order to renounce the revolutionary gains and withdraw the armed struggle that you are advocating retreat; you advocate disbanding the squads; you advocate not to hit at the enemy. Thus you are advocating a political retreat, and not a military retreat. What you advocate is not a temporary retreat, not by way of preparation to carry on the resistance against the enemy; instead, you have created a whole

86. Cadres who are left behind

stage of retreat, and contend that we should not at all continue armed struggle during this stage. What you say is POLITICAL RETREAT. And what we advocate is a retreat that is part of guerilla tactics. It is temporary and is such that it will carry forward the armed struggle.

#### We should Organise Propaganda amidst enemy armed forces

Hitherto, we have not been working with a realisation of the importance of this issue. News has been pouring in that there has been an ever-increasing despair and demoralisation in the enemy forces. The main reasons for their despair and desperation are frequent dismissals from service, not increasing the wages, refusing leave to go home, and in addition, fear of death.

Their confidence in the Union government and in ultimate victory has been dwindling be-

cause of China's victories and struggles in Burma and Malaya. These armed forces are particularly drawn from such politically backward areas as Nepal, UP, Rajasthan and Mysore. As they are forced to be far away from their homes for months together, their despair and demoralisation will increase rather than decrease. Though language is an obstacle for our propaganda among them, we should still do it through pamphlets.

We should organise extensive propaganda amidst Congress volunteer squads. There will be repression also on the local volunteer squads because of conflicts between the Congress factions led by Burgula<sup>87</sup> and Swamiji<sup>88</sup>. We should take advantage of the resultant discontentment among them, and intensify our propaganda among them.

Thus it will be possible to neutralise a section among them, particularly those from poorer classes.

## VII. PARTY ORGANISATION

Defining our tasks in the party front in Telangana, "Andhra Committee's Letter" has given a call to reorganise the party organisation on correct foundations while continuing the armed struggle. These comrades, who are arguing that we should withdraw armed struggle and retreat, contend that the enemy is strong and the people are not prepared for armed struggle; and further, that there is no party organisation at all in Telangana. And then, they advance yet another wrong formulation that we should start armed struggle only after a strong party is built. They contend that the call given by the Andhra Committee to reorganise the party is not correct. They express their retrogressive view on Party organisation in Telangana in the following words:

"But for a handful of important cadres here and there, there is no real communist party exist-

ing in Telangana today. So, the armed struggle should be begun only after the party is brought up to a level in Telangana"

-- Munagala Paragana's Organiser.

"There is no really strong, well-trained, extensive and deeprooted party organisation .... How, then, can we carry on the armed struggle?" -- Tiruvuru's Organiser.

"Under these circumstances, we should regard it a great victory for us if we are able to set up the party organisation to the possible extent and to evade the enemy by not getting caught" -- Huzurnagar Area Committee's Review.

One of them says there is no party at all in Telangana. Another says that there is no deep

87. Burgula Ramakrishna Rao was leading a Congress faction and was a representative of landlords loyal to Sardar Patel at the centre.

88. Swami Ramapanda Teertha - a gandhian and a follower of Nehru; claimed to be leading anti-landlord group. There were serious conflicts between the two for some time.

- rooted party organisation. Yet another says that we should set up the party to the possible extent. Yet all of them advocate that we should withdraw armed struggle and take up party building. Instead of resolving, with a correct perspective, the problems that are cropping up in the course of reorganising the party in Telangana today, and continuing the armed struggle, they are counterposing party building with armed struggle, and introducing a wrong formulation that we should build the party by withdrawing armed struggle and without struggles.

This is not the first time to bring in party organisation as a hurdle with a view to apply brakes so that mass struggles do not reach a higher level in Telangana. Though the peasantry was prepared to defy the then existing government laws and wage struggle during the tenants' struggle of Suryapat<sup>89</sup> area, instead of organising it, it was watered down with the excuse that the party did not have the requisite strength. It was again with the same pretext that an attempt was made to see that the Janagaon struggle<sup>90</sup> did not take a militant shape. Even while the people had redistributed land during Nalgonda struggle<sup>91</sup>, it was contended that the party did not have the required capability to lead such a struggle, and thus a struggle that had reached a high level was relegated. It is with the same trend again that these comrades today are advocating withdrawal of armed struggle because they say, the party does not have the requisite strength.

Should the party be built through revolutionary struggles? Or should the struggles be left to winds and party be consigned to flames?

Is it not possible to reorganise party in Telangana? Must we start building the party with ABCs?

What are the problems that crop up in the context of reorganising the party? And how should they be resolved?

If we examine these questions, we can very well understand their retrogressive view towards party building.

An examination of the experiences of Telangana struggle shows that where revolutionary struggles were boldly led and organised, the party became strong. Where they were relegated with the pretext that the requisite strength was lacking, the party remained nominal. However the party policies of the day were an obstacle to develop the struggles to a higher level, an attempt was made in Nalgonda district to take the struggle to a higher level atleast to the extent possible by implementing a militant programme. As a result, not only did the enemy fail to suppress the movement; the party emerged stronger after every struggle. Though the party organisation could not be given a proper shape because of a reformist political line on one hand, and intense repression by the enemy and weaknesses in party organisation on the other hand, the party was getting stronger with every struggle. The extension of party organisation to many villages, the spread of party's influence not only to areas of struggles but over entire Telangana, and the diminishing influence of Congress are an evidence of Party's strength.

89. The struggles mentioned here took place in 1942-43. There was no tenancy Act as such which protects the rights of the tenants partially or wholly. The only Act which goes in favour of the tenants was: those with continuous (uninterrupted) possession of the land as tenant would not be evicted. Since there were no records to prove their occupation, the tenants as a general rule were evicted from the tenancy lands by the landlords. We organised them so as to resist evictions. The party leadership at State level, characterised our activities as left sectarian, because the party and people were not strong enough to adopt such tactics. It should be noted that there were tenancy problems all over the

State, but not a single party unit in other districts took up the issue and organised the struggle.

90. The "attempt" mentioned here was more by local leadership and in certain aspects by the leadership at higher levels also.

91. The struggle in Nalgonda district (1945-46) could not extend to other parts of the district. The party units in other districts also did not develop an agrarian movement of this type. They advanced so many reasons to defend themselves, one of them being that the party was not strong enough to lead such struggles.



By leading the anti-Nizam armed struggle, we could extend our organisation quite well in three districts. We could extend our political influence throughout Hyderabad State. We could not much strengthen the organisation because of mistakes committed in the organisational sphere<sup>92</sup>, true but it is wrong to say that it was not stronger than before.

Though the movement did suffer a setback because of not adopting correct tactics in the wake of "military action", with our decision to carry on armed struggle by reorganising the

movement with the help of cadres left with us, we could come out of disastrous situation our movement was thrown into as a result of mistakes committed earlier, could establish ourselves, and are able to gradually advance. Now a situation has emerged wherein the enemy could not suppress it even after one year. We are able to defend the revolutionary gains, extend the struggle, and develop the organisation as well. In Manukota, Palwancha and Bhuvanagiri areas, we are able to advance by carrying on the struggle and reorganising the party simultaneously. In Janagaon area, where we were routed we have revived the armed struggle together with reorganising the party.

What do these experiences conclude? It is only by leading, and by passing through revolutionary struggles that the party becomes strong, politically as well as organisationally. It is only by rectifying the organisational weaknesses that are there in the party at the time, and by carrying on struggles simultaneously, that we can overcome them. On the contrary, neither can we overcome them, nor build the party, by postponing the revolutionary struggles, or by withdrawing them and concentrating on "party building".

Instead of continuing the armed struggle by defending and extending the revolutionary gains in Telangana, they are for giving it up. With such

a programme, how will it be possible to develop party organisation, or even to keep close to the people and to protect ourselves by not getting caught by the enemy, as Huzurnagar comrades contend? If one goes by their formulation, no one should be surprised if the people's resistance gets gradually extinguished and a situation may befall us wherein the party would not have even the support of the people.

We have already stated that, in the present situation, there is no gulf as such between local struggles and political struggles. And it follows that we can build the party through all the struggles that we are waging today. There is no point in Munagala Paragana Organiser's contention that Party organisation must be developed only through local struggles.

There can not be a greater 'blindness' than to say that the party in Telangana is not "rooted among the people", as contended by Tiruvuru's comrade. If the Union armies failed to isolate the party from the people in spite of unleashing fascist repression since last one year, and if the people in the struggle areas are braving repression without revealing the party secrets, how deep-rooted the party is too self-evident to comment. If we have suffered too many losses, it is because of our wrong tactics, and not because the party had no roots or had weak roots in the people. It should not be forgotten that the people are looking for the party to lead their struggles, not only in struggle areas, but in the whole state.

The crucial problem before us is: how to reorganise the party simultaneously with carrying on the armed struggle, and this amidst worst repression and at a time when the movement is so badly hit. And this we must solve.

The main obstacle in building the party is:  
1. A wrong approach towards party building.  
2. The 'legal barracks methods' that are being adopted while functioning. All the problems that we are encountering in this regard are emanating from them.

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92. The mistakes committed by the party were not limited to organisational sphere. The political line adopted by the party was itself wrong, as mentioned elsewhere.

Firstly: Today our party is not confined to Area Committees, organisers and a few hard-core squad members in the struggle areas as it appears on the surface. There are countless numbers of militants who have come to the fore in the anti - Nizam phase of struggle, and also, as a result of the year - long resistance we have been carrying on. To presume, at a time when a massive struggle of this nature is going on, that the number of militants will be very limited is only to underestimate the revolutionary consciousness of the people.

We can activate these militants in the villages and the Gram Rajyas, defend the redistributed land and carry on local struggles on farm Wages etc. - which are the main issues before the people - only when we continue armed struggle. The militants who come to the fore while we prepare the people for struggles on these issues should be organised in local as well as central squads. And this chain of squads should be extended not only in struggle areas but also the ever - expanding areas. This will be possible only when we properly dispose our present cadres between the party and guerilla front, and simultaneously reorganise the party and carry on armed struggle.

We recruit as party members only such people who come through central and local squads, and from mass organisations such as Gram Rajya Committees and agricultural labour committees, and who are tested in struggles and have the requisite party consciousness; we organise them in party cells and build the party. It is only in this way that we can build a strong party.

The mistake that we committed was not in starting armed struggle without a "strong revolutionary party organisation", as contended by Paragana 93 comrades. It was because we failed to organise the militants who came to the fore in course of armed struggle into squads, and because we did not develop party organisation

locally that can function independently. And now we must rectify that mistake by organising party cells which can function independently, and not by withdrawing, as they contend but by continuing armed struggle. This alone is the correct way. It is a fundamental principle of the party that a strong party ought to be built through revolutionary struggles alone. As long as this principle is not grasped, it is impossible to reorganise the party and carry on armed struggle simultaneously.

Secondly: What are the qualifications of party membership? It was very clearly explained in "Andhra Committee's Letter" thus:

"A. They should understand and accept the aims and programme of the party.

B. They should observe a conscious and iron discipline based on democratic centralism, i.e., they should frankly express their opinions during discussions in their cell or committee, and participate in taking decisions; they should obey the decisions of the majority and of a higher committee; they should not reveal their cell secrets to others.

C. They should sacrifice their whole, even their life if need be, for the party.

D. They should have a moral life that is no hindrance to the party prestige and party activities. Placed as we are in a society that has no economic basis for an ideal life, drinking and adultery by mistake are not disqualifications for party membership. Only drunkards and debauchees have no place in the party. Provided all other qualifications are there, one can be taken in to the party in spite of having the above vices,<sup>94</sup> if they are within limits.

Note: Those from among poor peasants and labourers should be taken into the party if they have all other qualifications, even if they can not clearly express party's aims and

93. Here Paragana means Munagala Paragana. See note no 11.

94. This does not mean that they had licence to continue

with these vices. They were expected to rectify themselves as soon as possible. In most cases membership was given to those who rectified beforehand.

objectives and programme. However, we should explain to them the Party Constitution, the thesis of the Party Congress, and Party's Programme for Hyderabad State. The Pledge contained in the Party Constitution should be read out for them in party cells. Those coming from exploiting classes must be observed in the course of struggle, whether they have shed away the negative features of their class before recruitment into party as well as promoting to higher positions."

Thus the "Andhra Committee's Letter" has defined, in detail and comprehensively, the qualifications for party membership. In this connection, the party aim cited in (A) above, should be understood as realising the chief aim of the party, i.e., socialist revolution and proletarian dictatorship, as also the immediate aim, i.e., New Democratic Revolution. What is being implemented today in guerilla areas is the programme of New Democratic Revolution.

Though most of those who withstood the present repression are eligible for party membership, the Area Committees should assess each of them in respect of the above qualities and recognise them as party members after taking the advice of Area Organisers. When there are well-developed zonal committees and party cells, this responsibility can be entrusted to them alone.

The formulation made by Huzurnagar comrades that "the conduct of those who hail from rich class should be observed with special attention", is disruptive. It leads to formation of factions in the party. Because of observing class differences in the party, there was no unity in it. This goes against the very concept of a united party, based on Marxist-Leninist theory.

It should not be forgotten that, once those from richer classes shed away the features of their class, all party members will have equal

rights. Party members should be observed whether they are developing or not, as seen by their role in struggles, and be promoted or not on that basis; on the contrary it is impermissible to discriminate between those from richer classes and from poorer classes. Even in this respect, the above excerpt from "Andhra Committee's Letter" provides a correct understanding.

**Thirdly: Functioning:** The Huzurnagar comrades have a wrong approach -- in that they belittle functioning through units while attaching importance to functioning as individuals -- which is very clearly seen in the decisions taken by the Area Committee (AC) on the question of functioning. Their decisions are:

**Party functioning :-** the main centre of the AC will be located in a safer area<sup>95</sup> and subordinate to that there shall be another centre inside.<sup>96</sup> With an uninterrupted link and close ties between them, their work will be coordinated through the main centre. In line with this, the comrades in charge of the AC will work as two segments, and discharge their responsibilities basing themselves on two centres. The comrades in charge of AC will divide various fronts between them, those who are concerned with the (division of) work will go to the safe area as and when necessary.

AC will continue to function with five members.

**AC meetings:** Meetings are being held frequently disregarding the present critical situation. Meetings held once in a fortnight every month are harmful technically and organisationally. Meetings are being held even before the decisions of a previous meeting are taken into the people and results obtained; as a result, the same decisions are again taken and ultimately there have been no results of meetings. In view of these losses, there should be a gap of atleast three to four months between two

95. Places where we had protection especially forests and mountainous regions.

96. Inside struggle areas.

There should not be more than three persons in the secretariats of ACs. By this curtailing it to three, it will be possible to overcome the technical problems that arise out of repression, and to hold meetings whenever necessary.

These secretariats should function as permanent committees. The committee should discuss and decide on the issues of any front, i.e., irrespective of fronts and work division.

At a time when we have to lead armed struggle even while facing fascist repression, we will be called upon to regularly take and implement major decisions on many crucial issues day in and day out. Or else, waiting for suggestions from higher committees or secretaries; suggestions not reaching well in time because of problems related to a period of repression; the critical moments would have come and gone; consequent discontentment with the feeling that the higher committees are not helping; damage to the struggle in the mean time; this is what is going to happen.

It is not correct for a secretary to take decisions on his own. However experienced a secretary might be, his decisions will still be his own opinions, and they can not have the completeness of decisions that are taken basing on the sum total of experiences of the three committee members. When three comrades function thus as a unit, there is no need for a higher committee member to attend each and every meeting.

If a programme is to be decided for an area in accordance with decisions of a higher committee, a programme that is decided after a collective discussion will be more comprehensive than one decided by a secretary. It is indisputable that a three-man-unit will be more effective than one person in regularly providing leadership to the lower committees, in sending their experiences to higher committees and in implementing the decisions of higher committees. This method will also be democratic.

The insufficiency in level should be overcome through ideological work, unit functioning and self-criticism. The higher committee should help much in this regard. The ACs

should provide even direct help to the lower committees and organisers, depending on the need. The political level of committees should be developed in this manner, and no other recourse should be taken.

To develop to a level wherein decisions are taken independently, and by displaying initiative - this is what is meant by live functioning of a unit. Only when a AC makes a beginning with unit functioning and advances, possibilities will open up for lower committees also to develop.

Fourthly: The system of permanent schools should be introduced. Party schools are necessary so that all party units function independently and develop properly and in order to develop the ideological education of party members. All those recruited as party members should be given political training in these schools. Mere reading of (party) journals and circulars, or their being read over, should not be considered as political training. Only when a minimum understanding is developed on fundamental principles of Marxism, on party programme and organisational principles of party, can it be considered that political training is given to cadres.

Fifthly :- How should the tech. system be?

We are reproducing two opinions within the Huzurnagar AC on the question of safety of cadres:

"1. The limited cadre in the area is already exposed. Even the cadres' level is low. The people don't have the consciousness to defy the class of rich. So all of them have to be sent to areas of safety in the event of large-scale raids. By thus sending them in a planned manner, we can switch them back into the front anytime.

"2. If cadres are sent to areas of safety, the initiative will pass into the hands of the enemy. If contacts are broken, it will be many days before they are reestablished. And we can't know who have turned into enemies in the mean time. The loss will be more when they leave the front than

when they are retained in the front." (AC Report. D/ 26-6-1949).

If we add their suggestion that members on behalf of the higher committee should attend each AC meeting to these opinions, how defective their technical system is, becomes clear. The essence of their opinions is as follows:

1. It is impossible for cells in the villages to function secretly when repression is intense.

2. At such times, either we leave the people to reach areas of safety, or we remain with the people and fall in the hands of the enemy, and there is no other alternative.

3. PC members should continue to attend AC meetings as in the period when the party functioned openly.

There are two main reasons for our not being able to function secretly in times of intense repression :

1. The main reason is the practice of 'barracks methods',<sup>98</sup> of the "Razakars' times" of course with slight modifications, as opposed to working with strictly secret methods that are in keeping with a correct assessment of the intensity of repression. When such wrong methods are practised, the people also would hesitate to give shelter lest they may get exposed soon. Being unable to remain amidst the people with self-confidence, cell members, squad members and other local cadres leave away to areas of safety, even with the slightest doubt.

2. It is inevitable that people's support would diminish after squads and Gram Rajyas are disbanded and the programme of "self-defence" is adopted. And as a result, even when the repression is intensified a little more, they will be on the run for areas of safety. Thus, in addition to adopting a programme of political retreat, it is the "barracks methods"<sup>98</sup> with no changes in tune with repression, that

are chiefly responsible for not being able to function secretly. Though it is more difficult for local comrades who are already exposed to function secretly than for newer comrades, it is not impossible. When we recruit party members and form cells from among those of local squads and other local cadres, it will be all the more necessary to adopt rigorous secret methods. Otherwise the same situation will be faced again and again.

Bhuvanagiri Area Committee comrades tell us as follows how, because of a rigorous practice of 'tech' 99 principles, the squads are able to operate with self-confidence and how people are coming forward to provide shelter to the squads :

"Comrades are taking strict 'tech' precautions. Any negligence in 'tech' matters is being treated by us as going against party discipline and action is taken accordingly. The strict 'tech' precautions being taken are having a positive effect on the people and they are well appreciating the secret methods.

"We got firm confidence that squads can operate without any losses if 'tech' principles are strictly observed. The squad members also have the same opinion. There has developed a good opinion among the people also about these 'tech' principles." -- Bhuvanagiri Area Committee's Report (22-7-1949).

It needs no explanation. Those comrades who claim that "it is impossible to function secretly" because repression is intense, should take lessons from these experiences of Bhuvanagiri comrades and function by observing secret methods strictly.

To underestimate the revolutionary consciousness of the people and advocating a retreat by withdrawing armed struggle; to underestimate the repression by the enemy and adopting "barracks methods"; and to run for areas of safety or preparing to be caught by the enemy when such methods fail; all these are various

98. Virtually open and loose methods.

99. a word used for secret methods,

meetings. It was decided that in only such meetings the good and bad results of the decisions taken will come out and they will greatly help our advance. We also make it known that one member from the State faction should attend such meetings".-AC's Report (26-6-1949).

The essence of their views is: There should be an Area Committee formed with five members. The AC members should function by being in charge of their respective fronts in accordance with the principle of division of work. The secretary should provide leadership to the movement by remaining in the Centre. In view of the technical difficulties, AC meetings should be held only 3-4 times in a year. Because the AC does not have the required level, these meetings should be conducted by the higher committees themselves.

This is nothing but introducing individual functioning in another form under the pretext of repression.

Reviewing the party functioning during anti-Nizam phase of struggle, they write thus:

"There was no cell organisation at all. Cell life was non-existent. The whole movement was conducted by organisers and commanders as individuals. There was no more the tradition of thoroughly and collectively discussing the situation regularly and of rectifying party's slogans of policy and the practice with a self critical attitude. The slogans that were provided by the higher committees were never understood politically and in their depth; instead, they were implemented haphazardly and blindly. Opportunities were closed for AC members, organisers, commanders and other cadres to contribute in the decision-making of policies and tactics, and to fulfill their responsibilities. The organisers and commanders have become allpowerful in respect

of their areas and their programmes. The people and cadres were mortally afraid to express themselves against leaders of their centres and areas. Thus the initiative of the people had been killed. A situation had developed wherein the leaders were dictators and followers were blind. Though it was not the same with everybody, it must be said, the net result was the same."

Then they characterised the gulf that had "developed between organisers and commanders" thus:

"The commander of a squad did not allow the central organiser to attend the squad meeting. A Military Commander (an AC member) of the area was not allowed to attend the meeting and was made to sit outside. This anti-party trend had innocently crept into the party, flourished day by day and ultimately took such a monstrous shape. The Titoist<sup>97</sup> seeds were sprouting in another form."—AC's Review.

Before we discuss the question of unit functioning, two words are to be spoken on the above excerpts from the Huzurnagar AC's Review.

Firstly: They write of the evil effects of individual functioning during anti-Nizam phase of struggle, but at the same time they attempt to introduce the same method of individual functioning in their AC and foster all these evils. By proposing that AC should function as individuals between two meetings, they are going back to the same old wrong trend.

Secondly: By citing some individual cases such as that of Kota Narayana and Raju in

their area as basis, they are characterising Party leadership as dictators, bureaucratic and other wrong tendencies prevailing in the party as "Titoism", and thus the Area Party as a bunch of Titoists. The party has been regularly taking ac-

97. Titoism: At the time, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia headed by Tito was expelled from international Communist movement. He was character-

ised as one adopting dictatorial methods against the opposition inside the party. The words "Titoism" and "Titoist methods" used to denote dictatorial methods and related tendencies.

tion against above mentioned persons and such other persons whose wrong trends crossed all bounds. The method of unit functioning that is being enforced today will gradually help to remove the bureaucratic tendencies in the movement. But it is neither by criticism nor of self-criticism, that these comrades are sticking labels such as dictatorship and "Titoism" to the bureaucratic tendencies in the party. Just as they negated the revolutionary character of the anti-British armed struggle, only to liquidate the entire struggle that has taken place till now and to advocate its withdrawal, they are going to the extent of characterising the party as a "bunch of Titoists" only to negate party's existence in Telangana and to justify their programme of retreat.

To so characterise is nothing but mud-slinging against the party. It can only be betraying their contempt towards party leadership and cadres who have won the hearts of the people. With this wrong approach, even while admitting of the evil effects of individual functioning, they are seeking to reintroduce and justify the same.

And now let us discuss the method of individual functioning. Because of individual—instead of unit-functioning, the party members were unable to discharge their responsibilities in evolving the party policy. The party lagged behind in thoroughly discussing the decisions of the higher committees and the problems encountered in the field from time to time and in self-criticism; as a result it could not develop. It was because of this that it became possible for bureaucratic tendencies to creep in, and for self-seekers and opportunists to reach into key positions in the party and sabotage the struggle. Thus the armed struggle was greatly weakened. These were the chief defects in our party functioning. It has long become an indisputable point that individual functioning was responsible for all this.

If one goes by the principle of division of work as decided by the Huzurnagar AC, the AC members will be required to function by holding responsibility of their respective fronts, and by implementing the decision mainly of the secretary on the issues they face because the secretary will be in the centre. Either they must consider is-

ues individually and take temporary decisions, or think over the problems and decide on their own, or implement the decision of the secretary. Even the circulars from the higher committees will have to be applied and implemented on their own; and there would not be any collective and thorough discussion and understanding on the part of the committee, nor would there be deciding on a programme on that basis. After all there can be any number of circulars and documents from higher committees between two meetings of the AC. Thus, according to their decision, the AC members as well as the secretary will be required to function as individuals in the intervening period between two meetings, and there would not be any scope for functioning as a unit. Even if opinions are exchanged through correspondence, they will remain as opinions and can not be decisions.

In meetings held three or four times in a year, it will of course be possible mainly to analyse the experiences gained in an intervening period, and to decide on a broad general programme until the next meeting. But they are of no use to regularly discuss the issues, and the decisions and documents of higher committees, and to decide on a programme. It is technically impossible to hold meetings with all the six comrades (ie., including the member of the higher committee) whenever it is necessary.

In view of these reasons, Area Committees that are formed with five persons and meet three or four times in an year, will remain, in practice, as only wider committees that take general decisions on issues. And the day to day work will be carried on individually rather than through a unit. Thus the AC members will continue to function individually as before, and there won't be any unit functioning. As a result, so far as the AC is concerned, individual functioning will continue as before. And the same old evil effects will come out in an even uglier form.

Thirdly: Then, how is it to solve the technical difficulties, and those that arise because of lacking in the requisite level to function independently, and to rebuild the party on correct foundations?

forms of the same wrong trend. And it is because of this that they are unable to change their methods in keeping with the changes in the situation, and consequently, the party and the struggle are facing setbacks.

Thus these comrades are advancing formulations that go against the main principles of party organisation even in the organisational sphere, in addition to their political retreat. They are detrimental to party reorganisation and to continuing the armed struggle in Telangana. And it is necessary that they should say goodbye to such wrong formulations.

## Conclusion

Comrades,

We have, in this document, comprehensively criticised the self-destructive slogan that raised its head in the party recently, viz. that "Telangana armed struggle" should be withdrawn and we should retreat", as also the wrong trends that emanated from it. We have criticised these wrong trends by basing on the invaluable experiences that we gained in Telangana struggle till now, and with the hope that our criticism will greatly help to overcome these wrong trends in the party, so as to remove any doubts on the question of continuing Telangana armed struggle. And we are confident that this criticism will not only provide a clear perspective towards Telangana struggle, but will also help to advance the struggle with a redoubled vigour.

The following is the essence of this document:

1. Let us remember the hundreds and thousands of guerilla fighters who laid down their lives in Telangana armed struggle and proceed to defend the revolutionary gains, i.e., the land, the Gram Rajyas, and the rights of the labourers, the abolition of forced labour (vetti) and atrocities of the landlords etc., and by reposing a firm confidence in the revolutionary energy of the masses of people of Telangana, and by providing leadership to them,

we must continue armed struggle without any vacillation whatsoever. We must put an end to the "company orientation" and "company tactics" that are disastrous in the present situation. We must continue the struggle by adopting strict guerilla tactics and by reorganising the guerilla squads.

2. We should mobilise the people for land distribution, Gram Rajyas, demands of the labourers and for direct resistance. The present areas of struggle should be safeguarded and orideas of struggle should be reorganised. We should extend the struggle to newer areas. By basing on mountains, forests and areas of safety, we should build bases that are impenetrable to the enemy.

3. We should put an end to the wrong organisational methods of the past and to the 'tech' methods of the "barracks style", and reorganise our party, the party of the proletariat, on the basis of totally secret methods, so that we can smash the enemy's plans, can provide leadership to the armed struggle and to the people of Telangana, and can lead to a victory.

We should put an end to individual method of functioning and develop unit method of functioning. We should mobilise the militants coming to the fore in struggles into the party. We should develop ideological work in the party by starting permanent schools.

4. We should expose, and isolate from the people, the Congress and other bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties. Though the Congress is getting isolated from the people on its own, we should not display any laxity whatsoever in exposing it. Intense efforts should be made to isolate from the people, the Socialist Party and other petty bourgeois parties that are disrupting and deviating the mass struggles.

Comrades should realise that the tasks before us are inseparably linked and that the armed struggle will advance only by fulfilling them simultaneously.

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100. moving more or less openly in big squads, which was the practice in the "Razakar days".



If we compare the present situation with the situation when it was decided to carry on the armed struggle against the Indian bourgeoisie 101. also, it becomes clear that we are stronger today than at that time. Though mass struggles had just begun at that time in other States in India, still, out of the armed forces that he concentrated to suppress the mass movement in Andhra Desha, the enemy could deploy a major part to crush the Telangana armed struggle. Besides this, if we keep in view the temporary illusions and confusion caused as a result of "military action" among the people of the State and of India, we marched ahead by continuing the struggle all alone. But comrades should note that situation has changed to a great extent and we got strengthened. Mass struggle have burst out in other States in India. The working class is marching ahead by waging protracted strikes also. Resistance has begun in Andhra 102 and raids are being organised against enemies of the people. And today the stage has gone when the enemy could send his armed forces from Andhra onto Telangana. Thus by following the path of Telangana, the Andhra masses have also moved in struggle.

The temporary illusions and the confusion that affected the people of the State are being

101. See note no 4.  
102. See note no 34.

shed away, and people are getting prepared for struggles everywhere. They are ready to go on struggle the moment the party gives the lead.

The boasts of the enemy that he will wipe us out in just six weeks in the struggle areas proved to be vain. Leave alone six weeks, even after one year, he failed to crush us. During this period, we have continued the armed struggle by putting up with untold and allround hardships, and are able to advance step by step. And the people are moving in struggles with self-confidence.

Drawing close to completion of the New Democratic Revolution, the Chinese people are beating drums of victory stunning the hearts of the Anglo-American imperialists and other reactionaries. Armed struggles are raging in Malaya, Indo-China, Burma, Greece and other countries. The working class struggles in France, Italy etc. are striking terror in the hearts of the bourgeoisie. And the world people's forces led by Soviet Union 103 have marched ahead.

It is indisputable that these conditions lend great strength to the armed struggle we are carrying today. We are not alone and are marching ahead, strengthening day by day. Let us march on and on by reposing confidence in the revolutionary energy of the people of Telangana.

103. This refers to Soviet Union of 1949 and not of today.

SUPPLEMENT

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(Contd. from Page No. 2)

Democratic and anti-imperialist forces all over the world are happy to see that socialist China is advancing under the present leadership. But a section of revolutionaries and those who claim to be so, are not able to see the specific conditions in which socialism is built in China. As a result they are drawing wrong conclusions that the leadership is revisionist, and has taken a capitalist road, and renounced socialism. Their understanding is wrong and inobjective. If the experience is any guide, they should have already realised it. By adopting such an attitude, they are harming not only International communist movement but the revolution in our country also.

Likewise, the CPI and CPI(M) are opposed to CPC in varying degrees from their revisionist and neorevisionist standpoints. They have been slandering against CPC that it is opposing Soviet Union blindly and has gone to the extent of lining up with US. Themselves being revisionists, they can not see Soviet Union as a social imperialist super power even after its occupation of Afghanistan. That apart, they proved to be wrong in their contention that CPC is collaborating with US, as explained above. They have no ground to stand on that it is opposed to liberation movements because facts are contrary.

The 12th Congress of Chinese Communist Party is undoubtedly an important milestone for building socialism in China. (20-9-82)

